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Abstract 
The latter part of 1976 witnessed the initial deployment of a new Soviet missile which 
was codenamed "SS-20" by the United States. The SS-20 was an intermediate-range 
ballistic missile which could deliver each of its three nuclear warheads to within 400 
metres of their designated targets throughout Western Europe from launch sites deep 
within Soviet territory. In addition the S8-20 was a fully mobile system which 
reduced significantly the likelihood of its detection and destruction by enemy forces. 
This, in conjunction with its accuracy and reliability, ensured that the SS-20 added a 
significant new dimension to Soviet nuclear forces within the European theatre. The 
Soviet Union's deployment of this new weapon system presaged a new era of 
uncertainty and tensions in East-West relations. Its initial service history coincided 
with the beginning of the end of detente and within a few years it had come to hold a 
position of pre-eminence as a focal point for superpower competition. Along with its 
Western counterparts - Cruise and Pershing II - the SS-20 became a name familiar to 
the wider public and served as an effective litmus test of superpower relations. 
Throughout the Cold War era a host of analytical models were promulgated with the 
stated aim of rationalising, explaining and, ultimately, predicting the nature of state 
weaponry procurement policy. Such models displayed a marked diversity of character 
and were the cause of conjecture and debate among their various proponents. The 
Action-Reaction model sought to explain weaponry procurement as a response to the 
activities of a potential adversary. By contrast both the National Leadership and 
Interest Group models stressed the importance of studying internal political factors in 
the pursuit of an explanation of such activities. A further alternative - the Military 
Mission model - contended that weaponry production was predicated upon the 
operational demands of specific and predetermined defence requirements. A variant 
which was applied with increasing frequency during the period of the SS-20's 
deployment was the Military Superiority model. It interpreted the development of the 
Soviet nuclear arsenal as evidence of her desire to establish political dominance 
through military power. Given both its undoubted military significance and the 
political symbolism it came to hold it is surprising that the development and 
deployment of the SS-20 was never employed as a case study through which to test 
the veracity and applicability of the hypotheses. 
New evidence gleaned during the course ofthis study from interviews with former 
high-ranking Soviet officers and officials and from restricted-access sources has 
necessitated a significant revision of the history of the SS-20's development and 
deployment. Consequently evolving Soviet theatre strategy and the United States' 
persistent refusal to include Forward Based Systems - medium-range aircraft and 
missiles capable of carrying nuclear ordnance - within the constraints of the SALT 
treaties are both reaffirmed as factors which did incline the Soviet Union towards the 
pursuit of a new missile system for the European theatre of operations. Significantly 
however neither factor seems to have possessed the overt influence upon the 
development of the SS-20 that so many past analyses have accorded them. The 
accepted course of the SS-20's technical development, its institutional origins and its 
links with other ballistic missile systems are now subject to radical re-evaluation in the 
light of the evidence which has emerged. Similarly the course and nature of this 
weaponry system's development is shown to have been subject to the vagaries and 
complexities of inter-elite relations to an extent previously unsuspected by all but a 
handful of analysts. The predominance of such bureaucratic interaction was a 
recurring theme in Soviet weaponry procurement throughout the period of the SS-20's 
developmental cycle. Analysts face considerable challenges when seeking to model a 
policy which was so heavily reliant Upot;l the complexities of personal relationships and 
bureaucratic rivalries. . 
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Preface 
The roots of this thesis lie in a misspent youth in which my early teenage years at the 
start of the 1980s were devoted to an avid consumption of current affairs publications 
and documentaries. This had the effect of producing a rather serious young man 
given to seeking solutions to many ofthe world's insoluble problems. My principal 
concern was the avoidance of nuclear war, an issue whose inherent complexities and 
seemingly inexorable progress were encapsulated in the imbroglio concerning the 
introduction of a new generation of NATO missiles into Western Europe ostensibly in 
response to the Soviet Union's deployment of the SS-20. A plethora of 
documentaries seemed to accompany the deployment of these weapons detailing the 
physical effects of nuclear war and the absolute devastation which would be wrought 
upon all structures and inhabitants within a ten-mile radius of every major 
conurbation. This offered little solace to one whose home lay seven miles from the 
centre of Glasgow. 
The fatalistic acceptance of the vagaries and uncertainties of the world which 
accompanies the passing of one's youth and is accelerated by the study of history 
served to diminish my propensity towards angst-ridden introspection. The removal of 
the principal theatre nuclear weapons through the INF Treaty and the end of the Cold 
War and subsequent demise of the Soviet Union provided more tangible means of 
allaying my previous fears. However my interest in the SS-20 system was not 
subsumed by the passing of time. The SS-20 seemed to have served a vital role as a 
catalyst in the deterioration in East-West relations which was ultimately associated 
with the cataclysmic implosion ofthe Soviet state. I was thus surprised that no more 
than a handful of dedicated scholars had deemed the motives and causal factors which 
underpinned the Soviet Union's decision to deVelop this partiCUlar weapon system to 
merit detailed investigation. Moreover a consensus emanated from this select band 
that the development of the SS-20 merited further research and provided a potentially 
invaluable means of investigating wider aspects of Soviet defence decisionmaking at 
the height of the Brezhnev era. Thus it was that when I decided to set aside the 
mantle ofthe teacher and don that ofthe student once more it was towards this 
subject that I gravitated. 
Professor Stephen White has played a pivotal role during the course of this study. He 
has availed me ofhis vast experience in the study of Soviet and Russian political 
science and helped to delineate precise avenues of investigation from the rather 
amorphous research proposal that I broached with him fours years ago. All too often 
have I taken advantage ofhis "open door" policy to distract him from his own work 
with questions and observations concerning obscure details of Soviet rocket 
development and defence politics. His responses to these numerous intrusions have 
always been characterised by a combination of wisdom and good humour. I express 
heartfelt thanks for the constant support and forbearance he has afforded me 
throughout the duration of my studies. I also owe a huge debt of gratitude to 
Professor John Erickson and Mrs Ljubica Erickson. I have been privileged to have 
witnessed the "Erickson Partnership" at work and have derived priceless assistance 
from the wealth of knowledge that they have accumulated throughout their many 
years of research in the field of Russian history. I am greatly indebted to them for the 
warmth with which they received me and the good grace with which they suffered my 
inordinate impositions upon their busy timetables. 
A key role in advising and supporting me throughout much of my research was played 
by a gentleman whom I have yet to meet in person. From his home in Hawai'i Dr 
Greg Varhall has been a constant companion throughout the last two years of my 
studies. Like his friends in Edinburgh, the Ericksons, Dr Varhall has gone out of his 
way to assist me in my studies. He has directed me towards sources of vital 
information and offered numerous perceptive insights which served to guide me 
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through the vagaries of Soviet defence politics. Dr Varhall was also kind enough to 
contact a former colleague of his on my behalf in order to secure declassified US 
Department of Defence photographs of Soviet missile systems. Mr Dennis McDowell 
of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) furnished me with some 
prize shots as a result for which I am most deeply grateful. Professor Erickson and Dr 
Varhall also acted as a conduit through which I was able to secure an interview with 
Dr Alexander Savel'yev and Lieutenant-General Nikolai Detinov. I am indebted to Dr 
Savel'yev for both the integral role in facilitating the Moscow interviews and acting as 
interpreter, while also sharing with me his own views on the nature of Soviet defence 
decisionmaking. I would like to thank General-Lieutenant Detinov for allowing me 
the opportunity to interview him. He was privy to the bureaucratic mechanics and 
personal relations which characterised the inner workings ofthe Soviet Union's 
governmental hierarchy during the Brezhnev era and is possessed of enormous 
authority on the subject. His candour is welcome and refreshing and enhances still 
further his invaluable contribution to study of this subject. Dr Savel'yev also secured 
an invaluable interview with General Vladimir Belous during my stay in Moscow. 
General Belous had enjoyed a long and distinguished career in the Soviet armed forces 
and provided and adroit account of the development ofthe Strategic Rocket Forces. 
My thanks are extended to my student colleagues, the members ofthe academic and 
secretarial staff of the Department of Po litics and their colleagues in the Department 
of Modern History for their unfailing patience in dealing with my numerous requests 
for advice and assistance during the past four years. My thanks are also directed to 
Mrs Tania Frisby of the Institute of Russian and East European Studies for her 
sterling efforts in introducing me to the joys of the Russian language. Mrs Frisby is a 
teacher of undoubted ability who can make much of those with little inherent ability 
although I suspect that my dearth of talent served to test her to the full. The staff of 
the University Library dealt with my numerous enquiries concerning obscure texts 
with a combination of good grace and diligence to their great credit. Mrs Ann Aldis 
ofthe CSRC at Sandhurst was similarly plagued by my enquiries and was responded 
with a generosity which belied her busy workload. My friend and neighbour Mr John 
Lomax provided me with invaluable assistance during the final stages of producing 
this work which was greatly appreciated. 
I was fortunate enough to be awarded a scholarship by the University of Glasgow 
during two of my four years of study. In addition I received a travel bursary from the 
Carnegie Trust which financed a vital fieldtrip to Moscow in June 1997. To both the 
University of Glasgow and the Carnegie Trust I offer deep gratitude for the generosity 
of their support without which the completion of my research would have been placed 
in jeopardy. 
To my family lowe a huge debt for the unqualified material and emotional support 
they have offered throughout this venture. My parents and my fiancee Avril 
demonstrated admirable forbearance throughout my dark hours and an ever-present 
sense of loving support which was the keystone of my efforts. My father always 
described this as a family adventure and it is to those who are closest to me, my 
family, that I dedicate this work with my unending love and gratitude. 
May 1998 Glasgow 
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1 Introduction 
Narrative2 
The year 1976 witnessed the first deployments ofa new Soviet mobile MRBM 
(medium-range ballistic missile), the RSD-10, which came to be more widely known 
by its US designation SS-20. The system was developed to redress a perceived 
NATO advantage in the sphere of theatre nuclear weapons3, an advantage which was 
expected to be enhanced by the new generation of such weapons systems then being 
developed by the United States. The SS-20 boasted impressive performance 
attributes and was viewed with considerable concern by NATO analysts. In contrast 
to its predecessors the missile was transported on a mobile launcher and possessed 
solid-fuel propellants (thus reducing the time required for launch preparations), 
factors which markedly diminished the system's vulnerability to surprise attack by 
enemy forces. Flight time from the Western Soviet Union to Great Britain was 
estimated to have been in the region of 15-20 minutes. Upon arrival, the missile could 
deposit three 150 kiloton warheads on given targets with a degree of accuracy 
unsurpassed by any previous Soviet missile systems. Finally, its estimated range was 
4,000 kilometres, which meant that it could be targeted on Europe and much of China 
from well within the boundaries and enhanced security of the Soviet Union itself. As 
the deployment of a new generation oftheatre systems by both sides ensued TNFs 
came to hold a place of vital symbolic political importance in the ensuing East-West 
confrontation and the deep divisions within Western Europe itself which stretched 
beyond even their undoubted military significance. Their deployment was the 
2 Those wishing a detailed account of the tortuous progression towards the elimination of Theatre 
Nuclear Forces from Europe through the eventual resolution of the INF Treaty should see Haslam, J., 
1989. The Soviet Union and the Politics o/Nuclear Weapons in Europe, 1969-87: The Problem 0/ 
the SS-20. London: Macmillan; Nitze, P.ll 1989. From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Centre of 
Decision. New York: Grove Weidenfeld; Savel'yev, A.G. and Detinov, N.N. 1995. The Big Five: 
Arms Control Decisionmaking in the Soviet Union. Westport, Ct.: Praeger. 
3 Subsequently referred to as TNFs. 
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principal cause of the manifestation of a degree of East-West tension which had not 
been in evidence for almost two decades.4 
While the detente which evolved during the first half of the 1970s led to an 
unprecedented level of superpower co-operation and cordiality, the process was 
neither inexorable nor without constraint. The renewed confidence with which the 
Soviet Union sought to expand her influence throughout the Third World during the 
1970s was a source of considerable concern to many US commentators and was often 
accompanied by a beliefthat the Soviet Union had enjoyed a significant unilateral 
advantage from the SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty) agreements and was 
continuing the process of strategic weaponry acquisition to the detriment of US 
security. While the SALT I and II limits upon strategic weapons systems and the 
ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty undoubtedly played a role in circumscribing the 
continuation of weaponry development in these two vital fields, the deployment of 
large numbers of strategic systems continued to be permitted within the confines of 
SALT and the development of other forms of nuclear weapons remained 
unconstrained. While "strategic" weapons such as ICBMs, SLBMs and, latterly, long-
range bombers fell within the SALT parameters, short and medium range nuclear 
systems such as nuclear-armed aircraft and missiles based within Europe were 
persistently excluded at the behest of the US and her NATO partners, much to the 
chagrin of the Soviet Union. It was within this field of weaponry development that 
the next round of the East-West arms race was set to occur. While many of the 
motivating factors which underpinned the development ofthis new generation of 
weaponry systems replicated those of the Soviet strategic build-up of the 1960s, the 
effects upon the course of East-West relations and the ensuing fortunes of the Soviet 
Union were markedly different. 
4 Evidence recently uncovered from the former East German archive indicates that the level of 
concern engendered within the Soviet leadership was such that some went so far as to consider the 
possibility of a pre-emptive strike against the West. Hellen, N. The Sunday Times, London 1997. 
"Kremlin Was Poised to Launch Nuclear Strike", 30 November, p.5. 
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Within Europe the fears of a superpower condominium which had accompanied the 
SALT process had not been assuaged and led to a fear of a US disengagement from 
its European security commitment. The debacle surrounding the proposed 
development of the neutron bomb and doubts sUlTounding the efficacy of NATO 
defences served to heighten existing European concerns over the Carter 
administration's lack of constancy. It was against this backdrop that in May 1977 
NATO heads of government agreed to a 3% p.a. increase in members' defence 
budgets and twelve months later accepted a US proposal to seek effective means of 
galvanising NATO forces. Although the ensuing LTDP (Long Term Defence 
Programme) formed the basis of the subsequent deployment of a new generation of 
TNFs within the European theatre, its remit included the entire gamut of NATO 
forces, and its initial investigations were centred upon the strengthening of 
conventional forces and their employment in a defensive operational role. Indeed at 
this point in time American desire to embark upon a programme ofTNF 
modernisation was singularly absent, despite knowledge of the deployment of the SS-
20 which was initiated in March 1976 and which coincided with the introduction of a 
number of other new Soviet TNF systems. However "doubts about the military 
necessity or even desirability of deploying new TNF systems were overwhelmed by a 
perceived political necessity within the NATO alliance."s 
Pressure to pursue this field of development emanated from within Europe and was 
advocated with most vehemence by Germany's Chancellor Schmidt. Schmidt's 
address to the International Institute for Strategic Studies in October 1977, in which 
he highlighted the challenge of maintaining a nuclear parity within the European 
theatre in the wake of the SALT agreements, came in time to be viewed as a seminal 
point in the process of NATO TNF modernisation. His sentiments coalesced with 
5 Garthoff, R.L. 1994. Detente and confrontation: American-Soviet relations from Nixon to Reagan. 
Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, p.945 and n.20. 
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those emerging from an increasingly vocal and influential constituency of defence 
experts in both Europe and the US who expressed their deep unease at the nature and 
extent of the continued Soviet build-up of nuclear weapons. However at the time of 
Schmidt's London speech the US government still remained to be convinced of the 
need for TNF modernisatio~ and of the operational efficacy of cruise missiles 
themselves. Despite this, European pressure upon the US mounted during the course 
of 1978 and by the autumn of that year the Carter administration had acceded to the 
demand. The timing of the acquiescence is in itself instructive, following hard on the 
heels as it did of the political debacle surrounding the neutron bomb. Although late 
converts to the notion ofTNF modernisatio~ the Americans soon became its most 
dedicated adherents and came to view it as an invaluable conduit through which to 
signal continuing US resolve to the NATO alliance, the American electorate, the 
Soviet leadership and, particularly, her NATO allies. 
The principle of developing a new generation ofTNFs and deploying them upon 
NATO soil was accepted by the British Prime Minister, the French President and the 
German Chancellor during a meeting with President Carter in Guadeloupe in January 
1979. The accompanying communique announced the intended deployment of a new 
generation of Western TNFs and sought to rationalise their development as a response 
to "Soviet decisions over the last few years to implement programmes modernising 
and expanding their long-range nuclear capability substantially. In particular, they 
have deployed the SS-20 missile".6 
Schmidt pushed for the adoption of a "twin-track" policy with a view to heading off 
anticipated domestic opposition to the NATO deployments. Western efforts to 
pursue this line were desultory. The working group responsible for seeking Soviet 
concessions to forestall the NATO deployment was established several months after 
the key decisions on deployment had been taken and failed to make up the lost 
ground. A fleeting visit to Moscow by Schmidt was the sole instance of intervention 
6 Garthoff, RL. 1983. "The Soviet SS-20 Decision", Survival, 15(1):118, n.1. 
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on the part of a Western political leader to seek an accommodation prior to the 
NATO deploymene The notion that unilateral constraints should now be imposed 
upon the Soviet Union's right to modernise a class of weapons which had been 
persistently proscribed from SALT despite numerous Soviet attempts to secure their 
inclusion was received with unrestrained indignation in Moscow.s The two year 
prelude to NATO deployment was similarly devoid of detailed consideration of the 
implications for East-West relations or its effect upon the balance of forces within the 
European theatre. 
Significant popular opposition to the proposed NATO deployment grew within 
Europe as the TNF issue became a cause celebre among proponents of nuclear 
disarmament and the resolve of several member governments wavered. However 
neither this nor the eventual emergence of a Soviet offer of negotiations stymied the 
NATO deployment, which had by this time developed a powerful bureaucratic and 
political momentum, particularly within the US. Against a backdrop ofthe Soviet 
invasion of Mghanistan in December 1979 and the unravelling of detente, the Carter 
administration became wedded to the principle of NATO TNF modernisation. The 
incoming Reagan administration retained the commitment to proceed towards 
deployment and allied it to a new stridency in its relations with the Soviet Union. 
During the initial exchanges at the INF (Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces) 
negotiations both sides adhered to mutually unacceptable positions. The Soviet 
7 In June 1979 Schmidt was returning from a visit to Japan and met briefly with Prime Minister 
Kosygin, Foreign Minister Gromyko and First Deputy Prime Minister Tikhonov at a Moscow airport. 
Although Schmidt, Men and Powers, pp.73-4, was rather coy in his description of his Moscow offer, 
authoritative Russian sources claim that he identified the rapid rate of SS-20 deployment as the 
West's principal concern. They claim that he assured his hosts that if the number of new warheads 
deployed on SS-20s tallied with the number removed via the decommissioning of obsolete SS-4s and 
SS-5s, "the West would prove understanding." Detinov interview and Akhromeyev, S.F. and 
Kornienko, G.M. 1992. Glazami marshala i diplomata. Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 
p.43. (This would have entailed a smaller SS-20 force in numerical terms as it carried three 
warheads, while the SS-4 and SS-5 were each armed with a single warhead.) 
8 At the ensuing meeting ofthe Politburo Kosygin's and Kornienko's espousal of the possible merits 
of pursuing this offer were subsumed by Defence Minister Ustinov's heated admonition that such a 
path represented an intolerable intrusion into the Soviet Union's weaponry procurement process. 
Foreign Minister Gromyko made no attempt to counter Ustinov's position. Detinov interview and 
Akhromeyev and Kornienko, Glazami marshala i diplomata, p.44. 
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Union's position was predicated upon the inclusion of all nuclear-capable theatre 
systems within the negotiations' remit. This harked back to their persistent attempts 
to include American, British and French TNFs within the SALT process. Such an 
approach was rejected by the US which proffered instead the "Zero Option". 
Essentially this offered the Soviet Union the opportunity to avert the planned NATO 
deployment of Cruise and Pershing II as the quid pro quo for the removal of SS-4, 
SS-5 and SS-20 systems. The negotiating process made little progress and the 
planned NATO TNF deployment developed an inexorable momentum. 
The ultimate NATO deployment consisted of 108 Pershing II ballistic missiles and 464 
Tomahawk GLCMs (Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles). The level of Pershing II 
deployment was predicated upon that of its nominal predecessor the Pershing lA, with 
Cruise missiles being used to make up the balance towards the upper level limit. 9 The 
first deployments were completed by December 1983 and elicited a swift and dramatic 
response from the Soviet Union, which suspended negotiations in protest. This 
response had been unanimously agreed upon by the Soviet leadership several months 
prior in advance as it was thought that continued participation in the INF negotiations 
in the wake of the NATO deployment would signal a de facto acceptance of its 
legitimacy. However neither a full-back position nor a means of resurrecting the 
negotiations had been formulated by the Soviet side and the process fell into abeyance 
against a backdrop of stagnant turmoil within the Soviet leadership due to the demise 
ofBrezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko in rapid succession and increasing rancour in 
US-Soviet relations. 
The Soviet Union was drawn back towards the negotiating table by the prospect that 
the NATO TNF deployment represented merely the first step in a wider programme of 
US strategic force-building envisioned by the Reagan administration. The Strategic 
9 Cruise missile units comprised of sixteen missiles - four launchers each armed with four missiles. 
Hence their final deployment total was a mUltiple of sixteen. 
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Defence Initiative (SDI) was unveiled in March 1983 and was accompanied by a 
programme to upgrade the counterforce capabilities of US strategic forces. Given the 
parlous state of the Soviet economy the resumption of the process of negotiation 
came to be regarded as the sole means of avoiding the onset of a new, unfettered arms 
race, whose emphasis upon new technologies would lie well beyond the economic 
means of the Soviet Union in the foreseeable future. Although Gorbachev was the 
General Secretary who played the principal role in the next stage of the INF process, 
the initial invitation to resume the negotiations was extended during Chernenko's 
tenure in June 1984. By the time ofChernenko's death in March 1985 Gorbachev had 
already assumed effective control of the formulation of the Soviet Union's arms 
control position. The adoption of a new Soviet approach was achieved in the face of 
significant internal opposition but was partially facilitated by the political demise of 
Marshal Ogarkov in September 1984 and the denial of Politburo membership to his 
successor and by the death of Defence Minister Ustinov in December. Another 
stalwart of the old guard, Foreign Minister Gromyko, was replaced by Eduard 
Shevardnadze in July 1985 as the new General Secretary sought to invigorate the 
government structure. 
One vital strand of continuity which bound Gorbachev's revised approach to the 
negotiating process to that espoused by Chernenko before his death was the attempt 
to link the resolution of the INF issue with a prohibition upon the development of 
SDI. This remained the central tenet of the Soviet approach at the Reykjavik Summit 
in October 1985, where Gorbachev offered radical cuts in strategic systems over a ten 
year period and the liquidation of all US and Soviet TNFs. Significantly this would 
have entailed the dual concession on the part of the Soviet Union of exempting both 
US FBS and British and French nuclear systems from the agreement. The quid pro 
quo desired by the Soviet Union was a ban on the SDI programme or a long-term 
moratorium which was intended to have a similar effect. SDI was however possessed 
of powerful advocates in President Reagan's adviser Richard Perle and Secretary of 
Defence Caspar Weinberger, and was accorded near-Messianic status by the President 
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himself; the Soviet proposals were accordingly rejected out of hand. Both sides 
continued to no avail to seek a means of compromise at the formal talks process in 
Geneva. By the end of February 1986 Gorbachev had recognised the disengagement 
of the question ofINF and SDI controls as a prerequisite to substantive progress and 
secured Politburo backing to authorise the unilateral pursuit of an INF agreement. 
The ensuing "Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range 
Missiles" ensued with a rapidity and simplicity which compared favourably with 
previous SAL T negotiations and the stultifying stalemate of the preceding years. It 
was signed by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev on 8 December 
1986 during a state visit to Washington and signalled the demise of all SS-20s and 
other US and Soviet intermediate and medium-range missiles within three years of the 
Treaty's ratification. Future agreements secured the limitations upon SDI and 
strategic forces that the Soviet Union had sought with such fervour to complement 
the resolution of the INF issue. Ironically however the removal of these perceived 
threats to the Soviet Union's strategic security coincided with the demise ofthe Soviet 
state itself 
The SS-20 played a vital role in what turned out to be the final act of the Cold War 
confrontation. In addition to its significant military potential the SS-20 played a vital 
role as a catalyst in this imbroglio which held fatal consequences for the Soviet state. 
The deployment ofthe SS-20 and Pershing II and Cruise was at once both a symptom 
and cause of the dramatic deterioration in East-West relations which continued 
unchecked in the coming years and came to hold a position of symbolic importance 
unmatched by any other Soviet weapon system in the public perception of the East-
West military confrontation. This provides an apparent dichotomy whereby the 
weaponry procurement process which had done so much to secure Western 
recognition of the Soviet Union's superpower status during the 1960s served, by 
contrast, to undermine that very status as the 1970s and 1980s progressed. 
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Rationale, methodology and sources 
The SS-20's impact upon the Soviet Union's geopolitical relations was such that it 
possessed a unique degree of political importance among Soviet weaponry 
developments. As such it has often been viewed as a definitive weapon system of the 
period. Its decade-long development cycle corresponded precisely with the period 
that has been characterised as the "golden era" of defence resource allocation and 
civil-military relations lO and also witnessed the acknowledged rise ofBrezhnev himself 
to a position of pre-eminence within the political leadership. Moreover the strategic 
rationale which seemed to underpin the missile's development and its apparently 
uneventful progression through the decisionmaking chain led one of the most 
authoritative commentators in this field to characterise its procurement as being 
entirely "natural".l1 The Soviet Union's decision to develop and deploy the SS-20 
missile thus affords researchers an unsurpassed opportunity to investigate the 
characteristics of the bureaucratic and inter-personal dynamics which formed the basis 
of Soviet defence decisionmaking at the height ofBrezhnev's tenure. 
While acknowledging the inherent difficulties associated with the study of such a 
sensitive issue Raymond Garthoffbemoaned the dearth of analytical energy directed 
towards the pursuit of such a goal. 12 The passing years have witnessed a certain 
diminution of the constraints on security but this has not been matched by a 
discernible renaissance in research activity in the field. Thus an area of prime 
importance to the understanding of the Soviet Union's defence decisionmaking 
process at the height ofBrezhnev's tenure remains neglected to this day. 
10 Azrael, J.R. 1987. The Soviet Civilian Leadership and the Military High Command, 1976- 1986. 
Santa Monica Ca.: RAND Corporation, pp.5-l2 and Cooper, J. "The Defence Industry and Civil-
Military Relations", in Colton, T.J. and Gustafson T. (eds.) 1990. Soldiers and the Soviet State: 
Civil-Military Relationsfrom Brezhnev to Gorbachev. Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
pp.166-170. 
II Garthoff, "The Soviet SS-20 Decision", p.112. 
12 Ibid., p.ll 0 and n.2. 
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The SS-20's all-pervading impact upon East-West relations during this period was 
reflected by its frequent citation in sources of varied hue. It is surprising therefore 
that so few studies sought to move beyond the analytical confines of such a tangential 
approach and subject the underlying motivating factors to closer scrutiny. Few can 
have written with more authority on the subject ofthe SS-20 than Raymond Garthoff. 
As a participant in the pre-SALT I discussions between 1967-69 and a senior 
Department of State adviser and executive officer of the SALT I delegation between 
1969-72 he gained an invaluable insight into the mechanics and perceptions which 
underpinned Soviet defence decisionmaking. While much ofhis work concentrated 
upon the SALT accords he considered at some length the later deployment of the SS-
20 with particular reference to their respective political and strategic linkS.13 However 
Jonathan Haslam's 1989 study of the political and strategic factors which lay behind its 
development and deployment stands virtually alone in the detail and breadth of the 
exposition it provided.14 Haslam cogently argued that increasing deficiencies in Soviet 
theatre forces ensured that modernisation through the deployment of a weapon such 
as the SS-20 was perceived as a strategic imperative. However he criticised its 
deployment in political terms as an action which would inevitably provoke a Western 
response, thus placing Soviet theatre forces in a still more precarious position. The 
Soviet Union and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons in Europe is to be commended as 
a sober and considered study of a contentious issue which provides a realistic 
assessment of Soviet capabilities and intentions in both the military and diplomatic 
spheres. This monograph served as a natural starting point for my own research and 
provided an avenue through which to pursue the investigation of the intricate details 
ofthe process of Soviet defence decisionmaking as it applied to the SS-20. 
This thesis seeks to provide a critical re-evaluation of the nature and extent of the 
roles played by the four pre-eminent factors whose interaction has customarily been 
13 Ibid.; Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, pp.958-974. 
14 Haslam, The Soviet Union and the Politics o/Nuclear Weapons in Europe. 
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posited by most previous accounts as a causal explanation of the SS-20's 
development. The study is based upon a detailed study of the now-available Russian 
primary sources and a number of ground-breaking interviews with former members of 
the Soviet military-political elite. While the veil of secrecy has yet to be completely 
removed, the end of the Cold War and demise of the Soviet state have facilitated a 
remarkable process of glasnost in the field of security studies as former officials of the 
Soviet state now enjoy the opportunity to discuss their experiences with Western 
researchers with unprecedented freedom. Access is neither readily available to all 
Westerners nor is it without constraint. However if secured it can provide the 
researcher with an invaluable source of knowledge and perception with which to 
formulate a study of the Soviet defence decisionmaking process. Archival evidence 
pertaining to such matters is unlikely ever to emerge. Its highly confidential nature 
would of itself ensure that it would probably remain classified for many years to come. 
Such an issue is however most probably academic as many of the key elements of 
defence decisionmaking were predicated largely upon amorphous and intangible 
factors of interpersonal relations and institutional interaction which remained devoid 
of documentary record. Against this backdrop the recollections of key figures within 
the former Soviet ruling elite provide a vital concomitant to the few new pieces of 
documentary evidence as the means of pursuing the most comprehensive analyses of 
the causal factors involved in the Soviet leadership's decision to develop the SS-20 
missile system. Interviews that I conducted during a fieldtrip to Moscow in June 1997 
and those that emerged as part of a University of Edinburgh Department of Defence 
Studies project enabled me to garner significant new information and insights into 
Soviet defence decisionmaking of this period from the entire gamut of the institutional 
military-political elite. 
During my fieldtrip to Moscow I was fortunate enough to interview three individuals 
who while they held positions of considerable authority within the upper echelons of 
the former Soviet Union's defence community, emanated from diverse institutional 
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backgrounds. General-Lieutenant Nikolai N. Detinov was a high-ranking official in 
the Central Committee's Defence Secretariat. He played an critical role in the 
formulation of the Soviet position at arms control negotiations from their inception in 
the late 1960s until the early in 1990s. He was involved in the SALT talks between 
1969-72 and participated directly at the Vladivostok Summit between First Secretary 
Brezhnev and President Ford in November 1974 and the Helsinki Conference of 1976. 
He subsequently participated in the next generation of arms control negotiations, the 
Soviet-American Nuclear and Space Talks (START, INF and DST) between 1985-91. 
Lieutenant-General Detinov is presently a senior analyst in a scientific centre of the 
Russian Academy of Sciences and a participant in the Russian-Americanjoint Global 
Protection Programme. Dr Vladimir S. Belous (Major-Generalretd) is currently a 
member of the Committee of Soviet Scientists for Global Security and heads one of 
their sections. Born in 1927, Dr Belous joined a junior artillery college at the 
outbreak of the war with Gennany before later graduating to its senior counterpart. 
He served in the Soviet artillery in the Sakhalin region during the war. In the post-
war era he attended the SRF academy first as a student before returning as a lecturer. 
He retired in 1990. 
Dr Alexander G. Savel'yev is the Vice President of the independent Institute for 
National Security and Strategic Studies in Moscow. He participated in the Soviet-
American Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva as an adviser to the Soviet delegation 
and as the representative of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. 
The record of interviews with a similarly catholic grouping of former officials is 
contained within the University of Edinburgh's Defence Studies Archives. 15 General-
Colonel Igor V. Illarionov was an aide to Ustinov within the Ministry of the Defence 
Industries, Central Committee Secretariat and the Council of Ministers, (1965-76). 
Illarionov served as an assistant to Ustinov for special assignments in the Ministry of 
Defence specialising in air defence, rocket forces and front aviation between 1976-84. 
15 University of Edinburgh, Department of Defence Studies Archive, (limited access only). 
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Following Ustinov's death in 1984, he worked with Marshal Sokolov in the Ministry 
of Defence. General-Colonel Makhmut A. Gareev served as the Chief ofthe Tactical 
Training Directorate of the General Staff between 1974-7, Deputy Chief of the Main 
Operations Directorate of the General Stafffor Training and Readiness from 1977-84 
and Deputy Chief of the General Staff for Scientific Work and Operational Readiness 
from 1984-9. Iu. A. Mozzhorin was General Director ofTsNIIMash, the main 
research and design institute of the Ministry of General Machinebuilding (MOM) 
responsible for missile production for thirty years. General-Colonel (Ret.) Andriian A. 
Danilevich was a General Staff officer fi.-om 1964-90. He served as a Senior Special 
Assistant (pomoshchnik) to the Chief of the Main Operations Directorate (GOU) in 
the 1970s and was Assistant for Doctrine and Strategy to Chiefs of the General Staff 
Marshal Akhromeev and General Moiseev from 1984 and 1990. Danilevich was also 
the Director ofthe General Staff authors' collective that composed and refined 
between 1977 and 1986 the top-secret, three-volume Strategy of Deep Operations 
(Global and Theatre) that was the basic reference document for Soviet strategic and 
operational planning for at least the last decade ofthe Soviet state. Dr Vitaly N. 
Tsygichko - Senior Analyst in the All-Union Scientific-Technical Institute for Systems 
Studies (VNIISI), Academy of Sciences, USSR, and Director of the Centre for 
National Security and Strategic Stability Studies. 
While much of my research was based upon Russian sources I also benefited from the 
knowledge and perception of the subject possessed by two gentlemen, who though 
bonded by a close common friendship, hail from rather different institutional 
backgrounds. Professor John Erickson's reputation served as a vital catalyst in the 
pursuit of high-level contacts; his depth of knowledge ofthe events surrounding the 
development ofthe SS-20 is remarkable and he devoted many hours of personal 
discussion on the subjects surrounding the development ofthe SS-20. Another 
gentleman of the highest standing in the field of Soviet strategic weaponry 
procurement is Dr Greg Varhall (Lieutenant-Colonel USAF, Ret.). Dr Varhall is an 
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arms control expert who served for three years as an adviser to the Office ofthe 
Secretary of Defence on the US DST delegation at the Nuclear and Space Talks in 
Geneva. He also backstopped the DST Talks and the ABM Treaty in Washington and 
also served as an American INF Treaty Inspector who oversaw the elimination ofINF 
weapons including the SS-20 in the Soviet Union. 
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Soviet Weaponry Performance Estimates 
During the Cold War unstinting efforts were made on the part of the Western 
intelligence agencies via a plethora of clandestine methods to derive accurate 
assessments of the performance characteristics of Soviet weaponry in general and 
nuclear missile systems in particular. Interest in this field extended beyond the 
intelligence realm and was apparent throughout academic and technical studies of 
Soviet weapons systems. Many studies of the Strategic Rocket Forces' arsenal relied 
upon the official US estimates obtained through the US Freedom oflnformation Act 
or disclosed during open Congressional sessions when discussing systems' technical 
and institutional backgrounds and estimated performance characteristics. Others 
sought to avoid the circuitous practice of collating and evaluating diverse evidence 
from disparate sources through reliance upon specialised collections which were 
themselves based principally upon such Western governmental and institutional 
analyses. One of the most authoritative and oft-quoted texts on the subject of Soviet 
strategic and 1NF forces is Berman and Baker's Soviet Strategic Forces: 
Requirements and Responses. 16 Berman and Baker cited declassified reports by the 
US Secretary of Defence to Congress, the annual publication of the United States 
Military Posture by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and hearings before the Senate's Armed 
Forces Committee among their sources. However at least one author has noted the 
"general belief that they had access to classified information for the preparation of 
their study. It is certainly indisputable that the sources they cite themselves do not 
contain much of the information they provide. ,,17 Barton Wright's contribution to the 
World Weapon Database ls enjoys a reputation of authority on a par with Berman and 
Baker. Assisted by John Murphy, Wright sought to provide a broad overview of 
16 Berman, R.P. and Baker J.C. 1982. Soviet Strategic Forces: Requirements and Responses. 
Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution. 
17 Bluth, C. 1992. Soviet Strategic Arms Policy Before SALT. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, p.l1. 
18 Wright, B., (assisted by J. Murphy; series editor, R. Forsberg) 1986. World Weapon Database, 
Volume I, Soviet Missiles. Lexington Mass.: D.C. Heath and Company. 
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Western analyses of Soviet missile development, production and deployment. To this 
end, thirty-five different sources were cited in his work. Chief among them were the 
Secretary of Defence's Reports to Congress (both unclassified versions and those later 
obtained via a Freedom ofInformation Act request), the United States Military 
Posture. The International Institute for Strategic Studies' Military Balance series, 
various publications by Jane's and the works ofleading analysts such as Meyer, Nitze 
and Berman and Baker were also consulted. The Nuclear Weapons Databook, 
Volume IV: Soviet Nuclear Weapons also made extensive use of a host of classified 
and partially declassified documents obtained under the U8 Freedom of Information 
Act. 19 Finally, an assortment of Jane's publications dealt with the subject of80viet 
military hardware. Principal among these was Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review prior 
to its incorporation into Jane's Intelligence Review in 1990. 
Despite the end of the Cold War era few new details ofthe technical specifications 
and operational performance of ballistic missile systems have emerged. Many key 
issues remain classified while interest in this field has waned somewhat with the 
passing of time and the demise of the Soviet Union. A number of new Russian 
sources have emerged which though apparently unnoticed in the West portray a 
markedly different account of the institutional and technical background of the 8S-20. 
Raketnii Voiska Strategicheskovo Naznachenia: Voenno-Istoricheskii Trwfo was 
published in 1992 and boasted an impressive editorial committee. Its account ofthe 
solid-fuel systems which preceded the 88-20 served to challenge the very 
fundamentals of Western explanations of the systems' technical antecedents. These 
claims were later supported by Lieutenant-General Detinov and General Vladimir 
Belous during the course of my interviews with them in June 1997. Documentary 
19 Cochrane, T.B. et aZ. 1989. Nuclear Weapons Databook: Volume IV: Soviet Nuclear Weapons. 
New York: Harper & Row. 
20 Kochemasov, S.O., Sizov, V.M. and Nosov, V.T. (eds.) 1992. Raketnye voiska strategicheskogo 
naznacheniya: voyenno-istoricheskii trud. Moscow: Strategic Rocket Forces. I am deeply indebted to 
Professor John Erickson for sharing the details of this rather rarefied source with me. It was from 
this source that I gleaned the first indication that the traditional portrayal of the S8-20's "lineage" 
was in need of considerable revision. 
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substantiation was obtained via copies oftwo further Russian sources acquired while 
in Moscow. Mezhkontinetalnii Ballitichisldi Raketii SSSR (RF) i SShA: Istorii 
Sozdania i Sokrashenia21 belonged to General Belous himself. This Strategic Rocket 
Forces publication is not intended for public sale and is not expected to enter 
mainstream circulation. I also obtained a copy of Strategicheskoe Raketno Yaderni 
Orujee,22 a contemporary account which utilised a number of open, yet authoritative, 
Russian sources. Although I possess neither the desire nor the technical ability to 
master the scientific vagaries of missile technology I have sought to delve into Soviet 
writings on the subject. The principal source for this adventure was Stroitelnaya 
Mekanika Raket.23 
The recent publication of Vooruzhenie i voennaya teknikha raketniykh voisk 
strategicheskogo naznacheniya24 serves only to reinforce the dramatic turn-round in 
Russia's international relations of recent times. After many years of struggling to 
obtain photographic records of Soviet weaponry in general, and missile systems in 
particular, lavish reproductions are now accessible to those in possession of sufficient 
hard currency. I am obliged to Professor John Erickson for being so kind as to lend 
me this precious acquisition to his personal records. 
21 Volkova, Ye.B. et al. 1996. Mezhkontinetal'nye baZlisticheskie rakety SSSR (RF) i SShA: sozdanie 
i sokrashenie. Moscow: Strategic Rocket Forces. 
22 Kolesnikov, S.G. 1996. Strategicheskoe raketno-yadernoe uruzhie. Moscow: Arsenal Press. 
23 Balabuch, L.I., Alfutov, N.A. and Usukin, V.I. (eds.) 1984. Stroitel'naya Mekhanika Raket. 
Moscow: Visshaya Shkola. Again I am indebted to Professor John Erickson as the source of this text. 
24 Rosvooruzhenie, 1996. Vooruzhenie i voennaya teknikha raketniykh voisk strategicheskogo 
naznacheniya. Moscow: Military Parade. 
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Soviet Nuclear Strategy 
Few areas of Soviet studies were subjected to such relentless academic investigation 
or elicited such contentious debate during the Cold War era as Soviet nuclear 
strategy.25 My consideration was conducted largely within the well~established 
confines of research and similarly sought to use pertinent articles within the restricted 
journal of the Soviet officer corps Voennaya mys/', texts in the army newspaper 
Krasnaya Zvezda and set-piece public pronouncements by both the political and 
military leadership to discern the evolving nature of Soviet theatre nuclear strategy. 
To the voluminous writings by a host of eminent Western scholars I have sought to 
add my own interpretation of the salient developments of strategic principles which 
emanated from the Soviet military and politicalleaderships via authoritative Soviet 
publications. In addition the evidence obtained from these rarefied but accessible 
sources has since been enriched with accounts of Soviet strategic analysis derived 
from defectors26 and latterly from the archives of former Soviet allies.27 Moreover the 
25 For a comprehensive cross-section of Western analyses, see Baylis, J. and Segal, G.(eds.) 1981. 
Soviet Strategy. London: Croon Helm; Dinerstein, H.S. 1962. War and the Soviet Union: Nuclear 
Weapons and the Revolution in Soviet Military and Political Thinking. London: Praeger; Douglass, 
J.D. jnr. and Hoeber, A.M. 1981. Conventional War and Escalation: The Soviet View. New York: 
Crane, Russak and Co; Garthoff, RL. 1990. Deterrence and the Revolution in Soviet Military 
Doctrine. Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution; Glantz, D.M. 1992. The Military Strategy of 
the Soviet Union: A History. London: Frank Cass; Goldberg, A.C. 1987. New Developments in 
Soviet Military Strategy. Washington D.C.: Centre for Strategic & International Studies; l-lines, J.G. 
and Petersen, P.A. 1983. "The Conventional Offensive in Soviet Theatre Strategy", OrMs, 27:695-
739 and "The Soviet Conventional Offensive in Europe", 1984. Military Review, 4:3-29; Kintner, 
W.R and Scott, H.F. 1968. The Nuclear Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs. Norman, Ok.: 
University of Oklahoma Publications; Lee, W.T. and Staar, RF. 1986. Soviet Military Policy Since 
World War II. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press; Leebaert, D. and Dickinson. T. (eds.) 1992. Soviet 
Strategy and New Military Thinking. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; MccGwire, M. 1987. 
Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy. Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution; Monks, 
A.L. 1984. Soviet Military Doctrine: 1960 to the Present. New York: Irvington Publishers Inc.; 
Scott, F.S. and Scott, W.F. 1979. The Armed Forces of the USSR. Boulder, Co.: Westview Press; 
Zisk, K.M. 1993. Engaging The Enemy: Organisation Theory and Soviet Military Innovation, 1955-
1991. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
26 Wardak, G.D. 1989. The Voroshilov Lectures: Materialsfrom the Soviet General Staff Academy. 
Washington D.C.: National Defence University Press. I was informed by a highly placed US source 
that the emergence ofWardak's transcript was the cause ofheated internal debate and was viewed by 
some as a calculated Soviet attempt to dupe US intelligence. 
27 Federal Republic of Germany Ministry of Defence report, "Warsaw Pact Military Planning in 
Central Europe: A Study", translated by Kramer, M. reproduced in Bulletin of the Cold War 
International History Project, Issue 2, Autumn 1992, Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Centre for 
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issue of Soviet nuclear strategy emerged on several occasions within the context of 
interviews with former members ofthe Soviet military-politico elite. Their accounts 
add vibrant colour and provide a deeper perspective to existing interpretations of the 
internal debate which surrounded the evolution of Soviet theatre nuclear strategy and 
ran parallel to the development ofthe SS-20 and serve to raise intriguing questions as 
to how the Soviet leadership might have reacted to the outbreak of a largescale 
conflict within the European theatre with its attendant concomitant of escalation to an 
unrestricted nuclear exchange. 
Scholars; Heuser, B. 1993 "Warsaw Pact Military Doctrines in the 1970s and 1980s: Findings in the 
East German Archives", Comparative Strategy, 12(4):437-57. 
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The SALT Process 
The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks dominated US-Soviet relations for a decade and 
more. The SALT process served as an indicator of the state of bilateral relations at 
any given time, while it itself played a significant role in determining the vitality ofthe 
wider detente process. It has long been regarded as having played an instrumental and 
multifaceted role in the Soviet Union's decision to develop the SS-20. The pattern of 
Soviet arms control policymaking described in The Big Five was claimed to have 
closely resembled that of defence decisionmaking as a whole.28 An appraisal of the 
Soviet Union's policymaking practices in the realm of arms control might therefore 
serve to provide an invaluable insight into the procedural mechanics and political 
culture which existed in the parallel field of defence procurement policy. It was 
traditionally believed that the chronology of SALT ran parallel to the developmental 
cycle of the SS-20 programme. As the decision to pursue its development was taken 
in the immediate aftermath of the Vladivostok Summit my consideration of SALT 
uses this as its chronological end point. Limitations of space militate against 
consideration of the SALT process in its entirety. Moreover, as this study seeks to 
investigate the motivating factors which lay behind the decision to develop the SS-20 
system, consideration of the period beyond the decision itself is a secondary concern. 
The detail afforded to the consideration of the Vladivostok Summit reflects the key 
role that it has been traditionally accorded in Western explanations ofthe development 
ofthe SS-20. The initiation of the SS-20's flight testing programme coincided with 
the Vladivostok Summit while the decision to proceed towards full production was 
taken in the immediate aftermath of the publication of the Vladivostok Accords. The 
strategic rationale behind its deployment was strengthened still further by the terms of 
the Vladivostok Accords, as they once again excluded FBS from the bilateral strategic 
limitations while placing new numerical constraints upon the SS-11 ICBM which had 
28 Savel'yev and Detinov, The Big Five, p.186. 
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recently been diverted to a TNF role. The agreement to preclude the development of 
mobile ICBM occurred later and the ensuing cancellation of the SS-16 undoubtedly 
facilitated the rapid pace of SS-20 production. However, the decision to develop the 
SS-20 predated this development and can be traced to the immediate post-Summit 
period. The Vladivostok Summit and its Accords have thus been traditionally viewed 
as a vital crossroads in the story ofthe SS-20 programme. 
Detailed and authoritative accounts of the course of the negotiations and the internal 
US political situation which served as a backdrop to them are provided by the 
memoirs ofthe respective leaders of the US delegations to SALT I and II, Gerard 
Smith29 and U. Alexis Johnson.30 An often-contrasting account is provided by the 
memoirs ofNixon31 and Kissinger32 themselves. John Newhouse's Cold Dawn enjoyed 
high level patronage most probably from Kissinger himself33 The most 
comprehensive account of the entire SALT process and the whole gamut of East-
West relations is offered by Raymond Garthoffs voluminous Detente and 
Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan.34 A plethora of 
subsidiary accounts dealing with both the SALT process as a whole and specific issues 
pertaining to it also appeared during the duration of the negotiating process and 
beyond. Western accounts ofthe Soviet approach to SALT written at the time of the 
negotiations and in the years after they had stalled could do little more than speculate 
29 Smith, G.C. 1985. Doubletalk: The Inside Story o/SALT 1. London: University Press of America. 
30 Johnson, U.A. and McAllister 1.0. 1984. The Right Hand 0/ Power. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice-Hall. 
31 Nixon, R.M. 1978. The Memoirs 0/ Richard Nixon. London: Sidgwick and Jackson. 
32 Kissinger, H.A. 1979. The White House Years. London: Weidenfield and Nicolson and Michael 
Joseph Ltd; Kissinger, H.A. 1982. Years a/Upheaval. London: Weidenfield and Nicolson and 
Michael Joseph. 
33 As the leader of the American SALT II delegation U. Alexis Johnson was later to observe "his 
information was extremely detailed, and he obviously had access to the most sensitive records. He 
revealed things that even the delegation members did not know. The only possible source for the 
leaks was Henry Kissinger. Newhouse told Paul Nitze that he had received his materials from the 
White House and that he had even listened to tape recordings of Verification Panel meetings which I, 
for one, had not been aware were being taped." Johnson subsequently sent Kissinger a sardonic 
telegram bewailing the leak of such detailed information and its potential effect upon the SALT 
negotiations themselves. Johnson, The Right Hand o/Power, pp.591-2. 
34 Garthoff, R.L. 1990. Deterrence and the Revolution in Soviet Military Doctrine. Washington 
D.C.: The Brookings Institution. 
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as to the true nature of the internal political dynamics and decisionmaking process 
which had together forged the Soviet Union's approach to arms controp5 
There remains to this day a paucity of detailed Russian analyses of the Soviet 
approach to SALT. Moreover those non-military institutions which offered strategic 
and geopolitical analyses were themselves merely affirming lines of argument that had 
already been adopted by the Communist Party itself 36 Allied to this is the dearth of 
written records detailing the formation of the Soviet Union's arms control negotiating 
position which served to reinforce the secrecy which had traditionally surrounded the 
rarefied deliberations of the governmental elite on matters of national security. This 
was principally due to the prohibition of note-taking during meetings of the Big Five 
and the Five, the central crucibles for the formulation of Soviet arms control policy. 
"Only final decisions were recorded to be put later in memorandums to the Central 
Committee (zapiska v TsK) or cables or delegations. All discussions were conducted 
informally with note-taking prohibited. Twice the representative of the KGB was 
noticed to discreetly take notes and each time, after a scandal, he was made to destroy 
the notes".37 
Researchers are thus forced to place heavy reliance upon the personal accounts 
offered by key participants as the most effective means of developing an accurate 
appraisal of Soviet practices in this realm. However the emergence of such sources 
does not in itself guarantee elucidation on the major questions surrounding the Soviet 
approach to SALT. 38 The recent publication of The Big Five: Arms Control 
35 Shulman, M.D. "SALT and the Soviet Union," in Willrich, M and Rhinelander, J.B. (eds.) 1974. 
SALT' The Moscow Agreements and Beyond. London: Collier Macmillan Publishers, pp.l 08-9; 
Blacker, C.D. "The Soviets and Arms Control; The SALT II Negotiations, November 1972-March 
1976", in Mandelbaum, M. (ed.), 1990. The Other Side of the Table: The Soviet Approach to Arms 
Control. London: Council on Foreign Relations Press, p.69. 
36 Savel'yev and Detinov, The Big Five, p.18. Arbatov and Inozemtsev were apparently the two 
exceptions to this rule and did play an active role in advising Brezhnev on the course of the 
negotiations. 
37 Sokov, N. 1996. "Crises and Breakthroughs: Notes Towards the History of Soviet Decisionmaking 
on START Talks" in The Journal of Slavic Milit01Y Studies, 9(2):262. 
38 Witness for example the memoirs of Georgii Komienko, 1995. Kholodnaya voyina: svidetel'slVo 
ee uchastnika. Moscow: International Relations. Their dearth of additional detailed material and 
personal insights were rightly criticised in review. See Stone, D.R. '''A Voice Crying Out in the 
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Decisionmaking in the Soviet Union39 has at last provided an authoritative account of 
the formulation of Soviet SALT policy positions and the wider strategic and political 
issues which underpinned them. The principal contributor to the text - Lieutenant 
General Nikolai Detinov - was himself a participant in policy formulation within the 
highest echelons of the Soviet state.40 In his foreword Paul Nitze accorded the text 
the distinction of having succeeded in providing a uniquely authoritative and objective 
account of the inner workings of the highest echelons of Soviet govemment.41 That it 
elicited such an accolade is striking, given both the Ambassador's authority on the 
subject and his well-earned reputation for the candour of his expression. 
A significant portion of the wide-ranging discussion on the Soviet development of the 
SS-20 which took place during my interview with Lieutenant-General Detinov at his 
Moscow residence in June 1997 was centred upon the SALT process and its 
implications for this partiCUlar weaponry programme. Lieutenant-General Detinov 
was able to shed new light upon the precise effect of the course of the SALT process 
upon the development of the SS-20. 
Wilderness'; The Professional's Revenge", in Cold War International History Project Bulletin, issues 
6-7, winter 1995-6, pp.272-4. 
39 For an assessment of The Big Five's contribution to the study of the formulation of Soviet 
disarmament policy, see Sokov, "Crises and Breakthroughs", p.261. 
40 Nitze emphasised Detinov's integral role in the workings of the Five. His principal criticism of 
The Big Five was that Detinov was "far too modestly absent from its pages". Savel'yev and Detinov, 
The Big Five, p.xiii. 
41 Ib'd ., 1 ., pp.XI-XlV. 
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The Defence Economy 
The form and extent of the Soviet defence economy and its attendant enterprises lie 
beyond the remit of this thesis and have been the subject of numerous lengthy 
discourses whose attention to detail could not be matched at this juncture. Providing 
a definitive account of the true mechanics of this process proved impossible 
throughout the Cold War era and even the most highly respected analysts struggled to 
provide a detailed and authoritative account of the actual proceedings of the 
decisionmaking process.42 Many sources served to do little more than recount the 
official texts which, while they purported to describe the details of Soviet 
governmental practice, in reality did little more than intimate the formalities associated 
with this process. However merely recounting the formal workings of Soviet defence 
decisionmaking is of marginal value to scholars seeking to create an accurate account 
of Soviet defence decisionmaking behaviour.43 It is now possible to offer with some 
confidence an authoritative account of the dynamics of the weaponry development 
process as it existed at the height ofthe Brezhnev era.44 More intrepid analyses 
sought to delve beyond the superficial and through evaluation of the subtle nuances of 
conflict and development provided by painstaking review of official pronouncements, 
pUblication and set-piece events sought to discern the shifting sands of Soviet intra-
42 Warner III, E.L. "The Bureaucratic Politics of Weapons Procurement", in MccGwire, M., Booth, 
K. and McDonnell, 1. (eds.) 1975. Soviet Naval Policy: Objectives and Constraints. New York: 
Praeger, pp.71-9; Holloway, D. 1983. The Soviet Union and the Arms Race. London: Yale University 
Press, pp.lll-5, 140-5. 
43 Ibid., pp.109-11; Jones, E. 1985. Red Army and Society: A Sociology o/the Soviet Military. 
Boston: Allen and Unwin, p.1. 
44 The most accurate Western account of this process was provided by Cooper in McLean, S. (ed.) 
1986. How Nuclear Weapons Decisions are Made. London: Macmillan, pp.24-7. This section draws 
in part from this account but adds a number of significant points of information and clarification 
gleaned both from my own interviews conducted while in Moscow and past interviews conducted 
with high-ranking Soviet officials. See also Cochrane, T.B. et al. 1989. Nuclear Weapons Databook: 
Volume IV: Soviet Nuclear Weapons. New York: Harper and Row, p.95; Central Intelligence 
Agency, 1986. The Soviet Weapons Industry: An Overview. Washington D.C.: Directorate of 
Intelligence, pp.11-16; For formal Soviet accounts, see Alekseyev, N.N. 1977. "Ispytaniya voyennoy 
tekhniki'~ Sovetskaya voyennaya entsiklopediya. vol.3, Moscow: Voyenizdat, pp.616-8; Tikhomirov, 
V. 1978. Organizatsiya, planirovanie i upravlenie proizvodstvom letatel'nykh apparatov. Moscow: 
"Mashinostroenie" and Fakhrutdinov, I. 1981. Raketnye dvigateli tverdogo topliva. Moscow: 
"Mashinostroenie". The latter two Soviet sources are cited in Cooper, n.23 in McLean, (ed.) How 
Nuclear Weapons Decisions are Made. 
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elite relations. Accounts provided by Soviet emigres and surreptitious interviews 
were also employed in the pursuit of a more accurate account of the machinations 
which underpinned the governmental process in general and weaponry procurement 
policy in particular. 
Elucidation into the true nature of Soviet defence decisionmaking does indeed lie in 
the amorphous realm of intra-elite interaction and it is to this often-intangible subject 
that this thesis looks for a more accurate appraisal of the formulation of Soviet 
weaponry procurement policies. While the Council of Ministers' Decree, which 
served to initiate specific programmes, provides a potentially useful means of gauging 
the chronological framework of systems' development. They do little to delineate the 
political forces which underpinned the decision itself. Against this backdrop the 
recollections of key figures within the former Soviet ruling elite, which detail both the 
personal dynamics and inter-institutional rivalries which formed the backdrop to the 
decisionmaking process, provide a vital concomitant to the few new pieces of 
documentary evidence as the means of pursuing the most comprehensive analyses of 
the causal factors ofthe Soviet leadership's decision to develop the SS-20 missile 
system. 
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Models45 
Those who have sought to consider the Soviet defence decisionmaking in terms of 
intra-elite and inter-institutional interaction have posited a number of interpretations 
of the process' salient characteristics. One school of thought sought to portray the 
Soviet Union itself as a leviathan of military production in which the Party and military 
leaderships shared common aims with those of the defence sector in a monolithic 
fashion. Others argued the existence of an alliance of interests between the military 
leadership and the defence sector which sought to ensure that the already sympathetic 
Brezhnev leadership maintained the high levels of weaponry production that had 
characterised the regime's policy since its inception. Still others posited that there 
existed a potential division of interests between the military leadership and their 
suppliers in the defence sector. Cooper saw the extraordinary munificence directed 
towards the latter group during a ten year period from the mid 1960s as evidence of a 
"golden age" in civil-military relations.46 Despite the differing emphases placed upon 
the degree of elite consensus and the relative weight of military influence, most 
observers were agreed that the Soviet military was a powerful player in the defence 
decisionmaking process at the time ofthe SS-20's development. Some went so far as 
to claim that military interests were the pre-eminent determinant of procurement 
policy at this time. 
45 This section draws upon the overview of models provided by Meyer, S. "Soviet National Security 
Decisionmaking: What Do We Know and What Do We Understand?" and Simes, D.K. "The Politics 
of Defence in the Soviet Union: Brezhnev's era," in Valenta, J. and Potter, W.C. 1984. Soviet 
Decisionmakingfor National Security. London: George Allen and Unwin, pp.255-97. See also 
Evangelista, M.A. 1984. "Why the Soviets Buy the Weapons They Do", World Politics, 36(4):597-
618. 
46 Cooper, J. "The Defence Industry and Civil-Military Relations", in Colton and Gustafson (eds.), 
Soldiers and the Soviet State, p.167. 
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Action-reaction model 
The action-reaction model posited the notion that a state's weaponry procurement 
policies were predicated principally in response to those oftheir potential adversaries 
and its advocates47 were often closely associated with the promotion of the principle 
of arms control. Within the theoretical strictures imposed by such a model any 
qualitative or quantitative enhancement in an opponent's arsenal which was perceived 
to alter the strategic balance would, ceteris paribus, be expected to elicit a 
compensatory response in an attempt to restore the previous equilibrium. In the case 
of the Soviet Union the military potential of both the US and its NATO allies 
constituted a longstanding threat which had emerged in the immediate postwar period. 
To this had been added by the 1960s a nascent threat from the East as the rise of 
China as a potential military force was paralleled by a dramatic deterioration in Sino-
Soviet relations. The action-reaction model identified the Soviet Union's principal aim 
as being to match the military power of its potential enemies or at least maintain a 
credible level of deterrence. Thus Soviet actions were claimed to reveal "a reactive 
decision process that reflexively and systematically responds to external threats 
(stimuli) in an effort to offuet and neutralise increased threats to national security". 48 
Although a desire to respond to adversaries' weaponry procurement initiatives formed 
the principal motive for force development, policy practices and behavioural 
constraints could serve to mask the reactive character of the decisionmaking process. 
While the state's reaction might take the form of imitative procurement which closely 
paralleled that of its adversary and was readily discernible as a reactive measure, this 
motive could be obscured if - by contrast - a deployment possessed of an off-setting 
characteristic ensued. The latter course of action might emerge due to the interplay of 
domestic factors such the degree of political consensus surrounding the decision to 
47 Bottome, E. 1971. The Balance of Terror. Boston, Mass., Beacon Press; Lapp, R. 1968. The 
Weapons Culture. Baltimore, Md.: Penguin Books; York, H. 1970. Race to Oblivion. New York: 
Simon and Schuster. 
48 Meyer, "Soviet National Security Decisionmaking", p.257. 
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adopt a particular weapon system or the economic and technological feasibility of its 
development. Thus the resultant decision may lead to the development of a weapon 
whose characteristics may be markedly dissimilar to those of its Western counterparts, 
thus masking the reactive motives which underpinned its development. 
An extension of the action-reaction model emerged in 1974 when Steinbruner 
proposed the "cybernetic process". This maintained the concept of reactive 
decisionmaking on the part ofthe Soviets while emphasising the importance of 
previously-defmed thresholds and of a select group of critical variables, rather than the 
strategic balance per se. Under the precepts of this variant, "reactions need not be 
proportionate, nor equitable. A cybernetic process does not necessarily respond to 
every change it senses, but may wait until a particular threshold is crossed. Delayed 
responses, involving either over-reactions or under-reactions are to be expected".49 
These models were susceptible to characterising as reactive Soviet deployments 
whose initiation was often largely concurrent with those ofthe West.50 This led to a 
further refinement which sought to overcome this apparent anomaly while remaining 
within the reactive precepts ofthe action-reaction principle. Thus the technological 
dynamic variant of the action-reaction model contended that Soviet procurement 
policies would be influenced by current adversarial procurement policies and the 
anticipated trends in this realm commensurate with their level of hostile intent and 
technological and economic potential. Within the technological dynamic variant scant 
attention was paid to the political aspects of the decisionmaking process as it was 
assumed that political approval of any technologically and economically feasible 
weapons programme would inevitably emerge. Such an approach ran the risk of 
characterising the Soviet defence decisionmaking elite as a monolithic force devoid of 
internal divisions or rivalries and insulated from the ramifications of geopolitical and 
49 Ibid., p.258. 
50 The pace of the ensuing development vis-a-vis their US counterparts might be constrained by 
political or technological factors. The Soviet nuclear and ballistic missiles programmes serve as 
testament to the importance of these factors. 
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strategic considerations. Were it to emerge that a more "pluralistic" characteristic 
pertained in weaponry procurement policymaking, this too would serve to undermine 
the model's analytical utility. 
These models were afforded credence by the circumstances of the Soviet strategic 
build-up in the quarter of a century following World War II. Initial Soviet attempts to 
break the West's monopoly on nuclear weapons and her ensuing drive to attain 
strategic parity were readily characterised as responsive in form. To a lesser extent 
the Soviet Union was also perceived to have been forced to adopt a reactive stance 
towards the unfolding events surrounding the deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations 
and its geopolitical ramifications rather than dictating their course. The initial 
attraction of these models also turned out to be their greatest inherent weakness. 
Their unreserved acceptance of offsetting, threshold and even anticipatory responses 
as being of equal validity to imitative reactions endowed them with great flexibility, 
yet at the same time detracted from their potential for detailed consideration of state 
weaponry acquisition. In short most any deployment of a new weapons system could 
be justified and explained by simple reference to allegedly provocative or threatening 
measures which had been taken by perceived adversaries. It seemed that such models 
sought to overcome their inherent inability to explain the contrasting nature of Soviet 
force structures largely by denigrating its importance or by alluding to the influence of 
internal factors which somewhat undermined the foundations of their central 
argument. 
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National leadership model 
The national leadership model presented the personal preference of the dominant 
figure in the political leadership or a consensus which emerged from the ruling cabal 
as the principal determinant of defence policy. A number of differing scenarios could 
fall within the defining parameters of this model due to the interaction of its inherent 
variables. When a single figure like Stalin enjoyed a position of untrammelled 
dominance or when an elite consensus existed as in the case of the strategic build-up 
of the 1960s, there was a high probability of implementation of the chosen policy 
option. During an interregnum or similar period offactional struggle residual 
bureaucratic interests were endowed with an enhanced ability to promote their 
sectional interests and obstruct unwelcome policy initiatives. Indeed in some 
instances a still more pro-active approach might ensue as institutional support was 
courted by rival groupings. The military establishment was viewed as the pre-eminent 
institutional element of the Soviet elite, second in power only to the Party itself and 
was seen to have played an integral role in the direction of procurement policy and 
leadership battles in the post-Stalin era. While this model offered a useful framework 
with which to investigate intra-elite political interaction in the defence decisionmaking 
realm, it was best suited to retrospective analyses as it was dependant upon a detailed 
knowledge of the integral balances and political forces at play within the ruling elite at 
a given point in time - a challenging task during the Cold War period. 
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Interest-group model 
The interest-group model of Soviet defence decisionmaking emerged in the wake of 
the adoption of a similar analytical regime in the study of the US style of policy 
formulation in this field. In marked contrast to the various forms of action-reaction 
model, the interest-group model was predicated upon the notion that factors that were 
internal to the Soviet governmental structure dominated the decisionmaking process. 
Thus the eventual form of weaponry adopted was the result of the interaction - both 
co-operative and competitive - of the principal institutional interest groups concerned 
in the formulation and implementation of defence procurement policies. Several 
divergent variants of the interest-group model were proffered. Some analysts sought 
to delineate "fault lines" within the Soviet elite not immediately discernible behind the 
public facade of unity, and to identifY potential coalitions of interest and rivalries in 
pursuit of political influence and its attendant reward of resource allocation. Some 
portrayed a united front of defence industrialists and their military "customers" as a 
military-industrial complex which stood in de facto opposition to the interests of 
consumer production through the advance of light industry.51 Some sought to avoid 
an unreserved conflation of industrial and militruy policy preferences52 while others 
posited the notion that alliance-building occurred between institutions to further their 
common aims, often in competition with those, and implicitly opposed to, those of 
their colleagues in different sections ofthe same institution. 53 
51 Agursky, M. and Adomeit, H. 1979. "The Soviet Military-Industrial Complex", in Survey, 
24(2):106-32; Aspaturian, V., DaHin, A. and Valenta, J. 1980, The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: 
Three Perspectives. ACIS Paper no.27, UCLA: Los Angeles, Ca.; Lee, W.T. 1972. "The Politico-
Military Industrial Complex", Journal of International Affairs, 26(2):73-86. 
52 Alexander, A. 1976. Armour Development in the Soviet Union and the United States. Santa 
Monica, Ca.: RAND; Caldwell, L. 1971. Soviet Attitudes Toward SALT Adelphi Paper 75. London: 
IISS; Deane, M. 1977. Political Control of the Soviet Armed Forces. New York: Crane Russak; 
Kolkowicz, R. 1967. The Soviet Military and the Communist Party. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press; Warner, E.L. 1977. The Military in Contemporary Soviet Politics: An Institutional 
AnalYSis. New York: Praeger; Wolfe, T. 1965. Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads. Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press; Wolfe, T. 1980. The SALT Experience. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger. 
53 Alexander, A. 1970. R&D in Soviet Aviation. Santa Monica, Ca.: RAND; Alexander, A. 1976. 
Armour Development in the Soviet and the United States. Santa Monica, Ca.: RAND; Boyd, A. 1977. 
The Soviet Air Force. New York: Stein & Day. 
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By contrast the apparent unity of the Soviet leadership led some to posit that attempts 
to influence policy options were characterised by a sense of gradualism and were 
confined exclusively to internal debate54 while yet another theory rejected the premiss 
that widespread intra-elite rivalry and competition provided the backdrop to the 
Soviet defence decisionmaking process and instead claimed that a heightened degree 
of elite consensus was the prevailing condition. 55 The strongest adherent of this 
interpretation as a means of explaining the emergence of the 8S-20 was Andrew 
Cockburn who sought to place its development within an all-embracing context of 
intra-elite competition and alliance-building with which he sought to characterise 
Soviet defence production. 56 Hagelin offered as a means of explanation a not 
dissimilar portrayal of the missile as the end product of an inexorable process of 
weaponry procurement. 57 
54 Griffiths, F. "A Tendency Analysis of Soviet Policymaking", in Skilling, H.G. and Griffiths, F. 
1971. Interest Groups in Soviet Politics. Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
55 Holloway, D. "Technological Change and Military Procurement", in MccGwire M. and 
McDonnell,1. 1977. Soviet Naval Influence. New York: Praeger; Jacobsen, C.G. 1979. Soviet 
Strategic Initiatives. New York: Praeger; Odom, W. 1975. "Who Controls Whom in Moscow?" 
Foreign Policy, 19:109-23; Odom, W. 1976. "A Dissenting View on the Group Approach to Soviet 
Politics", World Politics, 28(4):21-34. 
56 Cockburn, A. 1983. The Threat: Inside the Soviet Military Machine. London: Hutchinson. 
57 Hagelin, B. 1984. "Swords into Daggers: The Origins of the SS-20 Missiles", Bulletin of Peace 
Proposals, 15(4):341-53. 
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Military-superiority model 
Advocates of this model came increasingly to the fore as the 1970s progressed and 
were at the height of their powers at the time of the SS-20's deployment. They 
argued that Soviet weaponry procurement practice represented a pre-determined and 
cohesive policy predicated solely upon the desire to achieve military superiority over 
the West. Some viewed the ultimate aim of such a policy to be the use of military 
superiority as a means of political leverage with which to cajole the West into political 
submission to Soviet demands. 58 Specifically a Soviet preponderance in TNFs (theatre 
nuclear weapons) was viewed as a means through which the Soviet Union was 
seeking to achieve a powerful leverage upon US-European relations. William Hyland 
characterised the process of development of Soviet TNFs in the 1970s as an attempt 
to secure a "veto" over West European policy and singled out the SS-20 as the 
integral component of such a policy.59 Those who adopted a still more alarmist 
approach, warning of Soviet ambitions in the development of a nuclear warfighting 
strategtO similarly portrayed the SS-20 as the principal component ofthe Soviet 
theatre nuclear warfighting strategy. 
58 Finley, D. 1980. "Conventional Arms in Soviet Foreign Policy", World Politics, 33(1):1-36; 
Vincent, R.J. 1975. Military Power and Political ltifluence: the Soviet Union and Western Europe, 
Adelphi Paper 117. London: IISS; Wolfe, T. 1970. Soviet Power and Europe. Baltimore, Md.: John 
Hopkins University Press. 
59 Hyland was Director of the Bureau ofIntelligence and Research at the US State Department (1971-
5) and Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (1975-7.) Hyland, W. "The 
Struggle for Europe: An American View", in A. Pierre (ed.) 1984. Nuclear Weapons in Europe. New 
York: Praeger, pp.30-I, cited in Haslam, The Soviet Union and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons in 
Europe, p.x. 
60 The seminal work in this field was Richard Pipes ominously titled, "Why the Soviet Union thinks 
it could fight and win a nuclear war", Commentary, 1977.64:31-9. See also Gray, C. 1977, The 
Future of Land-Based Missile Forces, Adelphi Paper 140. London: IISS; Lee, W.T. "The Rationale 
Underlying Soviet Strategic Forces", in Kitner, W. (ed.) 1969. Safeguard: Why the ABM Makes 
Sense. New York: Hawthorn Press; Nitze, P. 1976. "Deterring Our Deterrent", Foreign Policy, 
25:195-210. 
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Military mission model 
Advocates of the military mission model emanated predominantly from those studying 
Soviet strategic force development programmes.61 The military mission model argued 
that weaponry acquisition policy was dictated by the need to fulfil certain combat 
missions whose characters were prescribed by the military doctrine and strategy 
adopted by the state's leadership. The significance of these missions was assessed 
according to their efficacy in the pursuit of an overall military victory as determined by 
current strategic perceptions. At first sight the military mission model bears a 
resemblance to the organisational model with their shared attention to the established 
patterns of institutional behaviour and procedures. The military mission model places 
more emphasis upon the specific strategic concepts and concerns which serve to 
formulate institutional concerns and their historical underpinning. In addition the 
military mission model recognised the potential for rapid policy transformation in 
response to the emergence of a new threat or challenge to the existing strategic 
balance, in contrast to the incremental transition process posited by the organisational 
model. What served to distinguish the military mission model was the emphasis it 
placed upon internally-devised strategic objectives as the principal determinants of 
weaponry procurement. Although Western procurement policy continued to playa 
significant role within this model, its significance was adjudged solely by its effect 
upon the continued ability of Soviet forces to fulfil the combat roles ascribed to them. 
Moreover, this model asserted that weapons for which no role existed or was 
expected to evolve in military doctrine would not be developed. 
61 Connell, G.M. 1980. "The Soviet Navy in Theory and Practice", Comparative Strategy, 2(2): 129-
47; Goure, L. Kohler, F. and Harvey, M. 1974. The Role of Nuclear Forces in Current Soviet 
Strategy. Miami, Fla.: University of Miami Press; Hudson, G. 1976. "Soviet Naval Doctrine and 
Soviet Politics", in World Politics, 29(1):90-113; MccGwire, M. (ed.) 1973. Soviet Naval 
Developments: Capability and Context. New York: Praeger; MccGwire, M and McDonnell, J. 1977. 
Soviet Naval Influence. New York: Praeger. 
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Most major studies ofthe SS-20's development can be placed within the parameters of 
the military mission model62 and provide a plausible response to the charges of military 
superiority levelled by those advocates of the military superiority model. However 
through their concentration upon largely strategic factors they faced the inherent risk 
of dissembling the process of weaponry procurement from the wider policy concerns 
and objectives of the Soviet leadership. 
Such an approach thus ran the risk of adopting "a most un-Clausewitzian 
assumption" .63 The task that Haslam set for himself, the investigation of the 
development of the SS-20 within all the parameters which served to define Soviet 
security perceptions and attendant policy formulation represents the most efficacious 
means of seeking a definitive explanation of the motivating factors and institutional 
interests whose complex interaction served to promote the development of the SS-20 
missile system. Consequently this thesis will seek to consider the key facets - nuclear 
strategy, technical potential, international relations and internal political machinations 
- which are assumed to have constituted the basis for Soviet defence decisionmaking 
and attendant weaponry procurement policy at the height of the Brezhnev era. 
Following a detailed consideration of each in turn a final assessment of the relative 
weight of their contribution to the 8S-20's development will be offered in conclusion. 
62 Berman, R. and Baker, J. 1982. Soviet Strategic Forces: Requirements and Responses. 
Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute; Meyer, S. 1984. Soviet Theatre Nuclear Forces. Part II: 
Capabilities and Implications. Adelphi Paper 188, London: IISS; Holloway, D. 1983. The Soviet 
Union and the Arms Race. London: Macmillan; Garthoff: R.L. "The SS-20 Decision"; Garthoff: 
Detente and Confrontation; MccGwire, M. 1987. Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy. 
Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute. 
63 Haslam, The Soviet Union and the Politics o/Nuclear Weapons in Europe, p.xii. 
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2 The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy 
The origins of Soviet nuclear strategy 
Prior to Khrushchev's fall there had emerged a new strand in Soviet strategic thinking 
which heralded major implications for Soviet theatre strategy. It was now argued that 
a future superpower conflict might not necessarily resort to the employment of 
nuclear weapons from the very outset. From this hypothesis grew an important re-
evaluation of Soviet doctrine and strategy as it pertained to conflict at the theatre level 
in general and in the European TVD in particular. This was of fundamental 
importance to the military planning process and was the principal source of the 
operational requirement for a weapon possessed of operational capabilities akin to 
those of the SS-20. This revision was motivated in part as a response to the US 
adoption of a policy of "Flexible Response" and increased US attention towards 
'limited' nuclear options. It can also be attributed at least in part to the build-up of 
Soviet strategic forces which gathered pace during the course ofthe 1960s. This had 
the dual effect of diminishing the Soviet Union's fear ofthe United States launching an 
all-out strategic attack and allowing a new balance and maturity to emerge within 
Soviet strategic thinking. This period was also marked by a growing awareness 
among Soviet lnilitary analysts of the detrimental effect of the employment of nuclear 
weapons upon the control of massed troop operations. While recognising that nuclear 
weapons had led to a 'qualitative' change in military affairs, Soviet strategists did not 
want to 'absolutise' them in the manner in which Khrushchev had sought to do. By 
adopting this path they reaffirmed the Soviet tradition of reliance upon 'mixed forces' 
and attendant weapons systelflS. It was perhaps no coincidence that such an approach 
also held out the prospect of continued high levels of resource support for all sectors 
of military production and their respective clients within the armed forces. The 
policies pursued in the era which followed have since been characterised as an attempt 
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by the Soviet Union to pursue comprehensive weaponry programme to fulfil an all-
embracing strategic posture. This occurred during a period of munificence in defence 
resource allocation which has since been referred to as 'a golden age'. The SS-20's 
development cycle paralleled this era and might thus have been expected to have been 
affected by its dual characteristics. 
The question of whether or not the Soviet Union's military strategy was modified 
during the course of the 1960s to incorporate the possibility of a conventional aspect 
to a future conflict proved to be a source of continuing contention among a host of 
Western analysts and was the cause of much often-polemical debate. Despite the 
repeated assertions of a number of high profile Western analysts,64 the evidence 
presented below will serve to demonstrate that a significant revision of Soviet strategy 
did in fact occur during the course of the 1960s. However, this raises the related -
and more complex - issues ofthe precise form that this revision took and the motives, 
defining characteristics and timetable of events which accompanied the decision. 
64 See for example, Wolfe, T.W. 1973. "The Convergence Issue and Soviet Strategic Policy", The 
RAND 25th Anniversary Volume, Santa Monica: RAND; Douglass J.D. Jor. and Roeber, A.M., 1981. 
Conventional War and Escalation: The Soviet View, London: Crane, Russak and Co. 
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The Dawn of a New Era 
Stalin's rule placed stifling constraints upon the evolution of Soviet doctrine and 
strategy during the two decades which preceded his death.65 Although Soviet 
theoreticians had studied military strategy in the late 1920s and early 1930s, such 
investigations were abruptly curtailed in the middle of the decade on Stalin's orders. 
Political commissars were reintroduced into the armed forces in May 1937, while the 
following month witnessed the trial and execution of Tukhachevsky and the opening 
rounds of Stalin's purge of the high command. Ironically it was the strategy formerly 
espoused by Tukhachevsky that came to form the foundations of the Soviet 
operations in depth which characterised their prosecution of the Great Patriotic War, 
and remained in place for much ofthe Cold War era. While evidence suggests that 
Stalin's generals succeeded in influencing his strategic and tactical decisions during the 
course ofthe Great Patriotic War66 the General Secretary retained absolute authority 
in the realm of doctrinal formulation. Indeed against the backdrop ofthe turning of 
the tide against Nazi Germany in 1942, Stalin promulgated the "Permanently 
Operating Factors" of warfare, whose applicability was deemed to be both universal 
and eternal. The Permanently Operating Factors consisted of: 
1 the stability of the rear 
2 the morale of the army 
3 the quality & quantity of servicemen 
4 the quality & quantity of equipment 
5 the organisational ability of military commanders 
65 The terms doctrine, strategy and operational art have been used in accordance with the defmitions 
provided in the General Staff's Dictionary of Basic Military Terms, Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1965. For 
discussion of their significance within Soviet military planning, see Skiubedia, P.I. (ed.) 1966. 
Explanatory Dictionary of Military Terms, Moscow: Voyenizdat. 
66 Colton, Timothy P. "Perspectives on Civil-Military Relations in the Soviet Union", in Colton, Tol. 
and Gustafson T. (eds.) 1990. Soldiers and the Soviet State: Civil-Military Relationsfrom Brezhnev 
to Gorbachev, Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, p.20. 
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As Stalin reimposed his grip upon military affairs in the immediate postwar period the 
General Staff found itself in an invidious situation. The Permanently Operating 
Factors were little more than generalised categorisations of military potential which 
offered little scope for meaningful operational planning. However, their hallowed 
status prevented a direct challenge being made upon them and further tightened the 
bind placed upon innovative strategic analysis. Moreover the General Staff were 
precluded from considering the theoretical potential of surprise attack, lest it detract 
from the facade of Stalin's omniscience in his conduct of the Great Patriotic War. 
Similar restrictions were imposed upon investigation ofthe strategic implications of 
the most recent addition to the Soviet arsenal- nuclear weapons.67 
Stalin had been an enthusiastic supporter of the development of nuclear weapons. 
The Soviet programme had been on-going since the 1930s and although disrupted by 
the German invasion in 1941, it had resumed by the end ofthe following year. To the 
intelligence concerning American progress in this field was added the tangible 
evidence of the weapon's capabilities in the wake of its use against Japan. The Soviet 
programme continued to enjoy generous levels of support in the immediate postwar 
period in terms of resource allocation, intelligence efforts and- significantly - in the 
pursuit of an effective means of delivery. Soviet denials of nuclear weapons' unique 
military potential espoused during this period have been cited as evidence of a 
reluctance to acknowledge American possession of a monopoly upon such a powerful 
new weapon system and its attendant geopolitical ramifications. Indeed some have 
posited that a desire for international prestige may have played as important a 
motivating role in the Soviet Union's development of nuclear weapons as perceptions 
of their military utility.68 However this should be given credence as only a partial 
67 For a more detailed discussion ofthese restrictions, see Dinerstein, HS. 1962. War and the Soviet 
Union: Nuclear Weapons and the Revolution in Soviet Military and Political Thinking. London: 
Praeger; Gatihoff, RL. 1958. Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age, New York: Praeger; Holloway, D. 
1983. The Soviet Union and the Arms Race, London: Yale University Press. 
68 Hines, lG., Petersen, P.A. and Trulock, N. 1986. Soviet Military Theory from 1945-2000: 
Implications for NATO. The Washington Quarterly, 9:119. 
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explanation of early Soviet perceptions of these new weapons. The manner in which 
nuclear weapons were initially incorporated within existing Soviet strategic concepts 
and military forces was not merely the result of Stalin's doctrinal conservatism. 
Rather it also represented an adherence to the Soviet tradition of 'mixed forces' as the 
only guarantor of military victory. The long-held aversion to over-reliance upon one 
particular branch of the military service was now extended to include a denial that one 
weapon might by itself provide an 'absolute' capability to achieve all military 
requirements. The very scarcity of nuclear warheads available to either superpower in 
the initial postwar period, their considerable physical bulk and the limitations imposed 
upon their delivery by aircraft in the pre-ICBM era led both sides to underestimate the 
strategic potential that they would come to hold in the near future. 69 Thus the earliest 
Soviet nuclear weapons were incorporated into existing arsenals and their attendant 
strategic theories of "fire support" to conventional offensive operations. The advent 
of Soviet nuclear weapons occurred in tandem with the development of Soviet long-
range aviation forces (principally through Tupolev's 'copy' ofthe US B-29, the Tu-4). 
In the event of conflict with the West, Soviet bombers armed with free-fall nuclear 
bombs would have sought to destroy targets such as airfields, logistical nodal points 
and military-industrial production centres. It was not anticipated that such attacks 
would lead to the immediate defeat ofthe West. Rather such actions were seen as 
disrupting the enemies' 'rear' areas and tilting the balance in the Soviet Union's favour 
in the anticipated war of attrition. As such they would play an important, though 
subsidiary, role in support of a massive tlnust westwards by Red Army infantry and 
armoured divisions. 
69 Similarly, the US underestimated nuclear weapons' strategic potential and possessed few atomic 
warheads in the late 1940s. See Meyer, S. 1984. Soviet Theatre Forces, Part I: Development of 
Doctrine and Objectives, Adelphi Paper 187, IISS: London, p.8. Moreover Soviet analysts remained 
unconvinced of the merits of massed aerial raids in the achievement of strategic aims, citing their 
limited results against Britain and Germany during World War II and attributing Japan's surrender 
in 1945 to the threat of imminent Soviet invasion. 
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The 'Interregnum' 
In the wake of Stalin's death there began a process of doctrinal redefinition of the role 
and potential of nuclear weapons within military strategy which ran in parallel to and 
was interrelated with, the contest to succeed as Soviet leader. Malenkov, Chairman 
of the Council of Ministers, argued that nuclear weapons' potential for mass 
destruction was such that protagonists in such a conflict could hope to achieve no 
more than a pyrrhic victory. As even the forces of imperialism would recognise this 
Soviet security could be achieved merely by the construction of a deterrent nuclear 
arsenal. As a corollary this would allow the reallocation of resources from the 
defence sector to light industries with resultant increases in the production of 
consumer goods. Such a dramatic departure from Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy was 
afforded a degree of ideological credence by the previously-unknown author, M. Gus. 
His article recognised that Marxist ideology had traditionally posited that the internal 
contradictions and uneven economic development of capitalist states led inevitably to 
war. However it also contained the unprecedented claim that the addition of nuclear 
weapons to the arsenal of the Soviet Union had allowed her to "paralyse the actions of 
this law". 70 At this juncture, Khrushchev portrayed himself as an avowed supporter of 
the traditional military structure as represented by the concept of 'mixed forces.' He 
also seemed to favour devolving greater autonomy to the military in the realm of 
strategic analysis while diminishing the extent of Party interference in their 
professional conduct. Such a manifesto elicited support from a large section of the 
Soviet military and proved to be a significant factor in determining the eventual 
outcome of the leadership contest. Attacks upon the removal of war as a viable policy 
option and the proposed reliance upon a minimum deterrent emerged from both Party 
and military circles and restated Khrushchev's rejection of the notion ofa new 
'absolute' weapon, while reaffirming the continuing validity of Marxist-Leninist theory 
70 Gus, M. "The General Line of Soviet Foreign Policy", Zvezda, Leningrad, November 1953, p.l09. 
Cited in Dinerstein, War and the Soviet Union, p.67. 
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as an exact science, which could not be manipulated to suit short-term political 
goals. 71 This argument continued throughout the course of 1954 with both sides 
employing contrasting doctrinal assertions as a means of attacking one another's 
stance, while minimising overt evidence of public disunity within the political elite. 
When counterpoised the claims made by the protagonists served as a litmus test of the 
wider political and doctrinal struggle in which they were engaged. Significantly, when 
Khrushchev eventually prevailed in February 1955 Soviet pronouncements on 
relations with the West and the likelihood of war lost much of their stridency, 
indicating that his earlier gloomy portents had been fuelled - at least in part - by the 
exigencies of the intra-elite conflict. 
Although strategic discourse was muted during the leadership struggle, it was not 
suspended and several issues of vital importance were raised during the period. The 
first tangible indication that a review ofthe role of nuclear weapons within Soviet 
strategy was underway had emerged in September 1953, a mere six months after 
Stalin's death. It took the form of an article in Voennaya mys[' by its then editor 
Major General Nikolai Talensky.72 Talensky's thesis has often been misrepresented as 
a direct challenge to the relevance ofthe Permanently Operating Factors in defining 
Soviet strategy. Rather, his critique was more subtle and sought to attack their status 
as both the eternal and sole determinants of military potential. He characterised such 
an assertion as being methodologically unsound as it accorded them the status of an 
overarching fundamental or basic law and thus placed them outwith the dialectic 
processes of military science. Although he accepted their great importance, he argued 
that they should be incorporated within the rubric of military science. This contention 
held potentially revolutionary implications for the study and evolution of Soviet 
71 Fedorov, G. "Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army; The Origin and Essence of Wars", 
Krasnaya Zvezda, 6 January 1954; Tereshkin, V. "The Great Mass Movement of the Present Day", 
Zvezda, Leningrad, February 1954 and Piatkin, A. 1954. "Some Questions of the Marxist-Leninist 
Science of War", Voennaya mys/', no.3 cited in Dinerstein, pp.68-70. 
72 "On the Question of the Character of the Laws of Military Science", 1953. Voennaya mys!', no.9 
cited in Dinerstein, War and the Soviet Union, p.47. 
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strategy and the article elicited an immediate and lively response. 73 The resulting 
discussion identified a 
diversity of views on matters of basic importance that it had not been possible 
to discuss in the Soviet Union for a generation. There seems to be no doubt 
that this was a real, and not a staged, discussion, for there was considerable 
irrelevance and some ofthe disputants failed to discern the main issues, 
concentrating on peripheral ones. 74 
Something of a backlash emerged against Ta]ensky's formulations and the 
Permanently Operating Factors were reaffirmed by Stalin's former Minister of 
Defence, Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky in articles published in Krasnaya Zvezda in 
February and May of 195475 and a new strategic text, "On Soviet Military Science" 
which was published by the Ministry of Defence in 1954. Talensky's removal as editor 
of Voennaya mysl' and his transfer to the Institute of History in the Soviet Academy 
of Science in June 1954 has long been regarded as punishment for "overstepping some 
undefined bounds". 76 Significantly, however, his reassignment did not prevent his 
future participation in the strategic debate. Indeed the momentum towards some form 
of reconsideration seems to have been inexorable. In October 1953, Soviet military 
literature contained its first specific mention of nuclear weapons 77 and in the months 
that followed the Ministry of Defence ordered are-evaluation ofthe weapons' 
potential in a move which heralded a major revision of the General Staff Academy's 
curriculum. A series in Krasnaya Zvezda in early 1954 dealing with nuclear weapons 
appeared to herald a desire to inculcate the massed ranks of the Red Army as a whole. 
73 The article elicited a largescale response. Voennaya mysl' received in the order of forty letters 
responding to its claims, many of which emanated from authors who saw Talensky's views as "both 
radical and pernicious". Dinerstein, War and the Soviet Union, p.47. 
74 Ibid., p.IO. 
75 Scott F.S. and Scott, W.F. 1979. The Armed Forces of the USSR, Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 
p.40, n.9 and 10. 
76 Ibid., p.40. See also Bluth, C. 1992. Soviet Strategic Arms Policy Before SALT, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, p.89 for similar sentiments. 
77 Bluth, Soviet Strategic Anns Policy Before SALT, p91, n.32. 
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That such a series appeared in the same publication and at the same time as the 
defence of Stalin's Permanently Operating Factors by Vasilevsky serves to highlight 
the fluid nature of Soviet strategic conceptualisation at this point in time. 
In the aftermath of Khrushchev's victory the Soviet military enjoyed a new-found 
sense of autonomy in several important spheres. Nowhere was this more apparent 
than in the field of strategic analysis. 78 The military's loyalty to Khrushchev was 
rewarded by Marshal Zhukov's promotion to the post of Defence Minister and the 
accession of his predecessor, Marshal Bulganin, as Premier. In March 1955 no fewer 
than eleven generals were promoted to the rank of marshal. The period from the 
spring of 1955 until Zhukov's dismissal in October 1957 has been characterised as an 
"alliance" between Khrushchev and his new Defence Minister.79 A key concomitant of 
this process was that the Soviet military leadership enjoyed a new independence in the 
formulation of strategy, free from the constraints of Stalinist rule and the perceived 
threat of resource allocation that had been associated with Malenkov's policy 
preferences. There soon began an unrestrained consideration of the likely strategic 
potential of nuclear weapons and the practical means by which their power might best 
be utilised. 
The speed with which the restraints on the internal military debate were 
removed after the ouster ofMalenkov may be an indication that the 
predominance of the need to oppose Malenkov's policies was suddenly 
replaced by other institutional objectives, such as reasserting a greater role for 
the military in the formulation of military doctrine. 80 
On the eve of his accession, Zhukov is said to have made a secret speech to the officer 
cadres in which he criticised Stalinist strategy and stressed the need for modernisation 
78 This serves to refute the characterisation of military thought as "stagnant" in the era prior to 
Khrushchev's speech to the 22nd Party Congress in 1961. Scott & Scott, The Armed Forces of the 
USSR, p.46. 
79 Garthof4 Soviet Military Policy, p.49. 
80 Bluth, Soviet Strategic Arms Policy Before SALT, p.126. 
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in military affairs. 81 Confirmation that strategic revision now enjoyed official 
approval was signalled by the reversal of the earlier decision to omit an article by P.A. 
Rotmistrov from Voennaya mysl.' Rotmistrov echoed Talensky's assessment of the 
Permanently Operating Factors as important - but not sole - determinants of the 
outcome of a future conflict. He specifically attacked previous failures to consider the 
potentially decisive effect that a surprise nuclear attack might entail - a clear 
dissension from the line promulgated only a year previously by the authors of "On 
Soviet Military Science. "82 With remarkable rapidity the acceptance of a strategic 
revision and Talensky's academic rehabilitation were completed. Soon after, an 
editorial in Voennaya mysl' contained an unequivocal rejection of the exclusive use of 
the Permanently Operating Factors. 83 Moreover, while the Permanently Operating 
Factors had been re-affirmed on at least 57 occasions 84 in military literature between 
1953 and 1955, they made no appearance in 1956 and by 1957 their accordance of a 
unique and exclusive role in the determination of strategy had been virtually 
proscribed. 85 
The Twentieth Party Congress in 1956 was the setting for Khrushchev's secret 
denunciation of Stalin but also occasioned a call for a re-examination of military 
matters. A major conference on the subject took place in May 1957 and was followed 
by a number of seminars held under the auspices of the General Staff. These 
proceedings formed the basis of a series of articles in Voennaya mysl' which came in 
time to be known as "The Special Collection" and played a key role in defining the 
revised strategy. The series demonstrated a general consensus that the introduction of 
nuclear weapons and missile technology had combined to necessitate a significant 
81 Ibid., p.92. 
82 Marshal P. Rotmistrov, "For Creative Examination of the Questions of Soviet Military Science", 
Krasnaya Zvezda, 24 March 1955. See Dinerstein, War and the Soviet Union, pp.49-51, Bluth, 
Soviet Strategic Arms Policy Before SALT, p.92. 
83 "On the Results of the Discussion on the Character of the Laws of Military Science", 1954. 
Voennaya mysl', 4:20. 
84 Garthoff, R.L. 1959. The Soviet Image of Future War. Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 
p.32. 
85 Dinerstein, War and the Soviet Union, p.52. 
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reappraisal of Soviet military strategy. Despite the revision, two vital strands of 
existing strategy remained intact - notwithstanding their destructive power, nuclear 
weapons did not in themselves possess a decisive military potential and only through 
the defeat of the enemy's military forces upon the battlefield itself could victory be 
assured. 
At this juncture Soviet strategy maintained its traditional adherence to the concept of 
a 'balanced' or 'mixed' force structure, where nuclear weapons would be dovetailed 
with existing conventional armaments as would any other new weapon. Although the 
impressive destructive potential of nuclear weapons was recognised by political 
leaders and military strategists, neither recognised them as being capable of 
fundamentally altering the character of warfare. Indeed it should be noted that 
although the Permanently Operating Factors had been stripped of their former kudos 
they retained a vital role in a new guise as 'decisive factors'. It was maintained that 
despite the introduction of nuclear weapons, ultimate victory still rested primarily 
upon the decisive defeat of enemy military forces in the various theatres of operations. 
There did emerge a growing recognition of nuclear weapons' potential to strike at 
military-economic targets, but this continued to be viewed as a 'supporting' mission. 
The primary aim of the Soviet armed forces remained the destruction of enemy forces 
'in the field'. 
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"The Revolution in Military Affairs" 
It is difficult to ascertain exactly when Soviet strategists first detected a possible shift 
in Western nuclear strategy, as much of the Western discourse - let alone Soviet 
responses - took place at a classified level. However it is clear that by the mid-to-Iate 
1950s certain sections ofthe Soviet officer corps were being exposed to Western 
concepts that contradicted the strictures of pure "Massive Retaliation" theory and 
were cognisant of the debate in the West concerning the continued efficacy of such a 
declaratory policy. From 1956 the semi-classified Voyennyi Zarubezhnik embarked 
upon a process - which was soon emulated by the military publishers, Voyenizdat - of 
translating key Western texts and reproducing accounts of pertinent doctrinal 
concepts which seemed to signal an evolution to a new US strategic posture. This 
process continued apace till the end of the decade and can be assumed to have 
provoked a keen interest and lively exchanges among those members of the Soviet 
military who were exposed to them. This period also witnessed the publication of a 
series of articles which sought to assess the implications that the introduction nuclear 
weapons held for tactical forces. 86 However although the West's revision continued, 
Soviet discussion of strategic innovation in response to the new demands and 
opportunities presented by the US' adoption of "Flexible Response" became muted. 
The sudden diminution of strategic discussion and conjecture within Soviet military 
publications was evidence of the perceived threat to military autonomy emanating 
once again from the civilian leadership. Just as open discussion of potentially-
contentious issues had diminished in the face of Malenkov's threatened policy of 
minimum deterrence, so too was it set aside as the military sought to present a unified 
opposition to Khrushchev's foray into the formulation of military policy. 
86 Zisk, K.M. 1993. Engaging The Enemy: Organisation Theory & Soviet Military Innovation, 1955-
1991, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, pp.53-8 for a detailed discussion ofthe Soviet 
Union's reaction to the emergence of "Flexible Response". 
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A radical departure in Soviet military doctrine was announced by Khrushchev on the 
occasion ofthe fourth session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on 14 January 
1960. In his speech, he accorded nuclear missiles a unique and unprecedented 
position as a weapon whose unilateral employment could strike a decisive blow 
against an opponent. Nuclear firepower was now the sole determinant of victory and 
the employment of nuclear weapons would take place at the very outset of any future 
conflagration. The initial nuclear exchange would of itself determine the outcome of 
the conflict as a whole. Although the Strategic Rocket Forces had only been 
established during the previous month, they were accorded the status of the Soviet 
Union's 'pre-eminent service' in preference to the Red Army which had held this 
coveted position since the inception of the Bolshevik state. Nuclear missiles were said 
to have rendered obsolete at a stroke all traditional forms of military forces such as 
surface ships, aircraft87 and infantry and armoured forces. Khrushchev announced that 
an increase in the Soviet Union's security had been achieved through the development 
of the SRF while also facilitating a reduction in outlays upon traditional conventional 
forces. The most tangible effect of his reforms was the announcement of a cut of 
1.2M men - approximately one third - from the ranks of the Red Army. Khrushchev 
even went so far as to suggest that the Soviet Union might in the future return to the 
system of territorial militia which had been employed in the early days of the 
Bolshevik state. 88 While Khrushchev's motives remain difficult to gauge,89 the 
reaction among military circles is readily discernible. Opposition to the plans was 
immediate and emanated from a large section of the military leadership, including his 
previously-staunch allies within the 'Stalingrad Group'. Indeed the military had 
already been engaged in a process of obstruction against Khrushchev's attempts to 
87 Berman, RP. and Baker J.C. 1982. Soviet Strategic Forces: Requirements and Responses, 
Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, pp.25-6, 47-8 made the point the missile forces 
accorded more closely with the traditional Soviet penchant for artillery forces than did strategic 
aviation. Additionally, the Soviets may have been seeking to downplay the US lead in this field. 
88 Khrushchev, N.S.Izvestia, 15 January 1960, pA. 
89 Zisk, K.M. Engaging The Enemy, pp.63-4 offers a concise outline of most ofthe reasons offered to 
explain his policy. Another potentially significant factor is highlighted by Scott and Scott, The 
Armed Forces of the USSR, ppA2-3, who highlight how the demographic effects of the Great 
Patriotic War led to a shortage of available manpower in the 18-21 age bracket during this period. 
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reassert the authority of the MPA in the wake ofZhukov's remova1.90 The doctrinal 
pronouncements forced the conflict onto a new plane and led to a dogged policy of 
resistance through bureaucratic inertia and concerted co-operation with Khrushchev's 
Party critics. Significantly the Minister of Defence, Marshal Malinovsky, adopted a 
markedly different tone in his reference to the implications of widespread deployment 
of nuclear missiles and the creation of the SRF as the 'pre-eminent' branch of the 
Soviet armed forces. While in his speech to the Supreme Soviet he accepted that 
force restructuring justified the "wise and timely" cuts in Red Army manpower and 
that nuclear strikes would be of "paramount significance" in any future war, he 
reiterated the importance of the traditional concept of "mixed forces" and assured his 
audience that "we are retaining at a definite strength and in relevant sound proportions 
all types of our armed forces whose military operations, as far as their organisation 
and means of operation are concerned, will resemble what took place in the last 
war".91 
Malinovsky has been portrayed as a moderate who sought to reconcile the conflicting 
views of the future course of Soviet strategy and force structure92 and it seems clear 
that the military were willing to accept significant aspects of Khrushchev's revision. 
The creation ofthe SRF as an independent service and its accreditation as the 'pre-
eminent' branch of the Soviet Union's armed forces was portended by high level 
discussion among senior figures in the General Staff, the Defence Ministry, the High 
Command and the Central Committee.93 In addition, while many of Khrushchev's 
doctrinal assertions were disavowed in the wake of his fall, military and Party leaders 
alike continued to trumpet the SRF as the central component of Soviet defence and 
they retained their status among the services without hint of challenge. It seems that 
while the military leadership were willing to accept that the marriage of nuclear 
warheads and missile technology did indeed hold major implications for the 
90 Bluth, C. Soviet Strategic Arms Policy Before SALT, 
pp.132-4. 
91 Malinovsky, izvestia, 16 January 1960, p.2. 
92 Zisk, K.M. Engaging The Enemy, p.64, n.91. 
93 Tolubko, V.I. 1979. Nedelin, Moscow: Molodaya Gvardiya, p.18l. 
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framework of military strategy,94 they refused to accept that it led inevitably to the 
obsolescence of all other types of military forces. The opposition to drastic reductions 
in the traditional service sectors was inevitably motivated to an extent by bureaucratic 
self-interest among those services which felt most threatened by Khrushchev's plans. 
Given that this entailed all services with the exception ofthe newly-created SRF, the 
extent of this opposition can hardly be overstated.95 It was also motivated by a 
continued adherence to the notion that only co-ordinated actions by a 'mixed force' 
structure could ensure military victory. The very manner in which Khrushchev had 
sought to impose his restructuring plans was viewed as a serious threat to the 
autonomy in the formulation of strategic concepts that the military had recently 
enjoyed following decades of Party interference. This new-found freedom was prized 
and would be jealously guarded.% Given that the relationship between nuclear and 
conventional warfare served as the litmus test in the imbroglio with Khrushchev, the 
conventional force implications of "Flexible Response" might have expected to have 
featured rather more prominently in the literary assaults upon the Party leader. Rather 
than "open the floodgates" 97 of discourse, Khrushchev's speech to the 22nd Party 
Congress in 1961 acted as a brake upon discussion among Soviet military planners. 
Discussion of the most potentially divisive strategic issues was postponed at this point 
as the military sought to present a united front in opposition to Khrushchev. 98 This 
would accord with the relative conservatism that was displayed on issues of strategic 
modernisation and revision less than a decade previously, when Malenkov's proposals 
for a reduction in defence efforts met with a similar unanimity of resistance. Zisk adds 
further weight to this case by highlighting the predominance within the military 
94 Penkovsky, O. 1965. The Penkovsky Papers. New York: Doubleday and Co., pp.248-9. 
95 Up to 250,000 officers alone faced losing their posts as a result of Khrushchev's proposals. This 
alone would have provoked deep resentment among the officer corps. 
96 By contrast, Scott and Scott claim that, "Soviet military thought had stagnated dming Stalin's long 
tenure and was not openly revived until Khrushchev denounced the former dictator at the 22nd Party 
Congress in 1961. Once this was accomplished the floodgates were open. Scott and Scott, The 
Armed Forces of the USSR, p.46. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Zisk, Engaging The Enemy, pp.58, 62 and 68-9 provide an excellent account of the military's 
stance on this issue. 
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hierarchy of Itold timers who would undoubtedly resist not only Khrushchev's 
intrusion into their affairs, but also the innovative ideas about doctrine proposed by 
those who wanted to overturn the positions worked out in the previous decade .. .In 
order to maintain a strong, unified coalition against Khrushchev, the issues of Ground 
Force resources and conventional war-planning had to be kept separate until 
Khrushchev was out of the way."99 
As a caveat it must be added that a number of authoritative articles - several of which 
were accorded the status of formal pronouncements of Soviet doctrine - which 
acknowledged the possibility that a future war might possess a conventional aspect, 
actually predated Khrushchev's departure by a not inconsiderable length oftime. 
Therefore the conclusion must be drawn that while there may have been something of 
a lull in strategic discourse as the confrontation with Khrushchev reached its peak, this 
did not entail a full suspension of analytical discourse for the duration ofhis tenure. 
Khrushchev sought to quell military opposition by inflicting a series of blows against 
key individuals and institutions during the course of 1960. In the immediate aftermath 
of his speech to the Supreme Soviet two leading figures of the High Command who 
had failed to endorse the proposals - Chief of the General Staff, V.D. Sokolovsky and 
Commander-in-Chief of Warsaw Pact Forces, 1.S Konev - were suddenly removed 
from their posts. 100 Khrushchev also sought to remove another perceived obstacle to 
his plans through the planned closure of the General Staff Academy in March of that 
year. A successful rearguard action was mounted by the new Chief of the General 
Staff, M.V. Zakharov, which cuhninated in the Council of Ministers overturning 
Khrushchev's plan in April 1961. This defiance of the Party leader was the probable 
cause of Zakharov's subsequent removal from his post. IOI Following his removal as 
Chief of the General Staff, Sokolovsky went on to edit the 1962, 1963 and 1967 
99 Ibid., pp.68-9. 
100 Scott, F.S. and Scott, W.F. 1988. SOViet Military Doctrine: Continuity, Fomlulation and 
Dissemination, Boulder and London: Westview Press, p.63, n.19, speCUlate that their previous close 
relationship with Stalin might serve to explain their removal. 
JOI Zisk, Engaging The Enemy, p.67, n.IOO and n.lOl. 
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editions of the Voyenizdat pUblication, Military Strategy, which came to match its 
billing at the time of its initial publication as the most important book written on the 
subject since 1929. It was hardly evidence ofSokolovsky being consigned to oblivion 
in the determination of strategic concepts. Meanwhile, Zakharov had regained his old 
post within days of Khrushchev's own demise. The persistent grumblings of 
discontent which emanated from most sectors of the military press and the continued 
high status enjoyed by those military leaders sacked by Khrushchev bore witness to 
the extent of opposition that he faced and the tenuous nature of his own hold upon 
power. A plethora of articles was published which signalled profound disagreement 
with Khrushchev's proposed policy of a one-variant form of conflict reliant solely 
upon nuclear missile forces. Many argued that the advent of atomic weapons called 
for still larger ground forces to overcome the anticipated effects of a nuclear attack. 102 
One line of attack implied that Khrushchev's proposed strategy shared the same 
fundamental flaws that had bedevilled Napoleon, 103 while another warned ofthe 
dangers of ignoring Clausewitz's dictums on the laws of war. 104 Within the journal of 
the MP A a bitter polemical struggle was waged between Lieutenant Colonel E. 
Rybkin and Colonel 1. Kuz'min, both of whom had higher degrees in philosophy, and 
who were respectively an apologist for and avowed critic of the notion that nuclear 
weapons had led to a qualitative change in military affairs. 105 
Khrushchev's attempts radically to restructure Soviet nuclear doctrine and force 
structure had effectively been stalled some time prior to his ouster. The cumulative 
effect of the renewal of Cold War tensions!06 and bureaucratic inertia combined to 
remove what momentum Khrushchev's programme may initially have possessed. 
102 Meyer, S. 1984. Soviet Theatre Forces, Part I: Development of Doctrine and Objectives, p.18; 
Iovlev, A.M. Krasnaya Zvezda, 5 April 1961 from Current Digest ofthe Soviet Press 13(13):8-9; 
Rotmistrov, P. Izvestia, 20 October 1962 from CDSP 14, no.43, pp.20-1. 
103 Zisk, Engaging The Enemy, p.65, n.93 and n.94. 
104 Ibid., p.65, n.95. 
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106 The Powers U-2 incident in May 1960; Kennedy's announcement of the US strategic build-up in 
January 1961 to bridge the "missile gap" - at a time when the Soviet military was all too well aware 
that the Soviet Union possessed a mere handful ofICBMs; the Bay of Pigs raid in April and the 
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Within weeks of returning empty-handed from the Vienna Summit Khrushchev had 
adopted a strategic posture which accorded closely with that previously enunciated by 
Malinovsky. In the public arena afforded by Pravda the Soviet leader reaffirmed that 
nuclear weapons would continue to be the prime means of defending the Soviet 
Union, but that "the strengthening of the defence of the Soviet Union depends upon 
the perfecting of all branches of our armed forces". 107 
The contrast with the sentiments expressed in his speech to the Supreme Soviet a 
mere seventeen months earlier could hardly have been more striking. However the 
emphasis continued to be placed upon the inevitable use of nuclear weapons were war 
with the West to break out. In his speech to the 22nd Party Congress in 1961, 
Malinovsky had reiterated Khrushchev's assertion of the primacy of nuclear weapons 
and stated that any future world war would inevitably witness the use of nuclear 
rockets as the main means of combat. The publication of Military Strategy early the 
following year represented a reaffirmation ofthe moderated Soviet doctrine. Its text 
stated that any future war would inevitably be waged through the employment of 
nuclear rockets, although a balanced force structure and mixed operations would also 
be required to ensure eventual victory. While the text as a whole was dominated by 
discussion of the expected nuclear aspects of any future conflict, the issue of a 
conventional introduction to a future war was alluded to, albeit in rather a tangential 
manner. All but subsumed within a section dealing with wars of national liberation 
and localised conflicts, there was a single paragraph which referred to the threat of a 
West German-led attack upon the GDR, which might not employ nuclear weapons 
from the outset. 108 While the implication was clearly that this particular "local" 
conflict would rapidly develop into a full East-West conflict with the ensuing use of 
nuclear weapons, the introduction of even this minor caveat is noteworthy. Marxism-
Leninism on War and the Army, which was published late in 1962, demonstrated a 
107 Khrushchev, Pravda, 22 June 1961. 
108 Sokolovsky, V.D. (ed.), 1962. Voyenna Strategiia, Moscow: Voyenizdat, p.325. 
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striking similarity to Military Strategy in its emphasis on the primacy of nuclear 
weapons. The respective General Staff and MP A publications thus seemed to accord 
closely with the new doctrine announced by the Minister of Defence in 1961. The 
form ofMalinovsky's pamphlet, "Vigilantly Stand Guard Over The Peace", was 
finalised just as the Cuban Missile Crisis repeated the assertion that a future war 
would inevitably be thermo-nuclear in character and that nuclear missiles would be the 
principal form of destruction. 
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The emergence of theatre strategyl09 
The 1963 Doctrinal Revision 
In 1965, the editor of Voennaya mysl', Major General S.N. Kozlov, wrote that 
although military doctrine constantly underwent evolutionary changes, its complete 
replacement represented a rare action by a state. The fact that, "the formal 
replacement of Soviet military doctrine had taken place on only three occasions during 
the existence of the Bolshevik state, served as confirmation of this". 110 This serves as 
an excellent precis ofthe process by which Soviet military doctrine evolved 
throughout the 1960s. It took the form of a methodical and gradual process through 
which a more sophisticated doctrinal stance emerged by the end of the decade, a 
stance which admitted the possibility that war with the West might assume a markedly 
different character from the unbridled and instantaneous nuclear exchange posited by 
Khrushchev in 1961. When taken to its most extreme conclusion, a handful of Soviet 
sources argued that war with the West might remain conventional for the duration of 
the conflict. The majority however were rather less sanguine. Indeed the extent to 
which a conventional aspect in a future war was viewed as a likely scenario of 
significant duration, and the rapidity of the process by which this possibility was 
incorporated into the mainstream of Soviet doctrinal analyses, have both been subject 
to exaggeration on the part of West em analysts. Rather the process of doctrinal 
revision was ongoing for much of the 1960s and although a wide spectrum of possible 
scenarios was accepted by the end of the decade, most Soviet sources still anticipated 
escalation to nuclear employment in a matter of days. The conventional option was 
viewed for the most part as a short-lived introductory period or a peculiarity confined 
109 For an authoritative precis of the evolution of Soviet nuclear strategy see Kokoshin, A.A. 1998. 
Soviet Strategic Thought. 1917-1991, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, pp.l11 ~ 129. 
110 Kozlov, S.N. "Military Doctrine and Military Science", in Derevyanko, P.M. 1965. Problems of 
the Revolution in Military Affairs, Moscow: Voyenizdat. 
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to a particular geographical area for specific reasons. However, despite the 
misgivings and caveats that were attached, the acceptance of the possibility of a 
conventional aspect in a future conflict with the West was in itself a major revision of 
Soviet doctrine. Moreover, this provided the catalyst for a lively discourse on the 
strategy most suited to meet these doctrinal requirements which proceeded well into 
the next decade. The revision also entailed major implications for Soviet theatre 
forces - most especially TNFs - and has traditionally been viewed as a prime 
motivating factor in the development of new generations ofTNFs such as the SS-20. 
The Evolution of the Conventional Option 
The second edition of Military Strategy published in 1963 was said to have contained 
"one glaring change that had taken place in military doctrine", 111 as it acknowledged 
that aggression against the Soviet Union or a fellow socialist state need not inevitably 
lead to a world (and by implication, nuclear) war. Although it was not stipulated in 
detail, the authors seem, by implication, to have concluded that a "local" conventional 
war might ensue. Such a conflict would have been expected to escalate to a full-scale 
nuclear exchange, the admission of the possibility - slim though it may have been - of 
a conventional introduction in such an authoritative source was an apparent indication 
of a formal modification in Soviet doctrine. 1I2 A major conference of military 
strategists in May 1963 provided a forum for wide-ranging discussions on a number of 
strategic issues. Entitled "The Essence and Content of Soviet Military Doctrine", it 
was called by one of the central administrations of the Ministry of Defence, "in all 
probability the Military Science Administration of the General Staff, the organisation 
that had supervised the writing of Military Strategy". 113 Colonel V.V. Larionovll4 
III Scott and Scott, Soviet Military Doctrine: Continuity, Formulation and Dissemination, p.41. 
112 The gravity of this revision has been underestimated by some analysts. See MccGwire, M. 1987. 
Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy, Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, p.405. 
113 Scott and Scott, The Armed Forces of the USSR, p.46. 
114 Assistant editor of Military Strategy. 
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and Colonel V.M. Kulish both addressed the conference. Major General A. A. 
Prokhorov presented a key discussion paper - whose title matched that of the 
conference itself - which was devoted to responding to recent Western doctrinal 
innovations. While a nuclear exchange would represent the "central tenet" of any 
future conflict, Prokhorov now acknowledged that its opening stage could take the 
form of a "localised" - and thus by implication conventional- conflict. Another 
speaker, Colonel V. Mochalov, supported the assertion that such a development had 
occurred in Western strategy. Both stressed the need for detailed consideration of 
such innovations and their implications for Soviet strategy."5 In the wake of the 
conference, a series of articles appeared in Voennaya mysl' during the course of 1963 
which urged Soviet planners to remain cognisant of developments in Western military 
planning and argued that Soviet strategy should remain responsive in character. 116 
Pressure to review Soviet strategy gathered further momentum in December 1963 
with the publication in Izvestia of an article by the Chief of Staff: Marshal S.S. 
Biryuzov which contended that although there remained a continuing danger of 
nuclear conflict, it was no longer inevitable and Soviet forces should be prepared to 
meet any eventuality. \17 The tenor of such articles stood in contrast to much ofthe 
literature of the era which had considered a future conflict exclusively in nuclear 
terms. 1I8 The debate continued into 1964 and this year witnessed the entry into the 
fray of Major General S. N. Kozlov. Kozlov enjoyed a position of considerable 
authority as editor of Voennaya mysl' from 1963-9."9 In the immediate aftermath of 
Khrushchev's remova~ the second edition of "On Soviet Military Science" was 
115 Belousov, L. 1963. "Conference on Soviet Military Doctrine", Voyenno-Istorichesky Zhurnal, 
10:122-3. 
116 Kazakov, D. 1963. "The Theory and Methodology Pertaining to Soviet Military Science", 
Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, 10:11-2, 71-2 urged Soviet planners not to lose sight of the possibility 
ofa conventional introduction to a future war. 
ll7 Biryuzov, S.S. "Politics and Nuclear Weapons", Izvestia, 11 December 1963. Biryuzov was later 
killed in a mysterious crash while on a flight to Yugoslavia, days after Khrushchev's removal. 
118 Balansov L. and Sapozhnikov, L. 1963. "Troop Combat Operations Under Conditions of 
Radioactive Contamination of Terrain", Voennaya mys[', 7:48-61; Lapshin, K. 1963. "Surmounting 
Obstacles and Zones of Destruction and Radioactive Contamination ofthe Offence", Voennaya mys!', 
10:15-27 and Zisk, Engaging The Enemy, p.59, n.58. 
119 Kozlov was to become a leading exponent of mathematical modelling for strategic planning in the 
following decade. 
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published by Voyenizdat. It was written by Kozlov, M. V. Smirnov, 1. S. Baz and P. 
A. Sidorov. 12o This publication followed a fairly conservative line, asserting that war 
would be nuclear and swift-moving. Such a war might well be of a limited duration, 
although a more protracted timescale was not ruled out. A strong and balanced force 
structure was thus required. The possibility that general war might evolve from a 
localised - and by implication conventional - conflict was accepted. However of 
perhaps greatest significance for future developments was the assertion that "doctrine 
is not dogma, but a guide to action". Kozlovs other contribution to the debate during 
the course of this year accorded still more overt credence to the notion of 
conventional conflict. 121 Indeed he went so far as to warn against the over-estimation 
of the operational utility of nuclear weapons and argued that the waging of a 
prolonged, conventional war of attrition might avoid the resort to nuclear exchange. 122 
Another source advised that Soviet forces should be trained to fight under nuclear or 
conventional conditions, thus requiring the dovetailing of conventional and nuclear 
weapons. 123 On a related theme, there was a warning that any use of nuclear weapons 
- whether strategic or TNFs - would probably cause an escalation to all-out nuclear 
war that conventional contlict alone could avoid. 124 A particularly strident case 
against the political utility of nuclear weapons' use had been made in Kommunist 
vooruzhennykh sil in January,125 while another had claimed that future war would be 
nuclear in character from the opening minutes. I26 Consideration was given to possible 
120 In addition to Kozlov's position of authority, Sidorov was secretary of Voennaya mysl' from 1963-
72, while Baz served for a time on its editorial board. 
121 Kozlov, 1967. "The Development of Military Science After The Great Patriotic War", Voennaya 
mys[', 2:47 argued that the Soviet military must not ignore the possibility of a conventional 
introduction to a future war. 
122 Kozlov, 1964. "Military Doctrine and Military Science", Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, 5:47. 
123 Reznichenko, V. 1964. "Questions of Contemporary Combined Operations Combat", Voennaya 
mysl', 3:21-32. 
124 Ponomarev, P. 1964. "Crisis of Bourgeois Theories of War and Peace", Kommunist 
vooruzhennykh sit, 16:l3 cited in Goldberg, A.C. 1987. New Developments in Soviet Military 
Strategy. Washington D.C.: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, p.14 n.43. 
125 Sushko N. and Kondratkov, T. "War and Politics in the 'Nuclear Age"', Kommunist 
vooruzhennykh sil, 2nd January 1964 cited in Garthoff, R.L. "Mutual Deterrence and Strategic Arms 
Limitation in Soviet Policy", in Lynn-Jones, S.M., Miller, S.E. and Van Evera, S. (eds.) 1989. Soviet 
Military Policy. Cambridge. Mass.: MIT Press. p.174, n.5. 
126 Vasendin, N. 1964. "Comments on the Article, 'Augmentation of Strategic Effort in Modem 
Conflict"', Voennaya mys[', 9:60. 
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US' preferences for retaining conflict at a localised and conventional level. 127 On this 
occasion, however, the author was rather more pessimistic in his conclusions and 
argued that the very weakness of Western conventional forces would of itself lead to 
NATO's recourse to the nuclear option. 
From 1964, there also began to appear a number of articles which envisaged a 
conventional aspect as a potential feature in a future conflict for purely operational 
reasons. In what were set to become recurring themes in the coming years, some 
argued that conventional weapons might be used on secondary axes of operations, 
while nuclear strikes were confined to the principal TVD of Central Europe128, while 
others foresaw their utilisation in instances where a lack of available nuclear weapons 
might in itself force the exclusive employment of conventional weapons. 129 Another 
line of argument favoured the use of a conventional introduction to allow time to 
prepare for the employment of nuclear weapons to optimum effect. 130 
The fourth edition of Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army131 was one of the first 
books of the Officers' Library series. Given that it was later nominated for the 1966 
Frunze Prize and its authorship was largely the same as that of the second and third 
editions, it can be regarded as enjoying high level approval and representing a sense of 
continuity. It repeated the assertion made in the 1962 edition about the potential 
importance of a surprise nuclear strike. However to this was now added, "At the 
same time, Soviet military doctrine takes into account the possibility of waging war 
127 Mochalov, V. 1964. "Types of War According to the Pentagon", Voennaya mysl', 9:86-90. 
128 Fedulov, M., Shemelev, M., Sinyayev, A and Lyutov, 1. 1964. "Problems of Modem Combined-
Arms Combat", Voennaya mys!', 10:28-9. This theme was still being echoed nearly a decade later. 
Grechko, AA 1972. On Guard Over the Peace and Building of Communism, Moscow: Voyenizdat, 
p.55 and Rodin, A 1972. "Increasing Anti-Tank Stability - A Trend of Modem Defence", Voennaya 
mysl~ 8:59. 
129 Golvchiner, B. 1964. "Encirclement and Annihilation of Groupings of Defending Troops", 
Voennaya mys[', 8:42-52; Dzhelaukov, Kh. 1966. "The Infliction of Deep Strikes", Voennaya mys[', 
2:47; Reznichenko, V. and Bob, Yeo 1966. "Consolidating a Gain in an Offensive Operation", 
Voennaya mysl', 3:47; Shkarubskiy, P. 1966. "Artillery Before and Now", Voennaya mys!', 2:51; 
Smimov, N. 1967. "An Engagement in Nuclear Warfare", Voennaya mys[', 9:48-9. 
130 Vasendin, N. and Kuznetzov, N. 1968. "Contemporary War and Surprise", Voennaya mysl', 6:45. 
131 Sushko N. and Tiuskevich, S.A 1965. Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army, Moscow: 
V oyenizdat. 
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with conventional weapons",132 while nuclear weapons would playa "decisive role, 
combined operations were also required". 
Zisk claimed to have been told that 1965 was the "key year" in the process of 
doctrinal revision by a retired General Staff officer whose position made him privy to 
such information133 and her chronological framework was supported by Raymond 
Garthoff.134 Zisk asserted that articles which later appeared in Voennaya Mysl' and 
General Staff Academy war games support this timing. 135 While this claim might well 
be accurate, the bulk ofthe strategic literature which appeared during the course of 
that year was conservative in tone and did not seem inclined to accept the 
conventional aspect. 136 The following decade and more witnessed a period of frenetic 
publication in the Soviet military press and something of a shift in the balance of 
opinions expressed. Those who favoured the notion of a potential conventional 
aspect came to enjoy first a parity, then a position of limited ascendancy, over their 
more conservative colleagues. Detailed comparison of consecutive editions of key 
texts adds weight to the argument that a significant doctrinal revision was ongoing at 
this time and that the proponents of modernisation were gradually attaining a more 
influential position. 
132 This section was reprinted in italics in the original Russian version, pp.337-8. 
I33 Zisk, Engaging the Enemy, p.74, n.143. 
134 Garthoff, R 1990. Deterrence and the Revolution in Soviet Military Doctrine. Washington D.C.: 
Brookings Institution, p.52, n. 7. 
135 Zisk, Engaging the Enemy, p.74, n.144, n.145 and n.146. 
136 Derevyanko, P. (ed.) 1964. Problems of the Revolution in Military Affairs, Moscow: Voyenizdat. 
Typeset immediately prior to Khrushchev's fall, this contained a number of articles previously 
contained in Kommunist vooruzhennykh sit and Krasnaya Zvezda. Boasting Malinovsky as one of its 
authors, it argued that a future war would definitely be nuclear and brief in character. Malinovsky 
reaffirmed this gloomy prediction in an individual piece entitled, "The Historic Exploits ofthe Soviet 
people and their Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War", Voennaya mysl', 1965. 5:27. 
Malyanchikov, S.V. 1965. "On the Nature of Armed Struggle in Localised Wars", Voennaya mys[', 
11: 12-24 refuted the notion that war in the European TVD could remain "local" and conventional. 
Lomov, N.A. 1965. "Vliyanie sovetskoi voennoi doktriny na razvitie voennogo iskusstva", 
Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, 21: 15-24, admitted the need for balanced forces, but anticipated 
nuclear war in which the initial period would be decisive. 
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Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army 
This text already possessed a history of playing the role of signalling new Soviet 
doctrinal stances. Its first edition in 1961 had detailed Khrushchev's radical initial 
stance. Its second edition in 1962 (with "Military Strategy") outlined the doctrinal 
refinement in the wake of the 22nd Party Congress. The fifth edition of "Marxism 
Leninism on War and the Army" 137 was published in 1968. The fact that it was felt 
necessary to update a Frunze Prize nomination a mere 32 months following its 
previous publication is offered as evidence that a significant doctrinal revision had in 
fact occurred. 138 Authored by chairs of such prestigious institutions as the Military 
Academy of the General Staff, Frunze, the Malinovsky Tank Academy and the Lenin 
Military Political Academy, its comments on the likely form a future war provided an 
interesting contrast to those contained within the previous edition of 1965. While the 
fourth edition had argued that a future global conflict would inevitably be nuclear in 
character, it was now stated that such a war might be nuclear. Although nuclear 
escalation was still posited to be the likely eventual outcome, "the possibility of 
conducting operations (does not stipulate "local" wars only) with conventional 
weapons,,139 was now acknowledged. Moreover the authors also stated that military 
doctrine was subject to change over time and that Soviet doctrine was currently 
undergoing a process of re-evaluation, although its principal aspects remained 
unaltered. Scott and Scott view this as "another confirmation of the modification 
which had first appeared around 1965: War might begin with the use of conventional 
weapons, but escalation was likely". 140 Subtle but significant alterations in 
phraseology were also apparent in the 1968 edition.141 The "special responsibility" 
137 Tiushkevich, S.A., Sushko, N. and Dzyuba, Ya. S. 1968. Marxism-Leninism on War and the 
Army, 5th ed., Moscow: Voyenizdat. 
138 MccGwire, Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy, pp.397-404. MccGwire believed that 
unlike the 3rd edition of Military Strategy, Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army, was not subject 
to last minute revision. He claimed that the "doctrinal revision" could thus be traced to the 
December 1966 Party Plenum. 
139 Sushko, Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army 5th ed., pp.350-1. 
140 Scott and Scott, Soviet Military Doctrine: Continuity, Formulation and Dissemination, p.48. 
141 MccGwire, Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy, pp.390-1. 
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previously accorded to the SRF was now devolved once more onto all branches of the 
Soviet military. "Contemporary war" replaced "nuclear war" in section headings and 
nuclear war was now posited as "a possibility" rather than, "inevitable". "War could 
begin as non-nuclear and then escalate to nuclear; in certain 
circumstances ... ( other) ... means of carrying out extended war" might be found. A 
section detailing the initial period of conflict as, "the time in which nuclear strikes will 
be carried out" was deleted. In apparent expectation of the potential for a prolonged 
conflict, more attention was devoted to the role of the economy. 
Methodological Problems of Military Theory & Practice 
Zheltov, Kondratkov and Khomenko edited the work of twenty authors in the 
Methodological Problems of Military Theory and Practice. 142 Published shortly after 
the 23rd Party Congress in 1966, it argued that Soviet strategy and attendant force 
structures should be prepared to respond to the contrasting requirements of both 
conventional and nuclear aspects of conflict. The second edition was published in 
1969. 143 Its authorship boasted contributions from twenty-four ofthe Soviet Union's 
leading strategic planners. l44 Kozlov provided a chapter for both editions. 145 
Comparison ofKozlov's contributions to both editions is instructive. In the second 
edition, far more attention was devoted to conventional weapons and they were 
clearly distinguished from their nuclear counterparts. Moreover, he argued that "the 
142 Zheltov, A.S., Kondratkov, T.R and Khomenko, Ye.A. (eds.) 1966. Methodological Problems of 
Military Theory and Practice. Moscow: Voyenizdat. 
143 Zheltov et al. 1969. Methodological Problems of Military Theory and Practice. Moscow: 
Voyenizdat. 
144 This in part explained its increase in size from 328 to 51Opp. 
145 Although his star was obviously rising - he was promoted immediately prior to the publication of 
both the first and second editions - Kozlov still felt the need to defend his ideas. In 1966, he 
authored an article in which he defended the study of "foreign" strategic concepts against the charge 
of seeking to emulate imperialists. This can be seen as evidence of the on-going debate within 
military circles concerning the efficacy of allowing the formulation of Soviet strategy to be influenced 
by Western innovations. Kozlov, S.N. 1966. "The Formulation and Development of Soviet Military 
Doctrine", Voennaya mysl', 7:57. 
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imperialists may for some time wage war without nuclear weapons". 146 The text as a 
whole was markedly less didactic in style and seemed to place a new emphasis upon 
the historical lessons provided by the Soviet experience during the Great Patriotic 
War. Perhaps the most dramatic volte face was that of one of the joint editors, 
Zheltov, who as late as 1967 had asserted that war would inevitably witness the use of 
nuclear weapons. 147 
Military Strategy 
MccGwire has argued that the third edition of Military Strategy was subject to last-
minute editorial adjustments, perhaps even after it had been sent for printing. 148 This 
task was helped by the fact that almost all ofthe changes involved the omission of 
past sections.149 The third edition contained "a number of amendments that touched 
on Soviet strategic concepts, and taken together, these implied a fundamental shift in 
underlying military doctrine". 150 MccGwire contrasted the articles co-authored by 
Marshal Sokolovsky and Major General Cherednichenko151 which were published in 
March 1966 and October 1968 respective1y.152 While the former made no specific 
146 Scott and Scott, Soviet Military Doctrine: Continuity, Formulation and Dissemination, pp.45-52 
for a full textual comparison. 
147 Zheltov, A.S. 1967. V.I Lenin and the Soviet Armed Forces, 1st ed., Moscow: Voyenizdat, 
pp.226-7. 
148 MccGwire, Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy, pp.387-96. 
149 Sent to the typesetters in late November 1966, it was not released to the printers until a full year 
later and was eventually published in 1968. In the third edition, the heavy emphasis on the 
importance of surprise and pre-emption was dropped; the notion of a "limited" war was discussed in 
detail while in the 2nd edition it had been disdainfully discounted and more attention was paid to the 
logistical and industrial requirements of a protracted struggle. 
150 MccGwire, Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy, p.387. 
151 It is instructive to compare Cherednichenko's 1968 offering to his subsequent solo works which 
were characterised by their rather cautious approach to the subject of a conventional option. 
Cherednichenko, M.l. 1970. "Features in the Development of Military Art", Voyenno-Istorichisky 
Zhurnal, 6:29 cited in Goldberg, New Developments in Soviet Military Strategy, p.l 0, n.29 and 
Cherednichenko, M.I. 1973. "Military Strategy and Military Technology", Voennaya mys[', 4:53 
cited in Zisk, Engaging The Enemy, p.n, n.134. 
152 Sokolovsky, V.D. and Cherednichenko, M. 1966. "On Contemporary Military Strategy", 
Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, 7 and Sokolovsky, V.D. and Cherednichenko, M. 1968. "Military 
Strategy and its Problems", Voennaya mysl', 5 cited in Hines, Petersen and Trulock, "Soviet Military 
Theory from 1945-2000: Implications for NATO", p.122 n.9. 
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mention of a potential conventional aspect in a future conflict, the latter stated that 
"military affairs are entering or have already entered the next stage of their 
development".153 Sokolovsky and Cherednichenko also contended that "the possibility 
is not excluded of wars occurring with the use of conventional weapons, as well as the 
limited use of nuclear means in one of several theatres of military action, or of a 
relatively protracted nuclear war with the use of capabilities of all types of armed 
forces" .154 This would seem to indicate something of a shift on the authors' part to 
include not only the conventional option, but also an early recognition of a concept of 
a limited nuclear exchange. In the style of classic Soviet strategy, it sought to prepare 
for all perceived eventualities. 
MccGwire has also highlighted the plethora of new editions of key military texts, 
many of which had only recently been updated. 155 A major contribution to the debate 
was made by General Zav'yalov. The author was a distinguished military strategist in 
his own right, who had contributed to Sokolovsky's Military Strategy. He had 
authored a rather cautious article in the wake of the 23rd Party Congress in July 1966 
which had concluded that escalation was inevitable in time. 156 Thus a nuclear 
warfighting capability was essential. 157 However, almost a year after the 23rd 
Congress, Zav'yalov produced a new study which, while it restated many traditional 
Soviet views, introduced some subtle and innovative nuances. Through the vehicle of 
criticism of "bourgeois strategists", he chided those who made a "fetish of nuclear 
weapons" and stressed the importance of a balanced force structure and strategic 
defence. Soviet military doctrine, he added, was currently being "enriched with new 
theses".158 Set against this rather innovative approach, Zav'yalov's 1971 article in 
153 Sokolovsky and Cherednichenko, "On Contemporary Military Strategy", p.40. 
154 Ibid., p.383. 
155 MccGwire, Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy, pp.400-5. 
156 Zav'yalov, 1. 1966. "The 23rd Party Congress and Questions Concerning the Further 
Consolidation of the armed Forces", Voennaya mysl', 7. 
157 On p.lO, he stated, "at this time, a consensus exists on the fundamental questions of military 
affairs." 
158 Zav'yalov, 1. "On Soviet Military Doctrine", Krasnaya Zvezda, 30 and 31 March 1967. This two-
part article was reproduced at the foot of pp.2 and 3 of the paper, a position identified by MccGwire 
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Voennaya myslf'S9 seems rather reactionary, restating as it did the primacy of nuclear 
weapons in a European TVD conflict which was assumed to possess a specifically 
nuclear character. The apparent volfe face on the part of both Zav'yalov and Zheltov 
is indicative of the fact that the strategic debate within Soviet circles was far from 
linear in its character and the position of individual analysts themselves changed over 
time. Indeed, a brief survey of related literature which emerged during the following 
decade serves to highlight an absence of unanimous acceptance of the implications of 
the doctrinal shift among key figures within the military elite. Increasing credence was 
afforded to the possibility of a conventional aspect in a future conflict by the support 
afforded to it by certain members of the military leadership. An article that was 
personally attributed to the Minister of Defence called upon Soviet forces to be able 
to meet the operational requirements of combat under either conventional or nuclear 
conditions,16O while no less a figure than Marshal Krylov, head of the SRF, 
acknowledged the possibility that future war might be initiated with a conventional 
introduction, "which might last for some time. "161 Marshal Y akubovsky, then 
Commander-in-Chief of Warsaw Pact force, stated that despite the constant threat of 
nuclear attack, operations could remain conventional. 162 
Evidence of the greater attention to the conventional aspect was also apparent in 
Soviet military exercises and their accompanying literature in the late 1960s. The 
"Dnepr" exercise in 1967 featured a conventional introduction and it was reported 
that both conventional and nuclear conditions should be simulated in such exercises. 163 
as the "usual location for major theoretical statements". In addition, MccGwire highlights the 
apparently related article by Admiral Gorshkov in Morskoy sbornik which for the first time since the 
"Revolution in Military Affairs", called for a balanced naval force capable of carrying out 
conventional operations. See MccGwire, Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy, pp.397 and 
399. 
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The "Dvina" exercise of 1970 also possessed a conventional aspect, though greater 
emphasis was placed upon the escalatory link between the conventional and nuclear 
phases. l64 Despite the gradual move towards recognition of the conventional 
possibility, Soviet commentators themselves admitted on several occasions during the 
next decade that heated debate continued at the highest echelons on the related 
questions of strategy and force structure. 165 
Diametrically opposing views appeared in high level publications for the rest of the 
1960s and well into the 1970s. Some articles stipulated that a future war would 
certainly be dominated by "decisive" nuclear weaponsl66 or would certainly escalate to 
involve their use, 167 while some went so far as enthusiastically to advocate their use. 168 
Others implicitly discounted the conventional option through omission, 169 while others 
assured their readers that escalation to the employment of "decisive" nuclear forces 
164 Erickson, J. 1971. Soviet Military Power, London: Royal United Services Institute, p.68. 
Interestingly, the only Soviet account which cast light upon the question of simulated nuclear 
employment during the Dvina exercise alluded to it by discussing landing forces following-up 
strategic nuclear strikes. Volkov, A.F. and Zapara, N. 1971. "The Scientific Revolution in Military 
Affairs", Kommunist vooruzhennylch sil, 2: 12. 
165 Dzhelaukov, Kh. 1967. "The Evolution of US Military Doctrine", Voennaya lnyS!', 9:94; 
Korotkov, I. 1973. "Some Questions on the History of Soviet Military Science", Voennaya mys!', 
11: 1 07; Zhakarov, M. V. (Khrushchev'S old adversary), 1976. "New Horizons ofthe Military Press", 
Voennaya mysl', 9:5. 
166 Poluboiarov, P. 1967. "The Armoured Troops ofthe Soviet Army", Voennaya mysl', 9:26-7; 
Azovtzev, N.N. 1971. V.L Lenin and Soviet Military Science, Moscow: Nauka, p.283; Skovorodkin, 
M. 1967. "Some Questions on the Co-ordination of Branches ofthe Armed Forces in Major 
Operations", Voennaya mysl', 2:36-7; Begunov, S. 1968. "The Manoeuvre of Forces and Materiel in 
an Offensive", Voennaya mysl', 5:42; Simonyan, R 1972. "The Development of Military 
Intelligence", Voennaya mys/', 8:74. The case of General I. Shavrov provides a fascinating insight 
into the complex and often contradictory evidence provided by the study of Soviet texts of the period. 
While he argued in "Soviet Operational Art", Voennaya mysl' 1973. 10: 11-12, that war within the 
European TVD would result in a decisive nuclear exchange, Zisk, Engaging the Enemy, p.69, n.l16 
highlights the fact that he was uniquely identified as one whose contribution to the Voroshilov 
Lectures had identified the conventional pause as a contingency which required study. Whether this 
indicates that such a scenario was intended to be considered in the more discreet surroundings of the 
Voroshilov Academy is unclear. 
167 Semenov, G. 1968. "The Content of the Concept of an Operation", Voennaya mys!', 1 :92. 
168 "The Tasks of Soviet Military Science in the Light ofthe Decisions of the 24th Party Congress", 
an unsigned editorial in Voennaya 1nys[' 1971. 8:8. 
169 Bondarenko, V.M. 1966. "Military Technical Superiority: The Most Important Factor of the 
Reliable defence of the Country", Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, 17; Shchedl'ov, V. 1966. 
"Camouflaging Troops During Regrouping and Manoeuvre", Voennaya mys[', 6:61; Kalashnik, M. 
1966. "Actual Questions ofIdeological Work in the Armed Forces", Voennaya mys[', 8:2; Ruban, M. 
1968. "The Strategic Forces of the Soviet Union and the Transition to a Communist Structure", 
Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, 13:80-1; Strokov, A.A. 1966. The History of Military Art. Moscow: 
Voyenizdat; Yepishev, A. 1968. "The Question of Moral-Political and Psychological Training of 
Troops", Voennaya mysl', 12:16. 
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was inevitable. By contrast, on rare occasions, enthusiastic proponents of the 
conventional-only option were apparent. 170 Indeed examples ofthis theoretical 
conflict also exist in microcosm, with contrasting views apparent in the same or 
consecutive publications of the same journal. I7l 
Despite this a general consensus can be discerned as having emerged over time. It 
was recognised that conventional operations were possible, though they would occur 
under the constant threat of escalation. 172 While some now recognised conventional 
and nuclear war as separate entities,173 escalation to nuclear employment was 
perceived as the eventual outcome of any conflict with the West. 174 A mere handful of 
sources contended that the conventional period could be maintained for a sustained 
period, although it was conceded that it might increase in duration as the US was 
170 Sidorov, P. 1969. "The Leninist Methodology of Soviet Military Science", Voennaya mysl', 4:26; 
Kurochkin, P. 1973. "A Chronicle of Heroism and Victories", Voennaya mysl', 4:53. 
171 Arushanian, B. 1966. "Combat Units by Tank Units Against Operational Defence Reserves", 
Voennaya mysl', 1:29-35 advocated the use of Soviet nuclear weapons to destroy NATO TNFs; 
Liyutov, I. 1966. "Some Problems of Defence Without the Use of Nuclear Weapons" Voennaya mysl', 
7 :36-46 advocated the use of conventional forces for this mission. Shakarubskiy, B. 1966. "The 
Artillery in Modern Combat Operations", Voennaya mys/', 6:61-66 and Shliapkin, A 1968. "Air 
Support of Ground Troops", Voennaya mys[', 8:35 clashed in a similar fashion on the most effective 
means of destroying NATO TNFs. 
172 Reznichenko, V. et aZ. (eds.), 1966. General Tactics: A Textbook, Moscow: Voyenizdat, p.ii; 
Reznichenko, "The Tendencies of the Development of Nuclear Battle", Krasnaya Zvezda, 28 June 
1967; Nikitin, M. 1968. "To Develop the art of Conducting Battles", Voyennyi vestnik, 10, pp.EE8-
14 FBIS trans.; Bondarenko, V.M. 1968. "The Modern Revolution in Military Affairs and Combat 
Readiness of the Armed Forces", Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, 24:29 cited in Scott and Scott, 
Soviet Military Doctrine: Continuity, Formulation and Dissemination, p.57, n.78.; Shtrik, S. 1968. 
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of Nuclear Weapons", Voennaya mysl', 1:53-5; Vorob'yev, I. "The Power of Fire and Armour: On the 
Role of Weapons and Equipment in the Victorious Outcome ofthe Great Patriotic War", Krasnaya 
Zvezda, 5 February 1970; lonin, G. and Kushch-Zharko, K. 1971. "Defence in the Past and the 
Present", Voennaya mysl', 7:62-75; Milovidov, AS. and Kozlov, V.G. 1971. The Philosophical 
Heritage o/V.I. Lenin and Problems o/Contemporary War. Moscow: Nauka, p.136; Strokov, AA. 
1971. Military History. Moscow: Voyenizdat, pp.340-5; Shkadov, I. 1973. "The Contemporary Art of 
Warfare and Some Questions on the Training of Military Personnel", Voennaya mysl: 11: 19 and 
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Voyenno-Istorichesky Zhurnal, 6:29; Ivanov, S.P. 1969. "Soviet Military Doctrine and Strategy", 
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attempting to increase NATO reliance upon conventional forces. 1?5 Soviet nuclear 
and conventional forces should thus be dovetailed to provide optimum levels of 
flexibility for military planners. 176 However the key role that would be accorded to 
nuclear weapons was such that the nuclear warfighting capabilities of the Soviet 
armed forces must be maintained as a matter of priority. I?? 
A conservative synthesis emerged in the strategic literature of the late 1960s. A 
conventional aspect to a future war was acknowledged to exist. However this 
acknowledgement was guarded, was not unanimously held and qualified with vital 
caveats. Major figures continued to challenge, undermine and on occasion directly 
refute it throughout the 1970s. Moreover there did not seem to exist widespread 
optimism that a conflict would remain conventional for a prolonged period. This was 
due to the belief that NATO would be forced to resort to escalation. The disparate 
response among NATO members to Flexible Response recurred in the wake of the 
Schlesinger Doctrine and served only to accentuate Soviet strategists' scepticism that 
escalation to nuclear employment could be avoided. 
Interviews conducted in the wake ofthe Soviet Union's demise serve to amplifY the 
notion that the issue of the likely nature of a future war led to considerable ferment 
within the upper echelons of the military itself Moreover they portray a process of 
175 Nepodayev, Yu. 1966. "On the Nuclear Threshold in NATO Strategy", Voennaya mysl', 6:70-2 
cited in Goldberg, New Developments in Soviet Military Strategy, p.ll, n.34. The timescale of 
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disengagement on the part of the political leadership in the formulation of military 
strategy and doctrine for the greater part of the Brezhnev era and beyond in vivid 
contrast to the traditional appraisal of the creation of Soviet strategic precepts in their 
classical form. Western analyses frequently identified defence minister Marshal 
Grechko as an ideological and strategic hardliner who was a late and somewhat 
reluctant convert to the merits of the SALT process. However it is apparent that 
none managed to gauge the true extent of his antipathy towards and suspicion ofthe 
West, nor of his unswerving adherence to a strategy of pre-emptive nuclear attack. 
Grechko was deeply opposed to the concept of graduated military responses and 
remained wedded to the notion of a massive pre-emptive strategic strike. He 
stridently attacked the notion of a second strike posture and its attendant ideological 
and technological ramifications. 178 Tolubko was similarly portrayed as "dying to push 
the button"L79 - an attitude he apparently retained throughout his service career. 
Grechko's opposition to mobile ICBMs and their associated strategic precept of 
assured retaliation placed him at odds with the political leadership and the proponents 
of strategic innovation within the General Staff. Grechko sought to block the 
development of mobile ICBMs which had been proposed by Yangel in the early 1960s 
and which enjoyed the support ofUstinov and the Defence Council. Furthermore he 
apparently disbanded the science committee of the SRF which had had the temerity to 
endorse the proposal. L80 
General-Colonel Illarionov spoke ofGrechko's continued preference for a "fust-
strike" policy which persisted even in the wake of the Defence Council's revision of 
nuclear strategy in 1969. Illarionov observed that he was "able to hold back much of 
L78 University of Edinburgh, Department of Defence Studies Archive, (limited access only), file 2. 
L79Ibid., file 2. 
L80 Ibid., file 2. The technical failure of the ensuing SS-15 programme ensured that the argument 
was at this stage merely academic. However it might reasonably be assumed that the ensuing 
development ofthe SS-16 and SS-20 systems in the near future brought this subject to the fore once 
again. Grechko's apparent failure to prevent continued attempts to develop mobile systems is in itself 
significant. 
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the Ministry of Defence and the technical analytical specialists in the military industries 
and military-political staff in making progress in improving systems and systems' 
survival. He overruled many, including the chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces who 
relied for his advice on his own military-technical committee. ,,181 Iu. A. Mozzhorin, 
the General Director ofTsNIIMash, spoke of his own temerity in seeking to intetject 
during the "silo debate" and the short shrift his views were afforded by Grechko, 
Ustinov, Chelomei and a number of other military industrialists. They deemed the 
quantitative advantages offered by the production of more missile systems a more 
effective utilisation of resources than the qualitative enhancement of strategic 
survivability engendered by silo basing. Mozzhorin similarly recounted the initial 
antipathy towards single-shot missile systems displayed by commanders who shared 
Grechko's Great Patriotic War vintage. Imbued with the traditions of Soviet artillery 
from which so many of the first generation ofSRF officers were drawn, they initially 
displayed deep scepticism as to the operational efficacy of such "cannon" that could 
fire but a single salvo without the capacity to reload. 182 
Dr Tsygichko, a Senior Analyst in the All-Union Scientific-Technical Institute for 
Systems Studies (VNIISI), has observed that while the effects of nuclear war were 
understood by the General Staff, Minister of Defence Ustinov "did not really 
comprehend" the full implications of such a scenario. 183 This assertion was supported 
by General-Colonel Danilevich of the General Staff. Danilevich recounted that 
Brezhnev and Kosygin were "visibly terrified" when presented with the results of 
computer models of the likely effects of a nuclear attack upon the Soviet Union. 
Danilevich recounted in sardonic fashion Brezhnev's visible unease when asked to 
push the button for a simulated ICBM as the exercise's culmination. "When the time 
came to push the button Brezhnev was visibly shaken and pale and his hand trembled 
and he asked Grechko several times for assurances that the action would not have any 
181 Ibid., file 2. 
182 Ibid., file 3. 
183 Ibid., file 1. 
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real-world consequences. 'Andrei Andrevich (Grechko), are you sure this is just an 
exercise?'" Given its potentially deleterious effects upon morale the results of the 
modelling procedure were subsequently altered to lessen the predicted impact of a 
mass nuclear strike and the report's conclusions were "buried". This position persisted 
until the early 1980s. 184 Indeed in the wake ofhis experience of 1972 Brezhnev 
studiously avoided undertaking a participatory role in the formulation of Soviet 
nuclear strategy. This approach was also adopted by his Politburo colleagues and 
extended to include Minister of Defence Ustinov following his accession to the post in 
1976. Moreover it continued to be the policy norm during the tenures of Andropov, 
Chernenko and Gorbachev. Danllevich supposed that in the event of conflict with the 
West the political leadership "would have become concerned and would have turned 
to people who, they would have hoped, had been thinking about what to do in the 
event of a strategic emergency". 185 
An excellent synopsis of unrivalled authority of the course and nature of the Soviet 
strategic revision was offered by General-Colonel Danilevich who contended that 
conservatism and realism returned to Soviet strategic analyses with the advent ofthe 
Brezhnev regime and were accompanied by an appreciation of the likely effects of 
nuclear conflagration. The advent of a Soviet SLBM force and the strengthening of 
the SRF as a whole combined with an interaction with evolving US strategic concepts 
to enable the development of more sophisticated strategic concepts by Soviet military 
planners. The role played by such Western concepts as Flexible Response or the 
Schlesinger Doctrine was rejected by Soviet theorists in their public pronouncements. 
Their effects in practical terms were however more readily apparent. Thus by the 
mid-1970s and despite the bombastic public statements by Grechko and his allies, the 
notion of an unrestrained response to any use of nuclear weapons against Soviet 
territory was increasingly tempered. A limited NATO tactical strike might thus have 
elicited a strategic strike of similar magnitude upon a specific target on US territory. 
1&4 Ibid., file 1. 
185 Ibid., file 1. 
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This was accompanied by the rise of the concept of a conventional introduction to a 
future conflict which was "officially documented" in the 1974-6 period. The possible 
duration of such a period increased from a matter of hours to 7-8 days to; in its final 
form, the advance to the Rhine, an operation which itself was calculated to last several 
weeks. Soviet planners were confident that their forces could prevail in such a 
conventional conflagration in the European TVD but anticipated an eventual 
escalation to the employment of strategic nuclear forces. 186 
It was claimed by one source that prior to the SALT era no serious research had been 
undertaken into concepts of strategic parity and mutual deterrence in the Soviet 
Union. 187 General-Colonel Illarionov stressed that there was no formal acceptance of 
the concept of deterrence on the part of the Soviet Union, and its attendant 
implications for strategic force structure which would have met with bitter opposition 
from entrenched sections of the military leadership, allied in common cause with the 
rocket design bureaux. Illarionov identified the extraordinary Defence Council 
meeting of July 1969 as the forum at which a revised strategic posture of "launch on 
warning" (otvetno-vstrechnyi udar) was adopted. Professor Mstislav Keldysh, the 
president of the Soviet Academy of Sciences and Brezhnev's most trusted adviser on 
matters of strategy, played a pivotal role in the formulation of his new strategy.188 
Tsygichko has argued that the Soviet Union's repeated rejection ofthe notion of 
deterrence I89 merely represented posturing for propaganda purposes. In his view the 
de facto acceptance ofthe principle of deterrence accompanied the Soviet Union's 
possession of its first ICBM systems in the mid-1960s. Even at this point it was 
recognised that either side might retain a retaliatory potential even following a 
surprise attack. This mutual fear served as the foundation for Soviet military policy 
from that point onwards - attempts to differentiate between ustrashenie and 
186 Ibid., file 1. 
187 Savel'yev and Detinov, The Big Five, pp.2 and 5. 
188 University of Edinburgh, Department of Defence Studies Archive, (limited access only), file 2. 
189 Soviet sources often differentiated between ustrashenie (terrorising, Western deterrence) and 
sderzhivanie (restraint, or morally correct, Soviet deterrence). 
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sderzhivanie were mere semantics according to Tsygichko. Tsygichko speculated that 
the Soviet political leadership would have sought to avert conflict through negotiation 
and would have been supported in such a course of action by the General Staff.190 
Such a belief accords with Danilevich's portrayal of Brezhnev's visceral fear of nuclear 
war. Tsygichko revealed the existence ofa plan during the 1960s and 1970s which 
detailed the means of retaliation in the event of a nuclear attack upon the Soviet 
Union. The plan wa..'> updated every six months and detailed a "launch on warning" 191 
(of an impending attack) policy employing all available Soviet silo-based systems. 
This annihilating retaliatory strikel92 would have been directed against US and 
Western European military and politico-economic targets. NATO strategic systems 
were not themselves deemed likely targets as it was assumed that they would already 
have been launched against the Soviet Union itself 193 
Thus MccGwire's assertion that the months spanning the end of 1966 and beginning of 
1967 contained a dramatic defining moment for the formulation of Soviet doctrine 
which led to a sudden break with past concepts and a consensual adoption of the new 
precepts l94 is undermined by close inspection ofpublished Soviet texts and the 
accounts subsequently offered by high-ranking former officials. Rather it is apparent 
that proponents of both doctrinal stances felt able to present the merits of their 
respective positions both prior to the Central Committee Plenum of December 1966 
and beyond. However, Zisk's criticism ofMccGwire's attempt to portray these 
developments as a "sea change"195 should be somewhat tempered. Although 
MccGwire claimed that a new and well-defined doctrinal stance was adopted at this 
time, he did not claim that all related debate would immediately cease as a 
190 University of Edinburgh, Department of Defence Studies Archive, (limited access only), tile 5. 
191 otvetno-vstrechnyi udar. 
192 unichtozhayushchii otvetno-yadernyi udar. 
193 University of Edinburgh, Department of Defence Studies Archive, (limited access only), file 5. 
194 MccGwire, Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy, p.400. 
195 Zisk, Engaging the Enemy, p.74. 
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consequence.196 Much - though not all- ofthe ensuing debate which Zisk portrays as 
undermining MccGwire's analysis could be portrayed in this fashion. Moreover, 
MccGwire himself admitted that even in the wake of the accession of the conventional 
concept to a position of primacy, Soviet doctrine did not conclude that avoidance of 
escalation in a future world war was likely, let alone guaranteed. 197 He sought to 
explain the not-infrequent publication of articles and speeches in the post-1967 period 
which seemed to defY his perceived new orthodoxy as an anomalous legacy which 
would be rectified in time as Soviet strategy and theatre force structure evolved to 
meet the requirements of the new doctrine. 198 However, this does not fully explain the 
host of dissenting doctrinal claims which emanated from high level sources in the 
years following 1967. The character ofthis debate would seem to reaffirm the notion 
that the higher echelons felt both the need and freedom to express their views on tins 
contentious issue of great magnitude. 
From the middle of the 1960s, there began a process of doctrinal reconsideration from 
wInch emerged a conservative synthesis of new and existing strategic concepts. The 
possibility that a future conflict might entail some form of conventional introduction 
was generally accepted. 199 However, the expected chronological timescale of the 
former and the geographical magnitude of the latter were both perceived as limited 
and escalation to nuclear use was viewed as being inevitable in the medium-to-Iong 
term by the vast majority of Soviet planners. A potential avenue through which to 
196 As MccGwire himself noted when discussing the military's attempts to dilute the effects of 
Khrushchev's new doctrine in the previous decade, "the fuct that it was a doctrinal decision did not 
mean that all the loose ends were tied up; there was ample room for argument about implications for 
force structure." MccGwire, Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy, p.22. 
197 "It seems unlikely that their formal plans have ever assumed that the odds of avoiding an 
intercontinental exchange were as good as even." MccGwire, Militmy Objectives in Soviet Foreign 
Policy, p.34. Berman and Baker offered a prescient appraisal of the implications for Western 
planners of the Soviet strategic revision. Soviet Strategic Forces, p.35. 
198 Ibid., pA05. 
199 The tempo of the turnover in personnel in the highest echelons of the Soviet military was 
heightened in the latter part ofthe 1960s. The influx of technically-proficient officers ofa younger 
generation may have helped - at least in part - to facilitate the acceptance of the implications of the 
new doctrinal stance. See Erickson, J. "Rejuvenating the Soviet High Command", Milttmy Review, 
50(7):83-4 and Erickson, J. 1971. Soviet Military Power, pp.17-22. 
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undermine this theory's foundations was the down playing of the likelihood or 
expected timespan of a conventional element in the strategic extrapolation of the 
doctrinal pronouncements to such a degree that it bore marginal relevance to military 
planning. Many pursued this line of attack and the related one of omission of 
discussion of the conventional aspect~ but a significant number of high-ranking 
military men chose to overtly contradict the new doctrine on a number of occasions 
without apparent fear of punitive action. Despite this reaction a significant revision of 
Soviet theatre strategy did occur during this period, a revision which placed 
concomitant operational demands upon theatre forces, most especially TNFs. 
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Theatre Strategy and Force Requirements 
Strategic Requirements of the Revised Doctrine 
Under the previous doctrinal regime, Soviet theatre nuclear strategy had possessed a 
rudimentary characteristic. From the initial stage of the nuclear era until after 
Khrushchev's demise, the role ofTNFs was straightforward and unquestioned. The 
anticipated employment of nuclear weapons en masse from the outset of hostilities 
was an area of consensus between Khrushchev and his opponents within the military. 
Immediate TNF use was viewed as a/ait accompli and study was thus devoted to 
how they might be employed to greatest strategic effect in the face of a growing array 
of NATO TNFs and the emergent Chinese nuclear potential. It should be stressed 
that even in the wake ofthe doctrinal shift in the late 1960s, a conventional 
introduction to a future conflict was viewed as only one of several potential scenarios 
and was expected to be of a transitory nature, succeeded in a matter of days by 
escalation to nuclear exchanges.2OO However, Soviet military planners were faced 
with the challenge of developing a theatre strategy which would meet the 
requirements of the more sophisticated doctrinal stance. In a highly innovative 
fashion, they sought to do so through the reversal of mission allocations among Soviet 
theatre forces as a whole, thus formulating a strategy which drew heavily upon the 
Soviet tradition oflargescale offensive strikes, deep into enemy territory. 
By the mid 1970s, Soviet strategy had identified six distinct types of military 
engagement. Of the six, only two referred to war between the West and countries of 
the Warsaw Pact organisation: 
200 Wardak, G.D. with Turbiville, G. (ed.) 1989. The Voroshilov Lectures: Materialsfrom the Soviet 
General StafJAcademy. Washington D.C.: National Defence University Press, pp.68-78. 
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P general nuclear war between the two antagonistic 
(Capitalist and Socialist) world social systems, using 
all types of weapons; 
- war between several Capitalist and Socialist nations 
conducted using conventional weapons and subsequent 
initiation of the limited use of nuclear weapons.201 
Soviet strategy posited that each type of war possessed particular characteristics and 
required individual study. In the case of war between the two opposing blocks being 
initiated solely through conventional means, the following strategic principles were 
expected to apply: 
When strategic action is initiated with the employment of conventional 
weapons, the basic method of its execution will be the accomplishment of 
missions in successive phases. Under such circumstances, the principal 
strategic tasks of the Armed Forces will be: 
- weakening enemy nuclear forces and destroying the main 
groupings of amled forces that are deployed in the 
TSMA; 
- destroying enemy air force groupings to seize air 
superiority; 
- seizing important areas and ground objectives and 
foiling enemy mobilisation and attempts to raise 
reserves; 
- covering friendly armed forces groupings and rear 
service objectives against enemy air and space attacks. 
201 Ibid., p.69. 
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In conducting a war using only conventional weapons, the following would 
become important for the successful conduct of strategic action in the war: 
- rapid destruction of enemy air force groupings at the 
beginning of the war; 
- seizure of the strategic initiative and its retention 
during the war; 
- decisive destruction of enemy groupings of forces 
deployed in the TSMA; 
- seizure and occupation of vital operational and 
strategic areas in enemy territory. 
The seizure of the strategic initiative and the accomplishment of assigned 
missions in a conventional war can be ensured by launches of heavy air strikes 
on enemy air fields and control means, air battles, decisive attacks of Ground 
Forces on the main direction, in co-ordination with naval and the pyas 
Forces, and rapid and bold actions of airborne assault landing forces. 202 
The principal focus of revision was the reallocation of the task of the preventative 
destruction of enemy TNFs, from Soviet TNFs to Soviet conventional forces. This 
was now designated as the principal strategic task of Soviet conventional forces 
during the non-nuclear phase of operations. 203 Working in conjunction with 
reconnaissance and intelligence units, Soviet conventional forces were charged with 
the responsibility for locating enemy TNFs and ensuring their rapid destruction.204 
The strategy was designed to call upon the combined weaponry assets of Soviet 
conventional forces, to mount a swift and all-embracing co-ordinated offensive on the 
202 Ibid., pp.237-8. 
203 Meyer, Soviet Theatre Forces, Part 1: Development of Doctrine and Objectives, p.25, n.87. 
204 Ibid., n.88. 
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central European front. The Soviet conventional offensive was to be cohesive and 
well-orchestrated, "the action of friendly forces should be as dynamic and decisive as 
possible to foil enemy attempts and efforts in seeking to engage friendly forces in 
heavy and intense combat. Attempts should be made to destroy enemy forces before 
they can fully deploy. Rapidly cutting enemy forces into pieces, isolating enemy 
individual groupings and individual strategic areas and countries, and foiling enemy 
actions to move reserves from the rear or overseas areas are of significant 
importance".205 
Target acquisition for Soviet theatre strategic missions was predicated strictly upon 
the level of priority accorded to their destruction. 
Group I: Nuclear Means of Strategic Function 
MRBM and IRBM 
SSB and SSBN and bases 
Long-range strike aircraft and bases 
Nuclear storage sites 
Strategic C3 facilities 
Group II: Nuclear Means of Operational and Operational-
Tactical Function 
Tactical aviation and aircraft-carrier aviation and 
bases. 
Short-range cruise and ballistic missiles 
Nuclear storage depots 
CJ 
205 Wardak, Voroshilov Lectures, p.311. 
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Group III: 
Ground force formations 
Strategic and operational reserve concentrations 
Stores of non-nuclear ammunition, weapons 
POL 
Naval bases 
Group IV: 
Au' defence airfields 
Air defence missile complexes 
Group V: 
Military-industrial objectives 
Political-administrative centres 
Transportation nodes206 
206 Dzhelaukov, Kh. 1966. "The blfliction of Deep Strikes", Voennaya mysl', 2 and Kutakhov, P.S. 
1973. "Air Forces in the Past and Present", Voennaya mysl', 10. Source: Meyer, Soviet 111eatre 
Forces, Part 1: Development of Doctrine and Objectives, p.26, n.92. 
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Operations against these target sets would take the following forms: 
Aerial bombardment 
Massed air strikes would have played a pivotal role in Soviet attempts to nulliiY 
NATO's TNF force stmcture with conventional means.207 They would have been 
directed against the ftrst echelon of targets which consisted of bases housing NATO 
TNFs and C3 capabilities.20s The imp011ance of strikes against the latter increased 
over time as improvements in early warning systems and the enhancement of TNF 
mobility and response capabilities reduced the vulnerability ofthe weapons themselves 
to direct attack.209 Attacks against tactical nuclear forces and their attendant ancillary 
forces would have been mounted in tandem with strategic nuclear strikes, or as soon 
as available forces allowed.2 !o The strategic significance of these targets was such that 
the entire complement of Soviet Long Range Aviation and Frontal Aviation forces 
would have been exclusively devoted to their destmction, despite the temporary 
neglect of the latter's traditional role of ground support that such a policy might have 
entailed.211 
207 Wardak, Voroshilov Lectures, p.311. 
208 Bryukhanov, Yu. 1969. "The Massed Employment of Aircraft", Voennaya mysl', 6; Kravchenko, 
A. 1966. "Trends in the Development of Military Aviation", Voennaya mysl', 66:42-3; Lyutov, K. 
1966. "Some Problems of Defence Without the Use of Nuclear Weapons", Voennaya mysl', 7:36-46 
and Lyutov, K. 1972. "Massing of Forces and Weapons in the Course of Combat Actions", Voennaya 
mys/', 11; Vershinin, K. 1967. "The Development of the operational Art ofthe Soviet Air Force", 
Voennaya mysl', 6; Shtrik, "The Encirclement and Destruction of the Enemy During Combat 
operations Not Involving the Use of Nuclear Weapons", p.59; Semenov, N. 1968. "Gaining 
Supremacy in the Air", Voennaya mys/', 4; Kutakhov, P.S. 1973. "The Air Force in the Past and 
Present", Voennaya mys/', 7; Korobkov, P. 1973. "Dispersed Basing of Aviation Under Conditions of 
Waging Modern War", Voennaya mysl', 11. Source: Meyer, Soviet Theatre Forces, Part I: 
Development of Doctrine and Objectives, p26, n.89. 
209 Dzhelaukov, Kh. 1966. "The Infliction of Deep Strikes", Voennaya mys/', 2; Semeyko, L. 1968. 
"Methodology of Detennining the Correlation of Nuclear Forces", Voennaya mysl', 8; Smirnov, N. 
1967. "A Meeting Engagement in Nuclear Warfare", Voennaya mys/', 9; Tarakanov, K.V. 1974. 
Mathematics and Armed Combat. Moscow: Voyenizdat; Sidorenko, A.A. 1970. The Offensive, 
Washington, DC: USGPO. Source: Meyer, Soviet Theatre Forces, Part L Development of Doctrine 
and Objectives, p26, n.90. 
210 Dzhelaukov, "The Infliction of Deep Strikes"; Kutakhov, "The Air Force in the Past and Present". 
211 Meyer, Soviet Theatre Forces, Part I: Development of Doctrine and Objectives, p.26, n.94. See 
also Sokolovsky, Military Strategy. 
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These operations were intended to shift the balance of TNF forces towards the Soviet 
Union and to provide air superiority to help facilitate the ground forces drive 
westwards: 
gaining air superiority is of particular significance ... the most important 
element of the strategic operation is the air operation to destroy or weaken 
enemy aviation groupings and destroy enemy nuclear rocket forces deployed 
in TSMA.212 
Ground attack 
A largescale incursion into NATO territory by ground forces was designed to occur in 
tandem with the aerial bombardment. Artillery and tactical missiles were entrusted 
with the task of further undermining NATO defences213 to help facilitate the advance 
of armoured divisions and motorised rifle troops. As with the aerial attack TNFs were 
deemed to be the prime targets of the ground forces' advance. Destruction of NATO 
TNFs would have been accorded priority over all other potential targets.214 Airborne 
special forces were expected to playa key role in storming NATO TNF facilities and 
ensuring their destruction.215 
Naval operations 
A similar strategy would have been pursued at sea as Soviet forces sought to detect 
and destroy SLBM-armed submarines and aircraft-carriers with nuclear-armed 
aircraft. Once again, such attacks would have been carried out with specifically 
212 Wardak, Voroshilov Lectures, p.262. 
213 Meyer, Soviet Theatre Forces, Part 1: Development of Doctrine and Objectives, p.27, n.9S. 
214 Ibid., n.96-9. 
215 Ibid., n.l00. 
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conventional weapons- in this instance, torpedoes and cruise missiles. The Soviet 
navy's own aviation forces would have played an integral role in such a mission. 
TNFs' role during conventional operations 
Soviet TNFs' role during this phase of operations was to deter NATO escalation for 
the maximum period, thus allowing Soviet conventional forces the opportunity to 
make deep inroads into NATO territory. Ideally, this would enable Soviet 
conventional "seal'ch and destroy" missions against NATO TNFs to turn the theatre 
nuclear balance increasingly in the Soviet Union's favour. Ideally, the Soviet Union 
might come to acquire a near-monopoly in TNFs. Realistically, the most it could hope 
for was to achieve a significant advantage in the balance of such forces and dissuade 
or delay their employment by NATO due to the "intermingling" of ground forces 
which might result from a deep tluust into NATO territory by Soviet armoured and 
infantry divisions. The realisation of any one - or combination - of these scenarios 
would however have afforded the Soviet Union a considerable strategic advantage. 
The conventional period would be "characterised by the need to maintain high combat 
readiness of strategic nuclear forces as well as units and large units offront 
operational-tactical rocket troops for the rapid deployment of nuclear weapons, 
should it become necessary."216 
Escalation to TNF employment 
General Danilevich noted that consideration ofthe practical aspects of conducting 
continued military operations under nuclear conditions forced revision of the existing 
"naive expectation" of advance at a rate of lOOkm per day. Such deliberations were 
216 Wardak, Voroshilov Lectures, p.239. Similar sentiments were expressed on p.31!. 
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the preserve of a mere handful of officers within the General Staff itself. "Such 
planning was not widely discussed, even within the General Staff. Major commands 
such as the SRF were not normally involved in this level of planning, and the various 
institutes outside direct General Staff oversight definitely were not included in such 
discussions and analyses. "217 This assertion was implicitly supported by the professed 
ignorance of a leading member of such an institution of the existence of planning for 
such a contingency. Dr Tsygichko of the Academy of Sciences has claimed that while 
Soviet declaratory policy called for continued operations under nuclear conditions "in 
practice the General Staff did no actual planning beyond the initial exchange of 
nuclear weapons on a tactical or operational scale. 11218 
Escalation to the nuclear level was considered a near-certain eventual outcome of a 
conventional introduction by the overwhelming majority of Soviet planners. Those 
who continued to argue during the 1970s that war would immediately assume a 
nuclear character were few in number. They did however, heavily outweigh the 
handful at the opposite end of the spectrum who posited that a conflict could be 
fought at the conventional level for its entire duration. It was expected that in the face 
of a Warsaw Pact westward drive, the weakness of NATO's conventional forces 
would force escalation. Such a view was shared by many Western analysts and 
seemed to be reinforced by the form of NATO exercises during this period. The 
Voroshilov Lectures warned that while operations might escalate rapidly beyond the 
nuclear threshold as an enemy faced the prospect of being overwhelmed, their 
devastating effect might, conversely, delay their employment. While the duration of 
the conventional period would be determined by the interaction of a number of factors 
the evidence of recent NATO exercises was claimed to indicate a likelihood of 
escalation on the part of NATO after five or six days of co nflict. 219 
217 University of Edinburgh, Department of Defence Studies Archive, (limited access only), file 1. 
218 Ibid., file 5. 
219 Wardak, Voroshilov Lectures, pp.74, 238 & 312. Levadov L. and Viktorov, v. "NATO's Training 
Manoeuvres; A Threat To Peace", Zarubezhnoe Voyennoe Obozrenie, no.7, July 1984, pp.3-9 stated 
that NATO might not be forced to resort to escalation or face the loss of their TNFs for 10-15 days. 
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It was thus concluded that, 
It is not likely that strategic operations in the European TSMAs will be 
conducted for the duration of the war without using nuclear weapons. There 
is every indication that a war initiated in European TSMAs with conventional 
weapons will transform into a nuclear war at a certain stage.220 
Against this backdrop, the process of escalation came to hold a position of vital 
strategic significance. The optimal moment for escalation was perceived to lie 
immediately prior to a decisive enemy TNF employment. The responsibility for 
adjudging the arrival ofthis crucial moment was accorded to the skill of the Soviet 
politicalleadership.221 
Transition to combat action using nuclear weapons is a profound, 
fundamental, and qualitative change in the conduct of strategic operations, and 
requires tremendous initiative on the part of the Supreme High Command and 
all commanders and staffs in the proper assessment of the situation, so that 
time is not lost and the enemy is not allowed to act before friendly forces. All 
nuclear delivery means must be prepared to strike on time, and their missions 
in launching the initial nuclear strike must be reconfirmed. The missions of co-
ordinating operational formations and large units must be adjusted and 
measures taken to protect troops against enemy nuclear strikes. All ofthese 
task should be accomplished in the shortest possible time. 222 
This was in marked contrast to Soviet estimates of the late 1960s and early 1 970s, when 3-5 days was 
considered the norm. 
220 Wardak, Voroshilov Lectures, p.262 
221 Meyer, Soviet Theatre Forces, Part I: Development of Doctrine and Objectives, p.27, n.103. 
n.104, n.105. 
222 Wardak, Voroshilov Lectures, p.313. See also Pavlovsky, l.O. "The Art of Controlling a Modern 
Combined-Arms Battle", Krasnaya Zvezda, 6 March 1970 and Samurokov, D. 1971. "On the 
Question of Foresight", Voennaya mysl', 9:27-40 for a discussion of the difficulties and importance of 
anticipating enemy escalation to nuclear employment. 
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The absence of effective protection from a massed US strike placed a heavy premium 
upon successful Soviet pre-emption. However, the prolonged preparation times 
required by the first generation of Soviet missile systems militated against the ready 
employment of such a strategy. This problem was largely overcome223 by the 
development of markedly more responsive systems in the late 1960s. This has led 
some Western analysts to argue that while the Soviet military had "in the mid-1950s 
developed a concept of pre-emptive action as a response to an imminent and 
irrevocable enemy decision to attack. .. {it) ... was largely, ifnot entirely superseded in 
the latter 1960s by the concept of launch on warning or under attack. "224 By the end 
of the 1960s, the Soviet Union did possess ICBM systems whose storable fuels 
endowed them with a time-urgent responsiveness which could utilise the 5-10 minutes 
warning time afforded by the Riga array radar. Whether this simply allowed the 
Soviet Union to fulfil its previously-stated policy of pre-emption or led to its adoption 
of refined variant225 remains a matter of some contention, even within the former 
upper echelons of Soviet military planners.226 The characteristics of a "launch-on-
warning" policy were clearly evident in articles (one of which was authored by the 
commander of the SRF) in the immediate pre-SALT era. 227 The US SALT 
negotiating team later forwarded a document from the US Secretary of Defence to 
their Soviet counterparts. It contained a disavowal of the notion of !'launch-on-
warning" and described it as a flawed and potentially destabilising policy option. An 
invitation to provide a similar assurance was met with a stony silence; ostensibly as it 
223 The quality and extent of radar coverage later became the principal limiting factor in the Soviet 
Union's response potential. 
224 GarthoiI, Deterrence and the Revolution in Soviet Military Doctrine, pp.77-8. 
225 As alluded to by Garthoff, ibid., p78 and elsewhere indentified by a leading Soviet military 
planner as "a retaliatory-meeting strike" [otvetno-vstrechnyi udal',] wherein Soviet missiles were 
expected to pass their (previously-launched) US counterparts in mid-flight. 
226 In marked contrast to the line of interpretation offered by his former colleague General 
Danilevich categorically stated that the terms "first use" and "pre-emptive" were synonymous. 
227 Krylov, "The Nuclear Missile Shield of the Soviet State", p.20. See also Vasendin N. and 
Kuznetsov, N. 1968. "Contemporary War and Surprise", Voennaya mys[', 6 and Ivanov, S.P. 1969. 
"Soviet Military Doctrine and Strategy", Voennaya mysf, 5. 
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lay outwith the remit of the SALT process. The fact that it formed an integral part of 
Soviet strategy was an additional cause of their reticence. 
As General-Colonel Danilevich himself highlighted Soviet strategy underwent 
something of a revision throughout the second half of the 1970s. While previously 
any strategic attack upon the Soviet Union would have elicited a maximal response, 
significant attention was increasingly devoted to the concept of limited nuclear 
options. Despite this, any attack upon Soviet territory which employed nuclear 
weapons possessed unpredictable attendant risks, especially if Soviet C3 posts were a 
principal target grouping. General Gareev confIrmed that a "symbolic" US strike, 
such as those posited against Soviet radar stations north of the Arctic Circle, would 
have been interpreted as an attempt to "decapitate" Soviet C3 capabilities as a prelude 
to a strategic attack and could well have elicited a full-scale Soviet response.228 Soviet 
strategy perceived the delivery of the fIrst largescale TNF strike as the decisive 
determinant of the outcome of conflict with West. The dismissal of the strategic 
importance of an isolated or limited NATO employment ofTNFs229 would have fatally 
undermined any "political signalling" intention on the prot of NATO. Ironically, it 
might well have elicited a full-scale Soviet TNF response instead.230 Once nuclear 
hostilities had commenced - whether from the outset or in the wake of a conventional 
introduction - Soviet TNFs would have been employed against Group I and Group II 
targets. The urgency with which their destruction was sought during a conventional 
conflict was replicated under nuclear conditions. MRBMs and IRBMs were 
specilically designed to carry out strategic strikes within the European and Far 
Eastern TVDs. They would have been supported by those SLBMs and ICBMs 
designated to a theatre role. In marked contrast to NATO's incremental policy of 
escalation, Soviet TNF employment would have been characterised by its far greater 
228 University of Edinburgh, Department of Defence Studies Archive, (limited access only), file 6. 
229 Meyer, Soviet Theatre Forces, Part L Development of Doctrine and Objectives, p.2S n. 106 and 
107. 
230 Ibid., p.30 for a strongly-argued portrayal of this view. It is restated in slightly less strident terms 
in the Wardak, Voroshilov Lectures, p.74. 
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scale, rapidity and the mounting of operations against targets of prime strategic 
importance from the very outset of operations. 
In general nuclear war, important missions are accomplished by nuclear 
weapons, primarily by strategic nuclear forces that will be used simultaneously 
throughout the entire territory of the enemy coalition. Consequently, military 
action will assume a continental form. .. The principal form for the conduct of 
nuclear war is the infliction of massive losses by nuclear strikes on the enemy's 
military and economic base and armed forces throughout his entire territory.231 
Centrally authorised and directed by the General Staff from MOSCOW,232 strategic TNF 
missiles233 were expected to play the principal role in attacking NATO TNFS.234 
However their actions were intended to be complemented by supporting missions 
undertaken by other service branches, in accordance with the Soviet tradition of 
'mixed' force operations. 
The essence of the need to unifY the efforts of the Armed Forces lies in the 
fact that the achievement of the final aim of strategic action is only possible 
through co-ordinated action of operational formations and large units of all 
Services of the Armed Forces ... Each element plays a specific role and occupies 
a certain position by virtue of its combat capabilities and methods of 
conducting strategic actions.235 
231 Ibid., p.71. See also Meyer, Soviet Theatre Forces, Part I: Development of Doctrine and 
Objectives, p.30. 
232 Meyer, Soviet Nuclear Options, p.527. 
233 In this context - and in marked contrast to their stance at the SALT negotiations - Soviet 
defmitions were predicated upon weapon systems' range: 
"tactical nuclear" = <150km 
"operational-tactical" = 150-1,OOOkm 
"strategic theatre" = + 1 ,OOOkm 
234 Wardak, Voroshilov Lectures, p.242. 
235 Ibid. 
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Subsidiary TNFs were expected to playa supporting role to the principal strategic 
TNFs. Given their relatively short flight-times, SLBMs were viewed as an effective 
means of destroying "soft" mainland targets. Operational-tactical missiles and cruise 
missiles launched from submarines and surfuce ships were intended to provide target 
coverage of those Group I and Group II targets remaining in the wake of the strategic 
TN}'s' initial salvo. Ifnecessary, nuclear-armed aircraft might be called upon to 
perform support operations and would be expected to prove particularly effective 
against mobile or camouflaged targets. Soviet conventional forces were expected to 
playa key role in the destruction of enemy air forces and the seizure of enemy 
territory.236 Such a strategy placed stringent operational demands upon Soviet 
strategic TNFs. They were required to respond instantaneously in the face of 
imminent NATO escalation and possess the ability to inflict accurate strikes against a 
varied - and perhaps, rapidly changing - array of targets within their own and 
neighbouring TVDs. The Soviet TNFs of the latter 1960s were singularly ill-equipped 
to meet this challenge. 
236 Ibid. 
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3 Soviet Theatre Nuclear Force Potential and the Lineage of the SS-20 
The manifest deficiencies which were apparent in the operational potential of the 
Soviet Union's theatre nuclear forces by the end ofthe 1960s have often been 
proffered as a key explanatory factor in the decision to develop and deploy the 88-20. 
The introduction of the S8-20 signalled the phased withdrawal of the 88-4 and S8-5 
systems which had served as the backbone of the Soviet TNF since their deployment 
in the late 1950s and early 1960s. It also removed the need for the continued 
diversion of the 88-11 ICBM to a theatre role. However such an apparently smooth 
and unremarkable transition masked the complex interaction of R&D and political 
machinations which had provided the backdrop to Soviet missile development during 
the preceding two decades. 
With near-absolute unanimity Western sources portrayed the 88-20 as being 
possessed of a long and rather checkered lineage of system deVelopment whose 
progenitors had all emanated from the Nadiradze Bureau and could be traced back to 
the late 1950s. The modular evolution ofthe two-stage SS-20 from the three-stage 
S8-16 was viewed as an attempt to develop a technically-viable IRBM from an 
unsuccessful ICBM project. This was portrayed as a replication of the pre-existing 
production practice established during the development of a previous generation of 
Nadiradze designs. What distinguished the 8S-20 was its technical viability which 
stood in marked contrast to that of the 8S-14 and 88-15. 80viet claims that the third 
generation ICBM, the 88-25, which emerged in the 1980s was a direct derivative of 
the first generation S8-13 served only to reinforce the perception that three 
generations of solid fuel missile designs had emanated from the Nadiradze Design 
Bureau. 
This belief formed the cornerstone of Western analyses of the Nadiradze Design 
Bureau's role in the history of Soviet solid filel missile development. To the notion of 
99 
a "family" of Nadir adze designs was added the assertion that this particular bureau had 
been endowed with a monopolistic status within Soviet attempts to develop this 
particular type of fuel propellant. However new evidence which has recently emerged 
fi'om a number of diverse and authoritative Russian sources has served fatally to 
undermine this longstanding portrayal of the course of Soviet development efforts in 
this field of rocket research and has led to a dramatic re-evaluation of the SS-20's 
technical "lineage" and its relation to other missile systems. Moreover they portray 
the backdrop of the Nadiradze Design Bureau's initial forays into the development of 
longer range systems as having been accompanied by a degree of intra-elite rivalry and 
dissonance that has been identified by very few Western analyses. 
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SS-4, SS-5 and SS-11. 
The Yangel Design Bureau was responsible for the design and production of the 
Soviet Union's early TNFs. They owed much of their characteristics to the German 
V -2 missile on which they were closely modelled. Following small-scale deployments 
of the SS-1 and SS-3 systems, the SS-4 and SS-5 were the first Soviet TNFs to go 
into mass production and they came to form the backbone ofthe Soviet Union's TNFs 
until their replacement by the SS-20 a decade and a halflater. Initial deployment of 
the SS-4 began in 1959 and the majority ofthe c.550-600 units finally deployed were 
in place by 1962. The SS-5 was a close derivative of the SS-4 with an enhanced 
range of c.2,500nm and its deployment proceeded in 1961. Both systems were one-
stage, single-RV237 missiles powered by liquid fuel. Only 97 SS-5s were eventually 
deployed, most probably due to the fact that few strategic targets lay outwith the SS-
4's c.1 ,200nm range. When used in tandem the SS-4/SS-5 force allowed target 
coverage throughout the entire European TVD, while those based in the East of the 
Soviet Union could be directed towards China and US targets in the Mediterranean 
and the Middle East. The comparable US TNFs the Thor and Jupiter missile systems 
were deactivated by 1963 and were superseded in their role in May of that year by the 
diversion of five Polaris-armed U8 submarines to NATO's defence. The vulnerability 
of Soviet TNFs to NATO attack was further accentuated in the following year as the 
Polaris A-3 missile entered service offering increased accuracy and multiple 
warheads. 238 
The 8S-4/88-5 force was endowed with the requisite range to provide target 
coverage of air bases and missile sites throughout the European TVD and retained 
237 Re-entry vehicle. 
238 Berman, R.P. and Baker lC. 1982. Soviet Strategic Forces: Requirements and Responses. 
Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, p.59. 
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such a theoretical operational potential until their eventual decommissioning. 239 
However their inherent unreliability and slow response times significantly detracted 
from their operational performance to such an extent that their strategic utility had 
been radically diminished by the late 1960s. Although he was quick to acknowledge 
the mUltiplicative uncertainties involved in such calculations, Meyer posited that the 
targeting of between three and eight missiles would have been required to ensure a 
95% chance of the designated target's destruction. Allied to the expected dearth of 
post-strike reconnaissance, this would have forced Soviet planners to err greatly on 
the side of caution in their targeting computations. Thus attacks upon SAC bases in 
the European theatre would alone have exhausted the entire SS-5 force and 50-100 
SS-4s. To ensure the destruction of a large proportion of the remaining Group I and 
Group II targets would have necessitated a further 880-7,150 SS-4s, depending upon 
their SSKP (Single Shot Kill Probability).240 There were thus insufficient SS-4 and 
SS-5 systems to guarantee comprehensive target coverage without reload. This 
could take several hours and would undermine the principle of a massed, all-
encompassing attack which lay at the very heart of the Soviet TNF strategy. 
Consequently, Soviet planners were forced to rely upon the support of several 
hundred aircraft delivery systems to ensure adequate coverage of Group I and Group 
II targets in the initial strike. 
In order to carry out pre-emptive nuclear strikes against the 200-250 primary 
targets described above, some 550 MRBMlIRBM , 400 medium bombers, 300 
fighter bombers, and 20 submarines had to be co-ordinated into a single plan. 
Though not impossible, the timing and co-ordination of deployment, 
preparation for attack, and pre-emptive strike by a force so large, diverse and 
239 Meyer, S. 1984. Soviet Theatre Forces, Part II: Capabilities and Implications, Adelphi Paper 
188. London: IISS, pp.13-16, 57-8. 
240 Meyer used a .15-.45 range. 
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dispersed would have been no simple feat...In short, the sheer mass of the 
Soviet TNF posture complicated the implementation ofa pre-emptive strike.241 
The theoretical demands of comprehensive theatre target coverage were themselves 
imposing and risked pushing Soviet theatre strategic forces to breaking point. Faced 
with the increasing numbers of weapons systems required to galvanise the SS-4/S8-5 
force, Soviet planners faced a daunting task. This was exacerbated by the expected 
performance limitations of the 8S-4/SS-5 force. The low levels of reliability that were 
common in Soviet weapons systems were endemic within their missile forces, 
particularly the SS-4 and 8S-5. In an attempt to overcome the deficiencies of 
production quality through quantity, the Soviet Union manufactured large numbers of 
weapon systems. This went some way to resolving the original problem but in tum it 
created another, by placing great demands upon those services responsible for 
technical maintenance and the supervision of these systems. The result was that 
remarkably few SS-4/S8-5 units were operational at any given moment.242 Indeed 
reports in the late 1960s claimed that the 8S-4 and 8S-5 systems were actually 
"crumbling in their silos".243 Thus even without the vagaries of operational 
performance under conditions of conflict Soviet planners were well aware that a 
majority (perhaps the vast majority) oftheir principal strategic TNFs were effectively 
inoperable. 
To this was added the new and additional burden of the revised theatre strategy which 
envisioned the possibility ofTNFs not being employed from the very outset of 
hostilities and being required instead to maintain a heightened state of readiness for an 
uncertain duration while under constant threat of attack by their Western 
counterparts. The SS-4 and SS-5 systems were particularly poorly suited to meeting 
241 Meyer, Soviet Theatre Forces, Part II: Capabilities and Implications, p.14. 
242 Meyer estimated that a mere 20-40% of Soviet TNFs would have been operational at any given 
time. Cockburn, A. 1983. The Threat: Inside the Soviet Military Machine. London: Hutchinson, 
p.198, quoted an unnamed US official who gauged it to be as low as 15-20%. 
243 Cockburn, The Threat, p.20l. 
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such operational demands. Although they were powered by storable liquid fuels,244 
they were initially based in a horizontal fashion as technological limitations and the 
vagaries of the Russian climate prevented their deployment in vertical mode for a 
sustained period. This precluded the practice of storing the fuel in their on-board 
tanks which in turn prevented their time-urgent deployment.245 Simply fuelling the 
missiles required a prolonged preparatory period - Western estimates of its duration 
varied between eighe46 and twelve to twenty four hours.247 Moreover, once fuelled, 
the missile had to be fired within a short space of time or undergo the complex and 
time-consuming operation of removing the volatile liquids from its fuel tanks. This 
was compounded until the late 1960s by the Soviet practice of storing nuclear 
warheads under KGB control, often at considerable distance from their delivery 
vehicles.248 Even when this storage policy was revoked Western estimates of launch 
preparation time remained in the region of7-8 hours for both systems.249 General 
Danilevich of the General Staff stated that fuelling the SS-4/SS-5 systems required in 
the order of 5-6 hours while 2-3 hours were required to couple the warheads to the 
missiles themselves. 25o "Soft-site" deployment of the SS-4 and SS-5 forces in batteries 
of four missiles offered protection from neither enemy attack nor the Russian weather. 
Only 135 (84 SS-4s and 51 SS-5s) were silo-based. Contrasting explanations have 
been offered to explain this low leveP51 However both neglect a simple, but 
244 A strong consensus exists on this point. See Wright, B., (assisted by l Murphy; series editor, R. 
Forsberg) 1986. World Weapon Database, Volume L Soviet Missiles. Lexington Mass.: D.C. Heath 
and Company, pp.80-1. 
245 Meyer, S. "Soviet Nuclear Options," in Carter, AB. , Steinbruner, lD. & Zraket, C.A (eds.) 
1987. Managing Nuclear Operations. Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institute, pA88, nA3. 
246 US Central Intelligence Agency, "Major Consequences of Certain US Courses of Action in Cuba," 
SNIE 11-19-62, (declassified 20 October 1962) cited in Berman and Baker, Soviet Strategic Forces, 
p.15, n.22 posited that the SS-4/SS-5 force required eight hours to be readied for firing, could be held 
in that state for a mere five hours and required a further six hours to reload and refire. 
247 Gregory Treverton, 1981. Nuclear Weapons in Europe, Adelphi Paper 168. London: IlSS, p.lO; 
US Department of Defence, 1981. Soviet MilitOlY Power, Washington DC: USGPO, p.27. 
248 Meyer, S. "Soviet Nuclear Options", in Carter, AB., Steinbruner, J.D. and Zraket, C.A (eds.) 
1987. Managing Nuclear Operations. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute, pA87. 
249 Wright, World Weapons Database, pp.81-2. 
250 University of Edinburgh, Department of Defence Studies Archive, (limited access only), file 1. It 
remained unclear from his assertion whether these operations were carried out concurrently. 
251 Khrushchev himself had stressed the importance of silo-basing for Soviet missiles, if only to avoid 
the elements. Khrushchev, N. (Talbott, S. trans.) 1974. Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, 
Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown & Co., pp.48-50. Berman and Baker, Soviet Strategic Forces, pp.90-2 
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potentially vital, explanatory factor and are apparently unaware of the political 
complexities which surrounded the issue of silo-basing at this time. Between 1964-6, 
largescale Soviet nuclear tests were used as the basis of an analytical modelling of the 
likely effects of a US nuclear strike. The results indicated that current Soviet silo-
basing practices provided little protection. As a result, a twin-track policy was 
pursued. One was the priority development of mobile, solid fuel missiles. In this 
regard the anticipated deployment ofthe mobile S8-14 and SS-15 systems, which 
were due to enter service in the mid-to-Iate 1960s, would have led Soviet planners to 
expect a marked enhancement ofTNF survivability thus diminishing the incentive to 
divert resources to silo provision constmction of dubious value for the 8S-4/88-5 
force. The other aspect of the policy was a series of studies into means of improving 
silo protection potential through improved construction methods and greater 
dispersal. However, evidence gleaned from a highly placed 80viet official indicates 
that the detailed studies carried out by a variety of institutions into the question of silo 
improvements was abruptly disregarded in the face of opposition from a Chelomei-
Grechko axis. According to Iu.A. Mozzhorin,252 Chelomei suggested that 80viet 
security would be enhanced more effectively by the construction of more missiles and 
a protective ABM network. Grechko meanwhile shared the constmctor's penchant 
argued that silo-building was consciously devoted to the SS-9 and SS-ll ICBM force and the SS-
4/SS-5 "reload" capacity (only readily available at "soft" sites) was valued and retained. MccGwire, 
M. 1987. Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 
pp.504-6 disagreed, highlighting the filct that the silo-building programme for ICBMs had run in 
parallel with that for SS-4/SS-5 TNFs. Rather, he sought to explain it through the Soviet Union's 
strategic perceptions c.l962-3, when the silo-building decisions were being made. At this point, war 
was expected to be initiated with massed nuclear strikes. The Soviet Union's ensuing "launch-on-
warning" policy anticipated that most, if not all, of their missiles would have been dispatched 
towards their allotted targets by the time that enemy missiles struck the launch sites. MccGwire 
identified the 135 silo-based SS-4s and SS-5s as a limited strategic reserve, with which the Soviet 
Union could hope to retain a retaliatory capacity in the event of a surprise attack. These missiles 
would have been targeted against the remaining "hard core of political and military targets", within 
the theatre. MccGwire points out that - ironically - the construction programme for this small 
fraction of the TNFs was completed at the end of 1966: at the very point in time that Soviet doctrine 
began to evolve to accept the possibility of a conventional introduction, with all its attendant 
requirements for enhanced and prolonged TNF survivabilty. 
252 General Director ofTsNlIMash, the main research and design institute of the Ministry of General 
Machinebuilding (MOM) responsible for missile production for thirty years. University of 
Edinburgh, Department of Defence Studies Archive, (limited access only), file 3. 
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for optimal weaponry production levels and launched a bitter ideological onslaught 
against the defensive strategic stance that he associated with silo-basing, with its 
emphasis upon an assured second strike capability. By contrast Grechko reiterated his 
faith in a fIrst strike/launch-on-warning policy as the sole guarantor of avoiding a 
repeat of 1941. Against this backdrop the silo hardening programme was postponed 
indefInitely. 253 Emplaced in closely-grouped clusters of three, even silo-based SS-
4/SS-5s were vulnerable to an accurate enemy strike, while those that were based in 
"soft" sites offour missiles enjoyed no protection at all. 
Therefore as Soviet doctrine began to consider a conventional introduction to war as 
a possibility, Soviet TNF forces were already stretched to the outer limits of their 
theoretical operational capabilities to fulfIl their mission requirements. Soviet 
strategists must have feared that Soviet TNFs were more likely to fInd themselves the 
victims, rather than the agents, of a largescale disarming strike. The Soviet Union 
sought to overcome the operational deficiencies of the SS-4 and SS-5 through the 
development of the SS-14 and SS-15 systems. They were viewed in the West as 
stable-mates of the SS-13 ICBM, apparently employing two of the ICBM's three 
stages to create a dual MRBMlIRBM force in much the same way as the SS-5 had 
been derived from the SS-4. Allied to their tactical range counterpart, the SS-12, 
these systems were intended to add new elements of performance capabilities to 
Soviet TNFs through system mobility and more time-responsive fuel propellants. 
Development of the SS-14 and SS-15 began at the very end ofthe 1950s and 
prototype flight testing was underway by the middle ofthe next decade. Testing 
proceeded during the 1965-8 period but their subsequent deployment in token 
numbers was viewed as clear evidence of manifest operational defIciencies. The 
failure of the SS-14 and SS-15 forced the Soviet Union to utilise an existing missile 
system to galvanise her TNFS.254 Chelomei's ubiquitous SS-1 F55 had begun its career 
253 Ibid., file 3. 
254 "It is assumed that the routine replacement of the SS-4 and SS-5 by the third-generation SS-14 
and SS-15 systems was provided for in the production plans drawn up in the fIrst half of the 1960s, 
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as a land-based system intended for use principally against US carrier forces. 
However its impressive adaptability allied to a forceful lobbying campaign on the part 
of its designer soon led to its employment in an ICBM role, largely at the expense of 
the curtailed SS-13 programme. It was produced at a rate in excess of 150 p.a. 
throughout most of the 1960s and by 1971, a total of970 had been deployed. From 
1969 the deployment of the SS-11 in a theatre role began, with 120 being targeted on 
Western Europe, while a force of around 100 faced the now-volatile border with 
China. The SS-11 possessed a range which allowed it to switch to a target set in a 
neighbouring TVD. This flexibility endowed Soviet TNFs with a significantly 
enhanced cross-targeting and strategic manoeuvre potential. In contrast to the SS-
4/SS-5 units, the entire complement ofSS-lls in the TNF role was housed within 
hardened silos. Although the SS-11 was liquid fuelled it had benefited from the 
technological progress which had been made since the development of the SS-4 and 
SS-5 and due to its silo-basing in the TNF role, its fuel could be stored within the 
missile's "internal fuel tanks" for prolonged periods thus, according to General 
Danilevich ofthe General Staff, endowing it with a response time of 1-2 minutes.256 
When taken together, such attributes endowed the SS-11 with considerably enhanced 
survivability and responsiveness compared to that of its rather antiquated counterparts 
and its operational attributes were a vital catalyst in the Soviet move away from a 
strategy premised upon pre-emption.257 While the diversion of the SS-11 to a TNF 
role coincided with the deactivation of c.70 SS-4s, some 625 SS-4s and SS-5s 
remained operational. The apparent willingness of Soviet planners to divert 15% of 
their ICBM force to a specifically theatre role was testament to the importance with 
which they viewed the European TVD and a lingering concern that existing TNFs 
were not adequate to fulfil their mission requirements. The supplementing of the SS-4 
but when these systems proved unsatisfactory the requirement remained on the books." MccGwire, 
Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy, p.509. 
255 The SS-II was known by the Soviet "operational index" code name URIOO and was referred to as 
the RS-IO by the Soviet Union during the SALT and INF negotiations. 
256 University of Edinburgh, Department of Defence Studies Archive, (limited access only), file 1. 
257 Ibid., file 1. 
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and 88-5 force with a missile system rather than aircraft, would also have allowed 
more effective time-urgent coverage of strategic missions within the European TVD. 
However, the deployment ofthe 88-11 as a TNF added yet another weapon system to 
the existing complexities of theatre strategic planning. In addition, while the 88-11 
was more accurate and less vulnerable than the 88-4 and 88-5, its accuracy did not 
match that of the most modem systems and it lacked the operational responsiveness 
and invulnerability of a solid-fuel mobile missile. Moreover the numerical limitations 
that were anticipated as a result of the 8AL T negotiations would be expected to apply 
to the 88-11 as it possessed an intercontinental range. The 88-11 could thus serve as 
no more than an interim solution to the 80viet Union's TNF requirements. Despite 
the technical inadequacies ofthe 88-14 and 88-15, the principles of solid-fuel and 
mobility that they embodied continued to be viewed as the best solution for 80viet 
TNF requirements. 
Thus even before the prospect of deployment ofU8 Pershing II and Tomahawk 
Cruise missiles within the European TVD had emerged, there existed a prima facia 
case for the modernisation of 80viet TNFs. This requirement was long overdue by 
the end ofthe 1960s. The failure ofthe 88-14 and 88-15 programmes had forced a 
continued reliance upon first generation 88-4 and 88-5 systems which had been 
possessed of marginal operational utility from almost the outset of their service 
careers.258 Attempts to galvanise the force through the direction of aircraft, and 
latterly the 88-11 into a supporting role, provided a partially-enhanced TNF potential. 
It was however only a transient and partial solution and by the late 1960s, the 
rationale for a thorough modernisation of 80viet TNFs was undeniable. Ideally it 
would take the form of a single weapon system whose operational utility and 
flexibility was such that a plethora of supporting systems - and the attendant planning 
complexities - were unnecessary. 
258 Garthoff, R.L. 1983. "The Soviet SS-20 Decision", Survival, 15(1), p.llO. 
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Figure 2: 88-4 schematic drawing 
1 . warhead; 2 . warhead separation pneumatic Idcl<er; 3 
. oxidizer tank; 4 . instrumentation section; 5 . oxidizer 
feed pipeline; 6 . fuel tanl<; 7 . toroidal compressed air 
bottle; 8 . hydrogen peroxide tanl<; 9 . turbo pump unit; 
10 . liquid propellant sustainer combustion chamber; 11 . 
tail section; 12· fin; 13· jet vane 
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Figure 3: 88-5 schematic drawing 
1 . warhead; 2· oxidizer tank; 3 . oxidizer feed pipeline; 4 • instrumentation sec 
tion; 5 • powder retrorocket; 6 . fuel tanl<; 7 . sustainer; 8 . tail section; 9 . fin 
10· jet vane 
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Figure 9: 
88-11 Mod.1 schematic drawing 
1 - warhead; 2 - instrumentation section; 
3 - second stage oxidizer tanl<; 4 - inter-
mediate plate of second stage fuel sec-
tion; 5 - second stage fuel tanl<; 6 - sec-
ond stage sustainer; 7 - first stage oxidiz-
er lanl<; 8 - intermediate plate of first 
slage fuel section; 9 - first stage fuel tan 1<; 
10 - first stage tail section; 11 - first stage 
sustainer 
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88-11 Mod.2 schematic drawi 
1 - warhead; 2 - instrumentation section; 
3 - second stage oxidizer tanl<; 4 - inter-
',me(liate plate of second stage fuel sec-
lion; 5 - second stage fuel tank; 6 - sec-
RmJ slage sustainer; 7 - first stage oxi-
dizer tanl<; B - intermediate plate of first 
'stage fuel section; 9 - first stage fuel 
tanl<; 10 - first stage tail section; 11 - lirst 
slage sustainer 
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1 . silo entrance; 2 . airlocl<; 3 - protective device; 
4 - silohead; 5 - silo shaft; 6 - UR-l00 missile; 
7 - transport launch canister; 8 - gas deflector 
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The Nadiradze "family" of designs and solid fuel monopoly 
The 88-13 was widely credited as being the starting point for the Nadiradze Design 
Bureau's efforts in solid fuel missile development. It was a three-stage solid fuel 
ICBM project which was seen to provide the foundation for the subsequent 
development of the "family" of Nadir adze systems. The initiation of this project was 
traced to the late 1950S259 and was credited as a Nadiradze design by almost all 
observers260. Its deVelopment was explained as an attempt by the 80viet Union to 
develop a strategic reserve potential,261 specifically a desire to acquire a solid-fuel 
system to avoid reliance upon liquid-fuel propellant with all its attendant dangers and 
limitations.262 The ensuing absence of wide scale deployment of this system was 
viewed as evidence of its technical deficiencies/63 while its production in relatively 
low numbers was explained by a 80viet propensity to deploy even unsuccessful 
weaponry projects in limited quantities. 
The 88-14 and 88-15 were seen to have evolved directly from the 88-13. Both the 
88-14 and 88-15 systems were identified as mobile, solid-fuelled systems developed 
by the Nadiradze Design Bureau by the vast majority of West em analyses. This could 
take the form ofan implication264 or an overt assertion. 265 Jane's was apparently alone 
259 Cockburn, The Threat, p.200 cited it as being "around 1957" while Wright, World Weapon 
Database, p.171 cited 1958. 
260 Berman and Baker, Soviet Strategic Forces, p.53, n.41; Wright, World Weapon Database, p.173; 
MccGwire, Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy, p.503; Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems. 
An isolated but notable exception was an article by Steven Zaloga in Jane's Intelligence Review, 
August 1994 which cited the SS-13 as a product of the Korolev Design Bureau. 
261 Berman and Baker, Soviet Strategic Forces, p.120. 
262 Cockburn, The Threat, pp.198-200. 
263 Berman and Baker, Soviet Strategic Forces, p.121 and p.132. In Table C7 ,p.138 they asserted 
that 40 SS-13 systems were deployed in the period 1965-70. A further 20 were deployed by 1975 and 
the resultant force of 60 remained in service in 1980. See also Cockburn, The Threat, p.200. 
264 Berman and Baker, Soviet Strategic Forces, p.120. 
265 Garthoff, RL. 1994. Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet relations from Nixon to 
Reagan. Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, p.960; Garthoff, "The SS-20 Decision", p.lIO; 
Cochrane, T.B. et al. 1989. Nuclear Weapons Databook: Volume IV: Soviet Nuclear Weapons. New 
York: Harper and Row, p.124; 
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among Western analytical sources in suggesting that the Nadiradze Bureau might not 
have been responsible for their development. 266 Unanimity did however strongly 
prevail with respect to Western assessments of the fundamental technical deficiencies 
which were apparent through the wayward progress of their flight-testing programmes 
and strongly implicit in the subsequent token deployment levels, despite the glaring 
inadequacies of the existing SS-4/SS-5 force. 267 Some attributed the high failure rate 
encountered during flight-testing to the systems' propellant fuels268 while others 
posited that it represented the Soviet Union's continued inability to mass produce the 
sophisticated mechanical and electrical components of an advanced inertial-guidance 
system.269 No source could venture a definitive explanation. Token deployment of 
the SS-14 and SS_15270 was confined to the Far Eastern regions of the USSR.271 which 
exacerbated problems of gleaning reliable intelligence on their institutional origins and 
operational potential. 
266 Jane's speculated that the design of the SS-15 might have been attributable to the Korolev Bureau, 
"but presumably with considerable assistance from the Nadiradze Bureau". "Russia: Offensive 
Weapons - Obsolete Systems, SS-X-lS 'Scrooge'," Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems, Issue 15. A 
considerably later article by Zaloga in Jane's Intelligence Review in August 1994 claimed that the 
SS-14 and SS-15 were developed by the Korolev and Vangel Bureaus respectively. Such divergent 
claims were however exceptional. 
267 Berman and Baker, Soviet Strategic Forces, p.98; MccGwire, Military Objectives in Soviet 
Foreign Polky, p.506. 
268 Wright, World Weapon Database, pp.322 and 328. 
269 Berman and Baker, Soviet Strategic Forces, p.88. 
270 Ibid., p.136, Table C4 asserted that 29 SS-14 systems were deployed in the period 1965-70. By 
1975, they had all apparently been decommissioned. Wright quoted this figure & source and a 1971 
classified Secretary of Defence report which projected 0-18 SS-14s by mid-1971 & 18-27 by mid-
1972. There were no other confirmed deployments however. Berman and Baker did not cite the SS-
15 as having been deployed at all. Wright had no specific figures for the SS-15, but the implication 
existed that a small-scale, token deployment (possibly in tandem with SS-14) had occurred. 
271 Whether as "training units" - as posited by Garthott: Detente and Confrontation, p.960 or to add 
marginal reinforcement of the SS-11 force - as suggested by Berman and Bakel', Soviet Sh'ategic 
Forces, p.l1l. 
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The SS-16 and SS-20 
The SS-16 was viewed as the Soviet Union's first attempt to develop a mobile, solid-
fuelled ICBM system. The initiation of its development programme was thought to 
have overlapped the final stages ofthat of the SS-13 during the mid-1960s. Had this 
project succeeded, the Soviet ICBM force would have enjoyed a high level of 
operational invulnerability for the foreseeable future and may well have leapt ahead of 
their US counterparts. However as with the SS-13, SS-14 and SS-15 this project 
encountered insurmountable technical difficulties a fact that became apparent to 
Western observers in part through the unexpected willingness of Soviet SALT 
negotiators to accept a comprehensive ban on land-mobile ICBMs. It was never 
deployed in mobile form and the Soviets denied its continued operational status during 
the course of the SALT IT negotiations.272 On this occasion however, Nadiradize's 
design team was thought to have been able to salvage something from a project's 
demise. By utilising two of the three stages of the SS-16, it was possible to create the 
SS-20, which possessed an intermediate range which enabled it to target sites 
throughout the European and Far Eastern theatres and retain the potential pioneered 
by the SS-11 to "swing" from one theatre to the other. The SS-20 was viewed as an 
ideal solution to the Soviet Union's pressing military need for TNF modernisation. 
Moreover, it also benefited from the existing R&D and component production 
associated with its predecessors, most especially the S8-16. Thus the Soviet Union 
was able to proceed with a relatively swift process of manufacture which began in 
1977 and had by the early 1980s resulted in the deployment of over 300 missiles and 
rapidly transformed the operational efficacy of Soviet TNFs. 
272 This was in response to increasing concern on the part of some analysts that SS-20s might readily 
be transformed into SS-16s through the addition of a third stage, thus creating a risk of a Soviet 
potential for rapid "breakout" from SALT II's provisions. 
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The SS-25 
The SS-25 was a road-mobile ICBM system developed by the Nadiradze Bureau that 
entered service in 1985. While the SS-25 was solid-fuelled like the SS-20 the new 
ICBM was armed with only a single-RV. It was designated by the Soviets as a direct 
descendant of the SS-1327J and it seemed to most Western observers that something 
had finally been achieved from tlris otherwise fruitless programme. The Soviets were 
thus able to justifY its development as being within the provisions of the lUrratmed 
SALT II accord as it was not a new design as such, rather the development of an 
existing system.274 It \vas also thought to possess strong teclulOlogicallinks vvith both 
the SS-16 and SS-20 systems. However, scepticism existed among some Western 
analysts as to the extent of the links between the SS-13 and SS-25 systems. One the 
four criteria for defining system evolution and development under SALT II was 
"throw weight". While a 5% increase was deemed to be acceptable under SALT II, 
the SS-25 was estimated to possess a throw weight double that ofthe SS-13.215 
Sceptics viewed the apparent similarity in the Soviet designations applied for arms 
control purposes to be disingenuous. It was noted that US' protests at Hris apparent 
violation of SALT II were muted presumably because the deployment of the single-
RV S8-25 represented a move away from the MIRVed ICBMs which had served to 
cause so much concern among American strategic planners during the previous 
decade.27G 
Thus the SS-13, SS-14, 88-15, 8S-16, S8-20 and SS-25 were viewed as belonging to 
a 'family' of designs which emanated fi'om the Nadiradze Design Bureau over the 
m The Soviets designated the SS-13 as the RS-12 during the SALT negotiations. The SS-25 was 
described as the RS-12M. 
274 The SS-24/Scalpel was the Soviet Union's designated single new ICBM design, as pennitted by 
the (unratified) SALT II Treaty. 
275 Zagola, S. 1995. "The Topol (SS-25) Intercontinental Ballistic Missile", Jane's Intelligence 
Review, 7(5): 198. 
276 Ibid. 
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course of a period of two decades and more277 and it was within this context of such 
an apparently prolific - though often unsuccessfhl- output that the Nadiradze Bureau's 
performance was evaluated.278 All six systems were believed to have shared a high 
degree oftechnological commonality with their Nadiradze stable-mates. The fact that 
the final member of this lineage, the 88-25, was believed to have evolved directly 
from the progenitor, the 88-13, served to reinforce this notion. 8uch interpretations 
were influenced both by past and future Soviet missile developmental practices. As 
the SS-16 formed the basis of the SS-20 this reinforced the existing notion that the 
88-14 and 88-15 had evolved directly fi.'0111 the 8S-13.279 In addition the parallel 
development of two similar systems with shared technical roots but a differing 
operational range was reminiscent of the relationship between the SS-4 and 8S-5, the 
systems that the S8-14 and 88-15 were expected to replace. 
All six ofthese new systems were identified as being powered by solid rocket fuel and 
a strong consensus existed among eminent Western analysts which identified the 
Nadiradze Bureau as possessing a designated monopoly on the development of solid 
fuepo and was inextricably linked to the belief that the Nadiradze Bureau had been 
solely responsible for the development of these three "generations" of missile 
systems. 281 
177 Berman and Baker, Soviet Strategic Forces, p.82, figure Al and pp.102-4, table Bl and table B2. 
278 Cockburn, The Threat, pp.200-3. 
279 Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, p.963. 
280 Berman and Baker, Soviet Strategic Forces, p.54 and p.80. For additional confirmation, see 
Freedman, L. 1977. US Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat. London: Macmillan, p.ll3; 
"Russian Missile Bureaux," Aerospace Daily, 22 January 1979, p.l00. A caveat was provided in the 
form of Jane's account of the SS-15's development by the Korolev Bureau. Even here however, it 
was assumed that the Nadiradze Bureau had played a supporting role in the context of propellant 
development. JSWS - Issue 15, Russia Offensive Weapons - Obsolete Systems. 
2&1 Tables created to display the responsibilities and characteristics of the various design bureaux 
frequently listed the Nadiradze Bureau as the sole exponent of solid-fuel development. Berman and 
Baker, Soviet Strategic Forces, p.83. 
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Design Bureaux 
The majority of R&D for Soviet missile development was carried out in the design 
bureaux and research institutes of the nine defence ministries. A number of different 
organisational arrangements had evolved within this sector of the Soviet defence 
ministries. Some institutes were incorporated into science-production associations 
while others enjoyed a greater degree of operational independence and in some 
instances possessed their own research centres and prototype production sites. The 
latter type was often termed an OKB (experimental-design bureau) and such design 
bureaux played a vital role in the Soviet defence industry. OKBs were particularly 
prevalent in the development of aviation and missile systems. They were to a large 
extent built upon the reputations of their principal designers and often came to bear 
his name. There were four leading missile design bureaux and they came over a 
period of time to specialise in the design and production of various contrasting types 
of missile weapomy. S.P. Korolev could fairly be seen as the father of Soviet rocket 
production. Despite a period of imprisonment Korolev later headed the Soviet drive 
to develop a viable rocket delivery system. Korolev was responsible for the SS-6 the 
Soviet Union's first, albeit ineffective, ICBM. He enjoyed more success in the parallel 
development of space booster rockets and his design became the workhorse vehicle 
for Soviet space projects fi'om the Sputnik onwards. For his efforts he was conferred 
the honour of "chief designer" in 1966. The Korolev Bureau continued to specialise 
in ultra-long range rocketry, which in theory held military potential for ICBM 
vehicles, but for practical purposes was employed chiefly in the role of space research. 
Upon Korolev's death later in 1966 the title of "chief designer" shifted to M.K. 
YangeL Yangel had been a chief scientist under Korolev until he had established his 
own independent enterprise in 1945. While Korolev had enjoyed the acclaim for 
designing the flIst Soviet ICBM, it was to Yangel that the leadership were to tum in 
the search for technically-viable missile systems. While Korolev's designs relied upon 
highly volatile non-storable liquid fuels Yangel's missiles could employ a storable 
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variety which held obvious operational advantages. During the period from the late 
1940s till the mid 1950s the Yangel Bureau was commissioned to produce a series of 
systems which came to be the principal nuclear weapons of the Soviet Union till the 
1970s. The SS-4 MRBM and SS-5 IRBM formed the backbone of the Soviet Union's 
TNF until their reinforcement by the SS-ll in the late 1960s and eventual replacement 
by the SS-20 in the course of the 1970s, while the SS-9 was the principal Soviet 
ICBM until the advent of the SS-19 in the mid-1970s. Yangel himselfheld the post of 
"chief designer" till his death in 1971. V.N. Chelomei headed the third missile design 
bureau. He had apparently been introduced to rocket technology through Korolev's 
work during the latter's time in prison.282 Although Chelomei's principal interest later 
lay in aircraft propulsion he also turned his attention to missile design in competition 
with his old mentor Korolev. While he enjoyed mixed fortunes in his missile designs 
his close links with Khrushchev ensured continued patronage during Khrushchev's 
tenure. 283 Chelomei's Bureau sought to develop its expertise in a number of fields, 
among them space booster rockets, cruise missiles, naval missiles and variable-range 
ICBMs. Into several of these categories could be placed the ubiquitous SS-ll system 
which began its career as a long-range naval missile before being developed to play 
roles both as a light ICBM and long-range TNF. Chelomei was also responsible for 
the SS-19 ICBM. Its huge throw weight and the possibility of it being armed with 
MIRV s were viewed with great alarm by many Western commentators as it came into 
service in the mid-1970s. Like the majority ofYangel Bureau designs Chelomei's 
missiles depended upon storable liquid fuel propulsion. 
282 See Vladimirov, L. 1971. The Russian Space Bluff, (Floyd, D. trans.) London: Tom Stacey for 
details ofKorolev's early career. This account describes Korolev's early career, imprisonment but 
avoidance of execution and Chelomei's taking the credit for Korolev's early work as he oversaw his 
entire research project during the Korolev's latter years in prison. 
283 Chelomei appointed Khrushchev's son as one of his engineers and also married Khrushchev's 
daughter. Central Intelligence Agency, 1986. The Soviet Weapons IndUStry: An Overview. 
Washington D.C.: Directorate of Intelligence, p.20. 
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Solid Fuel 
While the storable liquid fuel customariIy featured in Yangel and Chelomei designs 
offered greater operational efficacy than the non-storable liquid fuel employed by 
Korolev for the SS-6 and space booster rockets, no form of liquid fuel could be 
regarded as ideal propellant for military missile systems. Although the process of 
manufacturing liquid fuel was relatively straightforward it required a complex rocket 
motor and series of pumps to bum effectively and was always liable to explode while 
in storage. In addition missiles and rockets using liquid-fuel propulsion required long 
hours of preparation prior to firing. By the end of the 1950s, the US had abandoned 
liquid fuel in favour of solid fuel propellants. This powder was highly stable and could 
be stored within missiles for long periods of time with minimal risk of explosion and 
offered a virtually instantaneous firing ability. It relied upon an exact mix of chemical 
compounds to produce a consistent rate and character of consumption. Any deviation 
could cause the fuel to produce either insufficient or excess propulsion. Either form 
of deviation could fundamentally undermine a missile's performance. Uncertainties 
surrounding the fuel's reliability stemmed from the relatively primitive state of Soviet 
development in this area and were exacerbated by the fact that, once emplaced within 
the missile, solid fuel cartridges could be neither checked nor maintained. Soviet 
designers were also concerned that missiles' structures, in particular their exhaust 
chambers, would prove unable to withstand the higher levels of heat produced by the 
burning of solid fuel propellant. However the advantages to be gained through solid 
fuel in terms of operation capabilities were of vital significance as solid-fuelled rockets 
could be held at the level of combat readiness for prolonged periods in marked 
contrast to their liquid-fuelled counterparts. The increasing importance of developing 
a viable means of solid fuel propulsion played a pivotal role in the emergence of the 
fourth major missile design bureau. 
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The Nadiradze Bureau 
In contrast and despite the central role it was accorded by Western analyses in the 
development of Soviet missile systems, relatively little was known about the 
Nadiradze Bureau.284 Moreover much of what was said in this regard has since 
emerged as having been inaccurate. The roots of the Bureau's evolution lie in the 
contretemps which emerged in the mid-1960s surrounding the efficacy of solid fuel 
development which served in turn as a backdrop for a vital episode in Ustinov's 
inexorable rise to power. Given the priority accorded to the danger of a rapid surprise 
attach in Soviet strategy, it was traditionally assumed that the pursuit of a viable solid-
fuelled system would have held high priority in Soviet missile R&D. Grechko's 
opposition to mobile ICBMs and their associated strategic precept of assured 
retaliation has since been attested to by several Soviet sources.285 This placed him at 
odds with the political leadership and the proponents of strategic innovation within the 
General Staff. Grechko sought to block the development of mobile ICBMs which had 
been proposed by Yangel in the early 1960s and which enjoyed the support ofUstinov 
and the Defence Council. Grechko disbanded the science committee of the SRF 
which had had the temerity to endorse the proposal and his attitude and actions served 
as a brake upon the Ministry of Defence and the technical analytical specialists in the 
military industries and military-political staff in making progress in improving systems 
and systems' survival. 286 Against this backdrop the support that Grechko might have 
been expected to extend to the development of a rapid response form of propellant 
such as solid fuel might have been tempered by his suspicion that its employment 
might inculcate the defensive strategic forms that he viewed with such disdain. In 
addition a deep-seated sense of scepticism permeated Minobshchemash's287 perception 
284 Berman and Baker, Soviet Strategic Forces, p.80; p.74; Cochran, et al. Nuclear Weapons 
Databook, p74, n.37. 
285 University of Edinburgh, Depatiment of Defence Studies Archive, (limited access only), files 2, 3 
&5. 
286 Ibid., file 2. 
287 Minisny of General Machine Building. 
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ofthe development of solid fuel and was enunciated by several of the chief missile 
designers, in particular Chelomei, as they sought to justifY their continuing reliance 
upon liquid fuel propulsion. 
Despite the lack of impetus towards the development of solid fuel emanating from 
these key areas of the military and defence production leaderships, by the late 1950s, 
Sergei Korolev had become increasingly convinced of the need to develop solid fuel 
propulsion to militate against the operational deficiencies of existing Soviet systems. 
He was joined in this conviction by First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers 
with responsibilities for the defence industries, Dmitrii Ustinov. Ustinov viewed the 
rapid development of solid fuel propellant as a key area of technical development and 
- in conjunction with mobility - as the principal means of ensuring the operational 
survivability of Soviet ballistic missile systems. In addition the promotion of this rival 
development path provided a welcome area of bureaucratic competition through 
which Ustinov could seek to enhance his political position within the Soviet political 
hierarchy. Thus it was that Ustinov became the patron ofKorolev's first foray into 
the realm of solid fuel development via the RT-l test-bed system in 1959. Within a 
few years, this project had evolved into two parallel, though independent, 
programmes. Development ofthe IRBM variant, which came to be known as the SS-
14 in Western parlance, was devolved to TsiruInik:ov and Tyurin ofthe Perm SKB-
172 and TsKB-7 bureaux respectively while control of the ICBM version ofthe 
programme was retained by the Korolev Bureau. However Korolev himself had 
anticipated the eventual diversification of the department responsible for solid fuel 
ICBM development as a new, independent venture as soon as it was considered well 
enough established to sustain an independent existence. This would have followed the 
precedent set by the creation of the Makeyev SLBM and spy satellite bureaux as filial 
off-shoots of the Korolev Bureau. Korolev's sudden death in January 1966 threw the 
Bureau into turmoil and threatened the future of the SS-13 project in particular. The 
new head of the Korolev Bureau, Vasiliy Mishin was equivocal about the importance 
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of solid fuel development and was far more concerned by the fate of the N-l manned 
lunar programme which hung in the balance at this time. Given the dearth of support 
that solid fuel development enjoyed within Minobshchemash Mishin was keen to 
avoid conflict with Minister S.A. Afanseyev in what might well have proven to be a 
futile quest to save the S8-13 project. Against this backdrop Chelomei waged an 
energetic campaign seeking the adoption of his rival SS-11 system at the expense of 
the SS-13. He contrasted its ready availability, low cost and proven technology with 
the uncertainties and delays which beset the 8S-13 programme. Finally division 
appeared from within the SS-13 design team itself, principally between the project 
leader, Igor Sadovsky and Boris Zhukov who was responsible for the propellant 
development. Zhukov sought a new patron from within the defence establishment 
who emerged in the person ofUstinov at a crucial point in the history of Soviet 
defence politics which coincided with a major restructuring of the defence industries 
bureaucracy. 
The Ministry of Medium Machinebuilding (Minsredmash) was established in 1953 and 
from its inception played a key role in the Soviet Union's development of nuclear 
weapons. 288 Minsredmash was joined from 1965 in the production of Soviet nuclear 
weapons by the Ministry of General Machine Building (Minobshchemash) and the 
Ministry of the Defence Industry (Minoboronprom). Agursky characterised the 
creation of the Ministry of General Machinebuilding in 1965 as predicated by 
"bureaucratic-political" factors as Ustinov sought to consolidate his new-found 
powers.289 To Minoboronprom's remit of tactical-range (solid fuel) missile systems, 
Ustinov sought to add solid fuel strategic systems, ICBMs, a range of missile 
development that had until then been the sole preserve of Minobshchemash. While 
288 Prior to this, the nuclear programme was overseen by the First Main Administration of the USSR 
Council of Ministers under Beria's leadership. 
289 Agursky, M. "Nauchno-isseldovatel'skii mstitut tekhnologii Mashinostroeniia kak chast' 
sovetskogo voenno-promyshlennogo kompleksa", pp.32-44 cited in McDonnell, lA. "The Soviet 
Weapons Acquisition System", in Jones, D.R (ed.) 1979. Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual, 
Vol.3. 
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apathy had characterised Minobshchemash's approach to the development of solid 
fuel up until this point, the prospect of losing jurisdiction over any aspect of 
development authority was opposed in principle and was apparently viewed as being 
"seditious" in nature.290 Ustinov sought to create a new design bureau under the 
auspices of Minoboronprom control founded upon the MI'P91 research bureau, headed 
by A.D. Nadiradze. While this venture had in 1965 been assigned the responsibility 
for the development of the SS-12 solid fuel tactical-range missile it possessed no 
previous experience in the realm oflonger-range systems. This led to a compromise 
as the SS-13 programme would be retained by the Korolev Bureau in the immediate 
future, while longer term upgrades would be carried out by the TsKB-7 institute, 
possessed as it was of prior experience of the project via the filial SS-14 project. 
According to Detinov the Korolev Bureau became solely devoted to the development 
of space rockets following Korolev's death. Existing military projects were 
transferred to other bureaux - ICBMs were, gradually, devolved to Utkin,292 SLBMs 
were transferred to Krasnoyarsk and the Nadiradze Bureau was assumed to have 
utilised the remnants ofthe SS-13 programme for its future solid fuel ICBM 
projects.293 The future course of Soviet solid fuel development would come to be 
centred Plincipally upon the emergent Nadiradze Bureau which rose to a position of 
prominence as a result. General Detinov refuted the claim that the Nadiradze Bureau 
was simply an "offshoot" of the Korolev Bureau.294 The fact that the Nadiradze and 
Korolev Bureaux were themselves under the auspices of separate ministries was 
offered as testament to this fact. Detinov highlighted the fact that the Nadiradze 
Bureau was established prior to the Korolev Bureau and concentrated solely upon the 
development of tactical missiles. This experience, he said, later endowed it with a 
290 Pavlov, I. "Polemics: Who Doesn't Like the Topol Missile and Why?" Nezavisimoye Voyennoye 
Obozreniya, 21 March 1997. 
291 Moskovskovskii Institut Teplotekhniki - the Moscow Thermo-technology Institute. 
292 Formerly the Vangel Bureau. 
293 Detinov characterised such a process of programme distribution as the customary practice 
associated with the voluntary sunender of projects by a design bureau ceasing work in a particular 
field of weaponry development. Detinov interview. 
294 Zaloga, S. 1994. "Russian Missile Designations", Jane's Intelligence Review, 6(8):342-349. 
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position of pre-eminence among design bureaux when it moved into the field of solid-
fuel ICBM development. While the emergent evidence lends credence to Detinov's 
caveat it also serves to clarify the precise nature of the unusual link between the two 
bureaux themselves. 
Thus while it was customary to place strategic missile design bureaux under the 
authority of Minobshchemash the Nadiradze Bureau was placed under the auspices of 
Minoboronprom. This anomaly has almost invariably been overlooked by Western 
accounts of the position of missile production bodies within the structure of the Soviet 
defence sector.295 The Nadiradze Bureau's anomalous ministerial background was 
partly due to the fact that its origins lay in the development of tactical missiles which 
had formed part of Minoboronprom's remit and the exceptional circumstances that 
surrounded its creation. However its ensuing expansion into the deVelopment of 
strategic systems was not accompanied by the Bureau's transfer into the designated 
ministry as Ustinov jealously sought to preserve his new-found influence upon this 
sector of weapomy production - an area that he himself viewed as a neglected, though 
vital, area of missile development. The fact that the Nadiradze Bureau continued to 
flourish against a backdrop of cordial relations between its Chief Designer and 
Ustinov was testament to both the military and political importance with which the 
First Deputy Chairman viewed the development of solid fuel. Minoboronorom-
related ventures undoubtedly enjoyed the benefit ofUstinov's support and Detinov 
accepted that "his" bureaux benefited from an enhanced position in the process of 
resource allocation. Detinov acknowledged that ministers were well aware of this 
situation and concluded that it was in their own interest to, "feed the demands of a 
295 Cooper was a notable exception among Western analysts as he consistently asserted that the 
Nadiradze Bureau was under the auspices of Minoboronprom. Similar credit should be accorded to 
the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence which stated that the development of "mobile solid-propellant 
ballistic missiles" • and thus by implication work of the Nadiradze Bureau - was contained within 
Minoboronprom's remit. See Central Intelligence Agency, The Soviet Weapons Indusny, p.viii. 
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General Designer who enjoyed Ustinov's 'patronage'. Apparently former 
Minoboronporom minister Zverev knew this very well."296 
296 Detinov interview. 
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Reappraisal of the SS-20's "lineage" 
SS_13297 
Traditionally and almost without exception the SS-13 was identified as a product of 
the Nadiradze Bureau and was accorded the status of the progenitor of all subsequent 
members of the Bureau's "family" of designs. This has been refuted by a number of 
recently emerged Russian sources which have cast new light upon the true origins of 
this system's institutional background. The solid-fuelICBM, the SS-13 was the final 
member of the first generation of Soviet ballistic missiles. As early as 1959 the 
Korolev Bureau had initiated an experimental research programme centred upon the 
development of a solid-fuel motor, intended principally for use in medium-range 
missiles. The results of tests on the prototype missile demonstrated its potential for 
development as an ICBM. Discussions between supporters and opponents ofthe 
scheme ensued to determine whether the burden of a new field of technological 
development could be sustained. The decision to develop a solid-fuel ICBM was 
made at the highest levels against a backdrop of US testing of a similar solid-fuel 
ICBM. On 4th April 1961 the government appointed Korolev to head the 
development of a fixed-site, solid-fuel ICBM system, armed with a single RV. The 
decision to proceed with this programme entailed the involvement of many research 
establishments and construction bureaux.298 On 2 January 1963 a new test range at 
Plesetsk was created for the testing ofthe new ICBM system The process of 
developing this weapon system entailed many new and complex scientific-technical 
and production challenges, particularly with regard to the solid-fuel propellant, the 
manufacture of large rocket motor fuel cartridges and the major new guidance system 
which was also developed. A new type of ignition mechanism for the main engine 
197 This account is based upon Kolesnikov, S.G. 1996. Strategiches/we raketno-yadernoe uruzhie. 
Moscow: Arsenal Press, pp.61-2 and Kochemasov, S.G., Sizov, V.M. and Nosov, V.T. (eds.) 1992. 
Raketnye voiska strategiches/rogo naznacheniya: voyenno-istoricheskii trud. Moscow: Strategic 
Rocket Forces, pp.114-5. 
298 It is not entirely clear whether this co-operation extended to rival rocket design bureaux. 
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was developed and was sealed within the casing of the missile. The first launch of the 
RT-2P missile took place on the 4 November 1966. The tests proceeded for a further 
two at the Plesetsk range under the supervision of a state commission headed by P . V. 
Rodimov before the missile finally entered service with the SRF on the 18 December 
1968. The RT-2P was a three-stage missile employing a lattice construction to link 
the three stages which was intended to allow the unobstructed exit of exhaust gasses 
from the next stage as it was ignited. The second and third stages would work in 
tandem for a few seconds until the former was exhausted and the latter took full 
control. The rocket engine of the first and second stages had steel casings. They also 
had blocks offour slit-nozzles situated at the base of both stages to provide guidance. 
The third stage's construction was distinguished by the composite-construction of its 
casing. All three stages had different diameters and capacities to ensure that it 
possessed the requisite range. Special reinforcements were applied to the lower 
sections of the casing to withstand the effects of igniting the solid-fuel. The SS-13 
employed a complex autonomous-inertial guidance system, which guided the missile 
in flight to the point of the release of its (unguided) single-RV warhead. It employed 
a "counting-decision device and pendulum accelerator" situated in a module placed 
between the third stage booster and the RV itself The SS-13 could deliver a 0.6 MT 
warhead and possessed a 1.9km CEP. Missile launch was controlled at a distance 
from the main rocket command and control complex. Its solid fuel propulsion 
dispensed with the need to fuel the rocket immediately prior to launch thus 
dramatically enhancing its responsiveness and greatly reducing manpower 
requirements. 
The RS-12 was successfully tested and was manufactured in collaboration with the 
Ministry of Defence. Much ofthe development work required high level guidance 
which was provided by the SRF and representatives of the military including I. S. 
Kosminov, G.A. Solnetzev, P.P. Sherbakov, N.V. Kravets, N.K. Kudko and V.E. 
Vedenskiy. The appearance of a US ABM system led to the requirement for an 
upgraded system. Development work commenced in 1968 and it was first tested at 
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the Plesetsk range on 16 January 1970. After two years, it was accepted into service 
with the SRF. The modernised RT-2P (SS-13 Mod.2) was distinguished from its 
predecessor by its improved operating characteristics, specifically its enhanced 
guidance system and its warhead whose yield was increased to 750KT. The "accuracy 
of its firing was improved" to l.5km. The missile was equipped with a complex 
system with which to overcome ABM defences. The modernised RT-2P entered 
service in 1974 and was claimed to have provided a rapid response capability until its 
eventual decommissioning in the 1990s. 
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88-14 
The origins of the 88-14 have traditionally been extremely difficult to ascertain with 
any degree of confidence. Its technical demerits were apparently so great that it did 
not proceed beyond the initial testing stage. Its marginal role in the process of missile 
development during the 1960s is attested to by the near-total lack of narrative or 
analysis it is accorded within Russian sources. While Volkova listed the 88-14's 
80viet "operational" and "technological" designations and its U8INATO codenames 
were in the general table of80viet missiles,299 the 88-14 was almost unique in not 
being credited with an individual entry detailing its technical characteristics and 
development history. Kolesnikov went further and made no mention of the missile at 
any point in his text.3oo Indeed even Berman and Baker's assertion that a modest 
deployment of29 88-14s occurred may itself have been inordinately generous.30t A 
line of enquiry was provided by General-Lieutenant Kravets who mentioned the 
development of a tactical-range mobile missile by the Chelomei Bureau which 
paralleled that of the 88-15, both of which he claimed went unheeded by NATO. 
Given its mobile status, one might assume that this Chelomei project would have 
sought to employ solid fuel propellant. It seemed at first that this obscure 
development project might itself have been the elusive 88_14.302 However new 
evidence has recently emerged from Russian sources which point to the Korolev 
Bureau as the source ofthis abortive project,303 thus substantiating Zaloga's earlier 
claim.304 
It has emerged that the Korolev RT -1 test-bed project was the progenitor of both the 
88-13 ICBM and the 88-14 IRBM. The RT-2 produced two distinct variants - the 
299 Volkova, Ye.B. et al. 1996. Mezhkontinefal'nye ballisticheskie rakety SSSR (RF) j SShA: sozdanie 
i sokrashenie. Moscow: Strategic Rocket Forces, p.ll. 
300 Kolesnikov, S.G. 1996. Strategicheskoe raketno-yadernoe uruzhie. Moscow: Arsenal Press. 
30t Berman and Baker, Soviet Strategic Forces, p.136, table C4. 
302 University of Edinburgh, Department of Defence Studies Archive, (limited access only), file 7. 
303 Karpenko, A.V. 1993. Russiskoe raketnoe oruzhie, 1943-1993. RIKA, ST. Petersburg, p.lO. 
304 Jane's Intelligence Review, August 1994, p.346. 
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8K98 possessed with a 500kg warhead and an operational range of 10,00·12,00 km 
which evolved directly into the SS-13 and another variant, armed with a heavier, 
1,400kg, warhead and a reduced range of 4,000·5,000km. Development of the latter 
was devolved upon Mikhail Tsirul'nikov of the Perm SKB-172 bureau and P.A. 
TyurUl's TsKB-7 bureau at the Arsenal plant in Leningrad.305 This venture was 
redesignated as the RT-1S/8K97 and was subsequently identified by the West as the 
SS-14. Although the Perm bureau had recently been involved in the unsuccessful 
development of the Ladoga tactical-range missile it still boasted more experience in 
the development of solid fuel, mobile missiles than any of its Soviet 
contemporaries306, while Tyurin's bureau had previously concentrated upon the 
production of naval solid fuel missile systems. A revised Council of Ministers decree 
of29 June 1962 heralded the official inception of the project. During the course of its 
development cycle the programme's management was transferred from the Perm 
headquarters to those of the Tyurin in Leningrad. 
While traditional Western analyses were correct in their assertion that the SS-14 was 
derived from the two upper stages of the SS-13 they remained largely ignorant of the 
bureaucratic interaction that had accompanied its devolution from the Korolev Bureau 
to its filial counterparts. Several potential TEL designs accompanied its development 
which helped to cause confusion amongst Western observers and led to it being 
accorded two NATO designator titles.307 While US sources credited it with a range of 
a mere 2,950km, Russian sources indicate that its intended range was in the region of 
4,000-4,500km. An authoritative US intelligence source credited it with an 
anticipated CEP ofO.9km30S, a launch reliability of 90% and an overall force 
305 Zaloga, S. Russian Solid-Fuel Strategic Ballistic Missile Systems: Decisionmaking, Design and 
Development, forthcoming, p.2. 
306 Litovkin, D. "Snaiperskiy vystrel", Krasnaya Zvezda, 6 July 1996 and Tyurin, P.A. "Perviy 
otechestvenniy morskoy strategicheskiy tverdotoplivny raketniy kompleks D-11 ", Nevskiy Bastion, 
no.t, pp.22-3 cited in Za1oga, Russian Solid-Fuel Strategic Ballistic Missile Systems, p.9, n.2 and 
n.3. 
307 "Scapegoat" and "Scamp". 
308 Zaloga, Russian Solid-Fuel Strategic Ballistic Missile Systems, p.1 0, n.6. 
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operational reliability of60%. The SS-14's test programme occurred between 
September 1965 and March 1970. While Tyurin himself claimed that the system 
succeeded in accomplishing the state flight tests and was recommended for limited 
series production and deployment he claimed that the "Strategic Rocket Forces were 
not yet ready to operate such a new type of missile system". 309 Such a statement 
seems to sit rather at odds both with U8 intelligence estimates of the 8S-14's marginal 
operational role and, more significantly, with its omission from the authoritative 
account ofthe history ofthe 8trategic Rocket Forces.310 
S8-15 
Jane's speculation on the origins ofthe 88-15 design proved to be partially correct, 
although in common with the vast majority of Western accounts it too failed to 
discern its intended use as an ICBM The 8S-15 did not emanate from the Nadiradze 
Bureau. However it was in fact the Yangel bureau - not the Korolev Bureau - which 
was responsible for the design. It seems that Zaloga was alone in ascribing the 88-
IS's development to the Yangel Bureau.311 Moreover the 88-15 was not initially 
conceived as a three-stage312 IRBM intended to playa TNF role within the European 
TVD and was thus not initially viewed as a potential replacement for the 88-4/88-5 
force. Rather it was accorded the description of a "combined, two-stage ICBM". It 
was against the backdrop of the 88-13's laboured development and American plans to 
deploy the Minuteman missile in a rail-mobile mode that the 88-15 project was 
initiated, rather later than previously thought, in 1964313 • The S8-13's weight had 
effectively precluded its deployment in rail-mobile mode and it was thus to the 88-15, 
309 Tyurin, P.A. "Perviy otechestvenniy morskoy strategicheskiy tverdotoplivny raketniy kompleks D-
11", p.23. 
310 Kochemasov, 8.G., 8izov, V.M. & Nosov, V.T. (eds.) 1992. Raketnye voiska strategicheskogo 
naznacheniya: voyenno-istoricheskii trud Moscow: Strategic Rocket Forces. 
311 Jane's Intelligence Review, August 1994, p.346. 
312 Wright, World Weapon Database, p.332. 
313 Volkova et al., Mezhkontinetal'nye ballisticheskie rakety SSSR (RF) i SShA, p.328; Berman and 
Baker posited 1958-61 as the most likely period for the programme's inception, 1962 was the date 
offered by Soviet Military Power. 
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which was some twenty tons lighter than its Korolev counterpart, that Soviet planners 
turned in an effort to secure operational mobility. Initially deployment ofthe SS-15 
was considered in three forms, road-mobile, rail-mobile and silo-based. However just 
as the SS-13 had been developed in tandem with two warhead/range capabilities314 so 
too were two variants of the SS-15 developed. One version was armed with a 
1,410kg single-RV 1MT warhead and possessed a range of7,OOOkm, another with a 
545kg warhead and a 9,800km range.315 It was eventually decided to employ a 
tracked TEL of the type developed for the SS-14 as the basis for the SS-lS's mobile 
launcher. The tracked TEL was developed by the KB-3 bureau in Leningrad and 
sought to employ a tracked chassis with lower ground pressure to minimise the levels 
of vibration associated with traversing the Soviet rural road network. Such vibrations 
held potentially catastrophic implications for the operational viability of ballistic 
missile systems, whose structural casings, electronics and guidance systems were all 
particularly vulnerable to fatal damage under such circumstances. Although the TEL 
was designed in an attempt to obviate such problems, it is questionable that a vehicle 
with a combined weight of over one hundred tons could have operated effectively in 
the Soviet hinterland. Mobility might well have been severely constrained, while 
untold damage to the missile itselfmay well have ensued during the course of the 
journey to the pre-surveyed firing point. However this was to become a moot point 
as the SS-lS possessed a fatal flaw which led to an abrupt halt in its development 
programme. 
The most significant feature of the SS-lS's design was its means of propulsion. 
Apparently uniquely among Soviet missiles, the SS-lS was a hybrid which sought to 
use two different types offueP16 The composition of the first stage was described as 
314 Which became, in the case of the SS-13, the SS-14. 
315 It is interesting to note that these two warhead weights were very close in size to those for the SS-
13 and SS-14 systems, but the SS-15's IRBM range was longer than that of the SS-14 while its ICBM 
range was shorter than that ofthe SS-13. 
316 Golokov, L.G. 1976. Gibridnye raketnye dvigateli. Moscow: Voyenizdat, cited in J. Erickson and 
L. Erickson, 1996. The Soviet Armed Forces 1918-1992: A Research Guide to Soviet Sources, 
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"blended solid fuel". By contrast however, the second stage consisted of NDMG and 
N04. 317 NDMG - "nesimmetrichnyi dimetilrgeedrazin" - is the Russian tenn for the 
substance "asymmetric dimetyl hydrazine". This substance is a liquid which although 
highly corrosive can be stored for prolonged periods under appropriate conditions. 
Relatively inexpensive to produce, it can be closely controlled by the use of 
mechanical valve systems. On contact with N04 an instantaneous chemical reaction 
ensues which produces a high specific impulse. The residual poisonous gas produced 
would be incidental when employed to power a missile. These attributes led the US 
to employ this propellant during this period on Apollo series rockets, on the booster 
rockets used to carry out manoeuvres and course adjustments.318 To the best of my 
knowledge no published Western source has ever posited the notion that Soviet 
attempts to combine solid and liquid fuel sections within the same missile had reached 
such an advanced stage of development. The continued employment of a liquid fuel 
element to the system's propUlsion was most likely to have been a reflection of 
continuing Soviet difficulties in mastering the intricacies of solid fuel development. In 
addition Soviet liquid fuelled engines of this period provided a greater thrust-to-
weight ratio than their solid fuel counterparts and the Yangel design team may thus 
have been forced to employ a hybrid design to generate sufficient thrust to power the 
system. 
The SS-15's CEP - Circular Error of Probability - the standard definition of warhead 
accuracy - was not listed by Volkova in his performance profile of the system which 
seemed indicative of a major deficiency in the missile's guidance system on the scale 
previously suspected by Western sources.319 It transpired however that the system's 
technical deficiencies were of a rather more fundamental nature. Volkova 
Westport, Ct.: Greenwood Press, p.124 is a rare example of a source devoted to this rather obscure 
field. 
317 Volkova et al., Mezhkontinetal'nye ballisticheslde rakety SSSR (RF) i SShA, p.328. 
318 I am greatly indebted to Dr Greg Varhall and Mr Steve Bennett, the Programme Manager of "The 
Starchaser Foundation", for this information on "NDMG." 
319 Volkova et al., Mezhkontinetal'nye ballisticheskie rakety SSSR (RF) i SShA, p.328. 
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documented nine experimental test-launches of the SS_15.320 Their apparent lack of 
success was such that the programme was cancelled. 32 1 The details which have 
emerged concerning what proved to be the final prototype launch are themselves 
instructive and provide compelling evidence of the system's technical deficiency. 
Despite his claim that this prototype remained unknown to NATO, it seems almost 
certain that General-Lieutenant Kravets322 was referring to the SS-15 when he 
described a "Yangel designed longer range mobile missile that combined a liquid-
fuelled first stage with a solid-fuelled second stage tested in 1968 with terrible results 
- there was a massive explosion - and the programme was cancelled. "323 The failure to 
accord a "treaty" designation code to the SS-15 and its absence from the table of 
deployed Soviet systems seem to bear out the assertion that deployment of this system 
was negligible or nonexistent. Indeed against this backdrop earlier Western estimates 
of a token deployment of c.60 units in the Eastern Soviet Union may themselves have 
been exaggerated. 
320 Ibid. 
321 The first test launch in October 1967 was so fleeting in nature that US intelligence systems failed 
to detect its brief existence. Subsequent tests were detected though their persistent brevity was 
evidence oftheir technical failure. 
322 Kravets worked for over 30 years in Soviet rocket design and development and had played a key 
role in the development of the SS-13. 
323 University of Edinburgh, Department of Defence Studies Archive, (limited access only), file 7. 
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The 88-16 and 88-20 - a shared genealogy 
Recent evidence from several key Russian sources has tempered traditional Western 
portrayals ofthe lineal relationship between the 88-16 and 88-20. It portrays 
something ofa symbiotic relationship between the 88-16 and 88-20 programmes 
which serves as a contrast with the "father and son" metaphor so often employed by 
past analyses. Western analyses were for the most part accurate in ascribing the 
initiation of the 88-20's development to c.1966. With regard to the 88-16 however 
they were markedly less reliable, dating its initiation to as early as 1964 or 1965.324 In 
fact the origins of the 88-20 programme actually predated those ofthe 88-16 by over 
three years. The 88-20 programme was initiated on 4 March 1966 while the 88-16 
programme was not formally set in motion until 10 July 1969.325 This stands in 
marked contrast to the ensuing course of programme development in which the 88-16 
came to play the vanguard role. While an unequivocal explanation for this apparent 
dichotomy cannot yet be proffered two hypotheses have emerged which between them 
seem likely to hold the key to explaining the uneven course of the missiles' 
development. 
One avenue of explanation posits that the Council of Ministers' Decree of 4 March 
1966 which was cited as having initiated the 88-20 programme was intended to 
facilitate the development of a common test bed for an ensuing twin-tracked 
programme encompassing both intercontinental and intermediate range components as 
had Korolev's earlier RT-2 programme.326 This thesis identifies 1968 as the likely 
chronological point for the project's separation into two distinct programmes. Official 
reticence concerning the long-term aim of developing an ICBM system in addition to 
an IRBM variant could variously be explained by the inherently fluid nature of such 
324 Wright, World Weapon Database, p.180 quoted Soviet Military Power 1985 and Berman and 
Baker resectively for these assessments. 
325 Volkova et al., Mezhkontinetal'nye ballisticheskie rakety SSSR (RF) i SShA, pp.336-7. 
326 Karpenko, Podvizhnye Raketnye Kompleksy Strategicheskogo Naznacheniya, pp.l0-14. 
147 
ventures or by the vagaries of80viet intra-bureaucratic relations. Against the 
backdrop of Minobshchemash's ire at the loss of responsibility for a section ofICBM 
development to the rival Minoboronprom Ustinov may have considered it prudent to 
await an opportune moment to seek official approval for the deVelopment of an 
intercontinental system under the auspices of the latter Ministry. Thus the 88-20 is 
portrayed in large part as a "stalking horse" for the 88-16. This thesis derives some 
measure of additional support from the 88-16's and 88-20's 80viet "technological 
designations" which were 15Zh42 and 15Zh45.327 However it fails to address the fact 
that Volkova's authoritative text specifically identified the 88-20 programme as pre-
dating that ofthe 88-16 by three years and gave no indication that the 88-20 
programme was intitially possessed of such dual or test bed status associated with the 
development of its ICBM sibling. A definitive assessment of this issue will remain 
elusive in the foreseeable future as it would require the public disclosure of the 
Council of Ministers' decree. 
An alternative explanation of the rather enigmatic course of the systems' development 
is closely related to the fate of the 88-15 programme. As a result of the longstanding 
Western misrepresentation of the 88-15 solely as an IRBM the implications of its 
failure upon 80viet strategic force structure has been effectively ignored. The 
programme's failure would have engendered considerable concern among the 
increasing numbers of the 80viet defence community who perceived of solid fuel and 
system mobility as the only effective guarantors of ballistic missile systems' operational 
survivability. In connection with this General-Lieutenant Kravets described the way in 
which "another mobile ICBM programme was initiated in 1968 as 80viet scientists 
improved their competence with solid fuel'1328 following the dramatic demise ofthe 
88-15 programme. This new project closely corresponds to the chronology of the 
327 Such an interpretation is advocated by Zaloga, Russian Solid-Fuel Strategic Ballistic Missile 
Systems, p.lS. 
328 University of Edinburgh, Department of Defence Studies Archive, (limited access only), file 7. 
148 
88-16's development. 329 It is thus entirely plausible that the Nadiradze Bureau's initial 
foray into longer range missile design was centred upon the 88-20 IRBM330 but that 
its attentions were necessarily diverted toward the pressing demand for a solid-fuel, 
mobile ICBM in 1969 which caused the effective suspension of the 88-20 programme. 
The ensuing failure of the 88-16 programme might well have then led the Nadiradze 
Bureau to resume it development efforts via the 88-20 project. 8ignificantly this is 
supported by the fact that the 8S-16's flight testing programme was coming to an end 
in the latter stages of 1974 as the 88-20's test programme was about to commence. 
The apparently desultory development of the 88-20 and, in particular, the dearth of 
apparent progress in its development between 1968 and 1974 could thus be attributed 
either to its secondary role in Ustinov's plans to facilitate Minoboronprom production 
oflCBMs 01' the pressing nature ofthe requirement for a mobile ICBM which 
emerged with both drama and urgency in the wake of the spectacular demise of the 
88-15 project. Proponents of the respective interpretations would thus attribute the 
ensuing resurrection of the 88-20 programme either in terms of resource utilisation 
from a redundant ICBM programme or a reversion, in the wake of the 88-16's 
abandonment, to the development of theatre forces whose importance - though vital-
was secondary to that of strategic-range missiles. Whichever explanation is favoured 
- and both hold strong elements of common ground - it is clear that the lineal 
relationship that existed between the 8S-16 and SS-20 was symbiotic in nature to a 
previously unrecognised extent. 
S8-16 performance specification 
329 If, as seems likely, Kravets was refening to the 8S-16 this raises a number of intriguing questions 
regarding the existence of inter-bureaux interaction and the pooling of technological information. 
Moreover if such a practice did occur, was it conducted upon a voluntary basis or at the behest of the 
VPK or some other governing agency? 
330 This would accord with Volkova's chronological timescale. It would also have represented a 
gradual process of entry into longer range missile design on the part of the Nadiradze Bureau which 
might have been anticipated given both its roots in strategic missile design and earlier high level 
reluctance to grant it authority over the development of the SS-13 and SS-14 projects. 
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As the SS-16 was expected to weigh significantly less than either the S8-13 or SS-15 
system it was for the first time feasible to employ a wheeled, heavy truck chassis as a 
TEL platform. This held the prospect of greater road speed and lower maintenance 
levels. It also facilitated a move away from reliance upon tracked TEL systems whose 
inherently high levels of vibration could potentially inflict fatal damage upon the 
missile's intricate electronic systems and casings during the transit process. The TEL 
units were produced at the Titan Design Bureau's Barrikady plant at Volgograd under 
the auspices of Minoboronporom. Whether due to associated R&D work for the SS-
20 system, or surreptitious development of the SS-16 itself, the Nadiradze Bureau 
succeeded in making rapid progress towards the test flight stage. Following the 
project's formal inception in 1968 test flights were initiated within four years, a rapid 
evolution by contemporary standards, still more so in a system employing a host of 
new technological characteristics. The test flight programme was initiated on 14 
March 1972 with the launch of a missile from the Plesetsk range towards the 
Kamchatka Peninsula. The entire SS-16 test programme was characterised by 
unprecedented, and largely successful, Soviet attempts to conceal their course and 
progress from US intelligence-gathering activities.331 A total of thirty-five test flights 
were conducted until their effective suspension in December 1974. The sporadic 
nature of the test programme and the data that was gleaned concerning the flights 
themselves seem to suggest that the design team encountered serious technical 
obstacles. US intelligence sources denigrated it as "a dog of a missile"332 and 
speculation centred upon the third stage booster or guidance systemlPBV333 as the 
most likely culprit. The former explanation was given credence by the contrasting 
efficacy of the SS-20's subsequent performance while essentially employing the SS-
16's first two stages. Support for the latter explanation was derived form the fact that 
331 Zaloga, Russian Solid-Fuel Strategic Ballistic Missile Systems, p.17, n.ll. 
332 Talbott, S. 1979. Endgame: The Inside Story a/SALT II. London: Harper & Row, p.134. 
333 Post-Boost Vehicle. 
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while the S S-16 was theoretically designed to operate using a MIRV warhead, test 
flights had been conducted, without exception, employing a single-RV. 
During interview General Detinov observed that as the SS-16 "was not a very good 
system from a technical point of view" it was decided to "drop" the system. When 
pressed further on the issue of the SS-16's technical viability and specific problems 
regarding its development Detinov could offer no further elucidation but indicated 
that the technical difficulties encountered during the course of the SS-16's 
development were not in themselves insurmountable. He confirmed that the SS-16 
was armed with a single-RV, which further diminished its attraction in an era when 
"MIRVing" ofICBMs was in vogue. It was thus considered more desirable to fulfil 
the Soviet Union's ICBM allocation within SALT I with MIRVed systems alone. 
General Detinov did however categorically state that the SS-16 had been deployed in 
small numbers in the early 1970s.334 Such an acknowledgement, of even a small-scale 
deployment, stands in marked contrast to the repeated Soviet assertions throughout 
the 1970s and 1980s that the SS-16 had not moved beyond the stage of prototype 
testing.335 Moreover a recent and authoritative SRF history confirms Detinov's claim 
and stated that two SS-16 regiments, commanded by Colonel L.V. Forsov and V.V. 
Runov, became operational at Plesetsk on 21 February 1976.336 It is instructive to 
compare this with Volkova's account which reflected the official Soviet line by simply 
detailing its failure during its acceptance trials and its subsequent preclusion under the 
remit of SALT II. 337 The significance of this revelation should not be underestimated 
as US fears of a Soviet "break out" from the provisions of the SALT limitations 
centred principally upon a rapid programme of conversion of SS-20s into SS-16s via 
the addition a third stage booster. Soviet attempts to placate such fears were based 
on an assurance that the SS-16 had not been operationally deployed and a subsequent 
334 Detinov interview. 
335 Ibid. 
336 Kochemasov, Sizov and Nosov (eds.) Raketnye voiska strategicheskogo naznacheniya, p.30. 
337 Volkova et al., Mezhkontinetal'nye ballisticheskie rakety SSSR (RF) i SShA, p.336. 
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undertaking not to proceed with any such development process in the future. The fact 
that the deployment of the SS-16 seems to have occurred without detection by US 
intelligence means is additionally significant and is itself testimony to the efficacy of 
concealment via a mobile basing mode.338 
However while the Soviet Union stands accused of breaching the letter of SALT on 
this occasion, it could claim with justification to have adhered to its spirit. General 
Detinov stressed that the Soviet Union became aware of the United States' deep-
seated opposition to allowing the development of mobile ICBMs at an early stage of 
the SALT proceedings.339 The system seems to have suffered from a lack of 
widespread support from within the Soviet military-industrial establishment as a 
whole. To what extent this equivocal attitude was due to its unimpressive test 
performance or inherent jealousy due to its Ministry of origin remains unclear.340 
What is strikingly apparent however was the extent ofthe Soviet Union's continuing 
amenability to the acceptance of the principle of prohibition of such systems 
throughout the duration of SALT. 341 This stance provided something ofa contrast to 
the positions adopted by both sides on a host of substantive issues and was perhaps 
indicative of the low level of institutional backing that the system possessed. 
338 This assumption is made on the basis that the construction of silos to house the SS-16 would 
almost certainly have been detected by US satellites. The issue remains shrouded in secrecy however. 
Significant portions of a CIA "Team B" report on the SS-16 that was released in 1995 remained 
classified and subject to censor. 
339 Detinov interview. 
340 Accounts sympathetic to the Nadiradze Bureau stress the role played by Minobshchemash and 
rival design bureaux in undermining support for the SS-16 programme through a sustained campaign 
of disparagement. See for example, Pavlov, I. "Polemics: Who Doesn't Like the Topol Missile and 
Why?" Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozrenie, 21 March 1997, (trans. FBIS=UMA -97-075-S). 
341 For details ofthe role played by the question of mobile ICBMs in SALT and the eventual 
resolution of the issue see Savel'yev, A.G. and Detmov, N.N. 1995. The Big Five: Arms Control 
Decisionmaking in the Soviet Union. Westport, Ct.: Praeger, pp.73,80n.l,86,135,143,149 and 
Talbott, Endgame, pp.71-2, 134-6, 141, 145,228. 
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88-20 performance specification 
The 88-20 was constructed at the Votkinsk Machine Building plant in Votkinsk, 
Udmurt, in a construction hall that had been built to meet the anticipated production 
of the 88_16. 342 The IRBM employed a TEL that was virtually identical to that used 
by the 88-16, the only visible difference being that the canister containing the ICBM 
variant was in the order ofa metre longer than that of the 88_20.343 The link between 
the two systems was reaffirmed by Detinov and Belous during my interviews with 
them. Detinov stated that the 88-20's two-stage booster rockets were "virtually 
identical" to the first two stages of the 88_16.344 Within 80viet solid fuel systems "the 
fuel could be positioned within the missile in one of three ways, integrated into the 
fabric of the casing during manufacture or as a cartridge, either free to move around 
within the casing or firmly fastened within it".345 The 88-20 employed the final of 
these three options.346 The major innovation associated with the 88-20 was its 
employment ofa new guidance system.347 While one variant of the missile was armed 
with a single-RV348 the principal effort in the system's development centred upon the 
MIRV variant.349 This derivative employed the practice common among early 80viet 
MIRV designs ofleaving the three re-entry vehicles exposed without a ballistic nose 
cone. This was apparently adopted in the wake of testing which indicated that the 
342 Confirmation of the plant's output was provided in a later article by a former manager of the SS-
20 production programme. See Khromov, G.K. "Conversion from military to civilian production: 
The Votkinsk plant", in Paukert, L. and Richards, P. 1991. Defence Expenditure, Industrial 
Conversion and Local Employment, Geneva: ILO, pp.179-80. The SS-25 was subsequently produced 
at this same facility. 
343 Their near-identical appearance was a key aspect of US' fears concerning the possibility of a 
surreptitious SS-16 deployment. 
344 Detinov interview. 
345 Balabuch, L.l., Alfutov, N.A. and Usokin, V.I. 1984. Stroitel'naya Mekanika Raket. Moscow: 
Vysshaya Shkoia, pp.370-1. 
346 Kochemasov, Sizov and Nosov (eds.) Raketnye voiska strategicheskogo naznacheniya, p.148. 
347 Detinov interview. 
348 This variant was designated as the 15Zh48 in Soviet technological parlance and SS-20 Mod. 1 by 
Western sources. 
349 15Zh451 SS-20 Mod.2. 
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"naked" version was possessed oflower levels of aerodynamic drag than its faired 
counterpart,350 
Testing of the SS-20 commenced at the Kapustin Yar range351 on 21 September 1974 
and proceeded with remarkable rapidity culminating in the final pre-deployment flight 
on 9 January 1976. During the first three years of its service with the SRF over 100 
successful training and test flights occurred. The SS-20's operational efficacy was 
later confirmed during its destruction under the terms ofthe INF Treaty.352 One study 
has claimed that of the 72 test firings permitted under the INF decommissioning 
procedures 71 of the missiles launched successfully hit their designated targets. 353 An 
authoritative US intelligence source has confirmed the system's reliability and cited a 
100% success rate during the course of 104 L TDs354 that were monitored by US 
sources. The exceptionally high degree of component commonality existed between 
the two systems and facilitated the rapid build-up ofSS-20 force levels.355 
350 Saratov, S. "Missile Complex Pioner (Rocket SS-20)", 1993, Russian Magazine o/Science and 
Technology, pAS. 
351 Significantly the Kapustin Yar range was the designated site for flight testing of tactical-range 
systems, while the Plesetsk and Tyuratam ranges oversaw the testing of solid and liquid fuel ICBMs 
respectively. It is likely that the decision to host the SS-20's development at Kapustin Yar 
represented an attempt to signal the SS-20'5 lack of strategic potential to US intelligence observers. 
352 Confirmation of this was volunteered independently by both Detinov and Belous and was 
subsequently verified by a top-level Western source. 
353 Zaloga, Russian Solid-Fuel Strategic Ballistic Missile Systems, p.24. 
354 Launch to Destruction. 
355 Belous and Detinov interviews. 
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Plate 12: 
88-20 
Figure 13: 88-20 schematic drawing 
Plate 13: 
1 - transport launch canister; 2 - combat 
stage motor; 3 - supporting and driving 
band; 4 - second stage power unit; 
5 - second stage power unit nozzle 
assembly; 6 - coupling section; 7 - first 
stage power unit; 8 - first stage tail sec-
tion; 9 - first stage nozzle assembly; 
10 - solid propellant gas generator; 
11 - movable bottom plate of transport 
launch canister 
88-20 first stage 
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Plate 14: 
88-20 second stagE 
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SS-25 
The link between the SS-13 and SS-25 is in itself intriguing and serves as a vital 
postscript to the account of the 88-20 and provides a promising avenue for future 
research. It was alleged that the Soviet Union was disingenuous in ascribing to it a 
direct developmental link to the SS-13 in order to disguise the development of a new 
system in contravention of SALT. Zaloga's specific claim that the SS-25 was 
endowed with a throw weight double that of the SS-13 was somewhat exaggerated. 
Although the increase was indeed significant - and vastly exceeded the 5% convention 
employed in SALT - the SS-25's throw weight potential was similar to that of its 
immediate predecessor, the SS-16 and was but a fraction of that of its MIRVed 
contemporary, the SS-24.356 Detinov confided that the Nadiradze Bureau was 
assigned the continued development of the Korolev Bureau's ballistic missile 
programmes in the wake of the latter's specialisation in space launchers. While the 
incorporation of the SS-13 into the Nadiradze portfolio might have provided some 
impetus to the SS-25 programme its tangible effects were likely to have been limited. 
The SS-13 programme had not been an unqualified success and had lain dormant for a 
number of years prior to the development of the SS-25. The experiences derived by 
the Nadiradze Bureau from the development of the 88-16 and SS-20 were likely to 
have played a more significant role in the development ofthe SS-25. However any 
link which emerged between the SS-13 and S8-25 is of potentially great significance 
as it would provide evidence of a degree of inter-agency co-operation in Soviet 
defence production, specifically the degree of inter-bureaux co-operation and 
interchange of design projects.357 The existence of such a practice would demand a 
356 Relatively little elucidation as to the true nature and extent of the link between the two systems is 
provided by contemporary Russian sources. One highlighted the "wealth of experience" previously 
acquired in the course of mobile operational-tactical and medium-range systems that was utilised in 
the SS-2S's development but made no mention ofthe SS-13 itself. Kolesnikov, Strategicheskoe 
raketno-yademoe uruzhie, p.76. 
357 Kravets also alluded to the existence of a degree of pooled research when he referred to the 
development of solid fuel and implied that it took place on a supra-bureau basis. University of 
Edinburgh, Department of Defence Studies Archive, (limited access only), file 7. 
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significant revision of West em analyses of the character of Soviet missile design and 
development which has traditionally been cast as highly compartmentalised in 
character. 
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Figure 15: 
Plate 21: 
88-25 schematic drawing 
88-25 
1 - warhead; 2 - adapter section; 
3 - third stage solid propellant sus-
tainer; 4 - second stage coupling 
section; 5 - second stage solid pro-
pellant sustainer; 6 - lirst stage cou-
pling section; 7 - first stage solid 
propellant sustainer; B - first stage 
tail section 
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Conclusion 
The refutation of the notion of the "Nadiradze family tree" serves to place the 
Bureau's initial attempt to develop an ICBM system a full decade later than Western 
accounts have traditionally posited. This portrayal has major implications for the 
perception of the resource allocation enjoyed by the Nadiradze Bureau as the 
established narrative had formed the parameters for analysing commission awards and 
resource allocation. Past analyses consistently concurred that the level of support 
enjoyed by the Nadiradze Bureau was considerable.358 However it is now evident that 
still fewer tangible results emanated from the Nadiradze Bureau than had previously 
been assumed. While the SS-20 was accurately accorded the status ofthe Nadiradze 
Bureau's first operationally-viable system the technical lineage upon which its 
development was thought to have been based has been all but extinguished in the light 
of the new evidence presented above. This would accord with the fact that the 
Nadiradze Bureau's roots lay firmly within the realm of tactical-range missiles and is 
largely explained by its relatively late entry into the development oflonger-range 
systems. 
One explanation proffered for the continued patronage of the Nadiradze Bureau was 
the perceived importance of developing a viable solid-fuel system and the attendant 
technical problems this entailed. As the Nadiradze Bureau was identified as the sole 
Soviet exponent of this form of propulsion, support for the principle of solid fuel 
necessarily entailed support for the Bureau itself. However as the concept of the 
Nadiradze "family tree" has been demonstrated to have been illusory, so too has the 
premiss that this Bureau enjoyed a monopoly on the development of solid fuel 
propellants. It is apparent that both the Korolev and Yangel bureaux and their filial 
358 Cockburn made great play ofthe fact that the Nadiradze Bureau was apparently not penalised for 
failing to produce a viable design. The continued support extended to the Vangel Bureau through the 
small-scale deployment of SS-17s was "eclipsed by the record of the Nadiradze Bureau, which has 
been trying and failing to build a solid-fuelled ICBM for twenty years". Cockburn, The Threat, p.87. 
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off-shoots sought to develop solid fuel throughout the course ofthe 1960s. Moreover 
their pursuit of this form of propulsion for long range systems clearly predated 
Nadiradze's activity in this field. While such a process might have been anticipated 
under the precepts of defence procurement theory as allowing a broad range of 
development options by a number of bureaux provided an enhanced prospect of 
achieving a breakthrough in this complex and vital field of technological development 
than the practice of according a monopolistic status to one particular bureau. 
However the empirical evidence suggests that internal political factors, and, vitally, 
the role played by Ustinov, were the principal driving forces behind this development 
effort. Upon reflection, despite the widespread failure to discern the involvement of 
the Korolev and Yangel bureaux in the pursuit of solid fuel development, Western 
appraisals of the ensuing unimpressive performance results themselves require no 
significant revision as the Soviet effort to perfect a solid fuel missile system was 
characterised by a dearth of achievement prior to the SS-20. 
The refutation of the notion of the Nadiradze Bureau "family tree" and the its 
supposed solid fuel monopoly serve to accentuate the scale of resource munificence it 
enjoyed. This persisted over a prolonged period and was apparently unaccompanied 
by the threat of punitive sanctions, despite the continued failure to develop a system 
whose technical viability was thought to justify progression to flight-testing. The SS-
20 represented a vital breakthrough for the Nadiradze Bureau and a new frontier in 
Soviet missile development as the first operationally-viable solid-fuel ballistic system. 
To this was added its mobility, a high level of accuracy and the potential to proceed 
rapidly towards largescale deployment due to the pre-existing production lines as a 
legacy of the aborted S8-16 project. The SS-20 met all of these requirements and 
endowed the Soviet Union with a markedly enhanced TNF potential. However the 
extent to which the development of the 8S-20 was a direct and calculated response to 
this particular strategic requirement remains a subject worthy of continued 
investigation. 
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4 SALT and the SS-20 - the Process of Detente and its Effect Upon 
Soviet Defence Decisionmaking 
The Soviet Approach to SAL T359 
Strategic Weapons 
The Soviet leadership was profoundly affected by the experience of the Great Patriotic 
War. Its message was seemingly reiterated by the Cuban Missile Crisis which served 
to illustrate the necessity of creating a Soviet strategic force to match that of the US. 
During the late 1960s the Soviet Union assumed an unprecedented level of strategic 
security and geopolitical prestige facilitated largely by her attainment of parity with 
the US in the realm of strategic forces. The attainment of strategic parity was an 
essential prerequisite360 of any process geared towards establishing ceilings upon the 
numbers of strategic nuclear weapons held by both superpowers. Soviet leaders 
would not have countenanced participation in arms control negotiations prior to this 
point for fear that the United States would have sought to codify and preserve her 
advantage in strategic weapons. Agreement to this would have ensured that Soviet 
strategic inferiority would persist for at least the duration of any treaty's provisions. 
Indeed, parity in strategic forces was viewed as the minimum acceptable level for the 
Soviet Union. A desire to obtain maximal security and a lingering fear of attack by a 
third power or an anti-Soviet alliance led the Soviet Union to view strategic 
superiority over the US as the most-favoured option. By 1968, the Soviet Union had 
deployed 850 ICBMs and by 1970 had surpassed the US in numbers oflaunchers 
though not in the overall number ofweapons.361 Consequently, a vital prerequisite for 
359 This section draws heavily upon the information and perceptions gleaned from interviewing 
General-Lieutenant Detinov and fi'om Savel'yev, A.G. and Detinov, N.N. 1995. The Big Five: Arms 
Control Decisionmaking in the Soviet Union, Westport, Ct.: Praeger, pp.I-42. 
360 This was despite the "strong felt and vocal sentiment" among some members ofthe Soviet 
leadership that a modus vivendi should be sought with the Kennedy administration on strategic arms 
levels. Savel'yev and Detinov, The Big Five, p.B. 
361 Gerard Smith, 1985. Doub/etalk: The Inside Story o/SALT 1. London: University Press of 
America, pp.l 05 and 247 noted that Soviet strategic forces were increasing significantly even as the 
talks themselves were in progress. This could be seen as another potential motivating factor for the 
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Soviet participation in the process of strategic arms limitation was, by the end ofthe 
decade, about to be achieved.362 The Soviet Union entered into the process of arms 
control negotiation because it was seen to offer a means of securing the Soviet 
Union's newly-attained position of parity and averting an unrestricted new round of 
weaponry development in an arms race in which the US and her allies enjoyed a 
marked advantage in economic terms. By the mid-1960s concern was growing among 
the Soviet leadership at the sheer scale of investment required to secure strategic 
parity with the US. Once achieved, there would exist a strong incentive to seek to 
retain this position through mutual agreement rather than through the continued 
process of unrestrained weaponry development in both the offensive and defensive 
spheres. The prospect of pursuing Soviet security through a process of negotiation as 
opposed to strategic competition was thus viewed as offering a diminished level of 
uncertainty and risk, while reducing the onerous burden that defence spending placed 
upon the Soviet economy. At an early point in the process, the Soviet leadership 
concluded that the SALT negotiations held potentially beneficial prospects for the 
Soviet Union which should be pursued. A limitation upon strategic weaponry 
deployment at appropriate levels would be welcomed at a time when the Soviet 
procurement cycle was nearing completion and prior to the development of a new 
generation of US systems. If this could be secured in return for a prohibition of 
widespread ABM deployment, Soviet interests would be doubly served. 
Soviet preference for "playing the long game". Rowny, E.L. "The Soviets Are Still Russians", in 
Currie, KM. and VarhaH, G. 1984. The Soviet Union: What Lies Ahead? Studies in Communist 
Affairs, Volume 6: USAF, p.150. 
362 For a precis of parity as a vital prerequisite for US-Soviet strategic arms limitations, see Rice, C. 
"SALT and the Search for a Security Regime", in George, AL., Farley, P.l and DaHin, A (eds.) 
1988. 
US-Soviet Security Co-operation: Achievements, Failures, Lessons. New York: Oxford University 
Press, pp.294-5. 
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ABM 
There was a growing recognition among many civilian commentators and a number of 
military analysts that nuclear conflict held out the prospect of Pyrrhic victory at best 
and, more likely, annihilation of much of the world's population. Connected with this 
the creation of an effective ABMlBMD363 system had initially been seen as vital to 
complement the strategic build-up and furnish the state with the offensive and 
defensive capabilities required to achieve a nuclear war-winning capability. Following 
apparently bright beginnings, the Soviet Union's ABM programme had encountered 
severe technical difficulties by the late 1960s. The Galosh programme's stalled 
progress coincided with the apparently impressive strides being made in the US' 
Safeguard scheme. The impending advent of MIRVed ICBMs would add to the 
exacting demands of developing a system capable of intercepting incoming supersonic 
warheads. Were a technically viable ABM system to be developed - this was in itself 
by no means certain - it would probably be overwhelmed by the sheer weight of 
warhead numbers anticipated under conditions of widespread MIRVing of strategic 
delivery systems. By this time the economic burden imposed by the massive strategic 
build-up came to be viewed by the Party leadership as "clearly unbearable".364 This led 
to a volte face in the Soviet Union's stated position on the deterrent efficacy of 
ABM.365 
In response to an earlier US proposal for a total ABM ban Prime Minister Kosygin 
had in 1967 reaffirmed Soviet commitment to BMD (Ballistic Missile Defence) as the 
most effective and humane means of ensuring national security.366 Indeed the 
intention was eventually to develop nationwide ABM coverage from the basis 
363 Anti-Ballistic Missile/ Ballistic Missile Defence. 
364 Savel'yev and Detinov, The Big Five, p.4. 
365 It is instructive to compare Kosygin's 1967 assessment of the morality of the principle ofBDM 
and its potential contribution to strategic stability with that proffered by Semyonov in his initial 
presentation to the SALT negotiations a mere three years later. Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 
19(6),1 March 1967; Smith, Doubletalk, pp.123-4 and Garthoff, R.L. 1994. Detente and 
Confrontation: American-Soviet Relationsfrom Nixon to Reagan. Washington D.C.: The Brookings 
Institution, p.1S3. 
366 Pravda 11th February 1967 - Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol.XIX, no.6, 1 March 1967. 
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provided by the Moscow area network. Under the doctrinal precepts of the early 
1960s, BMD had been viewed as a vital corollary to the creation of an advanced 
strategic force in the drive for an integrated arsenal with which to achieve victory in 
any future nuclear conflagration. Indeed this legacy remained long after the 
implementation of the ABM Treaty and the doctrinal shift away from immediate 
nuclear employment, as the principle of withstanding attack by ballistic missiles 
continued for many years to be viewed as a principal mission of the Soviet armed 
forces. However, while the Soviet leadership continued to preach the moral and 
technical efficacy ofBMD a growing number among the scientific community began 
to question the technical feasibility of the Soviet ABM programme. The advent of 
MIRVs served to reinforce such scepticism. Such sentiments were initially, "scattered 
and low-key; the individuals who made them either belonged, for the most part, to the 
weapons research and production communities or were diplomats ... their doubts went 
unheeded by the country's leadership who remained convinced that no problem was 
beyond solution and no technical difficulty was insurmountable, provided there was 
enough investment and perseverance".367 The limited deployment of the Galosh 
system around Moscow was largely due to the technical difficulties that had been 
experienced and the growing realisation - which now extended to the political-military 
leadership - of the enormity ofthe task of defending a large land mass against a 
wide scale ICBM attack. Furthermore, the apparently rapid progress enjoyed by the 
US in its fledgling ABM development was a cause of concern to Soviet planners.368 
There was a recognition ofthe immense technical difficulties and resource 
implications that the pursuit of a comprehensive ABM structure would entail. 
Although the development of an operationally effective ABM system by either side 
was unlikely the Soviet Union would have been forced to participate in a costly new 
round of military development as insurance against the US gaining an ABM monopoly 
367 Savel'yev and Detinov, The Big Five, p.5. 
368 Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, p.163,n.43 and Smith, Doubletalk, pp.94-5. 
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which would have fatally undermined the Soviet Union's new position of strategic 
parity.369 
Detailed analysis of the first round of talks engendered a keen interest into the 
possibility of an ABM ban, most especially from within the Ministries of Defence and 
Foreign Affairs. Ustinov had chaired a meeting ofthose responsible for the Soviet 
ABM programme which had concluded that it faced enormous technical obstacles. In 
contrast to the offensive weaponry competition, where parity was imminent and the 
great bulk of opportunity costs had already been expended, the outcome of a 
defensive weaponry arms race was far from certain at this stage. Its portents seemed 
clearly to indicate that it would entail an immensely costly R&D programme with little 
prospect of eventual success. The limited deployment that was eventually permitted 
under the ABM Treaty served as something ofa "sop" to those hawks who had 
championed its development. It had in any case already been deployed around 
Moscow and might have offered a degree of protection against a small-scale strike.370 
Thus the Soviet position underwent something of a volte face by the time of its entry 
into SALT. The principal motivating mctor behind this shift was, as Detinov himself 
readily admitted, an acknowledgement of 
"insufficient technological development in the Soviet Union vis-a-vis the United 
States, rather than a product of strategic analysis of the defence-versus-offence 
relationship". 371 
369 Laird R.F. & Herspring, D.R. (eds.) 1984. The Soviet Union and Strategic Arms. London: 
Westview, p.1IS. 
370 From the very outset of the SALT negotiations, the Soviet preference for a limited ABM 
deployment was apparent to the leader of the US delegation. Smith, Doubletalk, p.94. 
371 Savel'yev and Detinov, The Big Five, p.21. 
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The Geopolitical Balance 
The unusually fluid nature of the wider geopolitical scene also served to encourage the 
Soviet leadership to engage in the SALT process. Allied to the Soviet achievement of 
strategic parity by the end of the decade, America's prowess was itself undermined by 
her deteriorating fortunes in South East Asia. When taken together, this endowed the 
Soviet Union with a position of unprecedented strength in the geopolitical balance.372 
To this was added a new stability in Soviet relations with Europe373 focused 
principally upon Soviet links with France and West Germany. Cordial relations re-
emerged with surprising rapidity in the wake of the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 
1968 and took their most tangible form through an historic agreement of huge 
symbolic importance which recognised the post-war settlement of German borders 
soon after the signing ofthe ABM Treaty and SALT I limits in Moscow. 
However, the most vital aspect of the new geopolitical complexities which faced the 
Soviet leadership was the emergence of China as a potentially powerful, yet 
worryingly unpredictable, player in tri-polar superpower dynamics. The dramatic 
deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations following the Damansky Island clash in March 
1969 seemed for a time to presage a more widespread conflagration between the 
principal communist powers.374 It was paralleled in chronology and complexity by the 
prospect of a US-Chinese rapprochement which had emerged as the result of a long 
372 See Litwak, RS. 1984. Detente and the Nixon Doctrine: American Foreign Policy and the 
Pursuit of Stability, 1969-1976. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.49-50, 64-7 and 73-5 
for an assessment of the impact of the reversal of American fortunes in South-East Asia upon her 
geopolitical status and its interaction with the new style of foreign policy enunciated by Nixon and 
Kissinger. 
373 Kissinger, H.A. 1979. The White House Years. London: Weidenfield and Nicolson and Michael 
Joseph, Chapter XI, pp.380-432; GarthotI: Detente and Confrontation, pp.123-45. 
374 Ostermann, c.P. "New Evidence on the Sino-Soviet Border Dispute, 1969-71 If, and Wishnik, E. 
"In the Region and in the Centre: Soviet Reactions to the Border Rift", Cold War International 
History Project Bulletin, issues 6-7, winter 1995-6, pp.186-93 and 194-201 respectively; GarthotI: 
Detente and Confrontation, pp.227-42; Robinson, T.W. "The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict", in 
Kaplan, S. (ed.) 1981. Diplomacy o/Power: Soviet Armed Forces as a Political Instrument. 
Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, pp.265-313; Haslam, J. 1989. The Soviet Union and 
the Politics o/Nuclear Weapons in Europe, 1969-87: The Problem of the SS-20, London: 
Macmillan, pp.35-41. 
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and often tortuous process of diplomatic signalling through a host of different 
intermediaries.375 Although Chinese caution was clearly evident in their responses to 
the US overtures, there was evidence of some movement in both sides' positions by 
the autumn of 1969. 
It was against this backdrop that on 20th October, the Soviet Ambassador to the US, 
Anatoly Dobrynin, relayed Moscow's desire to enter into negotiations aimed at 
limiting strategic weapons. The same day also witnessed a resumption in the Sino-
Soviet peace talks. The border clashes and the Sino-US rapprochement vividly 
highlighted Soviet concern at the prospect of potential encirclement. To meet this 
threat there emerged a twin-tracked solution. The Soviet military build-up in the Far 
Eastern TVD continued apace. The SS-lls which had replaced the ageing force of 
SS-4 and SS-5s would in tum be replaced by the new SS-20 as a further consolidation 
of the Soviet southern flank. More immediately, the apparent Chinese move towards 
a new understanding with the US and the recent rancour in Sino-Soviet relations 
would act as strong incentives towards active Soviet participation in the process of 
detente. 
FBS 
The Soviet Union's clear aim from the outset ofthe negotiations was to obtain a 
codification of the strategic balance which preserved her present advantage in certain 
fields of strategic force development, while allowing her to maintain a compensatory 
lead in the overall levels of strategic forces vis-a-vis the US to off-set "third power" 
375 Its origins lay in a Chinese invitation to the outgoing Johnson administration in November 1968 
that Sino-US ambassadorial talks might resume in February of the following year. In accordance 
with Nixon's instructions, a positive response was issued to the Chinese leadership. Throughout the 
summer months of 1969 the new administration sought to open a number of secret channels to the 
Chinese leadership with France, Romania and Pakistan playing the role of intermediaries, the 
heightened awareness of the issue of China being reflected in the commissioning ofNSSM (National 
Security Study Memorandum) 14 on 5 February 1969. 
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nuclear arsenals and US FBS.376 "Accounting" of the issue of NATO FBS was viewed 
as "central" to the Soviet position within SALT and stemmed from the Soviet Union's 
definition of "strategic" weaponry which stood in marked contrast with that employed 
by the US.377 The issue ofFBS - and the related theme of "third power" nuclear 
weapons - lay at the very heart of the Soviet demand that SALT should be premised 
upon the principle of "Equal Security" for its participants. This dichotomy was 
apparent from the very outset of the negotiations, a fissure which ran throughout the 
entire SALT process and proved to be the greatest and most enduring obstacle to the 
agreement of bilateral strategic limitations.378 The Soviet Union received de facto 
compensation for FBS under the SALT I provisions which enshrined her quantitative 
advantage in strategic delivery systems. However, while the US hoped that such 
compensatory provisions would prove to be a unique occurrence, the Soviet Union 
pressed for this tendency to remain an on-going practice throughout the ensuing 
SALT II process. 
SALT Policy Formulation 
The impetus provided by the Partial Test Ban Treaty persisted despite US 
involvement in Vietnam and the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. By the time of 
Nixon's accession to power, the Soviet Union was prepared to enter into a process of 
negotiation with the stated aim of imposing limits upon the numerical deployment of 
strategic weapons. The Soviet Union entered into the SALT process with "a clearly 
one-sided negotiating position and a tenacious adherence to it during the 
376 A strong echo of this is to found in Garthofl's accurate appraisal of Soviet aims in "The Military 
and SALT", in Valenta, J. and Potter, w.e. 1984. Soviet Decisionmakingfor National Security, 
London: George Allen and Unwin, pp.141-3. 
377 Lieutenant-General Detinov highlighted in the strongest possible terms Soviet concerns about the 
potential strategic threat posed by the NATO PBS which had been arrayed around much of the Soviet 
Union's perimeter from the late 1940s. Detinov interview. 
378 See for example, Vishnevsky, S. "International Week", Pravda, 4 February 1973, pp.1-4 and 
"Missiles in Excess ofthe Estimate", Izvestia, 15 April 1973, p.2. 
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negotiations."379 Indeed despite the interest in SALT evinced by the Soviet leadership 
as a whole they retained throughout the process the belief that the US would seek to 
gain a strategic advantage through the process of detente. This view took its most 
virulent form in the person of Grechko, while Brezhnev, Ustinov and Gromyko 
favoured a more open-minded approach. Nixon himself was viewed as a tough 
negotiator and the stance adopted by the US Congress towards the Soviet Union in 
the post-SALT I period served to reinforce this perception. The specific details ofthe 
SALT position were developed jointly by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
Ministry of Defence. In the summer of 1969, the Central Committee ofthe CPSU 
met to be briefed by Marshal Zhakarov, head of the General Staff and Vasiliy 
Kuznetzov, first deputy ofthe Foreign Ministry. Ustinov, then Secretary of the 
Central Committee, Serbin of the Defence Department of the Central Committee, 
Andropov, the head of the KGB and Ponomaryov, secretary of the Central Committee 
led the ensuing process of discussion within the Central Committee. Ponomaryov's 
participation was premised solely upon his role as a Central Committee secretary. The 
Central Committee's International Department, of which he was the head, was 
excluded from the entire SALT process by Gromyko as he jealously sought to 
maintain his department's elevated status in the formulation of arms control policy. 
This remained the case until Dobrynin became its head during Gorbachev's tenure. 
Following the preparation of further position papers by the ministries of Defence and 
Foreign Affairs, the negotiating stance with which the Soviet Union would approach 
the initial round of SALT negotiations was approved. 
Documents pertaining to the forthcoming negotiations were prepared exclusively by 
the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence. The responsibility for this in the former 
was devolved to the International Organisations Department (Oldel 
Mezhdunarodnykh Organizalsi) led by Kirill N. Novikov. After the second round of 
SALT negotiations this task was transferred to Georgii Korniyenko, the head of the 
379 Savel'yev and Detinov, The Big Five, p.34. 
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newly-created "United States desk". Within the Ministry of Defence, the Main 
Operational Administration (Glavnoye Operativnoye Upravleniye) of the General 
Staff was charged with the task. General Nikolay V. Ogarkov, First Deputy Chief of 
the General Staff was the principal figure in this process, aided by General Yefim V. 
Boychuk, First Deputy Chief of the GOU and the officers of its staff. The gravity 
with which the SALT process was perceived was indicated by the active participation 
ofBrezhnev, Ustinov, Andropov and Gromyko in the selection ofthe delegation 
personnel. First deputy foreign minister, Vasiliy Kuznetzov was originally selected to 
head the delegation. Upon his transfer to the pressing problem ofthe dramatic 
deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations, his place was taken by Vladimir S. Semyonov. 
The delegation also contained General Ogarkov, first Deputy Chief ofthe General 
Staff, Nikolai Alekseyev, Chairman of the Science and Technical Committee ofthe 
Armed Forces (later appointed as Deputy Defence Minister for Armaments,) 
Academician Shchukin, Chairman of the Technical Council of the VPK, Pyotr 
Pleshakov, Deputy Minister ofthe Radio Industry (later promoted to full ministerial 
status,) Georgii Korniyenko, the later first Deputy Foreign Minister (Korniyenko was 
soon replaced on the SALT delegation by Oleg Grinevsky, deputy head of the 
International Organisations Department of the Foreign Ministry) and Vladimir 
Pavlichenko of the First Chief Directorate of the KGB. 
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The Commission of the Central Committee of the Politburo for the Supervision of the 
Negotiations on Strategic Arms Limitations in Helsinki:- The "Big Five." 
The ad hoc manner of policy formulation, with its reliance upon top-down instructions 
to the respective Ministries did not remain in place beyond the negotiations' initial 
stages. As the delegation began to send back reports of proceedings, "it soon became 
clear that the viewpoints of the various agencies had to be co-ordinated and 
harmonised to work out an integrated and coherent Soviet government position on 
specific issues".380 To this end the creation ofthe Komissiya Politbyuro TsK KPSS po 
nablyudeniyu za peregovorami svyazannymi s ogranicheniyem strategicheskikh 
vooruzhenii v Khel'sinki381 was authorised in November 1969. The six-strong 
membership of the Big Five, as the committee soon came to be known, represented 
key agencies of the Soviet governmental structure and its membership was composed 
of the principal actors in Soviet defence decisionmaking as a whole. The lynchpin of 
this system was Dmitri Ustinov, the secretary of the Central Committee with 
responsibility for defence issues. He was delegated to chair the new body. While 
Ustinov nominally represented the Central Committee on the Committee his close 
association with the defence industries dated back to the war382 and was such that he 
effectively represented their institutional interests in parallel to those of the Party. 
Ustinov found a natural ally in the Commission's deliberations in the shape of Leonid 
V. Smirnov, Chairman of the VPK383. The Defence Ministry was represented by 
Marshal Andrey A. Grechko, the Defence Minister whose virulent distrust of the West 
was manifested on many occasions and must have served to colour his approach to 
the Commission's proceedings. 
380 Ibid., p.15. 
381 Literally "The Commission of the Central Committee of the Politburo for the Supervision of the 
Negotiations on Strategic Arms Limitations in Helsinki". 
382 Ustinov had served as a "People's Commissar", Minister of Armaments and Minister of Defence 
Industry from 1941-57. Between 1957-63 he had served as Chairman of the VPK. 
383 Smimov was also a Deputy Prime Minister as this time. 
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Yurii V. Andropov, the head of the KGB was another member of the Commission. 
The KGB's principal motive for participation was viewed by Detinov as being its 
proclivity towards maintaining its institutional involvement in all major governmental 
ventures and to preserve the integrity of Soviet security during the course ofthe 
negotiations. 
Foreign Minister Andrey A. Gromyko represented his ministry, which was assigned 
the task of producing appropriate propaganda and ideological materials with which to 
help substantiate the Soviet negotiating stance. 
Academician Keldysh, the President ofthe Academy of Sciences was the final member 
of the Commission. Keldysh played a brief role in the Commission's initial 
deliberations. While "his departure produced no shock waves and he himself did not 
protest or object"384 he would prove to be a vital force in the determination of Soviet 
strategic formulation in the coming years. 
The Soviet SALT team sent telegrams detailing the course of the negotiations which 
were circulated among the membership of the Big Five. Following telephone 
discussions with the members, Ustinov would have his aides assemble the preliminary 
views ofthe Big Five members. Ustinov apparently discussed arms control issues 
with Andropov and Smirnov at some length, but rarely went into detail with Grechko 
and Gromyko.385 Thereafter Ustinov would call a meeting of the Big Five with a 
prepared agenda. A quorum of the Big Five was declared when a representative of 
each of the member agencies was present. It did not require the attendance of the 
principal figures per se. Thus on occasion a principal might send his deputy to 
represent him at a meeting of the Big Five. Marshal Viktor G. Kulikov. Chief of the 
General Staff from 1971-7 would deputise for Grechko, while Vasilii Kuznetzov 
would playa similar role on behalf of Gromyko. The various strands of institutional 
384 Savel'yev and Detinov, The Big Five, p.20. 
385 It would thus seem that Ustinov - with aid of Andropov and Smirnov - was the principal in the 
arena of SALT policy formulation. This provides an obvious parallel with the dominant role he has 
traditionally been viewed as playing in defence decisionmaking as a whole during this period. 
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opinion would be presented to the meeting in the form of prepared written 
memoranda.386 In the ensuing discussion all present enjoyed the status of primus inter 
pares, regardless of whether they were departmental heads or nominated delegates. 
All in attendance reserved the right to veto a proposal deemed inappropriate from 
their institutional perspective. "All the agencies involved were virtually equa~ each 
having a decisive vote, irrespective of the rank of the person representing the 
agency. It387 
The provisional instructions for the Soviet SALT team were not directly formulated 
by the Big Five. Rather, the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs were 
designated the task of drafting the appropriate documentation in the light of the Big 
Five's negotiations and comments. No third agency was involved at this point. Nor 
could there have been as the Ministry of Defence possessed a monopoly on defence 
information, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs enjoyed a similar status in the realm 
of international affairs. 
the Ministry of Defence had a monopoly on the information concerning 
the state's armed forces and its weapons, leaving the Foreign Ministry 
virtually without experts in the field. The converse was true in dealing 
with the international political situation ... The Foreign Ministry 
proposed general areas for arms limitations, while the Ministry of 
Defence prepared the technical issues and detailed responses. One 
ministry could estimate how particular policy alternatives would affect 
the country's oboronosposobnost' ("defence capabilities") while the 
second could assess how those decisions related to the international 
interest of the Soviet Union ... During the initial period, all documents 
were drafted by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence. Then 
386 The Russian term for such a document is zapiski. 
387 Savel'yev and Detinov, The Big Five, p.28. 
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after further discussion within the Commission they could be 
amended. 388 
The Commission was dovetailed into the existing defence decisionmaking structure. 
The Big Five prepared reports for the Politburo which contained an appraisal of the 
current state of the SALT negotiations and the Soviet stance within them. Alternative 
negotiating positions deemed feasible and politically acceptable by the institutions 
represented on the Commission were also contained within such documentation. The 
customary Politburo treatment of the Commission's reports serves as ample testament 
to the authority vested in the new consultative body. 
For all practical purposes, there was no case in which the drafts were 
seriously altered, either by Leonid Smirnov, Dmitri Ustinov or the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party or the KGB. Changes - if 
any - were nonsubstantive and totally undramatic.389 
The Commission's decisions were then forwarded to the Politburo which in most cases 
simply rubber stamped them, fully trusting the appointed representatives of the key 
Soviet agencies on the issues. 
As a general rule the Defence Council did not consider the more 
practical issues related to the preparation of the Soviet negotiating 
position or guidance for Soviet negotiators. Rather it concerned itself 
with the more general problems, such as the development of the Soviet 
armed forces. 390 
388 Ibid., pp.28-9. 
389 Ibid., p.28. 
390 Ibid., p.20. 
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The unquestioned acceptance of the vast majority of documents prepared by the Big 
Five was testament to the Politburo's implicit trust in their political judgement and the 
elevated status they were accorded within the highest echelons of Soviet government. 
The mechanics of decisionmaking within the Commission which placed such stress 
upon consensual policy formulation would have served to reinforce Politburo 
confidence that the position papers that were subsequently forwarded to them 
represented a genuine cross-section of opinion emanating from the key institutional 
structures of the Soviet government. Exceptions arose most especially from 1972, 
when progress in the closing stages of the SALT I process prior to the Moscow 
Summit was dependent upon major policy shifts on the part of the Soviet government 
on such fundamental issues as the inclusion ofSLBMs and exemption ofFBS from 
the definition of strategic weapons. Issues of such magnitude came under the scrutiny 
of the Defence Council and were discussed in detail at this level. That apart, from the 
near the outset of the SALT process, the Soviet Union had put in place an inter-
agency committee structure which served to formulate the defining parameters of the 
Soviet negotiating stance with due accordance to the interests of the Soviet 
institutional elites. 
The Big Five seldom met during the course of SALT I as the initial negotiating stance 
was deemed the most appropriate reflection of Soviet interests and was rigidly 
adhered to. It is instructive to compare the contrasting appraisals ofthe Soviet 
negotiating style offered by their American opposite numbers. The leader of the US 
delegation, Gerard Smith, bemoaned the fact that the Soviets always expecting US to 
take the initiative, while Edward Rowny was scathing in his description of the Soviet 
approach. 39 I This practice remained in place until the latter stages of the talks process, 
when it became clear that certain concessions would be required of the Soviets prior 
391 Smith, Doubletalk, p.384; Rowny, "The Soviets Are Still Russians", pp.150-1. For an exhaustive 
account ofthe details of all Soviet arms control proposals during the detente era, see Vigor, P.R. 
1986. The Soviet View of Disarmament. London: Macmillan, pp.94-120. 
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to the signing of a final agreement at the Moscow Summit. This policy of laissez 
faire was replicated during the opening rounds of SALT II. 
The "Special Politburo Commission" 
By May 1971 it was recognised that the Soviet Union would have to modifY its stance 
on a number of key issues to accommodate US concerns in order to achieve eventual 
agreement.392 It was to this end that the "Special Politburo Commission" was created 
by the Politburo, a high-level working party whose remit was to review the 
geopolitical importance of the SALT process to the Soviet Union, the existing Soviet 
negotiating stance and areas of potential compromise through which it might mollify 
US concerns. Again it was headed by Ustinov. Ustinov, Ponomaryov and their 
respective ministries were to liaise with the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and the KGB in this assignment. It existed for only a matter of 
months and resembled a high level working party, rather than a commission. Despite 
the relative brevity of its existence the "Special Politburo Commission" played a vital 
role in re-affirming a positive perception of the SALT process among the Soviet 
leadership as a whole. Its conclusion that the improvement in US-Soviet relations 
associated with the SALT process corresponded to Soviet interests led it to advocate 
the acceptance of the principle of strategic arms limitations in association with 
appropriate ABM controls. Its specific recommendations served as the catalyst which 
enabled the negotiations to proceed towards their eventual fruition at the Moscow 
Summit. 
392 Testament to the of the Soviet Union's prescient appraisal of the US negotiating position is 
provided in a 1971 KGB memorandum from Andropov to Ustinov. "The Committee for State 
Security, 19th April 1971, no.983-A, To Comrade Ustinov, D.P, Moscow", in Cold War 
International History Project Bulletin, issue 4, autumn 1994, pp.69-70. 
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The acceptance in May 1971 of the Politburo Special Commission's recommendations 
as the foundations for the revised Soviet stance is identified as a pivotal point in the 
SALT process. Indeed the SALT I Treaty is characterised by Detinov as, "largely the 
product of the deliberations of the "Special Politburo Commission," rather than a 
product ofthe actions of the Big Five per se".393 
Major areas of contention remained in the wake of the adoption of the revised Soviet 
stance in May 1971. Soviet resistance to the inclusion ofSLBMs continued until 
April 1972 principally due to the persistent opposition emanating from Admiral Sergei 
Gorshkov the head ofthe Soviet navy. The eventual resolution of this issue was 
rightly viewed by Detinov as "a major US concession" to the Soviet Union. The 
subsequent effusive expression of Gorshkov's satisfaction to Brezhnev also serves as 
testament to this fact. Other sources of disagreement such as the definition of, and 
limitations upon, "heavy" ICBMs and the exact location of ABM sites similarly 
persisted till the eve of the Moscow Summit itself. 
393 Savel'yev and Detinov, The Big Five, p.24. 
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Pyaterka - the Five 
As the SALT discussions were initially centred upon the issue of strategic force levels, 
there was little requirement for an ongoing process of briefing by weaponry experts. 
Their widespread introduction in a consultative role occurred as negotiations on a 
proposed ABM limitation became embroiled in technical details. Initially U stinov 
himself selected various experts on an ad hoc basis but the appointment of expert 
representatives from within the institutions of the Big Five soon became the 
established practice. Such experts responded to requests from their superiors. They 
were not however empowered to volunteer unsolicited advice. The members ofthe 
Big Five became familiar with the practice and the personnel involved and it was 
decided to retain this organisational framework on a permanent basis - though without 
formal recognition of its form - in the immediate aftermath of the Vladivostok 
Summit. The committee came to be known as the Five394 and it too remained 
operational until the eventual break-up of the Soviet Union itself. The Five 
maintained a close supervision of the progress of the SALT negotiations and on 
occasion issued specific instructions to the Soviet delegation. This Committee was to 
play the principal role in the determination of the Soviet Union's approach to the 
minutiae of the SALT process. The Five did not convene on a personal basis and a 
quorum could be formed providing a representative from each of the institutions was 
present. The flexibility which characterised the composition of the Five's meetings 
extended to their numerical size. No upper limit was placed upon attendance and 
additional military, industrial and diplomatic experts were co-opted as necessary. This 
practice was particularly prevalent during recesses in the SALT talks, when members 
of the Soviet negotiating team often participated. 
394 It was initially termed, malaya Pyaterka - "Small Five". This was subsequently abbreviated to 
Pyaterka - "Five". 
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The rules were straightforward: if the existing instructions prevented 
deviations from the existing directives ~ no matter how minor - all documents 
were to be submitted for Big Five and Politburo approval. However, in the 
final phase of negotiations, organisational and technical problems became the 
order of the day. To solve these questions, the Soviet delegation sent 
telegrams to Moscow asking for acceptance of ad hoc agreements or else for 
additional instructions. The end result was that all American proposals were 
discussed by the Five, and, if these discussions were within the technical and 
organisational limitations of their informal charter, the Five took its personal 
decisions, wrote a telegram, and sent it without even having to notify the 
members of the Big Five. The telegrams were signed by only two persons: 
the military representative to the Five - a deputy of the General Staff and 
formal chairman of the group - who was one of the Deputy Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs. Sometimes, if the question were purely military, the only 
signature was by a military representative. However, if the question demanded 
discussions within the Big Five, this was done. Instructions resulting from 
these discussions were called 'operational' or 'immediate'.395 
Issues which lay beyond the Five's delineated field of competence were referred 
upwards to the Big Five for its consideration and beyond that to the Politburo itself if 
necessary.396 In the run-up to the Vladivostok Summit, the Five were customarily 
headed by General Kozlov, the First Deputy Chief of the General Staff. In addition, 
Kornienko the Deputy Foreign Minister ofthe CPSU; Detinov the Deputy Chief of 
the Department ofthe Defence Industries of the Central Committee ofthe USSR; 
Osadchiyev deputy head of the VPK and Mityayev, an Andropov aide from the KGB 
were the principal institutional representatives upon this sub-committee. 
395 Savel'yev and Detinov, The Big Five, p.37. 
396 The question remains of exactly where the defining limits of the Five's competence lay. 
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The arms control decisionmaking mechanism in the Soviet Union achieved its 
final shape - the Big Five supported by the Five - on the eve of the 
Vladivostok Summit. That mechanism drew upon the advice and expertise of 
all the agencies involved. The recommendations it produced were almost never 
questioned by the national leaders, including the General Secretary of the 
Communist Party. After Vladivostok, the Five became a standing forum to 
oversee and sort out all issue related to the negotiations.397 
397 Savel'yev and Detinov, The Big Five, ppAl-2. 
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The Role of the Military 
The Soviet military exerted significant influence in the formulation of the Soviet 
Union's SALT negotiating position. It shared with the other institutions represented 
on the Big Five the right to veto any proposal with which it disagreed. However the 
implication seems to be that the Party leadership placed a high premium upon gaining 
the acceptance of the military in particular. 
Looking for ways to harmonise the positions of the various government 
agencies within the ruling bodies ofthe USSR was a sine qua non for working 
out national decisions on the issues dealt with at the negotiations. Only after 
that had been done could the official Soviet position be adopted. Voluntarism 
in that area was completely out of the question. The Soviet leadership tried 
hard to avoid serious frictions and disagreements in decisionmaking ... only 
after the Soviet position had incorporated practically all concerns and wishes 
of the Ministry of Defence would the Politburo endorse it as the official 
position (italics added).398 
In practical terms the Ministry of Defence played an integral role which seemed to 
endow it with a potential to influence the formulation of policy which was unrivalled 
among the participating institutions. Although the SALT process itself acted as 
something ofa catalyst towards a slight loosening of the military's grip in this realm 
the near~obsessive desire on the part ofthe Soviet military to maintain minimal 
disclosure of technical and intelligence information was an oft-recurring theme 
throughout the entire SALT process.399 This was well~attested to and was applied to 
398 Ibid., p.25. 
399 Ibid., p.51 for details of how codenames for Soviet strategic systems were "invented" purely for 
the purposes of designation within the SALT negotiations. The anecdote about the Soviet delegate 
recounted by Smith conveys similar sentiments, Smith, Daubletalk, p.306. His successor, Johnson 
similarly opined, p.613. General Rowny's example from his personal contacts is the most acerbic, 
though this accords with the tenor of the article by the Joint Chiefs' representative at SALT II. 
Rowny, "The Soviets Are Still Russians", p.149. 
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the non-military participants in the Soviet delegation itself with near-equal vehemence 
to that reserved for the US delegates.4OO This monopoly on intelligence accentuated 
military power and ensured that it was the only institution capable offormulating 
military-technical documentation for the proceedings of the Five and the Big Five. 
Orders issued directly by the Five to the Soviet SALT team were customarily signed 
by the committee's military representative from the General Staff and the Five's formal 
chairman, a deputy minister of foreign affairs. However, if the instructions referred to 
a specifically military matter, the General Staff would on occasion be the sole 
signatory to the document. This in itself was further testament to the privileged 
position enjoyed by the military. Military membership consisted of around one third 
of the overall total at all echelons of the Soviet SALT delegation itself.401 The leader 
of the Soviet SALT team - Semyonov - sought to avoid conflict with his military 
colleagues. He viewed his role as that of an intermediary between the Soviet military 
and the US delegation. Semyonov accepted any reservations or caveats expressed by 
the military. Nor did Semyonov view himself as being a "final decision man" .402 
Indeed it seems that the reluctance to confront the military leadership extended still 
higher into the upper echelons of the governing elite and included the Foreign 
Secretary Andrei Gromyko.403 The General Staff did not have a specialised office to 
deal with the question of arms control negotiation in the mid-1970s, so the task fell to 
its Main operational Administration (GOU.) It "proved immensely beneficial for the 
development of well thought out arms control decisions as the arms controllers were 
400 Members of US SALT team were themselves chided by Ogarkov himself for discussing matters of 
a sensitive nature in front of their Soviet civilian counterparts during the course of the negotiations. 
Newhouse, J. 1973. Cold Dawn: The Inside Story of SALT. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 
p.192. Paul Nitze cites a similar incident which incurred the wrath of Marshal Akhromeyev. 
Savel'yev and Detinov, The Big Five, pp.xii-xiii. Gerard Smith told how a member of the US 
delegation had, in passing, enquired of his Soviet counterpart the Russian name for the "Bear" 
bomber he had formerly piloted. "Medved'" (bear) he was told brusquely. Smith, Doubletalk, p.386. 
401 Warner III, E.L. 1977. The Military in Contemporary Soviet Politics: An Institutional Analysis. 
New York: Praeger, p.240, n.62. 
402 Savel'yev and Detinov, The Big Five, p.39. See also Johnson, D.A. and McAllister J.O. 1984. The 
Right Hand of Power. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, p.613 for an account of the apparent 
limitations of Semyonov's authority among the Soviet delegation. 
403 Savel'yev and Detinov, The Big Five, p.25. 
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concurrently in control of the Armed Forces",404 and could view the situation from 
both the military and arms control perspective - thus allowing the adoption of the 
most appropriate course of action. 
While the Soviet military enjoyed a privileged position of influence in the formulation 
of the Soviet Union's SALT policy the Party leadership unquestionably retained its 
position of pre-eminence throughout. Ultimate authority was retained by the Defence 
Council, and through it, the Politburo. That this authority was seldom directly 
exercised was perhaps testament to the confidence in which the efficacy of the Big 
Five system was held. Moreover consideration ofthe attendant consequences and the 
aftermath ofthose infrequent occasions when military concerns were apparently 
overridden for political reasons is in itself instructive. Although Admiral Gorshkov 
had steadfastly resisted the inclusion of SLBMs in SALT their eventual incorporation 
was at such a high level that it failed to impinge upon planned deployment levels and 
led Gorshkov to thank Brezhnev for his preservation of the Soviet navy. On a wider 
scale, the SALT strategic limitations as a whole largely replicated this phenomenon as 
they barely impinged upon existing or planned Soviet strategic force deployment 
programmes, thus ensuring that the military were amenable to its terms. The omission 
ofFBS was similarly inevitable in the face of US intransigence. The Soviet response 
in this instance would be expected to have elicited similar - albeit grudging - military 
approval. 
404 Ibid., pp.37-8. 
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The Negotiation Process405 
FBS 
The SALT process was forced to grapple with the distinct asymmetries which existed 
between the superpowers' strategic force structures, the often conflicting demands and 
pressures exerted by the forces of internal politics within the governmental circles of 
both states and the uncertainty posed by anticipated weaponry technological 
development. The definition of strategic weapons was to prove a perennial point of 
contention throughout the entire SALT process and beyond. The Soviets argued that 
any weapon which had the capability of delivering a nuclear strike against the US or 
the Soviet Union should be included within the remit of the SALT negotiations. This 
would have led to the inclusion of US FBS406 based in Western Europe and carrier-
based aircraft of the US Navy.407 By contrast Soviet TNFs would have been exempt 
from limitation as their range did not allow them to strike at the US.408 Although the 
logic of the Soviet case was sound it rested uneasily alongside the geopolitical 
situation. The NATO Alliance had been built on the principle that an attack on any 
member country would be regarded as an attack on all and fears of US disengagement 
and the prospect of a superpower condominium were already evident among the US' 
European allies. Agreement to limit unilaterally or withdraw US FBS would have had 
405 Labrie, R.P. 1979. SALT Hand Book: Key Documents and Issues, 1972-9. Washington D.C.: 
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, provides an excellent summary of the wide 
range of SALT agreements and detailed accounts of their presentation to the US Congress and press 
by the President and White House officials, most notably Kissinger. The entire texts of the SALT 
Treaties and their related Accords can be consulted in Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: 
Texts and Histories a/the Negotiations. 1996. Washington D.C.: United States Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency, US Government Printing Office. 
406 The majority of such systems had previously been known as LDA - Light Delivery Aircraft. 
407 The verification of adherence to such constraints by both of these groups would in itself have 
posed a major challenge due to their inherent mobility. 
408 An important exception to this would have been the Ubiquitous S8-11. Although by this time it 
had largely taken on a TNF role its initial configuration as a long-range naval missile had endowed it 
with an intercontinental range. 
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a profoundly detrimental effect upon Western political cohesion409 and would also 
have markedly altered the balance of forces in the vital European TVD. Given that 
within both Western and Soviet strategic thought this TVD was regarded as being the 
principal determinant of the outcome of any future NATO-Warsaw Pact conflagration 
there was no prospect of such a unilateral withdrawal. However it would be wrong to 
view Soviet demands on this issue as simply disingenuous.410 While they did represent 
the typical tough stance which the Soviets sought to adopt on many issues at the 
outset of the SALT negotiations it was also evidence of their very real concerns at the 
operational potential of NATO FBS which was in contrast to their own rather 
antiquated TNFs. As such the Soviets hoped and perhaps expected that some form of 
"compensation" may eventually have emerged on this issue as the SALT process 
evolved.4Il The unequal ceilings upon strategic delivery systems that were 
subsequently agreed to in SALT I were certainly viewed in those terms - and not only 
by the Soviets. From the very outset ofthe negotiations US resistance to the 
inclusion ofFBS was resolute despite frequent Soviet demands. However although 
no negotiations concerning FBS took place their spectre remained constantly in the 
background and they proved to be a useful bargaining chip for the Soviets particularly 
in arguing for the exclusion of SLBMs from the freeze. US agreement to relatively 
high levels of Soviet SLBMs could be viewed as evidence of discreet compensation of 
409 US sensitivity to this concern was demonstrated by the regular briefmg of their NATO allies on 
this aspect of the negotiating process. 
410 Nerlich, U. 1976. The Alliance and Europe: Part V, Nuclear Weapons and East-West 
Negotiation, Adelphi Paper 120. London: IISS was untypical in concluding that FBS' were used 
principally as a negotiating device by the Soviets and that they possessed marginal utility in a TNF 
role. The former view is seldom propounded, while the latter ignored their potential vis "one-way" 
missions; a worst-case scenario that military planners would naturally consider. For evidence of such 
Soviet planning, see Kissinger, H.A. 1982. Years of Upheaval. London: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 
pp.l,023 & 1,171; Garthof( "The Soviet Military and SALT", in Valenta and Potter (eds.), Soviet 
Decisionmaking for National Security, p.150. A further caveat on the FBS issue was offered by 
Meyer who argued that the employment of US ICBMs would have been required in any attack upon 
Soviet TNFs - whether comprised of SS-4/SS-5s and SS-ll s or SS-20s - due to NATO TNFs' lack of 
requisite range and hard-kill capability against silo-based systems. Meyer, S. 1984. Soviet Theatre 
Nuclear Forces: Part II Capabilities and Implications, Adelphi Paper 168. London: IISS, p.28, 
n.47. 
411 Smith, Doubletalk, pp.92-3. See also pp.126-30, 179-87 for Smith's assessment ofFBS' role in 
the negotiating process as a whole. 
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the type the Soviets had sought.412 As the pressure to achieve agreement increased as 
the Summit approached the question ofFBS remained unresolved and was effectively 
deferred for consideration in SALT II. There it would prove to be as intractable a 
subject of contention as it had been during SALT 1. 
MIRVs413 
Some accounts have been keen to stress Soviet resistance to a MIRV ban and a desire 
to match US capabilities in this vital development.414 Closer inspection of the course 
of the SALT negotiations however serves to cast doubt on this notion of implacable 
Soviet opposition. Rather the Soviet Union's apparent reluctance is better explained 
by the unpalatable nature of the US proposals and a determination not to accede to 
any measure which risked preserving an unassailable US advantage in this vital area of 
strategic development. Members of the US negotiating team were surprised that the 
issue had not been raised by Semyonov in his opening statement. However, they 
concluded that the Soviet side probably felt bound to adopt a reactive position on this 
issue due to the US monopoly in this field and awaited a US proposal pertaining to 
this question.415 At this point in time the US had all but completed technical 
development of MIRVs, while Soviet research in this field remained in its infancy. 
The issue had already caused deep divisions among US government agencies. While 
the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and the Department of State 
412 Kissinger himself sought to placate Congressional concern over the Soviet SLBM SALT limit by 
highlighting NATO's advantage in PBS. Ibid., p.93. 
413 For an erudite description ofa MIRV system and its strategic potential, see Hersh, S. M. 1983. 
The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House. New York: Summit, p.150. 
414 Kober, S.H. "Causes of the Soviet Military Build-up", in Currie and Varhall, The Soviet Union: 
What Lies Ahead?, pp.314-5. 
415 As Smith himself wryly commented, the omission of MIRVs from the initial US Illustrative 
Elements framework document "must have told the Soviets something about the degree of US interest 
in that major issue". See Smith, Doubletalk, pp.89 & 153-78; Garthoff Detente and Confrontation, 
p.153, n.17 & Hersh, The Price of Power, pp.147-67. Newhouse interpreted the omission as being 
predicated by the Soviet desire to remove the US lead in this and other fields, rather than merely 
discussing them. Newhouse, Cold Dawn, p.174. See also Laird and Herspring, The Soviet Union 
and Strategic Arms, pp.114-5. 
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favoured a moratorium on MIRV development during SALT, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
and the Department of Defence favoured the retention of a free hand to deploy 
MIRVs on ICBMs and SLBMs. They also hoped to constrain future Soviet MIRV 
deployments by securing limits on the throw-weight capacity of Soviet heavy ICBMs. 
Garthoff argued that as early as the spring of 1969 both Nixon and Kissinger had 
concluded that it was not feasible in political terms to pursue limitation of both ABM 
and MIRVs in the face of expected opposition from the Pentagon, the wider military 
establishment and the political right. At this point Kissinger decided to opt for ABM 
rather than MIRV limitations.416 Two factors in particular influenced this decision. 
MIRVs represented a more valuable strategic asset due to their ready availability and 
the US lead in this field. This was in contrast with ABMs where US deployment 
could not be expected for a number of years, while the Soviet Union had already 
deployed the albeit limited Galosh system. In addition, while MIRVs enjoyed 
widespread support from a number of influential patrons within the US governmental 
bureaucracy417, Congressional support for initial development of the new Safeguard 
ABM system had only been secured by the Vice President's casting vote. With such a 
tenuous mandate from the outset, ABM development was clearly more expendable 
than the deployment of MIRVs. The US decision to seek limitations on ABMs while 
ignoring the subject of MIRVs was thus predicated upon its viability in the sphere of 
domestic politics, not its inherent role within the strategic balance. This pre-
occupation with domestic concerns was to recur on several occasions in the future 
with detrimental long-term effects upon US strategic interests. 
It was against this backdrop that the US' negotiating stance was formulated. 
Although the NCA-ABM provisions contained within the first US proposal of April 
1970 were attractive to the Soviets, its proposed constraint on MIRVs was 
immediately rejected by Soviet negotiators. Indeed they interpreted US insistence 
416 Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, p.154. 
417 Smith, Doubletalk, pp.157-164. 
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upon on-site inspection and a ban on "MIRV research and development, while allowing 
"MIRV deployment - a clause from which only the US could benefit - as clear 
signalling of a desire to avoid agreement on the subject. 418 The Soviets countered by 
proposing a ban on production and deployment of "MIRVs, while allowing research 
and development and precluding on-site inspection. This proposal was equally 
unpalatable to the US as it would have been impossible to verify. Permission to 
explore a potential ban on "MIRV production was denied to the US delegation by 
Washington who instead ordered the immediate tabling of a second formal proposal 
allowing the unconstrained development and deployment of "MIRVs by both sides. 
With this development the pursuit of "MIRV limitation during SALT I effectively came 
to an end. Moscow had not at this point taken a final decision on the question of a 
"MIRV ban and whether support for such a ban could have been achieved remains a 
matter of conjecture. The Soviets interpreted US' actions as evidence of an 
unwillingness to sacrifice the US lead in this field and this allied to the reactive 
approach adopted by the Soviet Union during the SALT negotiations prevented them 
from pursuing the matter further with fresh proposals of their own. 
Rather than accept an agreement which would have so obviously prejUdiced Soviet 
strategic interests a policy ofuntrammelled development was preferred. Kissinger's 
later confession that he regretted not having "thought through the implications of a 
"MIRVed world more thoughtfully in 1969 and 197011419 was disingenuous. He had 
been fully aware of their potential long-term effects upon the strategic balance.42o 
Rather it presented a tangible demonstration of Nixon and Kissinger's perception of 
SALT as a part of the wider political process rather than as an arms control measure 
per se and their assessment ofthe domestic political situation in the light of the strong 
institutional backing enjoyed by "MIRVs. Kissinger later sought to explain the 
418 Dobrynin, A. In Confidence, p.212; Berezin, V. Krasnaya Zvezda. "Spokes in the Wheels", 14 
March 1970, p.4; Vishnevsky, S. Pravda "Very Dangerous", 20 March 1970, p.5. 
419 Background briefing of Secretary of State Kissinger, 3 December 1974. Department of State, 
Bureau of Public Affairs. See also Smith, Doubletalk, p.I77. 
420 Hersh, The Price of Power, footnote, p.155. 
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exclusion of a MIRV ban from the SALT negotiations with a spirited, though rather 
spurious, justification of their strategic importance.421 Smith's argument that an ABM 
limitation was viewed by the administration as the most that "the traffic would bear" 
remains far more plausible and was affirmed by Gartho:ff.422 Thus the warnings of 
those who had foreseen the potentially de stabilising effects of MIRVs and the Soviet 
Union's greater potential to deploy them in mass due to the larger throw weights of 
their ICBMs were ignored.423 In essence an equitable MIRV ban was the only qUid 
pro quo of sufficient gravity that the US could offer in the pursuit of a significant 
curtailment of the Soviet strategic build-up. Consequently the absence of radical 
constraints from the Interim Agreement of 1972 was largely the result of the hasty 
retreat from the search for MIRV limitations at the outset of the SALT process. This 
US decision proved to be short-sighted in both political and strategic terms. 
ABM 
The exclusion ofthe SALT negotiating team from the intimate details of policy 
formulation caused an oversight of immense proportions on the part of the US 
President and his Chief Adviser on the issue of ABM limitation. In his initial 
statement of the Soviet position Semyonov identified widespread ABM deployments 
as a potentially destabilising development and argued that major constraints should be 
placed upon their numerical levels and geographical location. Indeed he did not rule 
out a complete ABM ban. This signalled a dramatic volfe face which apparently went 
unnoticed by both Nixon and Kissinger. This oversight would subsequently add 
confusion to the inherent complexities associated with negotiations in this field of 
weaponry development. The two initial sets of US proposals made to Soviet 
421 Kissinger, White House Years, pp.210-212. 
422 Smith, Doubletalk, p.IIS; Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, p.154 and n.20. 
423 See for example Smith's letter to Secretary of State Rogers of June 1969, Smith, Doubletalk, 
p.156. 
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negotiators in Vienna in April 1970 were the product of a piecemeal and at times 
chaotic process of policy fonnulation424 which contrasted sharply with Nixon's 
sanitised accounts in official statements and Kissinger's memoirs.425 They proposed 
limiting ABM deployments to Moscow and Washington as the National Command 
Authorities (NCA). Although both of the US proposals of April 1970 had been 
rejected by the Soviets due to their unacceptable strategic arms limitations, great 
interest was shown in the specific provisions concerning ABMs. The provisions for a 
limited ABM network protecting each nation's NCA accorded closely with the 
existing Galosh deployment around Moscow and would thus have required no 
adjustment in Soviet force structure. Moreover the protection ofNCAs was a 
distinctive Soviet preference while the US favoured the use of ABMs to protect 
ICBM silo fields. 426 Thus within a week of receiving the US proposal of April 1970, 
Soviet negotiators had accepted this component of the proposed limitation. While the 
swift Soviet acceptance came as little surprise to many within the US negotiating team 
it was something of a shock to Nixon and Kissinger who until then had remained 
oblivious to the existence of the revised Soviet policy. The US offer to allow an 
NCA-ABM system was intended purely as an initial bargaining position with no 
expectation of Soviet acceptance as with the MIRV and numerical limitations which it 
accompanied.427 
Against the backdrop of continuing failure to reach a modus vivendi on the parallel 
issue of strategic arms limitation the Soviets sought to break the impasse through 
progress on the specific matter of ABM limitation. This was hinted at in Vienna as 
early as May 1970 and specifically suggested via the Kissinger-Dobrynin channel in 
424 Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, pp.157 -9. 
425 Ibid., p.lS7, n.26; Kissinger, White House Years, p.l49. 
426 Savel'yev and Detinov, The Big Five, p.26 on how the exact distance between ABM sites persisted 
as an issue of contention until the eve ofthe Moscow Summit itself. 
427 Indeed implementation of this proposal would have entailed a renunciation of the widespread 
ABM networks which the Nixon regime had heralded as being of prime importance in a number of 
reports, the latest of which was unveiled only days before the SALT proposals were made in Vienna 
in April 1970. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, p.164. 
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June.428 By December this proposal had been made at the formal negotiating forum 
and in March 1971 the Soviets presented a draft version of a treaty dealing specifically 
with the ABM question. In the face of contradictory US signals on the possibility of 
securing a specific ABM agreement Semyonov and other key members of the Soviet 
delegation privately hinted that some form of "understanding" might be achieved on 
the question ofICBM limitations including, significantly, sub-ceilings on "heavy" 
Soviet ICBMs. The surfacing of this offer at the official talks in Vienna caused 
considerable ire among both Nixon and Kissinger who viewed it as a breach of faith 
on the part of the Soviet leadership as it appeared to have circumvented the secret 
"back channel". In fact Kissinger discerned Soviet enthusiasm to reach an agreement 
on ABMs as an ideal opportunity to pursue a policy of "linkage" with the aim of 
placing concomitant constraints on the Soviet strategic build-up. Thus an ABM treaty 
would only emerge as part of a comprehensive agreement.429 There then followed a 
remarkable series of revised US ABM proposals as Kissinger sought desperately to 
extricate himself from this unwelcome position of potential agreement. The process 
began in August 1970 with a proposal which included an additional ABM option of 
absolute prohibition, accorded equal status with the earlier offer of an NCA protection 
network. As expected the Soviets declined this new offer and reaffirmed their 
acceptance of the NCA-ABM proposal, much to the unease of the US negotiating 
team. US attempts at disengagement continued in March 1971 when a third ABM 
proposal (again accorded equal status) was presented to the Soviet delegation. It was 
suggested that the single Soviet NCA-ABM deployment would be balanced by four 
428 This was the occasion of Do bryn in's controversial offer to reach an agreement on the prevention 
of accidental war which has been viewed as a "sweetener" to an ABM Treaty for US domestic 
consumption (see Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, pp.199-205) or as a Soviet demand for joint 
action against a future Chinese threat: "Collusion against China was to be the real Soviet price for a 
summit". White House Years, p.117. See also Smith, Doubletalk, pp.141-145 and Newhouse, Cold 
Dawn, pp.188-9. 
429 The ABM Treaty was not completed until the Moscow Summit in May 1972 though its final 
provisions were essentially the same as those accepted by the Soviets in 1970. Most participants in 
the negotiations have argued that an ABM Treaty could have been secured long before the Moscow 
Summit. This did not occur because of the US administration's desire to pursue a policy of linkage. 
Hersh also notes acerbicly that while agreement in 1970 may have been a realistic aim, "Nixon was 
not running for re-election in 1970". Hersh, The Price o/Power, p.339. 
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US networks surrounding its main ICBM sites. However having secured its favoured 
option in the initial round of US proposals, there was little prospect of the Soviets 
renouncing their acceptance in the future and this new proposal met with a hostile and 
rather indignant reception. A further US proposal in July 1971 reduced the US 
component to three ABM structures while retaining the sole Soviet NCA network and 
met a similarly frosty response. Ironically the Soviet negotiators now quoted their US 
counterparts' earlier arguments in support ofthe NCA-Ievel proposal. In parallel with 
this diplomatic posturing Washington sought in July to assuage Smith's tenacious 
pursuit of a total ABM ban by authorising private discussions with Semenov on the 
matter, secure in the mistaken belief that the Soviets would not surrender NCA under 
any circumstances. To Washington's surprise the response was cautiously favourable 
and Smith was swiftly ordered to break-off the contact.430 The accompanying promise 
to Smith that a complete ABM ban would be pursued in SALT II was never realised. 
In August 1971 the US reduced their proposed ABM deployment to two sites to 
balance the Soviet NCA defence structure. By April 1972 a compromise had evolved 
which formed the basis of the ABM Treaty of that year. It limited both sides to the 
deployment of two ABM sites (for NCA defence and one ICBM field), each ofa 
maximum of 100 launchers. The upgrade of air defence systems to ABM status and 
the deployment oflarge phased array radars was prohibited. An evolution ofthis 
position emerged to form the basis of a Protocol in 1974 which further limited 
permissible provision to one ABM site of 100 launchers. Soviet enthusiasm for 
agreement on the ABM issue was seized upon by Kissinger who viewed it as an 
opportunity to pursue a policy of linkage with which to limit Soviet strategic force 
levels. 
430 Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, pp.172-4 and Smith, Doubletalk, pp.256-263 and Appendix 
5 pp.485-6. 
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Strategic Force Levels 
The US' initial dual proposals of April 1970 both contained identical provisions 
pertaining to strategic weapons levels. ICBM and SLBM launchers would be frozen 
at the then-current US level of 1,700 then reduced by 100 per annum for the next 
seven years.431 Inspection of its provisions soon identified a number of details which 
would obviously prove unacceptable to the Soviet side. While rejecting the Soviet 
definition of Western TNFs as strategic weapons, this proposal went further and 
sought to include Soviet TNFs within its provisions despite their inability to strike at 
the US. In addition its proposed constraints centred upon land-based ICBMs - the 
principal component of Soviet strategic forces - while largely excluding long-range 
bombers where the US enjoyed a longstanding advantage. The proposals sought to 
specifically constrain deployment levels of the SS-9 "heavy" ICBM, the mainstay of 
the Soviet ICBM force which possessed great potential as a MIRV carrier. A ceiling 
of250 SS-9launchers would be enforced, which as the Soviet Union had already 
deployed 222 launchers and had 60 more already in production, allowed no scope for 
future expansion. By contrast, the US would be able to meet its obligations under 
these proposals through the impending retirement of obsolescent B-S2 bombers. 
By August 1970 a new US proposal had emerged. The ICBM ceiling of 1,700 
launchers with its sub-ceiling of250 "heavy" ICBMs remained as did the related right 
to pursue unconstrained MIRV development and deployment. Previous restrictions 
on Soviet TNFs were removed but there was a rejection of Soviet demands for the 
inclusion of Western TNFs. In May 1971 Semyonov hinted to his US counterparts 
that some form of "accommodation" might be achieved on the question of strategic 
431 Within the US negotiating team this proposal was favoured most strongly by Paul Nitze with the 
backing of the Department ofthe Defence. 
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weapons, including a specific sub-ceiling on "heavy" ICBMs.432 The reaction in 
Washington when this news was relayed by the SALT delegation was one of 
unrestrained rage as the Soviets had brought into the open a topic which had been the 
subject of discussion via the Kissinger-Dobrynin "back channel" for four months.433 
Nixon was deeply concerned lest Smith's negotiating team gain credit for the 
breakthrough that he had expected to claim exclusively as his own. Kissinger viewed 
the development as a deliberate Soviet ploy and demanded a reply to his latest 
proposals within forty-eight hours. Soviet agreement was given within twenty-four 
hours and on 20 May 1971 Nixon was able to announce (a simultaneous and identical 
announcement was made in Moscow) that an agreement had been reached in principle 
on the matter of ABM and strategic weapon limitations.434 Despite the upbeat nature 
of the statement as a whole, the admission in its final sentence was indicative of how 
far both sides remained from a comprehensive agreement435. 
SLBMs 
While Kissinger's persistent use of the "back channel"436 often unnecessarily 
constrained the course of the official negotiations, his glaring faux pas437 of February 
432 This was broached almost a year earlier via the "back channel" on 4 July 1970. Smith was the 
only SALT delegate to be informed of this offer. 
433 Smith, Doubletalk, pp.222-233 and Kissinger quoted by Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, 
p.166, "a bizarre incident interrupted our efforts". See Smith, Doubletalk, p.243 for his personal 
reaction to the uncovering of this surreptitious form of negotiation. 
434 Weekly Presidential Documents, p.783. 
435 It now seems clear that a prerequisite corollary of this proclaimed breakthrough was an agreement 
to relax restrictions on sales of US grain surpluses and capital goods to the Soviet Union. Both 
Nixon and Kissinger were remarkably reticent about this issue in their memoirs. For a detailed and 
revealing account of the process of agreement see Hersh, The Price of Power, pp.334-349 and 
GarthotI: Detente and Confrontation, pp.l00-106. See also Weekly Presidential Documents, p.890; 
Kissinger, White House Years, pp.252-3 and GarthotI, Detente and Confrontation, p.103. 
436 Smith viewed Kissinger's role in the negotiation process as "all-pervading", Doubletalk, pp.l08-
14. For a detailed account of Kissinger's White House career under Nixon's Presidency, see Hersh, 
The Price of Power: KiSSinger in the Nixon White House. Chapters 12, 13,25 and 37 deal 
specifically with SALT. 
437 Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, pp.179-190 and Smith, Doubletalk, p.228. Dobrynin's 
account indicated that Kissinger's initial lapse on the issue could be dated as early as January 1970. 
Dobrynin, In Confidence, pp.215-6. 
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1971 threatened to undermine the entire US negotiating stance. He conceded that 
SLBMs could be excluded from the agreement's provisions, a caveat which would 
have allowed the Soviet Union carte blanche in her SLBM build-up. US SLBM 
deployments were by now complete and no plans existed for a renewed building 
programme in the foreseeable future. Kissinger placed the US representatives in a 
perilous negotiating position, the more so as they remained ignorant of the existence 
of such a concession during this vital phase of the talks in May 1971.438 The exclusion 
of SLBMs from the provisions would have met with intractable opposition from 
within the US military establishment and Congress. As the Soviets were naturally 
reluctant to give up this concession and US negotiators were not authorised to offer a 
compromise, no progress was made on the matter through official SALT channels. 
Their eventual inclusion was the result of a deal struck during Kissinger's visit to 
Moscow in April 1972439 which allowed him to save face and avoid a storm of internal 
protest.440 The compromise was however oflittle strategic value to the US as the 
Soviet ceiling of950 SLBMs and 62 submarines agreed upon closely resembled the 
planned level of Soviet deployment, a level that the Soviets would be allowed to meet 
by the withdrawal ofthe obsolescent SS-7 and SS-8 ICBMs. 441 
On his return to Washington, Kissinger was able to secure Nixon's backing for the 
unexpected breakthrough by highlighting the lack of progress made on the issue of 
SLBMs through the official SALT talks, while omitting that US SALT negotiators 
had been specifically prohibited from offering any such compromise. He was also able 
438 GarthotI: Detente and Confrontation, pp.179-183 and Smith, Doubletalk, pp.223-9, 272-6, 325-
30, 370-82, 400. 
439 This visit was intended to deal exclusively with the issue of Vietnam. Kissinger defied these 
specific instructions to raise the issue of SALT - perhaps indicative of his concern over his previous 
error. 
440 However while Kissinger succeeded in gaining Soviet acceptance of the inclusion ofSLBMs, 
Brezhnev had staked a new claim during the visit that US FBS and British and French SLBMs be 
included in the assessment of the overall strategic balance and the Soviet Union be accorded some 
form of compensation. British and French FBS/SLBM forces consisted of375 launchers in service; a 
further 250 planned or under construction. Smith, Doubletalk, p.145 and Garthoff, Detente and 
Confrontation, p.185, n.87. The inclusion of US FBS was not open to negotiation, while the 
inclusion of US allies' forces - despite their relatively small size - in a bilateral agreement without 
prior consent would have been an unprecedented step which would have placed the NATO alliance 
and co-operation with France in jeopardy. 
441 Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, pp.182-4. 
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to present his Moscow deal in a favourable light to the Verification Panel meetings 
held within days of his return by highlighting production potential figures prepared by 
his staff and based upon inaccurate Pentagon estimates. Five estimates of future 
Soviet SLBM potential were presented and Kissinger's agreed total of 950/62 tallied 
favourably with the second lowest projected figure.442 Nixon's brusque rejection of 
Smith and Roger's claim during a meeting of the NSC that a lower SLBM limit could 
well be extracted from the Soviets443 through further negotiation demonstrated the 
President's continued mistrust of the highest echelons of government and the Moscow 
deal's status as afait accompli. 444 Detinov's account of the eventual inclusion of 
SLBMs confirms both the chronological narrative proffered by his US counterparts 
and their strongly-held belief that the eventual compromise secured by Kissinger on 
his visit to Moscow was regarded in a most favourable light by his hosts. He 
confirmed that the Soviet Union resisted US demands for the inclusion of SLBMs 
until as late as April 1972. Gorshkov was eventually persuaded to accept the 
inclusion ofSLBMs under the auspices of the SALT I Treaty as it became clear that 
continued Soviet intransigence on this issue would preclude US acceptance of the 
agreement. However the quid pro quo secured as a result of Kissinger's faux pas 
allowed the unfettered completion of the planned Soviet SLBM build-up and led 
Admiral Gorshkov to thank Brezhnev for his preservation of the Soviet navy.445 
442 Ibid., pp,187-8 and Hersh, The Price of Power, pp.539-541. 
443 Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, p.188 and Smith, Doubletalk, pp.370-8. 
444 There remained a final twist with regard to SLBMs. As the Soviets were to be allowed to retire 
their obsolete SS-7 and SS-8 ICBMs and build-up their SLBMs in a numerical trade-off, the US 
sought to obtain equal rights to pursue such actions. This was an important matter of principal for 
any reciprocal treaty but held little practical import as there was no prospect of a renewed US SLBM 
build-up in the foreseeable future. However in the face of Soviet pressure at the pre-Summit 
conference Nixon and Kissinger acquiesced and the President gave a written undertaking that no 
such development would take place. This was to remain secret until 1974 and stood in marked 
contrast to the solemn undertakings provided to Congress by both men during the 1972 hearings that 
no secret agreements had been made. When rumours surrounding this covert undertaking surfaced in 
the summer of 1974 they were seized upon by Senator Jackson and fellow sceptics of detente. The 
ensuing brouhaha helped constrain Nixon's scope for manoeuvre at the forthcoming Moscow 
Summit. 
445 Savel'yev & Detinov, The Big Five" pp.25-6. 
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Silo Dimensions and "Heavy" Missiles446 
An issue of great import that remained unresolved following Kissinger's May 1971 
Moscow sojourn was the question of technical constraints upon ICBM modernisation 
programmes. The self-imposed Soviet moratorium on the building of new silos had 
evolved into an agreed ban to come into effect on 1 July 1972.447 While there were 
no specific restrictions concerning the development of new missile systems, their 
introduction would have been constrained by a parallel undertaking not to replace or 
develop existing silos containing "small" ICBMs in favour of those capable of housing 
their "heavy" equivalents. While this in itself was an important undertaking of 
principal, its true effect would be determined by the exact definition of "heavy" 
ICBMs and the size of the silo housing for the purposes offuture deployment and this 
issue dominated the sixth round of negotiations in Vienna from November 1971 till 
January 1972. The principal Soviet ICBMs in service at this time were the SS-9 and 
SS-I1. While the SS-9 was c.200 cubic metres in size, the SS-11 (due to its markedly 
different design background) was a mere 70 cubic metres. The problem of definition 
arose from the fact, of which both sides were aware, that the next generation of 
Soviet ICBMs which were currently under development would fall between these 
parameters. Thus while US negotiators sought 70 cubic metres as the upper limit for 
the definition of "light" ICBMs, their Soviet counterparts argued that such a limit 
would amount to a de facto constraint on modernisation in contravention of the 
previously agreed position. Kissinger advised that in the event of failure to gain 
Soviet agreement on this point the US delegation should issue a unilateral statement 
asserting that future Soviet deployments ofICBMs larger than the SS-11 would be 
regarded by the US as falling within the "heavy" ICBM classification. Smith's 
446 Ibid., pp.5-6 & 26 for an excellent summation of the Soviet Union's preference for "heavy" 
ICBMs, their subsequent strategic implications and their role in the negotiating process. 
447 Those silos already under construction on this date could be completed. 
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pessimistic evaluation ofthe effect of such a statement448 was vindicated by 
subsequent events and the issue later caused Kissinger considerable discomfiture. 449 
When the SS-19 was later introduced it was erroneously portrayed by critics as 
evidence of Soviet breach of - at the very least - the "spirit" ofthe SALT 
agreement.450 Thus SALT's credibility suffered due to Kissinger's expediency. 
The Moscow Summit451 
At this point the negotiations in Helsinki effectively halted as the Moscow Summit 
began in May 1972 with a number of technical issues still unresolved.452 There had 
been little progress within the official SALT delegations for several months as Nixon 
and Kissinger strove to ensure that "some issues would be left to the summit for 
triumphant presidential resolution".453 Remarkably both SALT delegations remained 
in Helsinki for the duration of the Summit where negotiations were carried out 
principally by Kissinger and Gromyko, though Nixon and Brezhnev also participated 
on occasion. Apparently these negotiations were "too important for negotiators".454 
Soon Nixon and Brezhnev had inadvertently agreed to a proposed ban on missile 
volume increase of more than 15% which would have had the effect of providing a 
partial MIRV ban on the future deployments of both sides. 455 This rapid progress was 
as unwelcome to the negotiating teams as it was unexpected and led to "several days 
of frenzied negotiations" .456 
448 Smith, Doubletalk, pp.331-4 and 423. 
449 Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, p.196. 
450 Perry, R "Verifying SALT in the 1980s", in Bertram, C. (ed.) 1978 The Future of Arms Control: 
Part 1, Beyond SALT II, Adelphi Paper 141. London: IISS, p.22 and n.27. 
451 See Smith, Doubletalk, ppA07-45; Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, pp.325-38 for a full 
account of the Moscow Summit. 
452 Smith, Doubletalk, ppA09-431. 
453 Hersh, The Price of Power, p.349. 
454 Smith, Doubletalk, pA08. 
455 Ibid., ppAI5-7. 
456 Interestingly, the result of these negotiations was an agreement that silo development in excess of 
15% would be defined as "significant" and would thus be prohibited. A final bizarre twist emerged as 
Kissinger's staff mis-translated a key word in the agreement and thus inadvertently sanctioned a 15% 
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SALT 1I457 
The SALT II process began in November 1972 with the stated aim of pursuing further 
strategic arms limitations in the new era of detente which seemed to have blossomed 
in the wake ofthe Moscow Summit. However the head of the US delegation paid 
scant attention to this period in his memoirs due to the inertia which beset the 
negotiating process for the remainder of the Nixon Presidency and contrasted it with 
the Ford period.4S8 Progress continued to be circumscribed by the US administration's 
inherent preference for political agreements with the Soviet Union rather than seeking 
to address the more intractable issues of arms control per se.459 To this was now 
added new levels of Congressional opposition460 and the Watergate scandal which 
began to cast its shadow over the process of detente - a shadow which would in the 
near future effectively paralyse the SALT II process until the demise of Nixon himself. 
These developments were in part a reflection of a wider and growing questioning of 
the efficacy of the process among the US populace at large which "was beginning to 
be less sure of the benefits of detente but had not rejected it. "461 
The SALT II process began only six months after the Moscow Summit. While the 
Soviet side had made a number of considered concessions in order to secure the 
Interim Agreement, they reverted to their long-held principle of "Equal Security" at 
the outset of SALT II. In practical terms this entailed a demand for the inclusion of 
FBS within the remit of SALT's strategic limits or some form of de facto 
compensation. The continuity of the Soviet approach that was evident in the initial 
increase in silo dimensions, thus also allowing a 15% increase in depth which allowed a total 
volumetric increase of c.32%. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, p.195. By contrast Detinov was 
rather more generous in his assessment of the leaders' active participation in Moscow. Savel'yevand 
Detinov, The Big Five, p.25. 
457 For an exhaustive account of the course of the SALT II negotiating process and the internal 
machinations of US elite politics which accompanied it, see Strobe Talbott, Endgame: The Inside 
Story of SALT II; Johnson, The Right Hand of Power, pp.571-624. 
458 Johnson, The Right Hand of Power, p.582. 
459 See Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, pp.370-1 and n. 27-9 for more detailed discussion. 
460 See Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, pp.367 -9 on the opposition of Senator Jackson et al. 
461 Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, p.462. 
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approach to SALT II was matched by the retention of the key personnel and policy 
formulation practices which had evolved during SALT I in the shape of the Big Five. 
The impetus which had reached a zenith at the Moscow Summit had quickly 
dissipated in the immediate aftermath. The SALT II negotiations would remain 
becalmed for two years and devoid of substantive progress until the Vladivostok 
Accords of November 1974. These factors combined to ensure that the Big Five 
played a largely passive role in the intervening period as the Soviet negotiating stance 
remained devoid of substantive alteration. Against this backdrop of inaction, the Big 
Five met on only one or two occasions during SALT II's initial rounds. 
The Negotiating Process 
In March 1973 the US delegation was instructed to table a new proposal in an attempt 
to broaden the provisions ofthe Interim Agreement (as SALT I was officially termed) 
to include heavy bombers within a revised equal aggregate total. This overall 
aggregate would have contained specific and equal constraints upon the numbers of 
ICBMs deployed and their throw-weights. Such a proposal was obviously 
unacceptable to the Soviets as the new constraints would have principally affected 
two areas of strategic competition - the numerical level ofICBM deployment and 
their throw-weights - where the Soviet Union enjoyed a clear advantage and would 
thus have entailed a reduction of Soviet ICBM forces or would have facilitated a 
unilateral US build-up of up to 300 ICBMs. Significantly MIRVs were again ignored 
by the proposals. Not surprisingly this was rejected by the Soviet delegation but they 
themselves provided no counter-proposal at this juncture. When Soviet proposals 
eventually emerged they were based exclusively upon the SALT I limitations as the 
guiding principal for agreement. New US SALT proposals were hurriedly composed 
in advance ofBrezhnev's scheduled visit to Washington in June 1973 for the second 
Summit meeting. The result was a proposed numerical limit of2,350 for both sides' 
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aggregate totals ofICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers, while the obviously 
unacceptable demand for an equal sub-limit ofICBM numbers and throw-weights was 
dropped. In addition there was now included a proposed freeze on MIRV testing and 
deployment on land-based missiles for the duration of the negotiations.462 
Unfortunately as Garthoffpoints out "this (MIRV) proposal was three years late" as 
by 1973 US deployment of MIRVs had been taking place for three years while the 
Soviets had yet to test a MIRV. 463 Thus the preservation of a significant and 
unacceptable US lead would have been the sole consequence of such a freeze at this 
time. The Soviet delegation presented a draft treaty in the autumn of 1973 which 
would have added unspecified limitations upon MIRV deployments to the existing 
constraints ofthe Interim Agreement. Given the prevailing political climate within the 
US at this point in time such a proposal was not regarded as a feasible option by the 
Nixon administration as it would have further codified the increasingly contentious 
Soviet numerical lead in strategic systems. Nothing emerged from the US until a 
February 1974 proposal of equal overall aggregate totals (2,350) ofICBMs, SLBMs 
and heavy bombers and equal ICBM MIRV throw-weight. The latter aspect ofthis 
proposal would have markedly favoured the US due to their traditional utilisation of 
smaller missiles and warheads. 
A more determined US effort to achieve a breakthrough emerged during Kissinger's 
pre-summit preparatory visit to Moscow in March 1974. As with SALT I the 
proposed limitations would have effectively frozen the strategic balance at its current 
level In this case the Soviet numerical lead in launchers would have been codified 
and offset by the US lead in MIRV deployments. Despite the optimism shown by 
Kissinger - mistakenly encouraged by Dobrynin - on his arrival in Moscow the 
response from the Soviet leadership was swift and negative. Brezhnev argued that the 
US proposal had sought to constrain missile throw-weight, the only area of clear 
462 Ibid., pp.368-72. 
463 Despite mistaken US concerns that SS-9s were being "MIRVed" as early as 1972. Ibid., p.370, 
n.25 and Hersh, The Price of Power, p.158. The tangible effect of the US programme was that 350 
Minuteman Ills had been armed with 1,050 MIRVs. 
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Soviet advantage in the strategic balance. Brezhnev himself proposed that the SALT I 
limitations be continued until 1980 with a limit of 1,000 MIRVed missiles. During the 
course of the ensuing negotiations the Soviets offered the US the advantage of an 
extra 100 MIRVed systems and a reduction of ABM systems to one site.464 The 
parley continued during Gromyko's visit to Washington in April and his subsequent 
meetings with Kissinger in Geneva and Nicosia in the weeks which followed. During 
the course ofthese talks the US proposed an extension of the SALT I provisions until 
1980 with additional MIRV limits of 1,000 and 850 for the US and Soviet Union 
respectively. As such the codification of the Soviet numerical lead in strategic 
launchers as a whole would have been off-set by the retention of a US advantage in 
the important field of MIRV s. Although this proposal would have based agreement 
upon a recognition of the existing strengths of both nations as in SALT I it was 
rejected by Gromyko at the meeting in Geneva on 28 April. 
At the third and final summit meeting between the two leaders in Moscow between 27 
June and 3 July 1974 both sides adopted slightly modified negotiating positions. 
However there was insufficient movement to allow a substantive breakthrough on the 
issue of strategic limitation. 465 An agreement to confine ABM systems to a single site 
which the Soviet Union had indicated its willingness to accept as early as 1972 and 
which matched the actual process of deployment by both sides emerged as the sole 
palliative. Significantly the Moscow summit was the occasion of a renewed Soviet 
attempt to include US FBS in the determination of the strategic balance. Brezhnev 
personally presented an array of evidence of Soviet evaluations of the potentially 
significant role that FBS could play in the event of a future nuclear conflict. He was 
joined in this process by Colonel General Mikhail Kozlov, first deputy chief of the 
General Staff and chief of its Main Operations Directorate and Marshal Grechko, the 
minister of defence. 
464 Kissinger, Years ojUncertainty, pp.l022-25. 
465 Soviet public pronouncements on the Summit were favourable and optimistic at the time but later 
evaluations of the situation were more candid. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, pp.480-5. 
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The Vladivostok Summit and SALT's Implications for Soviet Weaponry 
Procurement Policy 
The Vladivostok Summit 
By 1974, the Soviets recognised that the SALT II process required re-invigoration. 
Although the negotiating teams met in their fifth round of talks between 18 September 
- 5 November 1974, meaningful progress had long since halted. Discussion was 
generalised in form and limited to issues of marginal importance in accordance with 
the instructions received from both capitals. It was hoped that the accession of a new 
US President and the Summit in Vladivostok scheduled for November of that year 
would serve as the necessary catalyst. Such an occasion might also have served as a 
valuable fillip to the new administration. It was the first in US history to be led by a 
President who had not been elected to national office and faced an uphill struggle to 
attain public credibility in the aftermath of the Watergate scandal, while its opponents 
on Capitol Hill became still more vociferous in their criticism of any apparent 
concessions to the Soviet Union. The retention of Kissinger as Secretary of State was 
the singular untainted legacy from the previous administration. 
Prior to the Summit the official delegations were precluded from entering into 
substantive negotiations. Rather, the "back channel" link between Kissinger and 
Dobrynin was preferred. Kissinger visited Moscow on a four-day trip in late October. 
A week prior to his arrival proposals had been relayed to Moscow via Dobrynin. 
They would have allowed an overall total of2,200 strategic launchers, 1,320 of which 
could be armed with MIRVs. "Heavy" ICBMs or bombers would be limited to 250 
and the arming of the former with MIRVs was precluded. ASMs with a range in 
excess of3,000km were banned and the pace of force modernisation would be limited 
to 175 p.a. Although the initial proposals were skewed in the US' favour, their tenor 
and means of delivery to Moscow afforded them sufficient gravitas to serve as a 
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starting point for Kissinger's ensuing negotiations while in Moscow. During the 
Moscow meeting, Brezhnev countered with two potential bases for agreement. One 
served to codify the Soviet Union's advantage in the overall number of strategic 
systems to be off-set by similar recognition of the US' lead in MIRVed systems. The 
other offered to set an equal aggregate total oflaunchers for both nations, within 
which they would be free to determine the exact nature of their force structures. It 
was the latter format which came to form the basis of the Vladivostok Accord.466 
Significantly, Garthoffs account seemed to imply that the Soviet Union's acquiescence 
in agreeing to defer the issue ofFBS was secured by Kissinger during his October 
Moscow trip or in its immediate aftermath.467 Kissinger himselfwent still further, 
claiming that the possibility of deferment of the FBS issue, "at the very end ofthe 
process after all other issues were resolved" was hinted by the Soviet delegation as 
early as the negotiations' resumption in February 1974.468 By contrast, the principal 
Russian account laid little stress upon Kissinger's role in preparing the groundwork for 
the Summit and offered a rather different account of the issue of the status accorded 
to FBS in the pre-Summit exchanges. According to Detinov, the Soviet negotiating 
position at Vladivostok was formulated largely in accordance with the well-
established practices of the Big Five with the aid of the Five. An initial round of 
background papers was prepared by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence. 
They were reviewed by a meeting of the Politburo held in the spring of 1974, which 
took an unusual, expanded form to allow the attendance of a number of experts and 
nomenclatura. The Politburo agreed a number of "non-fundamental" changes. 
Detinov recalled that the Politburo specifically stated at this point in time that no 
concessions should be made on the question ofFBS. The members of the Big Five 
were not confident that progress would be made at the Summit while the Soviet 
466 Ibid., pp.494-6 for full details of the various proposals. 
467 Ibid., pp.495-6, n.19. 
468 Kissinger, Years afUpheaval, p.l,018. If this impression was accurate, it would mark something 
of a departure from the well-established practice of airing such sensitive matters exclusively via the 
"back channel" contact. Kissinger makes no observation on this apparent inconsistency. 
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Union maintained such a rigid insistence.469 The Five and the Big Five were then 
delegated to consider the matters in greater depth. The individuals who played the 
principal role in formulating the minutiae of the Soviet position for Vladivostok were: 
Kozlov of the Ministry of Defence; Korniyenko of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; 
Detinov of the Central Committee; Osadchiyev of the VPK and Mityayev of the KGB 
(Ivanov was possibly responsible for aiding Mityayev)470 
Korniyenko who had been responsible for organising the Summit attended the Summit 
in an advisory capacity. So too did Kozlov and Detinov representing the General 
Staff and Central Committee respectively. Detinov's institutional background may 
have been somewhat disguised due to his titular status as a general and the fact that 
Brezhnev introduced him as a "Representative of the Ministry of Defence" to the US 
delegation.471 Detinov, Kozlov and Korniyenko were positioned in an adjacent room 
while Brezhnev, Gromyko and Dobrynin faced Ford and Kissinger. In his customary 
fashion, Brezhnev consulted this array of experts on a number of occasions. A 
contrasting explanation of their location furth of the actual negotiating table was 
offered indiscreetly by Kissinger himself. During an "off-the-record" briefing of 
journalists on 3 December 1974,472 Kissinger claimed to have colluded with Dobrynin 
to facilitate the removal of Soviet military representatives to an adjacent room during 
the Vladivostok Summit to prevent a repeat of their frequent interruptions ofthe 
negotiations during the previous summit at Yalta in June-July 1973.473 Garthoff 
recounted this anecdote, the apparent implication being that it represented an attempt 
to marginalise the Soviet military from proceedings.474 Detinov's account however 
served to directly refute this implicit allegation. As a rule, "Brezhnev almost never 
[italics added] strayed beyond the accepted and approved directives and the experts' 
469 General Detinov interview. 
470 Savel'yev and Detinov, The Big Five, pp.36,39-40. 
471 Ibid., p.40. 
472 The relevant extract was eventually released following legal action in 1981. It is interesting to 
note that neither Kissinger nor Dobrynin made mention of any such incident in their memoirs. 
473 The question of reducing military involvement was supposedly considered at Dobrynin's request. 
Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, p.480. 
474 Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, p.4S0 & n.76 and p.SlS & n.65. 
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recommendations ... Moreover since these same experts were also members of the 
Five, their opinion could be accepted as the agreed view of the agencies involved. "475 
Blacker's comment that "Kissinger, as well as others who have reported on this drama, 
may have been reading more into the episode than the evidence warrants; to a degree, 
at least, they may have seen what they wanted to see"476 seems perceptive indeed. 
When interviewed on the subject, Detinov identified FBS and Soviet "heavy" ICBMs 
as insurmountable obstacles to agreement as the Summit talks dragged on into the 
early hours with no prospect of a breakthrough.477 He had not identified them as the 
principal obstacles to agreement in quite such an unambiguous fashion in the text of 
The Big Five, highlighting instead differences pertaining to "the overall ceiling on 
MIRVed strategic delivery vehicles".478 Dobrynin's account ofBrezhnev's 
contretemps with Grechko on the subject ofFBS' inclusion during a telephone 
conversation in the course of the Summit negotiations would seem to lend credence to 
Detinov's implication that the issue was not alait accompli arranged prior to the 
Summit itse1£479 Other sources appear ignorant of - or disinterested in - the precise 
chronological details ofthe Soviet deferment of the FBS issue and discuss it in more 
generalised terms. They do however imply that the concession was made during the 
course of the Summit negotiations themselves, rather than during Kissinger's previous 
preparatory visit to Moscow as claimed by Garthoff.480 However while the precise 
chronology might remain open to question FBS' potentially deleterious effect upon the 
SALT process remained - as did the lingering Soviet desire for appropriate 
"compensation". Kissinger had hinted during his preparatory trip to Moscow in 
October that the US would be willing to make a concession to Soviet concerns 
regarding FBS. The palliative token gesture was subsequently offered by Ford at the 
475 Savel'yev and Detinov, The Big Five, pAO,48. At the subsequent summit in Helsinki in 1975, 
Brezhnev's anger at the lack of room for manoeuvre afforded to him by his advisory team's 
instructions was all too apparent to his advisers. Significantly however, he followed their advice. 
476 Blacker, The Soviets and Arms Control, p.73. 
477 Detinov interview. 
478 Savel'yev and Detinov, The Big Five, pAO. 
479 Dobrynin, In Confidence, p.330. 
480 See for example, Talbott, Endgame, p.33,63,20S and Johnson, The Right Hand of Power, p.60S. 
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Summit, with a US undertaking to quit the Rota submarine base in Spain by 1985.481 
On this occasion and in the face of the continuing deadlock the Soviet Union "backed 
off from its demand to take American FBS into account. .. the Soviet delegation stated 
that all those (unresolved) issues had to be resolved in the follow-up talks".482 US 
concerns about the Soviet Union's arsenal of "heavy" ICBMs were deferred in a 
similar fashion. 483 At the press-conference held to unveil the Vladivostok Accords, 
Kissinger had been effusive in his praise for the Soviet FBS concession. The issue had 
been "one of the big obstacles to an agreement earlier. The progress that has been 
made in recent months is that the Soviet Union gradually gave up asking for 
compensation for the forward based systems partly because most ofthe forward based 
systems, or I would say all of them, are not suitable for a significant attack on the 
Soviet Union. "484 
The Vladivostok Accord was unveiled with considerable fanfare and genuine 
enthusiasm at the close of the two day Summit.48S The principles of the agreement 
were based upon the framework proposed by Brezhnev during Kissinger's earlier visit 
to Moscow. They provided for a ten-year agreement to limit strategic launchers 
(including strategic bombers) to a total of2,400 for each side, with an allowance of 
1,320 MIRVed system contained a subtotal within the overall aggregates and seemed 
set to form the basis for a rapid finalisation in the form of a SALT II Treaty. 
However despite the glowing public appraisal by both sides, the agreed details of the 
Accord remained vague486 and there remained a number of unresolved issues whose 
481 This was planned in any case and was hardly an onerous undertaking. It did however remain a 
closely guarded secret from the Spanish government. See Dobrynin, In Confidence, p.333;Garthof4 
Detente and Confrontation, p.496, n.19. 
482 Savel'yev and Detinov, The Big Five, p.4l. 
483 Talbott viewed these twin events as an undoubted quid pro quo and argued it marked the effective 
end of Kissinger's attempts to curb Soviet "heavy" ICBMs. Talbott, Endgame, p.33. Carter would 
later resume venture this with unfortunate consequences for US-Soviet relations. 
484 Weekly Press Documents, p.I,491. 
485 It seems that a genuinely cordial atmosphere permeated Ford's trip to the Soviet Union, despite 
the often frank exchanges which accompanied the Summit negotiations. Dobrynin, In Confidence, 
pp.329-34. 
486 Public statements made no mention of the exact numbers of strategic systems that would be 
deemed permissible under the agreement. Garthof4 Detente and Confrontation, p.497. 
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importance stretched beyond the realm of mere "technical problems". It was expected 
that a final written aide-memoire of the Accord would be agreed upon within days. 
However disagreement soon emerged over whether US ALCMs with a range in 
excess of 600km 487 and the new Soviet "Backfire" bomber should be included within 
the Accord's provisions.488 
487 The issue of US ALCMs arose as a result of careless US definition ofterminology during the 
Summit negotiations. This issue proved to a source of continued discord with the Soviet Union and 
conflict within US governmental circles until the very end ofthe SALT II process in 1977. See 
Garthofl: Detente and Confrontation, p.498, n.24,n.25. 
488 For a knowledgeable and perceptive contemporary US assessment of the Vladivostok Summit and 
its Accords, see "SALT After Vladivostok", Smith, G.C. 1975. Journal of International Relations, 
29(1):7-18. 
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Internal Military and Political Reaction. 
Attempting to provide a framework for understanding Soviet defence decisionmaking 
was an inexact science at best. This was still more apparent in analyses which sought 
to identify the nuances of political interaction which underpinned policy formulation 
structures and reactions among the ruling elite to the Soviet Union's evolving 
negotiating position at SALT. Western commentators became well versed in seeking 
to trace any shift in Soviet policies by sifting through numerous tracts and articles and 
adjudging the relative status of the Soviet leadership through the swirling eddies of 
elite interaction and personal pre-eminence through close inspection of the personnel 
and procedure attendant at formal functions of state and Party.489 An authoritative 
account of the incorporation of the Vladivostok Accords into Soviet policy by the 
arms control bureaucracy and the political response of the leadership elite to its 
implications has thus far proved elusive. The bureaucratic procedures employed to 
incorporate the outcome of the Vladivostok Summit into the formal Soviet SALT 
position were documented for the first time in The Big Five. 
As proposals and telegrams arrived from the Soviet Delegation, Osadchiyev of 
the VPK and Mityayev of the KGB responded with a combination of initiative 
and team-work, as the situation demanded. Under established practice, the 
Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs discussed questions, first within 
their apparat and then between their ministries. Even then, after consensus 
had apparently been reached, there were cases in which some of the Big Five 
members disagreed with the solution; when this happened, the two agencies 
had to start over from the beginning. Now, with the Five included in the 
decisionmaking process, all preliminary meetings could at least include 
489 Warner, The Military in Contemporary Soviet Politics, pp.244-8 for an example of the former 
pratice; Harry Gelman, The Brezhnev Politburo and the Decline of Detente, pp. 71-1 04 for an 
example of the latter. 
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representatives of all five agencies. After a draft was prepared, members of 
the Five took copies to their respective chief: Detinov to Ustinov, Korniyenko 
to Gromyko, and so on. After receiving their seniors' comments, they met to 
conform the amendments in the next version. When, finally, an approved 
version was agreed to, the document was then presented to the Big Five who, 
having already agreed to its content and wording, promptly signed it. 490 
While Garthoffmade no attempt to provide a descriptive framework of the procedural 
response to the Vladivostok Accord from within the policymaking bureaucracy, he 
was keen to stress the magnitude of the Soviet concession on FBS and the fact that 
US' recognition of it was to prove short-lived. 
The Soviet leaders had made major concessions to reach agreement ... the 
Soviet military leaders regarded as unjustified militarily the Soviet concession 
in agreeing to equal numbers of strategic forces without allowance for US 
FBS. While they accepted the decision to do so for broader political 
objectives, they were not happy with the decision. This attitude was 
heightened by what they saw as a series of American attempts in the months 
and years that followed to gain still greater unbalanced concessions, and to 
take advantage of the loophole to build up forward-based intermediate-range 
forces. 491 
The omission ofFBS from the Accord represented a major - and reluctant-
concession on the part of the Soviet military but it was justified in Moscow as a 
political concession to the US necessary to reach agreement. Equal numerical levels 
and the exclusion ofFBS were accepted despite the fact that they yielded less than 
equal security to the Soviet Union owing to geopolitical conditions. Garthoffbelieved 
490 Savel'yev and Detinov, The Big Five, pAl. 
491 Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, pp.517. 
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that military ire would have been further exacerbated by the perception that the 
Americans had simply "pocketed" the gain then proceeded to seek still further 
concessions. In support of his case Garthoff provided an array of evidence which, 
when considered as a whole, served to reinforce the magnitude of the FBS concession 
from the Soviet perspective and implied that a strong sense of disquiet would have 
accompanied the military's grudging acceptance ofthe Accord. Garthoffhlmselfwas 
"struck by the strong emphasis on this particular issue, and on the Soviet concession, 
in conversations with a number of Soviet political and military officials" and quoted 
Akhromeyev and Trofimenko to support the claim that the Soviet military viewed it as 
a major concession.492 Finally he cited the incident which accompanied the Carter 
Administration's attempt to circumvent the Vladivostok Accords in 1977 in an attempt 
to secure a more radical reduction in strategic forces. Korniyenko is claimed to have 
berated ACDA Director Paul Warnke and warned him that Brezhnev had had to "spill 
political blood to get the Vladivostok Accords".493 
Garthoff suspected that at the time of the Central Committee Plenum in December 
1974 Brezhnev found himself under some pressure due to a combination of factors 
which coalesced to undermine the momentum of detente. Prime among them were 
the heightened obstacles placed in the way of US-Soviet economic co-operation by 
the US Congress and the continuing tensions emanating from the situation in the 
Middle East. Against this backdrop, Brezhnev could ill-afford the emergence of a 
perception that he had succumbed to US pressure on FBS at Vladivostok.494 
Haslam went still further and adjudged the omission ofFBS to have been conceded by 
Brezhnev "in the face of strong Soviet military opposition (to which he was forced to) 
make crucial concessions, including the decision to test the SS-20".495 
492 Ibid., pp.517-21. 
493 Talbott, Endgame, p.73. Garthoff claimed that the authenticity of this reported aside was 
personally confirmed to him by Warnke himself. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, p.518, n.66. 
494 Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, pp.518-9. 
495 Haslam, The Soviet Union and the Politics o/Nuclear Weapons in Europe, 1969-87, p.57. 
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While The Big Five provided an excellent exposition of the procedural framework 
with which to study the Soviet reaction to the Vladivostok Summit it gave little 
attention to the true nature of the political reception afforded to the Accord, 
particularly the reaction to the renewed Soviet acquiescence on the question ofFBS 
inclusion or compensation. General Detinov spoke frankly and at some length on this 
matter and provided a first-hand account of unprecedented detail and authority. He 
stated that in the wake of the compromise, Brezhnev personally telephoned key 
members of the Soviet government to seek their support. Grechko and Podgomii 
were both strongly opposed to the proposals, while Ustinov, Andropov and Kosygin 
were willing to accept them. Upon Brezhnev's return there was a special meeting of 
the Supreme Soviet, addressed by Brezhnev and Gromyko. This meeting resolved to 
support the SALT II Accords as agreed at the Summit, a decision that was 
subsequently reaffinned by the Politburo itse1£496 Detinov accepted that the 
compromise on FBS at Vladivostok "didn't exactly draw applause from all 
quarters".497 However he specifically rejected the implication that the ensuing 
development ofthe SS-20 system represented a qUid pro quo to assuage discontent 
among military circles over the terms of the Vladivostok Accords and ensure their 
acceptance of its provisions. He claimed that the military acted "correctly" 
throughout and was quick to point out the central role that they played both in the 
formulation of policy in the run-up to the Summit and during the course of the 
Summit itself. Kozlov in particular had played a key role both in the formulation of 
the Soviet position prior to the Summit and was on hand throughout its proceedings 
to provide Brezhnev with personal advice. When allied to the bureaucratic procedural 
process of the Five and Big Five both prior to and in the aftermath of the Summit it is 
apparent that the military was afforded ample opportunity to influence the Soviet 
SALT stance. The requirement for consensual agreement within the Five and Big 
Five would in itselfhave ensured that fundamental military opposition to the omission 
496 Detinov interview. 
497 Ibid. 
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ofFBS could not have been overlooked. Although Grechko remained deeply 
opposed to accepting the terms of the SALT II Accord agreed at Vladivostok, he 
refrained from enunciating them in the public forum on this occasion.498 Moreover, 
this was essentially a continuation of his own virulent suspicion of all dealings with the 
West. Although some in the military and Party no doubt shared his outlook, it was far 
from being a widely held perspective among the Soviet elite as a whole. 
There appears to have been a misconception with regard to FBS' role in the wake of 
the Vladivostok Accords. Although they had been deferred from the negotiating 
agenda per se for the time being this by no means removed them as a source of 
concern for Soviet military planners. Indeed at the first meeting of the SALT 
delegations in the wake of the Vladivostok Accord, Semyonov presented a raft of 
proposals and demands to his US counterparts which included FBS and a number of 
new issues of Soviet concern.499 Their expected exclusion from the SALT limitations 
for the foreseeable future faced Soviet planners with a continued area of potential 
threat. At the same time however, it also appeared to have provided an avenue of 
unconstrained weaponry development through which the challenge might be directly 
countered. 
498 Ibid. 
499 Johnson, The Right Hand of Power, p.607. The new issues raised included the prospect of 
limitations upon the new US Trident SLBM programme. 
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The persistent refusal of the United States to countenance the inclusion ofFBS within 
the remit of the SALT negotiations confronted the Soviet Union with both challenge 
and opportunity. The perceived Western advantage in TNFs was expected to increase 
markedly in the foreseeable future with the advent of a new generation of weapons led 
by Pershing II and Cruise missiles. The approximate equivalence in the levels of 
strategic forces which facilitated the SALT process before being codified by it had 
served to accentuate the importance of perceived force imbalances in other areas of 
bipolar competition.soo After strategic forces themselves, Theatre Nuclear Forces 
were regarded as the most significant determinant of force level potentials. Indeed 
given the primacy that the European TVD held within Soviet strategic thought and the 
location of the Soviet state within the continent of Europe itself, the Soviet Union 
perceived an inextricable linear link between strategic and theatre forces as was 
demonstrated by their approach to the question ofFBS in SALT.sol However within 
the parameters of SALT the Soviet Union enjoyed an unconstrained right to seek to 
match Western development in this field. Both sides thus sought to maximise 
strategic programmes which remained unconstrained by SAL T502• Such a course was 
indeed anticipated and acknowledged by both leaderships at the signing of the SALT I 
limit at the Moscow Summit in May 1972. 
Presidents Nixon and Brezhnev had advised one another that the US and the 
USSR were going to go forward with military programmes not specifically 
limited by SALT ... Moreover, the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff and the 
Soviet General Staffhad been in full agreement on the right of each side to 
500 Burt, "Reducing Strategic Arms at SALT", p.ll. 
501 Over time, Western analyses came to recognise the merits of this particular Soviet argument. See 
for example, Burt, "Arms Control and Soviet Strategic Forces"; Lothar Ruehl, "The 'Grey Area' 
Problem", in Bertram, (ed.), The Future of Arms Control: Part 1, Beyond SALT 11, pp.25-34. 
502 Witness for example the history of the SS-19 development programme. See Garthoff, Detente 
and Confrontation, pp. 192n, 195,887,895, 897n, 900-1. 
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modernise except where specifically limited, and this had been specifically 
affirmed in the SALT I Agreement.503 
While the significance of achieving a breakthrough in the SALT process was viewed 
as being of such importance that the omission ofFBS from the Vladivostok Accord 
was grudgingly agreed to this did little to diminish the issue's continuing importance to 
the Soviet Union. Indeed the evolution of a strategic parity indirectly increased the 
significance of marginal forces such as FBS in the determination of the overall military 
balance. The political leadership had shown itself willing to trust the competence of 
the military in assessing matters of a strictly military-technical nature. It was thus 
natural that they should accept the strong case placed before them for the designation 
of West em FBS as "strategic" weapons. The Soviet experience during SALT had 
demonstrated a US propensity to agree to the inclusion of particular weaponry forms 
only when it seemed likely that the Soviet Union had attained the ability to match US 
deployment in the field or would do so imminently. This was matched by the US' 
unwavering opposition to the inclusion ofFBS within the SALT process. While the 
rationale for the inclusion ofFBS within the 8ALT limits or the rapid modernisation 
of the ageing Soviet TNF force might have been compelling the extent of its influence 
upon the decision to develop the 88-20 can only be placed within a more realistic 
perspective via a detailed consideration of the workings of the defence decisionmaking 
process itself 
503 Garthoff, 1983. "The Soviet SS-20 Decision", Survival, 15(1):112 and Garthoff, Detente and 
Confrontation, pp.963-4. For the exact notation of this provision, see Article IV of the Interim 
Agreement in Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of their 
Negotiations, p.122. 
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5 Weapons for the Generals? 
SovIet Defence Decisionmaking and Production 
The preceding chapters demonstrate the strong rationale that apparently existed for 
the development of a mobile nuclear missile system whose range enabled it to target 
the European and Far Eastern TVDs while remaining outwith the numerical 
limitations placed upon strategic systems by the SALT I Treaty and Vladivostok 
Accord. The apparent revision in Soviet doctrine and strategy which emerged in the 
latter 1960s would have placed heavy operational demands upon Soviet 1NFs which 
the existing force of SS-4s and SS-5s could not hope to meet. Their galvanising with 
SS-11 s had provided only temporary respite as this was itself an ageing system and 
would in any case be counted within the SALT limitations due to its marginal 
intercontinental potential. By codifying the position of superpower parity in strategic 
systems the SALT limitations commensurately increased TNFs' weight in the overall 
balance of forces. SALT singularly failed to address Soviet concerns about Western 
TNFs and Soviet intelligence was aware of the likely future deployment ofa new 
g~neration of Western TNFs. Both sides had demonstrated a propensity to expand 
their nuclear arsenals in those avenues of development unconstrained by SALT and 
the Soviet Union had demonstrated a remarkable enthusiasm in its attempts 
throughout the 1960s to match all areas of strategic weaponry where the US held a 
perceived advantage. Soviet attempts to develop a new generation ofTNFs thus 
came as little surprise to many informed Western observers. Given the readily-
available technology and components from the legacy of the SS-16 programme it 
seemed equally unsurprising that the Soviet riposte to the development ofTNFs took 
the form of the SS-20. If it could be demonstrated that such factors were the 
principal determining forces behind the decision to develop the SS-20 system then it 
could be forcefully argued that the defence decisionmaking process was, in this 
instance at any rate, predicated upon a clearly discernible strategic rationale and 
closely resembled the definition of military mission! geopolitical interest policy 
determination. 
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The purpose of this chapter is not to provide a detailed account of the form and extent 
of the Soviet defence economy and its attendant enterprises nor to recount the formal 
procedures followed in the course of weaponry decisionmaking. Both have been the 
subject of numerous lengthy discourses whose attention to detail could not be 
matched at this juncture. Furthermore neither avenue of investigation can provide 
elucidation into the true nature of Soviet defence decisionmaking. This lies in the 
amorphous realm of intra-elite interaction and it is to this often-intangible subject that 
this chapter looks for a more accurate appraisal of the formulation of Soviet weaponry 
procurement policies. The key question is whether the military leadership enjoyed a 
degree of influence in the selection of weaponry procurement options that was 
commensurate with its role in the definition of strategic precepts and their 
preservation during the pursuit of bilateral agreements with the US. If this was found 
to be the case then it could be argued that the Soviet Union did indeed adopt a holistic 
approach to defence decisionmaking at the height of the Brezhnev era, predicated 
upon a considered appreciation of the complex interaction of strategic factors and 
their implications for force structure requirements. Moreover as Cooper has 
observed, the interface between the decisionmaking elite, the defence sector and the 
military hierarchy was "best seen in the context of the weapons-procurement 
process" .504 This chapter will first consider whether the decision to develop the SS-20 
can be attributed to the actions of an individual member of the Soviet elite. It will 
then offer an overview of the mechanics ofthe defence decisionmaking process, 
before providing a detailed account of the evolving balance of power among the 
principals of defence decisionmaking as it unfolded during the SS-20's development 
cycle. 505 
504 Cooper, J. "The Defence Industry and Civil-Military Relations", in Colton, T.J. and Gustafson, T. 
(eds.) 1990. Soldiers and the Soviet State: Civil-Military Relations/rom Brezhnev to Gorbachev. 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, p.165. 
505 The SS-20 programme was initiated on 4th March 1966, flight testing occurred between 
September 1974 and January 1976. Deployment began almost exactly a decade after the project's 
initiation, on 11th March 1976. Volkova, Ye.B. et al. 1996. Mezhkontinetal'nye ballisticheskie 
rakety SSSR (RF) i SShA: sozdanie i sokrashenie. Moscow: Strategic Rocket Forces, p.337. 
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This chapter will demonstrate that the military's participation in the defence 
decisionmaking process was not uniform, while the extent of its influence similarly 
varied over time. In essence the SS-20's programme can be placed on the cusp, as its 
initiation corresponded to the zenith of the Soviet military's participation in the 
weaponry procurement process, while its subsequent development took place against 
the backdrop provided by the dramatic diminution of military authority in this realm. 
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The Development of the 88-20 - a single-actor rationale? 
General Vitalii 8habanov 
Given the controversy which surrounded the 88-20 and the position of key symbolic 
importance that it came to hold in East-West relations it was perhaps inevitable that 
Western analysts should seek to identify an individual member or section of the 80viet 
government responsible for the programme's initiation in an attempt to gain a clearer 
insight into the Soviet Union's motives for its development. The most credible account 
which sought to attribute the development of the 88-20 to the decision of an 
individual member ofthe 80viet government identified Vitalii 8habanov as the source 
of its developmental inception. According to an article in Der Spiegel,506 the decision 
to proceed with the development of the 88-20 should also have been viewed as an 
attempt to utilise existing scarce resources at his behest. General 8habanov had 
worked in the 8cientific Research Institute of the Air Force testing aviation 
equipment. From 1949 until the early 1970s he served in the Ministry of the Radio 
Industry, rising to hold the post of general director of a scientific production 
association from 1972-4 before promotion to the post of deputy minister in this 
department. His transfer to the Defence Ministry as deputy minister for defence was 
first alluded to in an article in Krasnaya Zvezda in 1978 although this was not formally 
acknowledged for several years.507 Haslam highlighted the Der Spiegel article and 
speculated that the decision to develop the 88-20 might have come about as the result 
506 Der Spiegel (Hamburg). "Sinnlos und gefahrlich, gefahrlich fur aIle", 26 September 1983,39, 
p.173 
507 Central Intelligence Agency, 1986. The Soviet Weapons Industry: An Overview. Washington 
D.C.: Directorate ofIntelligence, p.16 and Jones, E. 1985. Red Army and Society: A Sociology of the 
Soviet Military. Boston: Allen & Unwin, p.125. The former identified 1980 as the year of 
Shabanov's official recognition in the post of deputy minister of defence for armaments. The latter 
identified 1981 as the year, occasioned by the death of the incumbent, Marshal Alekseev. 
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of consultations within the new interagency working groups thought to have been 
established in 1972.508 
While it seemed that the chronology of Shabanov's career might well militate against 
his having played a central role in the development of the SS-20 it was nonetheless 
important to seek a definitive assessment ofthe extent of his involvement. Der 
Spiegel's head office in Hamburg provided a copy of the original article but were 
unable or unwilling to assist in attempts to contact the reporters who had written it. 
Shabanov's role was discussed during the course of elite interviews. Dr Vitalii 
Tsygichko was a senior analyst in the Academy of Sciences' Research Institute 
commissioned by Shabanov to create models with which to formulate weaponry 
procurement policy and conflict analysis prediction. Dr. Tsygichko enjoyed a close 
working relationship with Shabanov throughout the 1970s and transferred to a new 
analytical institute509 created by the General in 1976. Tsygichko noted that although 
the Directorate of Armaments which Shabanov headed was not formally created until 
the late 1970s, the General had possessed the authority to develop "general criteria" 
for weaponry development since the late 1960s. However it quickly became apparent 
to Tsygichko that procurement policy was not predicated solely upon the analyses 
produced at the General's behest. Additional factors and institutional interests 
increasingly came to the fore as the 1970s progressed.510 
As General Shabanov himself had died in August 1995 I was thus keen to discuss the 
question ofShabanov's role in the SS-20's development with Generals Detinov and 
Belous. I raised the question specifically with both men. It transpired that General 
508 Haslam, J. 1989. The Soviet Union and the Politics o/Nuclear Weapons in Europe, 1969-87: The 
Problem o/the SS-20. Macmillan: London, p.61. See Central Intelligence Agency, The Soviet 
Weapons Industry: An Overview, p.21 for a full discussion of the new interagency bodies, termed by 
the US Defence Intelligence Agency as NPO (nauka produktsiya obedineni) or scientific production 
associations. 
509 The new body was generally described as Institut Shabanova. 
510 University of Edinburgh, Department of Defence Studies Archive, (limited access only), file 5. 
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Detinov was a colleague of General 8habanov and was also a close personal friend. 51I 
Both Detinov and Belous emphasised the support that 8habanov and his department 
provided in the development of a host of weaponry programmes and Belous noted the 
cordial and productive relationship between Ustinov and 8habanov. However 
Detinov discounted the notion that 8habanov was the principal figure behind the 
inception of the 88-20 programme and categorically rejected the assertion that 
8habanov was the "'father' of the S8-20". Indeed Detinov was reluctant to ascribe 
such an epithet to any individual given the collegiate nature of Soviet defence 
decisionmaking. He opined that Nadiradze himself most suited such a description. 
51I Both men addressed each other in the familiar form. 
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The mechanics of decisionmaking 
Providing a definitive account of the mechanics of weaponry procurement proved 
impossible throughout the Cold War era, due principally to the dearth of available 
detailed information pertaining to the precise nature of the intra-elite interaction which 
served to define defence policy.S12 Jones referred to the formal acceptance by the 
Supreme Soviet in 1967 of the proposed decrease in the length of conscript service as 
a typical example of this practice, whereby this "rubber-stamp parliament had merely 
formalised a decision which has already been made elsewhere, probably at Defence 
Council and Politburo level. The formalisation of public policy - in this case through 
the Supreme Soviet - is the end-product (italics added) of the policy process. For 
military issues, the policy output is frequently the only direct evidence of the 
decisionmaking process. The Western observer is left to puzzle out the antecedents of 
the decision through indirect indicators and the few hints of policy controversy that 
surface in the Soviet press".513 It is now possible to offer with some confidence an 
authoritative account of the mechanics of the weaponry development process as it 
existed at the height ofthe Brezhnev era.514 
512 Holloway, D. 1983. The Soviet Union and the Arms Race. London: Yale University Press, pp.109-
11; Warner, E.L. "The Bureaucratic Politics of Weapons Procurement", in MccGwire, M., Booth, K. 
and McDonnell, J. (eds.) 1975. Soviet Naval Policy: Objectives and Constraints. New York: 
Praeger,pp.71-9; Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race, pp.111-5, 140-5. 
513 Jones, Red Anny and Society, p.l. 
514 The most accurate Western account of this process was provided by Cooper in McLean, (ed.). 
How Nuclear Weapons Decisions are Made, pp.24-7. This section draws in part on this account but 
adds a number of significant points of infonnation and clarification gleaned both from my own 
interviews conducted while in Moscow and past interviews conducted with high-ranking Soviet 
officials. See also Cochrane, T.B. et al. 1989. Nuclear Weapons Databook: Volume IV: Soviet 
Nuclear Weapons. New York: Harper & Row, p.95; The Soviet Weapons Industry: An Overview, 
pp.1l-16. For fonnal Soviet accounts, see Alekseyev, N.N. 1977. "Ispytaniya voyennoy tekhniki ", 
Sovetskaya voyennaya entsiklopediya. vol.3, Moscow: Voyenizdat, pp.616-8; Tikhomil'Ov, V. 1978. 
Organizatsiya, planirovanie i upravlenie proizvodstvom letatel'nykh apparatov. Moscow: 
Mashinostroenie; Fakhrutdinov, l. 1981. Raketnye dvigateli tverdogo topliva, Moscow: 
Mashinostroenie. The latter two sources are cited by Cooper in McLean, (ed.) How Nuclear Weapons 
Decisions are Made, p.25 n.23. 
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The Formulation of Strategic Requirements515 
Soviet strategic decisions were defined as "planned" or "non_plan".516 Strategic 
decisions had a hierarchical nature corresponding to the structure and functions of 
state administrative organs. Decisions adopted in the Politburo were then detailed in 
decisions adopted at lower levels - in the Council of Ministers, ministries and other 
organisations. Decision trees were developed with corresponding plans for 
implementing decisions. The overall structure of the planning and decisionmaking 
cycle was initiated by the Central Committee issuing a directive in the middle of each 
year dealing with military issues for the next year. This evaluated the international 
situation, possible paths for its future development, and modified or elaborated tenets 
of Soviet military doctrine and critically evaluated the current condition of the 
country's defence capability and formulated state tasks dealing with security for next 
year. The document was prepared in the Central Committee apparat with the 
involvement of specialists from different organisations working in this area.517 On the 
basis of this directive, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministries of the military 
industry formulated their tasks for the next year, drew up preliminary planning 
programmes, determined their costs and presented requests518 for budget financing. 
Practically all structural subdivisions at all levels in the administrative hierarchies of 
these ministries participated in drawing up these plans and requests. The documents 
prepared by the ministries were reviewed and confirmed in the Central Committee and 
then sent to the Council of Ministers, GOSPLAN, and the VPK where a draft military 
budget was drawn up according to the requests and existing capabilities. According 
515 This account is based principally upon the account provided by Dr Tsygichko. University of 
Edinburgh, Department of Defence Studies Archive, (limited access only), file 5. 
516 "Planned" decisions referred to the ongoing process of structuring state organs to meet the 
requirements ofthe Soviet Union's strategic interests. "Non-plan" decisions referred to unforeseen 
circumstances which would in all probability have required a policy initiative on the part of the 
Soviet leadership. The decision to intervene in Afghanistan is cited as an example of the latter fonu 
of policymaking. 
517 In the region of twenty-five Central Committee Departmental Chiefs and other officials involved 
in national security policymaking signed this document before it was submitted to the Defence 
Council. 
518 Zayavki. 
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to tradition, only expenditures for maintenance and combat preparation of the army 
and fleet were presented in the state budget confirmed by the Supreme Soviet. The 
significantly higher expenditures on military production were hidden in other parts of 
the budget. Therefore, to this day, the exact figures for actual expenditures on 
defence remain unknown. This draft budget was considered by all interested 
organisations, reworked many times and then presented for :final confirmation by the 
Central Committee. After being considered and confirmed at a regular Central 
Committee Plenum, the military budget was formally confirmed by the Supreme 
Soviet as part of the state budget. This gave it the status of a USSR law which all 
state organs were obligated to fulfil. We know of no case when the military budget 
was seriously discussed at any session of the Supreme Soviet. This was always purely 
a formal procedure. Budgets for the Ministry of Defence and other organs were 
based on the Law on the USSR Budget for each financial year. A directive issued by 
the Minister of Defence and based on the Central Committee directive and the USSR 
budget law served as the basis for planning current activities of the armed forces. This 
evaluated the military-political situation, determined the main opponent and possible 
threats, confirmed and elaborated basic tenets of military doctrine and strategy, 
evaluated the current status of the country's defence capability, pointed out 
shortcomings and set tasks for the Armed Forces and the services. The Chief ofthe 
General Staff and Commanders-in-Chief of the services issued orders based on this 
document, and the mechanism of internal planning was set in motion. Subordinate 
organisations always got the agreement of higher-standing commanders, and the 
Ministry of Defence, General Staff, and services got the approval of the military 
department ofthe Central Committee. Military deVelopment programmes and plans 
for the ministries of defence industry were confirmed by the Central Committee 
apparat and constantly controlled by this apparat. Special legislative acts and 
documents regulated this entire planning process. The planning process was 
supported by a system of scientific-research organisations, which carried out scientific 
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development and provided scientific support for all stages in the adoption of planned 
decisions. 
The Development ofIndividual Weaponry Schemes 
The bureaucratic procedures and documentary authorisation associated with the 
initiation of Soviet weaponry projects were generally common to all proposed 
programmes and were encompassed under the generic term YeSKD - Unified System 
of Design Documentation. A heightened level of elite participation in the 
decisionmaking process was occasioned when the development of the proposed 
system would be likely to entail significant economic, military or geopolitical 
ramifications for the Soviet Union. The bureaucratic mechanics of the procurement 
process possessed a duality of nature. Both design bureaux and individual branches of 
the Soviet armed services constantly sought to anticipate the likely form of future 
weaponry design practices and respond to the evolving requirements as they ensued. 
Weaponry development was a collective process in both the technical and 
decisionmaking sense and in no case can an individual be accurately accredited as the 
sole "inventor" of a particular system. A proposal for the development of new 
weapons systems could emanate from a design bureau, an industrial research institute 
or a branch of the military services or as a result of institutional co-operation. Design 
proposals of a military origin were most likely to have been derived from the General 
Staff or a specific military service - a Technical Administration or Scientific and 
Technical Committee in the case of the latter source. Most often however new 
projects were formulated and proposed independently by the design bureau in 
question. Missile design bureaux - as did their counterparts in the aviation sector -
encompassed their own R&D departments whose remit combined future threat 
assessment and development response. This department's recommendations would be 
reviewed by the bureau's own Scientific and Technical Council in association with the 
appropriate Council of the Industrial Ministry. Minor technical problems and the 
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detail of the design's specifications were addressed at this point by designers and 
relevant experts in a process overseen by the military-industrial commissions. 
Draft design proposals were presented to the appropriate Ministry. The procedural 
form of the decisionmaking applied to a particular design was predicated by its scale. 
Design proposals of minor resource or strategic import would be authorised by the 
VPK without requiring Politburo or Central Committee approval. The requisite 
documentation would be signed by the Minister of Defence and the Minister of the 
branch of industry designated to perform the necessary associated R&D. This 
research resulted initially in an "avanproekt"519 which outlined the military rationale 
and operating characteristics of the proposed system. Small-scale projects of this type 
would however proceed swiftly to the TTZ stage.520 The financial burden of such 
small-scale ventures was borne by the Ministry in question. 
In the case of major design proposals such as those for nuclear-armed missiles an 
avanproekt would be prepared in document form. Following consideration by 
representatives of the Scientific and Technical Council of the relevant industrial 
ministry and service branch, the Defence and industrial ministries prepared a draft of a 
Decree of the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers to initiate the 
developmental programme. This draft decree was formulated to provide a precis of 
the proposed scheme and was presented to the VPK. It detailed the designated 
General Designer responsible for its development, the timetable to be followed during 
the next stage ofthe programme's development and its designated resource allocation. 
A scientific committee known as "Institute Four" was responsible for assessing the 
technical viability of proposed missile designs.521 The documentation was reviewed by 
the VPK and prepared for submission to the Politburo. Prior to this however the 
revised draft was circulated to the design bureau and the relevant section of the 
military industry and branch of the armed services for their perusal. For example, in 
the case of the industrial ministry, it was necessary at this point to gain the preliminary 
519 A Preliminary Advance Project 
520 Taktiko-tekhnicheskoe zadanie - Tactical-technical Assignment. 
521 This particular aspect of the decisionmaking procedure was revealed by General Belous. 
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approval of the head of the relevant department, a Deputy minister and several key 
figures prior to the Minister himself signing the document. Following approval of the 
revised draft by the institutions and departments concerned the document was signed 
by the Chairman of the VPK, the Defence Minister, Industrial Minister(s) and the 
Chief of the pertinent branch of the armed services. Neither the General Designer nor 
the Chief of the General Staft'were signatories to this document although their prior 
approval of its contents was required. The document was then presented to the 
Defence Industries Department ofthe Central Committee. It considered the 
document's contents in some detail and on occasion consulted relevant experts for 
further elucidation on specific technical aspects. The Department forwarded the 
document to the Secretary of the Central Committee on Defence with attached 
conclusions and remarks. The Secretary was empowered to return the proposals to 
the relevant Ministries for required alterations. Once satisfied with the proposal's 
format the Secretary signed it and assumed the responsibility for presenting it to the 
apparat of the Politburo. By the time a proposal document reached the Politburo for 
consideration it had typically accrued in the region of200-300 patrons' signatures. On 
rare occasions a proposed design might be subject to discussion at a formal Politburo 
meeting but acceptance of proposed schemes was merely a formality in the vast 
majority of instances. "In ninety-nine cases out of a hundred"522 the Politburo 
members, including the General Secretary, would sign the appropriate documentation 
without debate and pass it directly to the Upravlenie Delami523 of the Council of 
Ministers. This paralleled the procedures employed by the Big Five in the realm of 
arms control decisionmaking. This department formulated the document into a 
"Decree of the Soviet Government". The Decree itselfwas something offormality 
and was generalised in character. Significantly however its proclamation signalled the 
official release of state funds to the project. As ministerial budgets were allocated on 
an annual basis the economic burden for the first year of a system's of development 
522 Detinov interview. 
523 The literal translation of this phrase is "business department". 
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was borne by the relevant ministry itself Attempts to recoup this outlay proved to be 
futile and underfunding of the subsequent developmental programmes was apparently 
endemic.524 Following Politburo acceptance the details of the implementation of the 
programme were devolved directly to the VPK which created a detailed scheme for 
the implementation ofthe programme. 
The Technical Administration of the relevant service branch then drafted a ITZ which 
set forth in greater detail the proposed system's technical-operational requirements 
and economic parameters. This formed the benchmark against which the development 
process could be adjudged.525 
The design bureau would then formulate an EP - eskiznyi proekt (Preliminary Draft 
Design) - which contained a detailed exposition of the programme's anticipated path 
of development. This was in turn reviewed by the Scientific and Technical Council 
and the central research institutes of the ministry in charge of development, the latter 
group evaluating the project's design qualities and production and operational 
viability. The approval of the "customer" service branch was sought and the Industrial 
Ministry considered its feasibility and created a special commission to this end. 
On acceptance, the EP formed the basis of a still more comprehensive Technical 
Project which entailed the technical plans for the prototype systems constructed at the 
OKB's experimental site. Prototypes were first subjected to "in-house" testing on the 
part of the OKB itselfbefore being submitted for a further series of military state trials 
to ensure that the system adhered to its design specification. 
Acceptance of the prototype was followed by the issuing of a further document - the 
TU26 which stipulated the requirements of technical performance and delivery 
schedule. This served as a de facto contract between the military technical 
administration and the ministry responsible for production. 
524 Detinov interview. 
525 On occasion - most likely in the case of radically new designs - the "customer" service branch was 
not possessed of the necessary technical information to compose the TIZ. In this instance the design 
bureau would play the principal role in formulating the document. 
526 Tekhnicheskie usloviya - Technical Conditions. 
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In the case of major weapons systems Defence Council! Politburo approval and an 
associated Council of Ministers decree was necessary to authorise series production. 
Staff from the design bureau responsible for the new system would assist in the initial 
stages of series production and the acceptance trials staged by the "customer" service 
branch at this juncture. The voyenpredy, the permanent military representatives 
emplaced within the OKB's and enterprises, oversaw the project for the duration of its 
development cycle. 
While the provision of a detailed account of the institutional mechanics and 
bureaucratic procedures associated with Soviet defence decisionmaking represents a 
degree of progress towards a deeper understanding ofthe decisionmaking process, it 
fails in itself to provide a comprehensive account of its true intricacies. Writing just 
before the break-up of the Soviet bloc, Cooper argued that even when possessed of 
such accounts "it would be an error to believe that the intelligence agencies of the 
West with their considerable human and technical resources have anything like a full 
appreciation of the realities of Soviet decisionmaking for national security".527 
However the subsequent dissolution of the Soviet Union facilitated an unprecedented 
degree of access to a host of key figures in Soviet defence decisionmaking and 
military planning. While their accounts must naturally be treated with due caution 
they represent the most promising means of securing an accurate insight into the 
workings of the Soviet defence decisionmaking process, heavily predicated as it was 
upon personal interaction and verbal agreements which were usually devoid of 
accompanying documentary records. 528 
527 Cooper in McLean, (ed.) How Nuclear Weapons Decisions are Made, p.2. 
528 Sokov, N., 1996. "Crises and Breakthroughs: Notes Toward the History of Soviet Decisionmaking 
on START Talks", in The Journal ojSlavic Military Studies, 9(2):262. 
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The Politics of Defence 
The Soviet military would have been expected to have e~oyed an increase in their 
ability to influence the political leadership as a concomitant of Khrushchev's 
deposition. This had previously been demonstrated during the interregnum following 
Stalin's death and the military had again been to the fore to suppress the Anti-Party 
group in 1957. While Brezhnev was the leading figure in the new regime it was 
differentiated from its predecessors at the outset by the general absence of a pre-
eminent figure. This in itself served as a catalyst for increased military influence as 
members of the ruling oligarchy sought to court military interests in a bid to 
strengthen their own institutional power base. Brezhnev himself was the premier 
exponent of this art. The military's political influence was perceived to have increased 
still further during the period of pointed leadership rivalries at the end of the decade, 
as Brezhnev courted their support in his bid to outflank Kosygin. The military 
leadership'S ability to resist the appointment ofUstinov as Malinovsky's successor as 
Minister of Defence in 1967 and the eventual selection of the conservative Marshal 
Grechko were seen as evidence of their residual power at a time when Brezhnev, 
Kosygin, Podgomy, Shelepin and Shelest were vying for power. Although Ustinov 
would have been an ideal choice for Brezhnev as a "civilian" Defence Minister and 
long-time political ally as the era of detente approached, Brezhnev's position was not 
yet sufficiently dominant to allow him to force the issue and risk an alliance of his 
political opponents and military hardliners. Grechko's subsequent promotion to full 
membership of the Politburo served to reinforce the image of military pre-eminence in 
intra-elite relations and was viewed as a quid pro quo for the Defence Minister's 
support against Brezhnev's rivals within the Politburo and tacit acceptance of Soviet 
participation in the SALT process.529 This impression led most to assume that the 
interests of the military leadership were similarly to the fore in the field of weaponry 
529 Parrott, B. "Political Change and Civil-Military Relations", in Colton, T.J. and Gustafson T. 
Ceds.) 1990. Soldiers and the Soviet State: Civil-Military Relationsfrom Brezhnev to Gorbachev. 
Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, pp.52-4. 
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acquisition.530 The new regime's military policies were predicated upon a largescale 
strategic build-up, while at the same time, maintaining traditional elements of the 
Soviet force structure. This was combined with the restoration of military autonomy 
in the definition of strategic precepts and the diminution of overt Party influence by 
reducing the role of the MPA. The fact that Brezhnev, Kirilenko, Suslov and Shelest 
were devoid of experience in foreign affairs and non-military intelligence increased 
their propensity to view the US strategic build-up events through a "military prism". 
This was coupled with Soviet humiliation over the Cuban Missile Crisis and US 
intervention in Vietnam. Against this background the Soviet leadership's endorsement 
of the development oflargescale strategic forces was inevitable as was its welcome 
from the military hierarchy. To this position of strength in resource-allocation and 
political status was further added the new social kudos attached to the military 
services by Party propaganda seeking to extol their past glories in an attempt to 
redress Khrushchev's perceived excesses in denigrating Soviet Union's experiences of 
the Stalinist era. Of greatest importance was the acceptance of the principle of 
"combined arms" by the Party leadership which at once removed the main source of 
past conflict between Khrushchev and the military hierarchy and established the 
foundation for a cordial institutional relationship - "golden age" which was thought to 
have remained intact until the mid-1970s.531 The Brezhnev regime's de/acto 
undertaking to retain its commitment to the traditional elements of the Soviet Union's 
force structure while embarking upon a largescale development of strategic forces 
heralded an era of apparently limitless resource support for all sectors of the Soviet 
defence industry. Thus "in the years immediately after Khrushchev's ouster, 
uniformed officers probably came closer to enjoying a monopoly of expertise on 
military-technical matters than ever before and the party decisionmakers' reflexive 
530 Azrael, J.R. 1987. The Soviet Civilian Leadership and the Military High Command, 1976-1986. 
Santa Monica Ca.: RAND Corporation, pp.2~4. 
531 The case for this interpretation was made by Azrael, The Soviet Civilian Leadership and the 
Military High Command, pp.1-5. 
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belief in military power enabled officers to override any civilian specialists who might 
question their recommendations on defence".532 
An increase in the military leadership's ability to influence weaponry procurement 
policy did occur during the Brezhnev era. However this process was neither linear 
nor without constraint. Rather it occurred as part of a wider process of institutional 
realignment in the wake of Khrushchev's ouster and was confined in chronological 
terms principally to the first half decade ofBrezhnev's tenure. 
The personnel turnover which was initiated within the General Staff hierarchy in the 
late 1960s can be assumed to have acted as a catalyst for attendant innovation, as an 
influx of new officers sought to challenge the assumptions ofthe trenche of 
longstanding appointees whose service beyond the age of sixty represented "a 
collective infraction of the 1939 law which stipulated transfer to the reserve at that 
age".533 The October 1967 law on Universal Obligation for Military Service was 
accompanied by a raft of promotions in the wake of the "Dnepr" exercise of that year 
and an unusually high number of mortalities among the ageing corps which itself 
allowed scope for an infusion of new officers.534 Zhakarov's arrival at the General 
Staff caused something of an invigoration in the late 1960s and led to the adoption of 
a more analytical approach to strategy formulation. While the strategic debate took 
place largely on an esoteric level it also led to more practical considerations regarding 
the requisite force structure in the light of the eventual conventional preference. The 
transition of personnel facilitated fresh consideration of the technical innovations that 
had recently emerged in weaponry development and their potential implications for 
strategic concepts. However the old guard was not entirely subsumed535 by the more 
youthful incomers and retained a powerful and largely conservative influence within 
532 Parrott, "Political Change and Civil~Military Relations", p.50. 
533 Erickson, J. 1970. "Rejuvenating the Soviet High Command", Military Review, 50(7):83-4. 
534 Erickson, J. 1971. Soviet Military Power. London: Royal United Services Institute, pp.17-22. 
535 One source claimed that this was due in no small part to the significant number who obtained 
exemption from compulsory retirement. Gallagher, M. P. and Spielmann, K. F. Jr. 1972. Soviet 
Decision-Makingfor Defence: A Critique of us Perspectives on the Arms Race. London: Praeger 
and Pall Mall, p.42. 
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the military hierarchy itself Divisions concerning fundamental questions of nuclear 
strategy and attendant priorities for strategic force development were manifested in 
the contradictory doctrinal statements which continued to emerge from the military 
leadership well into the 1970s. The contours of division were similarly replicated via 
their disparate weaponry procurement preferences and were readily apparent over the 
issue of mobile systems. The most tangible evidence of the military's eminent position 
was the appointment of Marshal Grechko as Minister of Defence in 1967. The 
twelve-day delay between the death of the terminally-ill Malinovsky and the 
announcement of Grechko as his successor has been cited as evidence of "the fact that 
the Politburo apparently considered installing a civilian minister indicates that the 
professional military's influence on military policy was not entirely beyond 
challenge".536 While the military held sway on this occasion, such an issue may have 
been portentous. Certainly the rapidity ofUstinov's later accession to the post in 1976 
was seen as testament to the transformation which had occurred during the 
intervening period.537 
Grechko himselfwas able to play an influential role in defence decisionmaking during 
the initial period of his tenure as Minister of Defence. "By the strength ofhis 
ministerial position, his personality, especially his simplistic single-mindedness, and his 
bureaucratic allies, Grechko was able to stalemate, postpone or ignore numerous 
decisions proposed or taken in the 1960s and 1970s by the Ustinov-dominated 
defence policy group. It is important to note that he was able for several years to 
dilute decisions and to reverse or postpone implementation of weapons and 
infrastructure programmes that contradicted his position, even though such initiatives 
were supported by the Politburo."538 
536 Parrott, "Political Change and Civil-Military Relations", p.50. Parrott cited Deane, M.l 1977. 
Political Control of the Soviet Armed Forces. New York: Crane, Russak, p.171 as one source of the 
rumour that Ustinov had been the Politburo's preferred candidate in 1967. Azrael by contrast was 
less convinced of the accuracy of these rumours. Azrael, The Soviet Civilian Leadership and the 
Military High Command, p.4, n.14. 
537 Parrott, "Political Change and Civil-Military Relations", p.50. 
538 University of Edinburgh, Department of Defence Studies Archive, (limited access only), file 2. 
The most tangible example of Grechko seeking to avoid the implementation of an unpalatable 
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Over time however Grechko's influence vis-a-vis Ustinov would come to wane as did 
that of the military as a whole and by the early 1970s Ustinov had already achieved a 
more powerful status in the ruling elite than his colleague in the Defence Ministry. 
Indeed while Grechko's promotion to full membership of the Politburo in 1973 was 
viewed by many as the symbolic culmination of the military's rise to a position of 
authority in Soviet government,539 it actually occurred during the progressive 
diminution of military influence against the backdrop ofUstinov's inexorable rise to a 
position of dominance. 
Grechko was deeply opposed to the concept of gradated military responses and 
remained wedded to the notion of a massive pre-emptive strategic strike. Tolubko 
was similarly portrayed as "dying to push the button"540 - an attitude he apparently 
retained throughout his service career. Grechko's opposition to mobile ICBMs and 
their associated strategic precept of assured retaliation placed him at odds with the 
political leadership and the proponents of strategic innovation within the General 
Staff. Grechko sought to block the development of mobile ICBMs which had been 
proposed by Yangel in the early 1960s and which enjoyed the support ofUstinov and 
the Defence Council. Furthermore he apparently disbanded the science committee of 
the SRF which had had the temerity to endorse the proposaI,541 This serves as 
something of a counterpoise to the relationship between the General Staff and 
Minister of Defence propounded by Jones.542 While such divisions would inevitably 
have had a deleterious effect upon the military's ability to offer a cohesive input into 
the political interaction of defence decisionmaking, the institutional arrangements that 
applied at the end of the 1960s did themselves endow the General Staff with a pivotal 
decision was provided by Illarianov and Grechko's attempt to avoid the aftermath of the compromise 
decision to develop both the SS-17 and SS-19 systems. 
539 Azrael, The Soviet Civilian Leadership and the Military High Command, p.4; Parrott, "Political 
Change and Civil-Military Relations", p.54. 
540 University of Edinburgh, Department of Defence Studies Archive, (limited access only), file 2. 
541 Ibid., file 2. The technical failure ofthe ensuing SS-15 programme ensured that the argument 
was at this stage merely academic. However it might reasonably be assumed that the ensuing 
development of the SS-16 and SS-20 systems in the near future brought this subject to the fore once 
again. Grechko's apparent failure to prevent continued attempts to develop mobile systems is in itself 
significant. 
542 Jones, Red Army and SOCiety, pp.15-7. 
248 
role in the selection and authorisation of weaponry development projects. The 
General Staffs Scientific-Technical Committee and its Directorate of Armaments were 
its principal channels of authority. 
Within the General Staff several agencies are responsible for weapons R&D 
and procurement, including a main operations directorate, central financial 
directorate, scientific-technical committee and an armaments directorate. The 
General Staffs scientific-technical committee may have been established 
around 1960 when General Alekseev was appointed to his post...It would be 
called upon to provide technical advice on new weapons proposals. As part of 
this task, it may have the overall responsibility of managing scientific-technical 
committees formed to review and follow each proposal and project through 
the R&D process. The Committee is also said to be the centre of operations 
research activity devoted to the selection of new weapons. The armaments 
directorate of the General Staff is headed by Colonel General Druzhinin. Most 
of the General Staff work in requirements, planning and co-ordinating 
weapons procurement probably takes place in this directorate; the new 
analytical planning techniques also come from this organisation. It was the 
appointment of General Ogarkov as first deputy Chief of Staff (with 
unspecified responsibilities) that signalled the enlarged role of the General 
Staff in military-scientific work. His duties were thought to include 
supervision and management of the scientific-technical committees in the 
General Staff and services, and overseeing weapons programmes and R&D. 
His appointment also suggests a liaison between the General Staff and the 
Military-Industrial Commission. 543 
543 Alexander, A.J. 1978. Decisionmaking in Soviet Weapons Procurement, Adelphi Papers 147 and 
148. London: IISS, p.18. This account corresponds closely with that offered by Danilevich himself. 
University of Edinburgh, Defence Studies Archives. Academic in confidence. 
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The five service branches of the Soviet military were subordinate to the General 
Staff.544 Although the majority of nuclear systems were controlled by the SRF all of 
the remaining services possessed contingents of nuclear-armed forces. Within each 
service branch there was a Deputy Commander-in-Chiefwho was delegated the task 
of overseeing force levels and weaponry procurement. It was believed that the 
Deputy Commander-in-Chief presided over a departmental structure which included 
Scientific and Research Committees. Individual service branches were thought to co-
operate with the central technical administrations of the Ministry of Defence to act as 
the "customer" for new armament programmes. It was thought that they acted in 
tandem in an attempt to foresee the course of expected operational requirements and 
associated Soviet R&D, issue appropriate specifications for new designs, and oversee 
the prototype testing of new systems.545 
Most requests for new or improved weapons as well as the initial estimate of 
the number required emanate from the individual military services. These 
requirements can come from several service sources which reflect the 
organisational structure of the General Staff and Defence Ministry: the 
armaments directorate, the scientific-technical committee of the Main Staff, 
the operations directorate ofthe Main Staff or from field commands. The 
Services' armaments directorate maintained regular contacts with the research 
institutes, design bureaux and the industrial plants of the design 
ministries ... The relative importance of the armaments directorate continues but 
other organisations also contribute to the initiation of requests for new 
weapons. The Main Staffs are now the most likely additional source of new 
requests - both from the Services' scientific-technical committee and from the 
operations directorate ... scientific-technical committees are probably 
544 The five branches were the ground forces, navy, air force, air defence forces and the strategic 
rocket forces. The SRF were the last to be formed and dated from 1959. They were however deemed 
the "premier" service branch from the outset of their creation - a mantle that went unchallenged 
throughout during Khrushchev's tenure and beyond. 
545 Cooper in McLean, (ed.) How Nuclear Weapons Decisions are Made, p.23. 
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responsible for planning research and for managing project review bodies. In 
this position, they would be alert both to technical opportunities on the one 
hand and to development problems on the other. They would thus be in an 
ideal position to make recommendations from a technical point of view. In 
contrast the operations staff would have the outlook of the equipment user and 
would be expected to make suggestions based upon particular mission 
responsibilities or on field-demonstrated problems and needs. Field 
commanders would promote even more applications-orientated requirements 
than the operations staff. 546 
It was from the service branches' technical departments that the voyenpreij47 were 
drawn. These officers were stationed within research enterprises to monitor the 
course and quality of the development work While some evidence suggested that 
such officers established a cordial relationship with their civilian counterparts this did 
not seem to have militated against the discharging of their stated duty of seeking to 
safeguard military interests in the realm of weaponry production quality. Nor was 
there evidence that overlapping or interchanging of their career structures with their 
civilian colleagues was a common practice.548 
General Detinov highlighted the role played by the Scientific-Technical Committee of 
the General Staff in the process of weaponry selection. He stated that it had operated 
independently within the General Staffunder the leadership ofN.N. Alekseev until the 
mid-1960s. The Committee itself did not issue contracts authorising weaponry 
procurement as this was carried out by the relevant service branches themselves. It 
did however enjoy the right to veto any proposed project on technical grounds and 
546 Alexander, Decisionmaking in Soviet Weapons Procurement, pp.18-9. 
547 Military representatives. 
548 Close co-operation mentioned by one source. Cordial relations but this did not blur the lines of 
demarcation in career structure or institutional interests. Ustinov and Shabanov were the exceptions 
who "crossed the divide" between the military and the defence industries. See Cooper, "The Defence 
Industry and Civil-Military Relations", p.166 and Alexander, Decisionmaking in Soviet Weapons 
Procurement, p.19. 
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was responsible for the detailed planning and direction of all military research 
programmes. The Chief of the General Staff would approve the initiation of a new 
project only after it had received the Committee's blessing. Following restructuring in 
the mid-1960s the Committee was incorporated into the General Staft's Directorate 
for Armaments and was placed under the authority of the Deputy Defence Minister 
for Armaments. Alekseev himselfwas appointed in this role.549 According to 
Tsygichko, prior to 1976 the Directorate of Armaments550 played a central role in 
shaping weapons programmes and funding. This Directorate gave its 
recommendations both to the General Staff and to the VPK. Based on these 
recommendations, the Minister of Defence and the General Staff allocated funding to 
the armed services. The VPK also worked with the Directorate to distribute funds 
which were allocated to military industry and weapons programmes. Thus at the end 
of the 1960s the General Staff was effectively responsible for the determination of 
military procurement policy (though not its initiation as such) and enjoyed executive 
powers in this vital aspect of defence decisionmaking.551 The later removal of these 
powers and their transfer to Ustinov's allies in the VPK served as a watershed in the 
process of diminution of the military's role in weaponry procurement. 
549 Detinov interview. 
550 Upravleniye zakazov. 
551 University of Edinburgh, Department of Defence Studies Archive, (limited access only), file 5. 
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The Brezhnev Regime and the Defence SectorS52 
While Khrushchev's leadership did not threaten the continued existence of ineffectual 
design bureaux through the kind of ruthless procurement policies pursued by Stalin, 
his quixotic approach to military affairs held its own potential dangers for the defence 
sector. The nature of the successor regime led by Brezhnev contrasted markedly in 
both style and policy content. It was dominated by a cautious style of "committee" 
leadership553 that was seen to provide a welcome constancy following Khrushchev's 
"harebrained scheming". The new leadership was dominated by men who had held 
close links with the defence industries and whose Party careers and personal contacts 
had been moulded by the Great Patriotic War. Brezhnev's links to military leaders 
such as Minister of Defence Malinovsky, his successor Grechko and Gorshkov the 
head of the Soviet navy dated back to the war. Brezhnev's post-war involvement as a 
Party official in the embryonic Soviet missile programmeSS4 had led to his close 
involvement in the Defence industries, serving from 1957-60 as the Central 
Committee secretary with responsibility for the defence and space research sectors 
and heavy industry. Tolubko hlmselflater recounted in his memoirs how Brezhnev's 
office formed the hub of research and production decisions connected with the 
development of the Soviet Union's first generations of strategic rockets. Brezhnev 
seems also to have had an unusually close involvement in the development projects 
and was a regular visitor at production plants.555 The leaders ofthe Soviet defence 
industries must have regarded Brezhnev as one of their own and viewed his accession 
and that of his like-minded colleagues as a reassuring development in securing their 
own institutional interests.556 They were not to be disappointed. 
552 For an exhaustive discussion of the internal machinations prevalent in intra-elite relations during 
Brezhnev's tenure see Parrott, Politics and Technology in the Soviet Union, pp.lSl-294. 
553 Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race, p.l13. 
554 Parrott, "Political Change and Civil-Military Relations", p.47, n.6; Cooper, "The Defence Industry 
and Civil-Military Relations", pp.166-7. 
555 Cooper, "The Defence Industry and Civil-Military Relations", p.166, n.7. 
556 Neither Kosygin nor Podgorny - the principal opponents of the rapid build-up of Soviet strategic 
forces - had had significant contact with the military in the course of their Party careers. Parrott, 
"Political Change and Civil-Military Relations", pAS, n.S, n.9. Shelepin was the exception. 
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For much of the Brezhnev era there was thus an apparent harmony in the 
relationship between the military-industrial sector and the political leadership. 
One dimension of this harmonious relationship was the way in which the 
activities of the military sector were shrouded in secrecy and were protected 
from public criticism .... .It is possible of course that this shroud of secrecy 
concealed real differences and conflicts, some of which may yet be exposed in 
the new era of glasnost. Nonetheless, compared with both the preceding and 
following years, the first decade of the Brezhnev period is likely to emerge in 
relative terms as a golden age.557 
The partial lifting of the shroud of secrecy that has since ensued has had a two-fold 
effect. The new evidence that has emerged has served to reinforce the notion that the 
defence sector of the Soviet economy enjoyed unrivalled resource allocation and was 
endowed with unmatched levels of political influence, due largely to the fact that 
defence producers succeeded in becoming inextricably "enmeshed" within the 
weaponry procurement process through direct personal participation and the 
cultivation of close cliental relationships with the principal decisionmakers. This 
stands in marked contrast with the fortunes of the military hierarchy whose ability to 
influence the course of defence decisionmaking wavered during the course of 
Brezhnev's tenure and had diminished markedly to a particularly low ebb by its 
conclusion. 
The style of defence decisionmaking which was adopted by Brezhnev and his 
colleagues has been characterised as "technocratic ... based on deference to specialised 
agencies and the resolution of disagreements through bureaucratic compromise".558 A 
fundamental "bureaucratic compromise" emerged from the outset and played the 
557 Cooper, "The Defence Industry and Civil-Military Relations", p.170. 
558 Parrott, "Political Change and Civil-Military Relations", p.49. 
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principal role in determining the nature of future Soviet force structure. This new-
found administrative autonomy was devolved upon an administrative elite whose 
personnel - in marked contrast to their civilian-industry colleagues - had been largely 
unaffected by the reforms of Khrushchev's later years. 559 The military industrial elite 
was also spared the politically-inspired upheavals to which their officer-corps 
counterparts were subjected. Indeed the military-industrial elite displayed a 
remarkable longevity of tenure which in many cases dated back to the Great Patriotic 
War or still earlier. They were thus possessed of an impressive structural cohesion 
and continuity ofpersonne1.56O The extensive intra-elite contacts developed over time 
were now complemented by a host of similar and vital links with the new Party 
leadership. The security of tenure among the military-industrial management elite that 
was reinforced during the course of the Brezhnev era led to a stability among the 
leadership cadre that came in time to be replaced by a process of bureaucratic 
stagnation as they aged together. Thus while the average age of the chairman of the 
VPK and industrial ministers was fifty-five in 1965, by 1975 it had reached sixty-one 
and sixty-five by 1982.561 The continuity displayed by the personnel profile of the 
military-industrial elite was paralleled by their representation in the Central Committee 
and the Supreme Soviet.S62 By the end of the 1960s this style of "committee 
leadership" had taken on a defined and increasingly settled form. Soviet participation 
in SALT might itself have been the catalyst for its further consolidation as a 
behavioural norm. 
The key figure to emerge from the SALT-associated committee structure was Dmitriy 
Ustinov. His rise to prominence in the development ofthe Soviet Union's arms 
control negotiating position was replicated by his growing influence in the 
determination of defence policy in general. Ustinov had been appointed a full member 
559 Cooper, "The Defence Industry and Civil-Military Relations", p.167. 
560 Spielman, K.F. "Defence Industrialists in the USSR", in Herspring, D.R. and Volyges, 1. (eds.) 
1978. Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems. Boulder Co.: Westview Press, pp.l 06-8. 
561 Cooper, "The Defence Industry and Civil-Military Relations", p.167. 
562 Ibid., p.168. 
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ofthe Central Committee in 1952 and was appointed Minister ofthe Defence 
Industries in the following year. From 1957-63 he was a deputy chairman, and from 
1963-5, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers with responsibilities for 
the defence industries. He was appointed Secretary of the Central Committee 
responsible for the supervision of the defence industries from the outset of the 
Brezhnev regime. From 1965 he held the status of candidate membership of the 
Politburo and was elevated to full membership in 1976, immediately prior to his 
accession as Defence Minister. He held this post until his death in December 1984. It 
is instructive to note the role played by Ustinov in the Big Five, the Politburo 
commission which played the principal role in determining the Soviet approach to 
arms control and weaponry procurement policy. While both the Defence and Foreign 
ministers and the heads of the powerful VPK and KGB participated in its 
deliberations, it was Ustinov - who was at this point devoid of the status associated 
with the rank of minister or state committee chairman - who chaired its proceedings 
and played the dominant role.563 This in itselfwas testament to his considerable 
influence in decisionmaking at the end of the 1960s and held portents for the course of 
future development. From the early 1970s Ustinov increasingly outflanked Grechko. 
This led to a diminution of the military's influence as the 1970s progressed. Grechko's 
subsequent promotion to full membership status of the Politburo in 1973 was largely 
symbolic, since by that time, few meaningful decisions being taken in that particular 
forum. 
According to Akhromeyev and Korniyenko, Brezhnev's health deteriorated 
dramatically in the early 1970s.564 They identified the Vladivostok Summit of 
November 1974 as the last major event at which Brezhnev was able to function in a 
statesmanlike manner. Major breaches of etiquette and protocol soon ensued with 
alarming regularity and by 1975 the General Secretary was effectively no longer 
563 University of Edinburgh, Department of Defence Studies Archive, (limited access only), file 5. 
Savel'yev and Detinov, The Big Five, pp.16-7, 28. 
564 University of Edinburgh, Department of Defence Studies Archive, (limited access only), file 7. 
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mentally competent. Brezhnev suffered a major heart attack in 1976. Akhromeyev 
claimed that from 1976 Brezhnev completely ceased to function in a leadership 
capacity, a situation that remained unchanged until his death in 1982. The ensuing 
political vacuum was not filled by Brezhnev's Politburo colleagues, many of whom 
increasingly evinced physical frailties similar to those of the General Secretary 
himself. 565 Rather the Soviet bureaucracy expanded its already-extensive demarcated 
areas of competence still wider and effectively assumed control of running the Soviet 
Union, most notably its defence procurement policies. There emerged a group of 
Party secretaries and state officials who, working independently or in issue-specific 
alliances with other functionaries, continued to produce policy proposals which were 
accredited with Politburo acceptance as a matter of course. Ustinov, Gromyko and 
Andropov were the principal figures in the determination of defence matters, 
international relations and law and order. Of all the subgroupings which came to the 
fore in the latter period ofBrezbnev's tenure this one possessed a uniquely 
authoritative membership and consequently enjoyed untrammelled powers in its 
direction of Soviet policy. The military hierarchy was notably absent from this de 
facto leadership. While Ustinov, Gromyko and Andropov formed the core of the 
defence decisionmaking triumvirate, its format was flexible and the number of those in 
attendance varied in accordance with the particular issue under discussion. Indeed 
both General-Colonel Illarionov of the Central Committee Defence-Industrial 
Department and Dr. Tsygichko stated that no formal decisionmaking body or 
structure was discernible at this time.566 Rather they pointed to the workings ofthe 
pyaterkd67 as the source of effective decisionmaking authority. Detinov stated that 
"Ustinov, Gromyko, and Andropov solved all the problems at the time ofUstinov's 
accession as Minister of Defence, not only in the arms-control decisionmaking sphere, 
565 Akhromeyev, S.F. and Kornienko, G.M. 1992. Glazami marshala i diplomata. Moscow: 
Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, pp.15,23,31.2,39-40. 
566 University of Edinburgh, Department of Defence Studies Archive, (limited access only), files 2 & 
5. 
567 The membership of the pyaterka referred to by this source was composed ofUstinov, Gromyko, 
Smirnov, Andropov and Brezhnev or his alternate, Keldysh. This matched the composition of 
Detinov's Big Five committee. 
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but also throughout the rest of the military-political fields. The reason for this was 
that Brezhnev had moved away from active duties after his health worsened".568 
In the realm of strategic weapons there also existed another group with 
responsibilities for overseeing missile deVelopment and production. The Kommissiia 
pri Politburo569 was formed in the late 1960s and was nominally headed by Brezhnev. 
Customarily however the deputy chairman, Ustinov, presided over its proceedings. 
The membership of the Commission included Grechko, Vasilii M. Ryabikov,s70 the 
ministers of the nine defence industries and general designers and members of the 
Academy of Sciences from the various institutes involved in the work of the defence 
ministries. This Commission acted as a de facto political-military-industrial review 
committee led by the senior members of the Soviet Defence Council and composed of 
the leaders of the industries and institutes over which they were to exercise oversight. 
A member of the Central Committee claimed that the Commission's decisions "were 
passed for pro forma approval by the Defence Council, but were never amended by it. 
Issues were always debated in the Commission and decisions made by a few 
individuals" .571 Thus the missile design bureaux gained an invaluable position of 
influence within the decisionmaking structure itself 
The Defence Council572 functioned throughout the Brezhnev era and customarily met 
around three times a year. Again the membership of the Big Five formed the core 
membership573 which numbered 8-10 individuals. The remaining members included 
the Chief of the General Staff: the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, the Minister 
ofIntemal Affairs and "several major military industrialists. "574 Thus the Defence 
Council was the only defence decisionmaking group where the professional military 
568 Savel'yev and Detinov, The Big Five, p.186. 
569 Literally, "the Commission under the Politburo". 
570 The Deputy Director of GOSPLAN for Defence. 
571 University of Edinburgh, Department of Defence Studies Archive, (limited access only), file 5. 
572 Sovet Oborony. 
573 Brezhnev, Ustinov, Andropov, Smirnov and Grechko. 
574 It would seem reasonable to assume that specific experts might also be called to attend meetings 
which focussed upon their given field. 
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were themselves represented by a uniformed officer. Following the death of Grechko, 
this representation was effectively halved and was confined solely to the attendance of 
the Chief of the General Staff. The new Minister of Defence, Ustinov, was considered 
to be a "civilian" in unambiguous terms by the officer corps ofthe professional 
military. 575 The service branches of the military were evidently denied representation 
on the Defence Council as a matter of course. On the occasion of an extraordinary 
meeting of the Defence Council in June 1969 attended by 50-60 people, a number of 
military leaders were in attendance but they were far outnumbered by the combination 
of the nine ministers, (at least) six chief designers, heads ofthe CC and Council of 
Ministers (possibly 20 in number) and academicians from the Academies of Science 
whose congruence of interests would have served to nullify the military's influence 
with some ease. Thus the military wielded marginal influence within the Defence 
Council - a body which in any case has been adjudged no more than a forum for the 
"rubber stamping" of previously-agreed decisions in a fashion identical to the 
Politburo itself.576 The infrequency with which matters of substance were discussed in 
the Defence Council is inferred by the ire displayed by Brezhnev on the occasion when 
such a contentious issue surfaced at a meeting ofthis body.577 The real function of the 
Defence Council was essentially to advance and protect the interests of the military 
industrialists at the highest levels ofthe state and Party leadership. Vladimir Rubanov, 
a former director from the Aviation Ministry, portrayed the Defence Council as having 
been "an instrument of the VPK"578, while Tsygichko criticised US analysts' consistent 
underestimation of the role played by the military-industrial department of the CC 
which "functioned as a de facto sitting Defence Council, setting military policy -
575 University of Edinburgh, Department of Defence Studies Archive, (limited access only), file 2. 
His subsequent promotion to the rank of Marshal, along with Brezhnev, was met with derision 
among professional military circles. Azrael, The Soviet Civilian Leadership and the Military High 
Command, pp.5-6 & n.4; Parrott, "Political Change and Civil-Military Relations," pp.59-60. 
576 University of Edinburgh, Department of Defence Studies Archive, (limited access only), file 5. It 
is instructive to compare this appraisal of the Defence Council with previous Western accounts where 
a consensual view emerged which stressed its importance in the decisionmaking process. See for 
example, Parrott, "Political Change and Civil-Military Relations", p.54. 
577 University of Edinburgh, Department of Defence Studies Archive, (limited access only), file 2. 
578 Ibid., file 7. 
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which governed military doctrine and force development - and supported the formal 
Defence Council". 579 
An important player was Professor Mstislav Keldysh, the president of the academy of 
Sciences, who played an ever-increasing role in lieu of the General Secretary. 
Keldysh's role as the General Secretary's designated representative - a role that 
Keldysh was also called upon to play when Brezhnev was himself physically present 
at the meeting - and the influence that he enjoyed with Ustinov were apparently well 
understood within the inner circles of the Soviet leadership and he was treated with 
the respect commensurate with his potential influence.580 Even prior to the 
deterioration ofhis physical health Brezhnev was apparently heavily dependant upon 
Professor Keldysh's advice on matters of military doctrine and strategy and force 
posture. Keldysh promoted the notion of seeking to develop a survivable strategic 
force rather than pursuing the costly and potentially dangerous path of an 
unconstrained arms race. Illarionov cited Keldysh's pivotal role at an extraordinary 
meeting of the Defence Council in July 1969. In tandem with Ustinov Keldysh 
composed what was essentially a new Soviet military doctrine based upon the 
principle of achieving an assured retaliatory capacity through developing survivable 
strategic systems. Korniyenko credited Keldysh's influence upon Brezhnev and 
Ustinov as the principal determinant of the Soviet decision to seek ABM limitations in 
SALT.581 He also claimed that even though Brezhnev was compos mentis throughout 
the first years of the 1970s, he relied heavily upon Keldysh's personal advice and 
accepted it unreservedly.582 In the wake ofBrezhnev's effective incapacitation from 
1976 onwards, Keldysh would come to playa still more active role in Soviet defence 
policy formulation to the extent that one observer described him as the General 
579 Ibid., file 5 
580 It is interesting to contrast this assessment of Keldysh' role in decisionmaking with Detinov's and 
Savelyev's assertion that Keldysh played but a marginal and short-lived role in the Big Five's 
deliberations. The Big Five, p.20. 
581 This view was supported by Detinov and Savelyev, Ibid, p.22. 
582 Akhromeyev and Kornienko, Glazami marshala i diplomata, pp.40-1. 
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Secretary's "surrogate brain".583 However by this point Ustinov had:firmly established 
himself as the pre~eminent figure in the formulation of Soviet defence policy in general 
and weaponry procurement in particular. As his policy preferences increasingly came 
to serve as the most influential policy determinant, the importance of his personal 
perceptions of defence requirements and cliental relations with leading members of the 
ruling elite rose exponentially. 
According to General Danilevich Ustinov possessed a sound grasp of the technical 
aspects of weaponry development, although this was not matched by his 
understanding of associated military implications.584 In the realm of weaponry 
development he was not a conservative per se and appreciated and understood the 
significance of new technologies for force modernisation and C3 and "ordered many 
R&D programmes in this regard and facilitated these efforts to a considerable 
degree".585 Ustinov exercised considerable influence in the military-industrial complex 
and knew all the subtleties of its workings. Paradoxically he possessed a fearsome 
reputation586 and the industrialists and the OKBs acknowledged his absolute authority, 
yet he "allowed certain weaknesses in relation to them".587 While Grechko's or 
Malinovsky's relations with military producers were predicated solely upon their 
desire to ensure optimal weaponry delivery for the armed forces, there existed by 
contrast an ambivalence in Ustinov's relations with the defence sector which stemmed 
directly from the duality of his role. While Ustinov extended his opprobrium towards 
those designers whose projects failed to satisfy previously determined requirements, 
his ire was mild in comparison to that displayed by Grechko. Of greater import was 
Ustinov's propensity eventually to accept such shortcomings without recourse to 
583 University of Edinburgh, Department of Defence Studies Archive, (limited access only), file 5. 
584 Ibid., file 1. 
585 Ibid., file 1. 
586 Reportedly dating back to his practice of making surprise visits "through the back door" of the 
various plants under his control as wartime Minister of Annaments. 
587 University of Edinburgh, Department of Defence Studies Archive, (limited access only), file 1. 
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tangible punitive actions against the offending designer.588 This dichotomy became 
increasingly apparent as Ustinov's political aggrandisement endowed him with still 
greater influence upon the decisionmaking process and reached its ultimate form 
through his eventual appointment as Minister of Defence. According to Danilevich, 
He acted as the client, the contractor and the customer. In practice his 
position was such that he was often forced to compromise with himself He 
stood on the edge of the blade and waffled in both directions. On the one 
hand he considered the interests of the military, and one the other hand, those 
of the military-industrial complex. But more often, since he worked there for 
thirty years, he sided with the military-industrial complex. But he understood 
the requirements. It seems that he should have played a tremendous role in 
military-technical progress - in a quick leap forward in our military-technical 
capabilities, and there was a certain leap. But it did not turn out to be as great 
as it could have been if there had been division of responsibilities. 589 
Contrasting accounts ofUstinov's personal dealings with colleagues in the military and 
defence industry were offered by colleagues and past associates in interviews attended 
by and reviewed by the author. General Detinov displayed an implicit admiration and 
loyalty towards U stinov that might be due - at least in part - to his own institutional 
background. He emphasised his opinion that Ustinov remained an approachable 
individual, devoid of airs and graces despite his accession to such an elevated position. 
His door remained open to colleagues from all fields of government and his actions 
were predicated upon a steadfast loyalty to his longstanding associates.59o Danilevich 
offered a similar observation relating to this latter point, citing Ustinov's preference 
for continuing the patronage of particular design establishments. In this instance, ease 
588 "Even though he scolded them, in the end he would give up and concede to the industrialists, 
because they were closer to him than the strategists." Ibid., file 1. 
589 Ibid., file 1. 
590 "He never betrayed his friends ... to him it more than just business, it concerned friendship". 
Detinov interview. 
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and familiarity with known personnel and practices seem, in Danilevich's view, to have 
been the implicit determining factors. 59l Danilevich's recollection ofUstinov's 
receptivity towards views that lay contrary to his own provide a stark relief to those 
ofDetinov92 and correspond closely with the anecdotal evidence provided by 
Mozzhorin593 concerning his own brush with the U stinov-Grechko axis over the 
principle of diverting resources from missile production to silo construction. 
It is impossible to provide definitive chronological parameters for the zenith of 
military influence upon weaponry procurement policy and the onset of its diminution. 
The initiation ofthe Soviet Union's massive strategic build-up accompanied 
Brezhnev's coming to power and continued throughout the remainder of the decade. 
Undisputably there existed a consensus among the political and military leadership that 
this process should occur on a maximal scale at an accelerated rate. The integration 
of strategic weapons into the existing Soviet force structure and strategy pre-occupied 
military planners for the remainder of the decade. The potential for strategic 
innovation which came to the fore in the late 1960s coincided with the planning stages 
of the next generation of strategic forces. It was at this point that the congruence of 
interests between the military leadership and their suppliers in the defence sector came 
under increasing strain. The eventual outcome of this divergence of interests is 
instructive. Danilevich referred to the "competition" between the General Staffs 
operational-strategic perceptions and VPK's military-technical criteria.594 Il1arionov 
was keen to stress the increasingly frequent vituperative clashes between the General 
Staff and the VPK from the end of the 1960s onwards. "By 1969, relations between 
the VPK and the military were hostile. There were continuous battles over weapons 
systems. This was true even though the Ministry of Defence was represented on the 
59l University of Edinburgh, Department of Defence Studies Archive, (limited access only), file 1. 
592 Danilevich claimed that "ifUstinov did not like what he heard in discussion, he would cut off the 
speaker or briefer and throw him out of his office". Ibid., file 1. 
593 Ibid., file 3. 
594 Ibid., file 1. 
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VPK by a First Deputy Minister of Defence. 11595 This view was substantiated by 
Tsygichko who observed that "disagreements between the VPK and General Staff 
were constant, but the VPK always won the decision". 5% As was demonstrated in the 
previous chapter, the civilian leadership based their eventual decisions upon factors 
beyond the purely military-technical and would on occasion choose to ignore the 
military's advice. The leadership's propensity to follow such a course of action was 
set to increase dramatically as the 1970s progressed. 
Through Ustinov's ascendancy and the high level of policy input enjoyed by the 
defence sector magnates, the defence industry held a powerful position within the 
process of defence decisionmaking - a position that was to become increasingly 
dominant throughout the course ofthe 1970s. This far surpassed the degree of 
influence exerted by either the Ministry of Defence or the General Staff.597 
Proceedings of the Defence Council were increasingly dominated by the policy input 
and preferred programmes of the VPK which enjoyed a near-monopolistic status with 
regard to the supply of technical information to the Soviet leadership. The VPK was 
responsible for overseeing the entire development programme, from initial technical 
and strategic evaluation of project proposals to the eventual determination of the size 
and location of the production run.598 The Defence Industry Department of the 
Central Committee was the principal means by which military industrialists sought to 
influence weaponry production to their own ends. Tsygichko has stated that the 
Department was dominated by ministers responsible for armaments production, chief 
designers and political officers.599 Tsygichko described its role in the development of 
new programmes and their series production. Furthermore he stated categorically that 
595 Ibid., file 2. 
596 Ibid., file 5. 
597 Ibid., file 5. 
598 Ibid., file 5. 
599 Ibid., file 5 
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the interests of the defence industry held sway with the Department over those ofthe 
General Staff or the Ministry of Defence. 600 
The balance swung still further in favour of the defence industries in the wake of 
Ustinov's accession to the post of Minister of Defence in 1976. According to 
Tsygichko Grechko's influence within the leadership diminished markedly as the 1970s 
progressed.601 This was followed by significant structural changes in the mid-1970s 
linked to Ustinov's accession as Minister of Defence which further diminished 
professional military influence over weapons development and procurement 
programmes. Prior to 1976 the General Staff Directorate of Armaments Orders 
played a central role in shaping weapons programmes and funding. This Directorate 
gave its recommendations both to the General Staff and to the VPK. Based on these 
recommendations, the Minister of Defence and the General Staff allocated funding to 
the armed services. The VPK also worked with the Directorate to distribute funds 
which were allocated to military industry and weapons programmes. The General 
Staff was in charge of determining how to place orders for military programmes. 
After 1976 Ustinov reshaped this process to reduce the role of the General Staff and 
greatly expanded the role and influence of the VPK. The VPK was directly allocated 
funds and the services could appeal to the VPK for funding as well as to the Ministry 
of Defence. The Directorate of Armaments was taken out of the General Staffand 
made an independent Ministry of Defence Directorate headed by deputy minister of 
defence Shabanov, its executive role replaced by a mere advisory one.602 
Detinov was keen to stress that while organisational changes did occur "and the 
Scientific-Technical Committee's position within the governmental structure may have 
altered, its influence upon the formulation of procurement policy remained - though in 
600 Ibid., file 5. 
601 Ibid., file 5. Compare this to Warner's discourse on the relative influence ofUstinov and Grechko 
at this time in MccGwire, Booth, and McDonnell (eds.), Soviet Naval Policy: Objectives and 
Constraints, pp.71-3. See Parrott, "Political Change and Civil-Military Relations", pp.58-9 for 
examples of the symbolic diminution of Grechko's status. 
602 It is instructive to contrast this with the heavy emphasis placed upon the role played by Shabanov 
and the Armaments Directorate by the CIA in The Soviet Weapons Industry: An Overview, pp.15-16. 
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a slightly diminished fonn - in the wake of the refonn. The General Staff continued to 
vet all proposals for new programmes and the Minister for Armaments would only 
sanction new research work that enjoyed the General Staffs support. The Main 
Directorate of Operations (GOU) also played an influential role in the procurement 
process, specifically in detennining the optimum scale of overall production by vetting 
service branches' force level requests. Here too however the Chief of the General 
Staff retained the right of veto. The restructuring process served to diminish the 
General Staffs influence in determining the future course of weaponry development 
by precluding its participation in the initial stages of the decisionmaking process. It 
did however retain a significant degree of influence in the direction of weaponry 
procurement and possessed considerable authority with regards to the approval for the 
transition of developmental programmes to full-scale production. "603 
Significantly however, his military counterparts were adamant that these changes were 
of profound import and effectively unleashed the military-industrial complex by 
directly allocating funds to the VPK and military industry and effectively 
circumventing the General Staffs role in the detennination of weaponry procurement 
decisions. Both the VPK and the Central Committee Defence Department 
represented military industrial interests. The military-industrial complex had broad 
influence and all civilian ministries were orientated towards the military-industrial 
complex. Central Committee members and ministries sought the lucrative defence 
sector contracts. 
Even at the height of the General Staffs influence individual service branches had 
cultivated close links with the VPK, "interacting more closely and concretely" with 
individual OKBs than did the General Sta:ff.604 The diminution of the General Staffs 
authority led to increased collaboration between individual service branches and the 
VPK as such links came to take on a new importance as the professional military 
analysts in the General Staff were effectively circumvented in the selection of 
603 Detinov interview. 
604 University of Edinburgh, Department of Defence Studies Archive, (limited access only), file 5. 
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weaponry programmes. 60S The General Staff and Shabanov's Directorate played mere 
advisory roles and did not participate in the details of programme selection or the 
distribution of resources. Tsygichko told of an occasion when his institute (NIl -6 -
Scientific- Research Institute of the General Staff) was commissioned by Shabanov to 
provide a system of models with which to adjudge the most efficacious form of 
weaponry procurement. Although Shabanov was said to have accepted the report's 
conclusions, "he could not use them because they would seriously run afoul ofthe 
prerogatives ofthe Services and the VPK leaders responsible for production of 
armaments, missiles and air defence systems".606 
Tsygichko believed that 
US analysts overestimated the General Staff's influence upon military 
planning and force deVelopment and grossly underestimated the 
importance of the Central Committee and its Military Department 
(Voennyi otdel). At least 60% of the Central Committee's Military 
Department were themselves defence industrialists, both ministers 
responsible for arms production and chief designers (Glavnye 
konstruktory). The balance of the Department's membership was 
composed of political officers whose loyalty lay exclusively with Party 
interests. Moreover these officers wielded authority that transcended 
their titular rank. The Defence Minister and chief designers - who 
virtually controlled military production - were all members ofthe CC 
and its Military Department. Neither the Chief of the General Staff nor 
the heads of the individual service branches were members and thus 
held but a fraction of the influence enjoyed by the Military Department 
of the CC, particularly with regard to the determination of military 
60S Tsygichko observed that "General Staff analysis weakened appreciably over time relative to the 
services working with the VPK". Ibid., file 5. 
606 Ibid., file 5. 
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policy (Voennaia politika) and force development (Voennoe 
stroitel'stvo). The Military Department of the CC functioned as the de 
facto sitting Defence Council, setting military policy (Voennaia 
politika) which governed military doctrine and force development, and 
supported the formal Defence Council which was comprised of the 
General Secretary, the Minister of Defence, the chiefs ofthe KGB and 
MVD, the Minister of Foreign Affuirs and several major military 
industrialists. 607 
Reviewing the interpretations of the implications ofUstinov's accession as Minister of 
Defence proffered by leading Western analysts serves to confirm the substance of 
Tsygichko's criticism. The roles assumed by the General Staff organs and the service 
branches themselves in the latter 1960s were accurately ascribed by Western analyses. 
They proved remiss however in their failure to recognise this as a brief and transitory 
high-point of General Staff input into the decisionmaking process, which was to be 
rapidly undermined in the coming years. They were customarily cautious and seemed 
unable to credit the true scale of consolidation of defence decisionmaking authority 
upon a sole member of the Soviet elite. According to one contemporary Western 
source the appointment ofUstinov as Minister of Defence "raised intriguing questions 
about the future supervision of the defence-industrial sector and may have been 
prompted - at least in part - by the political leadership'S desire to improve the overall 
efficiency of the Soviet defence effort" .608 Spielmann posited that it might have 
created a system of "checks and balances" as Serbin's and Smirnov's well-established 
positions served to temper Ustinov's authority609 while Jones pursued a similar theme 
when she argued for the existence of a "collegial decisionmaking system in both the 
607 Ibid., file 5. 
608 Spielmann in Herspring, D.R. and Volyges, I. (eds.) 1978. Civil-Military Relations in Communist 
Systems, p.I13. This view was echoed by Rice, C. 1987. "The Party, The Military and Decision 
Authority in the Soviet Union", World Politics, 40(1):72-4. 
609 Spielmann in Herspring and Volgyes, CiVil-Military Relations in Communist Systems, pp.112-3. 
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military and civilian hierarchies, which represents a check on capricious managers". 610 
Few analyses sought to avoid the "conflation" of military concerns with those of the 
defence sector and investigate the potential for conflicts of interest in their 
institutional relationship. 61 I Indeed those which did single out the military in general 
and General Staff in particular for detailed consideration displayed a consensual view 
that laid heavy emphasis upon their decisive role in the Soviet weaponry procurement 
process.612 Cooper provided an accurate appraisal when he claimed that "real power 
rested with the Central Committee's Defence Industry Department under Serbin, who 
had occupied the post since 1958, assisted by his first deputy, Dmitriev." However 
even this assessment ofUstinov's role erred on the side of caution, ascribing as it does 
his assumption ofthe "combined role of Party overlord of the armaments industry 
with his brief as Defence Minister"613 to as late a point as 1979. 
610 Jones, E. Red Army and SOCiety, p.24. 
611 Notable exceptions to this included Cooper "The Defence Industry and Civil-Military Relations," 
p.189; Hough, J. 1985. "Soviet Decisionmaking on Defence," in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 
23(7):84-8; Spielmann in Herspring and Volgyes, Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems, 
pp.108-12. 
612 Rice, C. "The Party, The Military and Decision Authority in the Soviet Union", pp.55-6, 61-71; 
Parrott, B. "Political Change and Civil-Military Relations", p.54; Cooper in McLean, (ed.), How 
Nuclear Weapons Decisions are Made, p.21; Alexander, Decisionmaking in Soviet Weapons 
Procurement, p.18; Jones, Red Army and SOCiety, p.24; Jones, "Defence R&D Policymaking in the 
USSR", in Valenta, J. and Potter, W.e. 1984. Soviet Decisionmakingfor National Security. London: 
George Allen and Unwin, pp.124-6; Holloway, D. The Soviet Union and the Arms Race, pp.ll 0-1, 
142; The Soviet Weapons Industry: An Overview, pp.11-2; Frost, H. "Soviet Party-Military Relations 
in Strategic Decisionmaking", in Currie, K.M. and Varhall, G. 1984. The Soviet Union: What Lies 
Ahead?, pp.65-7; Cochran, T.B., Norris, S. and Bukharin, O.A. 1985. Making the Russian Bomb: 
From Stalin to Yeltsin. Boulder, Co.: Westview, pp.69-70. While Cockburn succeded in delineating 
the intra-elite rivalries and coalition-building that so dominated defence decisionmaking he credited 
dominant factions of the military leadership with rather more influence upon policymaking than 
actually appears to have been the case. Cockburn, The Threat, pp.60-76. 
613 Cooper, "The Defence Industry and Civil-Military Relations", p.171. 
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Missile Design Bureaux 
The majority of R&D and proposals for new weaponry systems emanated from the 
design bureaux and research institutes of the tUne defence ministries. A number of 
different organisational arrangements had evolved within this aspect of the Soviet 
defence ministries. Some institutes were incorporated into science-production 
associations while others enjoyed a greater degree of operational independence and in 
some instances possessed their own research centres and prototype production sites. 
The latter type was often termed an OKB (experimental· design bureau,) and such 
design bureaux played a vital role in the Soviet defence industry. OKBs were 
particularly prevalent in the development of aviation and missile systems. They were 
to a large extent built upon the reputations oftheir principal designers and often came 
to bear his name.614 Detinov stated that due to the prestige and perceived importance 
ofthe development of the rocket forces, the heads of the missile design bureaux 
enjoyed a degree of status and an associated level of autonomy denied to their 
counterparts in other sectors of Soviet weaponry design and production. Indeed they 
were able to circumvent their nominal superiors and gain direct access to the highest 
echelons of the Soviet elite, in particular to Ustinov, the lynchpin of the weaponry 
procurement process and also to Brezhnev himself.615 Against this backdrop ministers 
preferred to maintain cordial relations with General Designers of the calibre of 
Nadiradze, Korolev et al. and to resolve problems without resort to "arbitration" of 
Politburo members. Detinov accepted that while the controversy surrounding the SS-
18 and SS-19 was the most high-profile and overt example of intra-elite conflict in 
Soviet defence decisionmaking, it was not an isolated example. Rather, "there were 
deeper contradictions which sometimes made things difficult. .. to some extent, such 
disputes positively affected Nadiradze's position and helped the development ofhis 
614 Cockburn provided an account oftheir role in his own acerbic style, Cockburn, The Threat, pp.86-
90. 
615 A plethora of anecdotal accounts serve to support the case that such practices were also 
widespread during Stalin's and Khrushchev's tenures. 
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systems and the allocation of resources to his Bureau" .616 In Detinov's view, the 
conflict centred upon Ustinov and Smirnov in opposition to Grechko and Monyseev. 
General Belous argued during the course of the interview that Nadiradze did indeed 
enjoy Ustinov's patronage. However he was keen to stress that this was not exclusive 
and extended to other missile design bureaux - for example to Yange1617 and his 
"heavy" ICBM designs. 
The Nadiradze Bureau was effectively created by Ustinov and Detinov accepted that 
"his" Bureaux benefited from an enhanced position in the process of resource 
allocation. While Detinov was adamant that Ustinov could not personally divert funds 
towards particular projects or bureaux ofhis preference and stressed that specific 
resource allocation remained within the remit of the ministries themselves, he did 
concede that ministers were well aware of this situation and concluded that it was in 
their own interest to, "feed the demands ofa General Designer who enjoyed Ustinov's 
'patronage.' Former Minoboronporom minister Zverev knew this very well. "618 
616 Detinov interview. 
617 Subsequently headed by Utkin following Yangel's death in 1971. 
618 Detinov interview. 
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System Replication 
To maintain political harmony and the continued existence of key design bureaux and 
their plethora of associated facilities, Soviet defence procurement policy under 
Brezhnev rapidly evolved a practice of constructing a remarkably large proportion of 
technically viable designs and a significant number of marginal viability. This was 
despite the significant operational deficiencies that many ofthem possessed and the 
ensuing inefficiencies of production and complexity of deployment and operational 
planning caused by system replication. This practice was particularly prevalent in 
missile production although this may have been exacerbated by a desire during the 
initial period of rocket development to maintain a diffusion of design centres in this 
new technological area. Soviet leaders were probably influenced by the notion that 
such a multiplicity avoided the dangers of over-reliance upon a single or limited 
number of design paths. Such a notion would itself have accorded with the traditional 
Soviet preference for mixed forces and an aversion to over-reliance upon a single 
weapon type. However this does not serve to explain the degree of system replication 
which emerged in the SRF over the coming two decades. At one point as many as ten 
different missile systems were deployed to fulfil an identical mission profile. 
Kalashnikov claimed that his proposal to reduce the number of operational systems to 
two or three was specifically rejected by Ustinov himself for fear of the downturn in 
output that it would entail and its consequences for defence producers.619 Vitaly 
Kataev of the Defence Industry Department told of how his attempts to increase the 
efficiency of defence production and overcome wasteful practices met with studied 
indifference from his superiors.620 An article in Krasnaya Zvezda in 1991 by Efilll 
Liuboshits, an analyst with over thirty years experience in the SRF's main research 
institute621 , stated that studies conducted in 1979 demonstrated that the number of 
missiles in storage exceeded by ten-fold the number required for operational alert 
619 University of Edinburgh, Department of Defence Studies Archive, (limited access only), file 4. 
620 Ibid., file 7. 
621 NU-4. 
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status. Additional missiles continued to be supplied by industry - apparently without 
financial penalty - despite the absence of requisite Ministry of Defence orders.622 A 
similar instance was highlighted in the production levels of SLBMs. Soviet 
submarines customarily carried 0.7 nuclear basic loads on patrol and a total 
production run which provided each vessel with a final total of 1.5 nuclear basic loads 
would have been sufficient reserve. However the production runs of the various 
SLBM systems ran to four, five and, in one instance, eight times the requisite basic 
nuclear load.623 
Kataev recounted the instance ofUstinov accepting a consignment of missiles surplus 
to requirements, simply to maintain production activity following a personal request 
on the part of a defence ministry chief.624 This was the result of the arms race which 
occurred within the missile production sector ofthe defence industries and the 
reluctance - principally for reasons of political expedience and oligarchical nepotism-
on the part of governing circles to arbitrate effectively between competing designs.625 
General Belous stated that despite the remarkably high levels of resources devoted to 
missile production, resource-allocation competition between design bureaux remained 
fierce. Awards and honours of various types were offered to officials as an 
inducement to help propagate their design proposals. Belous cited the appointment of 
Khrushchev's son to a top post within the Korolev Bureau as the most conspicuous 
example of such nepotism. The end result of such a system was inevitable - a host of 
different missile systems were deployed in large numbers, often as much in response 
to domestic political considerations as well as strategic factors. 626 
The Soviet leadership's expedience in the realm of defence procurement policy was 
manifested most dramatically in the furore which accompanied the proposed 
622 Krasnaya Zvezda, 9 July 1991, translated in JPRS-UMA-91-022, 21 August 1991, p.35. 
623 University of Edinburgh, Department of Defence Studies Archive, (limited access only), file 7. 
624 Ibid., file 7. 
625 Ibid., file 7. 
626 Belous interview. 
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development of the SS-17 and SS-19 in 1969.627 Both the Yangel and Chelomei 
bureaux were commissioned to design a new MIRVed ICBM system possessed of 
enhanced operational responsiveness. While there exists some confusion as to 
affiliation of some figures from the second echelon of government the identities of the 
principal protagonists are clear as was the genuine division which emerged among the 
leadership on this particular issue. The Chelomei SS-19 paid scant attention to the 
concept of survivability and was armed with six warheads to the SS-17's four. It was 
supported by the military, most especially Grechko with his proclivity towards 
maximising firepower and his disdain for the notion of developing survivable 
systems.628 Grechko was allied to Afanasyev, the Minister of General Machine 
Building629• By contrast Yangel's SS-17 laid heavy emphasis on the principle of 
survivability and received the backing ofUstinov, Keldysh, Serbin, and most of the 
chief designers. The positions adopted by Afansyev's deputy, Tyulin, and Mozzhorin, 
the head ofTsNIIMash630, remain unclear. Illarionov provided contradictory accounts 
of their affiliation.63l Detinov meanwhile placed Mozzhorin in the Vangel camp while 
stating that the deputy ofTsNIIMash favoured the Chelomei design.632 The dispute 
was eventually resolved following an extraordinary meeting of the Defence Council 
held near Yalta in July 1969. It was attended by a plethora of senior officials 
including ministers from the defence industries, military leaders, general and chief 
designers heads of the Central Committee and Council of Ministers apparatuses and 
academicians and numbered 50-60 people in total. 633 Both chief designers and their 
627 It is instructive to counterpoise this account with that offered by Cockburn, The Threat, pp.86-90. 
628 Mozzhorin's account ofthe initial reaction of many among the military leadership was testament 
to their adherence to the traditional concepts of artillery warfare which served as the SRFs first 
foundations and their implicit reluctance to accept the notion of an assured second-strike capacity. 
He stressed that for them, throw-weight was the single most important determinant of the operational 
utility of these new "canons" (sic). University of Edinburgh, Department of Defence Studies Archive, 
(limited access only), file 3. 
629 Minobshchemash or MOM. 
630 The Central Research Institute of Minobshchemash. 
63l University of Edinburgh, Department of Defence Studies Archive, (limited access only), file 2. His 
April 1993 account placed them on Vangel's side, while that of June 1993 described them as backers 
of Chelomei's cause. The former description is the more detailed so should perhaps be accepted. 
632 Savel'yev and Detinov, The Big Five, p.19. 
633 University of Edinburgh, Department of Defence Studies Archive, (limited access only), file 2. 
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principal supporters addressed the gathering and tensions rose, especially when 
Afanasyev launched a personal attack upon his long-time mentor, Ustinov, alleging 
that his personal dislike of Chelomei had prejudiced him against the design from the 
outset. During a recess in proceedings Brezhnev was overheard berating Ustinov and 
Grechko for placing him in such a compromising position. A compromise was 
subsequently agreed by Ustinov, Serbin, Keldysh, Illarionov and Alekseyev and it was 
decided that both systems should be produced. According to Illarionov a final bizarre 
twist emerged when Grechko sought to avoid signing the unpalatable agreement by 
leaving his dacha via the back door upon Serbin's arrival 634 
While Detinov claimed that this incident was unique in the annals of Soviet defence 
procurement during the Brezhnev era635 the weight of evidence suggests that it was 
not untypical and that such incidents arose with ever-increasing frequency from this 
time onwards. Dr. Vitaly Tsygichko a senior researcher in the Academy of Sciences 
with considerable personal experience in Soviet defence analyses during the Brezhnev 
era recounted an incident which bore all the hallmarks of the SS-17/SS-19 contest. 
Indeed the incident to which he refers may even have been that of the SS-17/SS-19 
imbroglio. If so it serves to highlight the leadership's flagrant disregard ofthe findings 
of their own defence analysts when determining weaponry procurement policy. 
Tsygichko recounted system review meetings chaired by the Deputy Director of the 
General Staffs Main Operations Directorate which achieved a clear consensus in 
favour of series production of one system while rejecting its rival in the face of 
"volumes of documentary evidence!! presented by the meeting chairman detailing its 
technical inadequacies. The ensuing series production of both systems led Tsygichko 
to conclude that "review board meetings were an empty formality designed to mollify 
the General Staff and others outwith the VPK but which had no real effect upon 
programme development". 636 
634 Ibid., file 2. 
635 Savel'yev and Detinov, The Big Five, p.19. 
636 University of Edinburgh, Department of Defence Studies Archive, (limited access only), file 5. 
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Conclusion 
Ensconced as it was in decisionmaking via bureaucratic committees, weaponry 
procurement policy formulation closely resembled that for SALT. By the time they 
reached the ruling elite proposals were thought to have been properly "filtered" 
through the Soviet bureaucratic structure and were customarily accepted on a pro 
forma basis. Control of the bureaucratic process thus detennined the course and 
nature of weaponry procurement. Ustinov came to enjoy untrammelled authority in 
this realm and effectively became the principal determinant of both the Soviet arms 
control negotiating stance and procurement policy. His policy enjoyed a fair amount 
of success in the field of SALT but less so in the long run in the arena of efficacious 
weaponry production.637 Indeed as the 1970s progressed promotion ofVPK interests 
undoubtedly became the most influential determining factor in defence production.638 
The practical effect of this was the continued production of obsolete weapons systems 
of marginal operational utility for the General Staffs evolving strategic precepts 
against a backdrop of resistance to technological innovation for fear of disruptions to 
long-established production practices.639 
The competition between the SS-17 and SS-19 systems and their rival creators came 
to be something of a cause celebre among the upper echelons of the Soviet ruling elite 
and its eventual outcome must have provided all concerned with a salutary message 
concerning the most efficacious form of decisionmaking with regard to missile 
production. Failure to resolve procurement decisions prior to their consideration by 
637 As Tsygichko observed "The process of making methodological decisions was methodologically 
and organisationally sound. This was shown by years of experience in planning and policymaking. 
However the dominant political regime did not allow for the full use of the potential capabilities of 
this dedsionmaking mechanism. The inadequacies and negative results in the administrative and 
decisionmaking sphere reflected the overall crisis of the political system in the country. The 
contradictions between reality and common sense on the one hand and ageing ideological postulates 
on the other, sharpened and increased over time. The decisions reached had increasingly tragic 
consequences." University of Edinburgh, Department of Defence Studies Archive, (limited access 
only), file 5. 
638 Ibid., file 5. 
639 For his part Danilevich claimed that "under Ustinov, we had weapons and the strategic objectives 
were subordinated and built around the weapons." Ibid., file 1. 
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the Defence Council was liable to draw the ire of the General Secretary who showed 
little inclination towards adjudicating on such matters. Moreover, where conflict 
over competing designs arose it seemed that it was most likely to be settled through 
just such a compromise. This incident must therefore have served to reinforce the 
tendency towards the issuing and fulfilling of parallel commissions which had already 
become prevalent in procurement practice by the end of the 1960s. 
Most observers failed to appreciate the pre-eminence of military-industrial complex 
interests in the Soviet defence decisionmaking process and the shift still further in their 
favour during the second halfofthe 1970s. Thus the development of the SS-20 was 
significant as the initiation of its development cycle took place during what was most 
probably the high point of military influence upon the decisionmaking process. By the 
time of its production and deployment however the military's input into policymaking 
had been dramatically reduced and this period did indeed witness fraught Party-
military relations. However the conflict which came to be focussed upon Ustinov and 
Ogarkov concerned more than resource allocation. Their contretemps was centred 
upon the nature of weaponry deVelopment required to meet the General Staffs 
expanded strategic precepts and the extent of military participation in this 
procurement decisiomnaking process. Thus the development of the SS-20 took place 
as Soviet defence decisionmaking was on the cusp. Professional military input had 
grown somewhat during the course of the 1960s and was at its height at the time of 
the initiation of the SS-20's developmental cycle. However the decision to proceed 
with the development of the SS-20 was accompanied within two years by a rapid and 
dramatic diminution of the professional military's ability to influence the Soviet 
defence decisionmaking structure. In many ways the SS-20 was an unusual product 
of the Soviet defence industry, displaying as it did efficacious operational capabilities 
which were pertinent to the contemporary strategy favoured by the General Staff"'° 
640 Although one must assume that Grechko would have opposed the eventual mobile status it held as 
much in an IRBM as he did in ICBMs. He would however have been expected to have approved of 
its solid fuel propulsion which engendered it with such a rapid response potential. 
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and providing as it did "an important exception to the usual pattern of the Soviet 
Union having to play 'catch-up' with the US was the SS-20 which was a strategic and 
technological breakthrough for the Soviets which gave them a significant advantage in 
Europe. 11641 It was a weapon system whose developmental roots lay in a period when 
the professional military enjoyed a degree of decisionmaking influence which - while 
subject to certain constraints and potentially competing interests - was proportionately 
greater than it had possessed in the early 1960s and was markedly greater than it 
would hold by the mid-1970s. 
641 University of Edinburgh, Department of Defence Studies Archive, (limited access only), file 7. 
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6 Conclusion 
The Development of the SS-20 Reconsidered 
Further research into the four factors posited by previous analyses as the principal 
motivations behind the Soviet Union's development of the SS-20 has served to correct 
a number of important technical and factual details but has, for the most part, 
reaffirmed their prima facie validity as explanatory rationales for such a course of 
action. The nature of the operational demands placed upon Soviet TNFs by the 
evolving theatre nuclear strategy has traditionally been credited as being of prime 
importance to the development of the SS-20. This development was claimed to have 
heralded a new era in theatre strategy, because for the first time since the deployment 
of nuclear forces Soviet strategy accepted the possibility that the onset of a future 
conflagration with the West might not lead to the immediate use of nuclear weapons. 
My investigation of this issue has confirmed that while Soviet strategy did indeed 
evolve to incorporate the possibility of a conventional introduction this course 
remained but one option of many and the shadow of nuclear engagement continued to 
loom large. Even in the event of a conventional introduction there was little 
confidence that conflict would remain at this level for any length of time. The relative 
weakness of NATO conventional forces and the Limited Nuclear Options (LNO) 
considered in the strategies of Flexible Response and the Schlesinger Doctrine 
coalesced to engender the belief that NATO would be forced to escalate to the 
employment of nuclear weapons. 
Moreover the process of evolution which served to produce this revision was itself 
protracted and occurred in the face of considerable opposition emanating from 
members ofthe military "old guard". The more detailed consideration of the nature 
and extent of the strategic revision afforded by recent interviews with former members 
of the Soviet elite serves to further refine the analysis of its course and nature. It is 
evident from these interviews that considerable ferment existed within the upper 
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echelons of the military over the likely nature of a future conflict. In addition it was 
paralleled by a process of disengagement on the part of the political leadership in the 
formulation of strategy and doctrine which accelerated during the course of 
Brezhnev's tenure. It is clear that while generally accurate in their appraisal of the 
strategic revision, Western scholars were largely unaware of the unrestrained ire 
displayed by Defence Minister, Marshal Grechko, and his allies towards the concepts 
of conventional or limited nuclear conflagration with the West and their unwavering 
adherence to the notion of a pre-emptive nuclear strike when conflict appeared 
imminent. While Western accounts often portrayed Grechko as possessing a sceptical 
attitude towards the merits of detente and as an advocate of the retention of military 
expenditure at maximal levels it is now clear that few gauged the true extent of his 
ideological conservatism. 
Grechko stridently attacked the notion of a second strike posture and its attendant 
ideological and technological ramifications, while the head of the Strategic Rocket 
Forces, Tolubko, was attested to have maintained a similarly hardline perspective. 
Nor was Grechko averse to confronting powerful vested interests in the pursuit of the 
adoption of his favoured strategic principles. His opposition to mobile ICBMs, and 
the assured retaliation strategy that they might have engendered, placed him at 
loggerheads with the political leadership and the proponents of strategic innovation 
within the General Staff, while his attempts to prevent the development of mobile 
ICBMs placed him in opposition to Ustinov and the Defence Council as a whole. 
General-Colonel Illarionov highlighted Grechko's continued adherence to a "first-
strike" policy long after the adoption of a revised nuclear strategy by the Defence 
Council in 1969. Illarionovalso observed the constraining effect of Grechko's dogged 
resistance upon the Ministry of Defence as a whole, and the technical analytical 
specialists in the military industries and military-political staff seeking to improve the 
technical performance of Soviet missile systems. Such constraints apparently 
extended to include even the chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces himsel£642 Iu. A. 
642 University of Edinburgh, Department of Defence Studies Archive, (limited access only), file 2. 
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Mozzhorin's account ofthe "silo debate" provided eloquent testament both to 
Grechko's strategic principles and his reluctance to accept opinions which stood in 
contradiction to his own. In this instance the Defence Minister enjoyed the support of 
Ustinov, Chelomei and a number of other military industrialists and this powerful 
alliance of institutional interests and members of the ruling elite deemed the 
quantitative expansion of missile systems preferable to the qualitative enhancement of 
strategic survivability engendered by silo basing. 643 
In The Big Five Savel'yev and Detinov claimed that no serious research had been 
undertaken into concepts of strategic parity and mutual deterrence in the Soviet Union 
prior to the SALT era.644 Dr Tsygichko offered a slightly different interpretation of 
events and argued that de facto acceptance of the principle of deterrence accompanied 
the Soviet Union's attainment ofa viable ICBM force in the mid-1960s. The repeated 
Soviet disavowals of the concept of deterrence which followed in the coming years 
represented mere posturing for propaganda purposes. 64S Illarionov explained the 
absence of a formal Soviet acceptance of the concept of deterrence through the 
trenchant opposition which emanated from certain sections of the military leadership 
and rocket design bureaux towards the concomitant implications for strategic force 
structure and missile design. 
The most authoritative account of the evolution of Soviet nuclear strategy was 
proffered by General-Colonel Danllevich. Danilevich's career as a General Staff 
officer spanned more than a quarter of a century and spanned Brezhnev's tenure. He 
served as an Assistant for Doctrine and Strategy under two Chiefs of the General Staff 
and was Director of the General Staff authors collective that composed and refined 
between 1977 and 1986 the top-secret, three-volume Strategy of Deep Operations. 
643 Ibid., file 3. 
644 Savel'yev, A.G. and Detinov, N.N. 1995. The Big Five: Arms Control Decisionmaking in the 
Soviet Union, Westport, Ct.: Praeger, pp.2 & 5. 
645 University of Edinburgh, Department of Defence Studies Archive, (limited access only), file 5. 
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He stood at a unique vantage point from which to survey the development of strategy 
throughout Brezhnev's tenure of office. While he characterised the Soviet strategy of 
the early 1960s as a period of "nuclear euphoria", 646 premised upon the mass 
employment of nuclear forces in pre-emptive strikes, Danilevich contended that a 
sense of conservatism and realism returned to Soviet strategic analyses with the 
advent ofthe Brezhnev regime, accompanied by an appreciation of the likely effects of 
nuclear conflagration. The development of a Soviet SLBM force and the 
strengthening of the SRF as a whole interacting with evolving US strategic concepts 
enabled the development of more sophisticated strategic concepts by Soviet military 
planners. Danilevich singled out the deployment of the SS-11 in 1970 as a watershed 
event as its markedly superior response ability, allied to the "over the horizon" radars 
developed at this time, enabled Soviet planners for the first time to consider an 
assured second strike option.647 This chronological framework closely coincided with 
Illarionov's account which identified Professor Mstislav Keldysh, the President of the 
Soviet Academy of Sciences, as the principal architect of the revised strategic posture 
of "launch on warning" (otvetno-vstrechnyi udar) which was adopted at an 
extraordinary meeting of the Defence Council in July 1969.648 
Danilevich acknowledged the impact that such Western concepts as Flexible Response 
and the Schlesinger Doctrine had upon the development of Soviet strategy despite 
their repeated rejection in Soviet public pronouncements. By the mid-1970s the 
principle of graduated responses was increasingly coming to hold sway within Soviet 
nuclear strategy.649 To this was added the growing influence of the concept ofa 
conventional introduction to a future conflict which was "officially documented" in the 
646 Ibid., file 1. 
647 Ibid., file 1. Although Chelomei's SS-11 had originally entered service in 1965 an uprated 
version, the UR-lOOK, was tested in July 1969 and entered service in March 1971. It seems likely 
that it was to this system that Danilevich was referring. 
648 University of Edinburgh, Department of Defence Studies Archive, (limited access only), file 2. 
649 It is however interesting to note that a nuclear strike against Soviet territory may well have 
elicited a strategic strike of similar magnitude upon a specific target on US territory itself rather than 
a response confined within the European theatre. 
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1974-6 period. Its possible timespan increased from a matter of hours to 7-8 days, to 
its final form, the advance to the Rhine, an operation which was anticipated to be of 
several weeks' duration. While Danilevich expressed his confidence that Soviet forces 
could prevail in such an exchange he, like the vast majority ofhis colleagues, 
anticipated an eventual strategic nuclear escalation.650 
General Danilevich stressed that the pursuit of a more sophisticated array of strategic 
options was confined to an elite group within the General Staff and neither research 
institutes outwith the General Staffs direct authority nor the service branches 
themselves were involved in these rarefied proceedings. The political leadership was 
still further removed from the process of strategic formulation. Thus dissenters from 
the revised strategic theory enjoyed considerable latitude in enunciating their 
opposition, largely due to the laissez laire stance adopted by the political leadership in 
this realm of policy formulation. The establishment of strategic principles was 
effectively devoid of input on the part of the political leadership as Brezhnev and his 
colleagues increasingly disengaged from the formulation of military policy. While 
Danilevich's anecdote detailing Brezhnev's aversion to the prospect of authorising a 
simulated nuclear release during an exercise in 1972 is laced with irony this should not 
detract from the portentous implications it heralded for Soviet strategic planning 
during the remainder ofBrezhnev's tenure and beyond. The near-complete 
withdrawal of the General Secretary from the process of doctrinal formulation 
proceeded during the remainder of the decade was replicated without exception by his 
colleagues within the Politburo and had a most deleterious effect upon the cohesion of 
Soviet military-political policymaking. Both Danilevich and Tsygichko stressed that 
while U stinov was undoubtedly the "magnate" of military production and possessed a 
sound grasp of weaponry's technical aspects he showed little interest in the affairs of 
military science and made no attempt to avail himself of the direction of strategic 
development pursued by the General Staff. This policymaking divergence was further 
650 University of Edinburgh, Department of Defence Studies Archive, (limited access only), file 1. 
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attested to by Danilevich's and Tsygichko's accounts ofthe manner in which analytical 
assessments of the likely effects of a nuclear conflagration were purposely ignored by 
the political leadership and directors of defence enterprises throughout the 1970s. 
This description provides a refutation of the traditional appraisal of the creation of 
Soviet strategic precepts in their classical form. The depiction of the upper echelons 
of the Soviet General Staff proceeding with the formulation of strategic planning 
devoid of oversight from, and accountability to, the political leadership stands in stark 
relief to the official portrayals of a linear process of doctrinal and strategic formulation 
via a continual and unconstrained interaction between the military and political 
hierarchies. General Danilevich's account of the Soviet political leadership bereft of a 
pre-arranged contingency plan in the event of major conflict with the West was 
remarkably frank, and even with the passing of time, remains alarming. Against such 
a background, where the revision process continued apace virtually devoid of 
direction on the part of the political leadership, opponents of the revision enjoyed 
considerable latitude in the expression of their scepticism as was reflected in the 
military press. The ensuing revision was thus gradual in nature and cautious in extent 
and was associated with a generational transition within the military leadership itself 
The absence offirm direction from above led to the emergence and persistence 
of contradictory strategic postures and policies .. stated policy, even for 
domestic consumption, often co-existed with contradictory planning and 
preparation in several areas, the most noteworthy being a policy of no first use 
and preparation for pre-emption ... here also developed serious inconsistencies 
between strategy and the force structure created to implement it, leading to a 
severely overburdened Soviet economy and confusion among Western 
leaders.651 
With regard to the SS-20 both strategic conservatives and innovators alike would 
have been expected to have recognised the gross deficiencies in the existing TNF 
651 Ibid., file 1. 
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force ofSS-4s/SS-5s and the merits of the development of a system possessed ofthe 
operational capabilities displayed by the SS-20. Those who expected that any conflict 
would be nuclear in character from the outset would have been expected to have 
welcomed a system whose rapidity of response ensured it could meet the requirements 
of the launch-on-warning strategy that had been adopted in 1969. The vast majority 
of their colleagues who acknowledged the possibility ofa conventional introduction 
anticipated eventual resort to nuclear employment. Rapidity of response was of equal 
importance to the proponents of such a strategy in the event of such a contingency. 
During the conventional period the SS-20's mobility and solid-fuel propulsion would 
have endowed it with the attribute of mobility which would have markedly improved 
its survivability - essential to preserve TNF potential during the anticipated period of 
attack by NATO conventional forces. 
Thus wherever they stood on the broad spectrum of anticipated nuclear strategy 
Soviet military planners would be expected to have favoured the development of a 
new TNF system possessing the type of performance capabilities with which the SS-
20 was endowed. Grechko's reported opposition to the development of mobile and 
solid-fuelled systems was said to have stemmed from his suspicion that possession of 
them might have tempted the political leadership to forsake a first-strike policy. This 
would serve as ample testament to the vehemence ofGrechko's views on this issue, as 
the pursuit of such a weaponry procurement policy premised solely upon such a desire 
would have denied the Soviet Union a valuable enhancement of its strategic potential. 
One might assume that Grechko's views would have engendered considerable disquiet 
even among fellow strategic conservatives who would have been expected to have 
recognised the potentially vital role that a force ofSS-20s might play within the 
European TVD regardless ofthe means and timing of escalation to nuclear 
employment. Thus while the nature and extent of the revision of Soviet theatre 
strategy requires reappraisal, the potential importance of the SS-20's role within either 
strand of operational principles remains undiminished. There was therefore an 
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apparently strong strategic rationale for the development and deployment of a new 
generation ofTNFs, endowed with attributes of mobility and enhanced responsiveness 
to meet the operational needs perceived to exist by Soviet strategists of various hues. 
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The operational deficiencies of existing Soviet TNFs 
The SS-4 and SS-5 systems represented the first Soviet theatre systems to enter mass 
production and largescale operational deployment. While the SS-4/SS-5 force was in 
theory capable of striking the full array of target groups assigned to it within the 
European theatre in reality their operational efficacy was fatally undermined by a 
series of performance deficiencies. Furthermore the operational utility of the SS-
4/SS-5 force vis-a-vis its Western counterparts had been undermined almost from the 
inception of its service career by the United States' deployment of Polaris-equipped 
submarines. In the intervening period a plethora of new systems joined Polaris as 
potential adversaries of the SS-4/SS-5 force and were added to its burgeoning target 
groups. These included American FBS and Poseidon-armed submarines and a host of 
aircraft and carrier-based forces, British and French nuclear systems and the nascent 
Chinese nuclear potential. Soviet military planners also expected that the existing 
disparity in strategic forces within the European theatre of operations was set to be 
exacerbated by the impending deployment of a new generation of US TNFs. Haslam's 
claim that Soviet intelligence had derived early warning of the United States' 
development of a new generation of theatre nuclear forces via an informant within 
NATO's international secretariat was implicitly supported by the testimony of General 
Belous. Belous observed that the Soviet Union "received first evidence ofthe 
development of the Pershing II in 1969". By 1975 the US was seen to have "allocated 
a reasonable sum to finalise the Pershing II programme, while the Cruise missile 
programme was also under way. These forces were seen as forming the cornerstone 
of US forces in Europe".652 
There was a firm consensus among Western analysts that both the SS-14 and SS-15 
had evolved directly from the SS-13 and that all three systems were products of the 
652 Haslam, 1., 1989. The Soviet Union and the Politics o/Nuclear Weapons in Europe, 1969-87: The 
Problem of the SS-20. London: Macmillan, p.61 and Belous interview. 
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Nadiradze Design Bureau. Unanimity prevailed in classifYing them as intended TNF 
systems designed to replace the existing 88-4/88-5 force and to the fundamental 
technical deficiencies which they encountered, attested to by their problematic flight-
testing programmes and eventual deployment in such low numbers. Against this 
backdrop 80viet planners were apparently forced to adopt innovative means of 
galvanising theatre forces while awaiting the development of a new TNF system. 
The diversion ofthe ubiquitous 88-11 ICBMs to a theatre role commenced in 1969 
and one hundred and twenty 88-11s were targeted on Western Europe with a further 
100 designated for Chinese targets. Due to its initial manifestation as an ICBM the 
88-11 was endowed with a range which enabled it to swing between theatres of 
operations, thus endowing 80viet TNFs with significantly enhanced operational 
flexibility and providing new cross-targeting and strategic manoeuvre opportunities. 
Unlike the 88-4/88-5 force all 88-11s deployed in the TNF role were housed within 
hardened silos. In addition although the 88-11 was liquid fuelled its silo-basing 
enabled it to utilise a more advanced fuel system which enabled its propellants to be 
stored within the missile itself for prolonged periods. Attributed by Danilevich with a 
response time in the region of 1-2 minutes the 88-11 served both as a catalyst for the 
80viet Union's adoption of a retaliatory strategic stance and an effective means of its 
implementation. 653 The redeployment of the 88-11 represented the diversion ofa 
significant proportion ofthe 80viet ICBM force to a specifically theatre role and was 
testament both to the perceived importance of the European TVD and a the high level 
of concern associated with the operational utility of the 88-4/88-5 force. However 
the deployment of the 88-11 as a TNF added yet another weapon system to the 
existing complexities of theatre strategic planning, while its level of accuracy did not 
match that of new 80viet ICBMs or its American counterpart, the Minuteman. In 
addition it lacked the operational responsiveness and invulnerability of a solid-fuel 
mobile missile and thus provided only a temporary solution to the 80viet Union's TNF 
653 University of Edinburgh, Depaltment of Defence Studies Archive, (limited access only), file 1. 
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requirements as it would itself reach the point of operational obsolescence in the 
foreseeable future. Moreover the numerical limitations upon strategic systems that 
formed the principal feature of the ongoing SALT process would apply to the SS-11 
as its original design format possessed an intercontinental range. Thus the SS-11 
could thus provide no more than an interim solution to the Soviet Union's TNF 
requirements. This served to accentuate still further the perceived requirement for a 
radical modernisation of Soviet theatre forces and would seem to present a strong 
rationale for the development of a system possessed of the operational characteristics 
with which the SS-20 was endowed. Therefore in purely strategic terms it was 
believed that there existed a strong rationale for Soviet development of a new 
generation of TNF which would be endowed with enhanced levels of survivability and 
operational responsiveness through the use of solid fuel and a mobile basing-mode. 
The SS-20 met these requirements and, at a stroke, transformed the Soviet Union's 
TNF potential. 
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The Impact of the SALT Process. 
The SALT process in general and the Vladivostok Accords in particular were also 
perceived by Western experts to have been instrumental in the Soviet Union's decision 
to develop the SS-20. The limitations placed upon strategic systems circumscribed 
this area of competition while at the same time it accentuated the importance of 
theatre forces in determining the overall balance of forces. The SS-20 was thus 
portrayed as both an attempt to achieve parity in Theatre Nuclear Forces as had 
already been accomplished in the realm of strategic forces and the next play in the 
"competition" of arms contro~ and a potential "bargaining chip" for SALT III. 
Furthermore the decision to proceed with its development was presented as a "sop" to 
the military leadership, coming as it did in the immediate aftermath of the Vladivostok 
Summit, the course of whose proceedings had allegedly drawn the ire of the military 
hierarchy. Others claimed that the SS-20 represented a deliberate attempt on the part 
of the Soviet Union to circumvent the constraining effects of the SALT limitations 
upon their ballistic missile forces. The evidence which has subsequently emerged 
serves to substantiate neither assertion. 
The notion that the SS-20 was developed at the behest of the leadership as a potential 
"bargaining chip" for SALT III is not supported by the available evidence. Indeed it 
seems, in sharp contrast, that the SS-20's development occurred with minimal regard 
to its likely impact upon US-Soviet relations and the balance offorces within the 
European TVD. There seems little doubt that the furore that its deployment later 
helped to engender came as a genuine surprise to both civilian and military alike 
among the Soviet leadership. Similarly Garthoffs portrayal ofthe missile's 
development as a "sop" to assuage the ire of the military hierarchy in the immediate 
aftermath of the Vladivostok Summit is not borne out by the available evidence. 
While General Detinov accepted that the compromise on FBS at Vladivostok had 
been grudgingly accepted by the Soviet side he was keen to stress that the military as 
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a whole had accepted the terms of the Vladivostok Accord without demur. Indeed he 
specifically rejected the implication that the ensuing development of the SS-20 system 
represented a quid pro quo to assuage discontent among military circles. He also 
highlighted the military's central role in the formulation of the Soviet Union's 
negotiating stance throughout SALT and the central role played by Kozlov at the 
Vladivostok Summit itself The requirement for consensual agreement within the Five 
and Big Five would in itself have ensured that fundamental military opposition to the 
omission ofFBS could not have been overlooked. Grechko's continued opposition to 
the terms of the Vladivostok Accord should be viewed within the broader context of 
his virulent suspicion of the West from which many within the military hierarchy 
sought to distance themselves. 
The discovery that the SS-20 programme was initiated significantly earlier than had 
previously been assumed also serves to cast the attendant military-political motives of 
its development in a new light. The programme's inception in 1966 occurred as a 
wider process ofTNF development654 at a time when the process of detente existed as 
little more than an aspiration for East-West relations. The significant evolution in 
geopolitical affairs which facilitated the SALT process was a distant prospect at that 
time and could in no way have been regarded as an inevitable outcome. While the SS-
20's flight testing programme did indeed coincide with a pivotal stage in the SALT 
process, and its ensuing deployment occurred within the Treaties' technical and 
numerical constraints, the development of the system was driven principally by a 
dynamic interaction of intra-bureaucratic rivalries and emergent strategic requirements 
which predated the SALT process and remained largely unaffected by its progress. 
Ironically it was this very process of development of the SS-20 in apparent isolation 
from the wider US-Soviet geopolitical relationship and strategic balance which later 
accentuated the missile's deleterious effect upon East-West relations. The SS-20's 
development seems more appropriately placed within a wider context of a continuing 
654 Via the SS-14 and SS-15. 
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process of Soviet weaponry procurement which, while undoubtedly influenced by the 
course of SALT, was possessed of its own form and characteristics. The decision to 
proceed with the development of the SS-20 elicited little high-level discussion or 
angst and proceeded through the various stages of the weaponry procurement 
decisionmaking process devoid of the high profile that it would later assume in the 
context of East-West relations. This was reflected by the fact that key members ofthe 
political-military leadership who were closely involved in the SALT process remained 
unaware of the impending development of the new TNF system.655 Indeed seeking to 
explain the subsequent development of the SS-20 as having been inextricably linked 
with the SALT process and intended to influence its future direction seems on the 
balance of available evidence to have been incorrect. Such a thesis implicitly confers 
upon the Soviet defence decisionmaking process an unwarranted degree of 
sophistication. While the SALT process did serve as a catalyst for an enhanced level 
of institutional interaction it seems likely that the degree of cohesion which ensued 
was insufficient to facilitate the type of proactive weaponry procurement posited by 
this theory. 
655 Georgii Korniyenko and General Nikolai Leonov, chief of KGB analysis department, 1973-83. 
The likely accuracy of Korniyenko's claim was confirmed to me by Dr Savel'yev. 
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The question of resource utilisation and the true nature ofthe 8S-20's technical 
lineage. 
The 88-20 was traditionally portrayed as a leading member of a family of designs 
which were purported to have emanated from the Nadiradze Design Bureau over the 
course of three decades and three generations of80viet rocket development. The 
three-stage 88-13 was perceived as having been the Soviet Union's first attempt to 
develop a solid-fuel, mobile ICBM. Almost without exception it was claimed that the 
original 88-13 design had then been shorn of a booster stage in an attempt to develop 
parallel TNF replacements for the obsolescent 88-4/8S-5 force. These projects took 
the tangible form of the 88-14 and 88-15 respectively and their ensuing deployment in 
token numbers in the far eastern 80viet Union was viewed in the West as clear 
evidence of insurmountable technical problems encountered during the course of their 
development. A similar pattern was discerned in the following generation of missile 
development as the Nadiradze Bureau once again sought to develop a solid-fuel, 
mobile ICBM. This development effort was accorded the codename 88-16 by U8 
analysts and befell a similar fate to its predecessor the 8S-13. Despite repeated 
denials by the 80viet 8ALT negotiating team it was thought by the West that token 
deployment of c.60 units superseding the 88-13 had occurred. Unanimity prevailed 
however that such desultory efforts towards deployment following a substantial 
investment in the development of the programme could only serve to indicate 
fundamental performance inadequacies on the part of the system, especially in the light 
of the developing 80viet practice of significant levels of parallel and token production 
of weaponry systems whose combat capabilities fell far short of optimum. On this 
occasion however the Nadiradze Bureau was credited with salvaging both its 
reputation and the fate ofthe project by evolving the technically-impressive S8-20 
IRBM system from the ashes of the 88-16 debacle. The final member of the 
Nadiradze family of designs was the 8S-25, a mobile, solid-fuelICBM which was 
claimed by the 80viet Union to have been developed directly from the 88-13. All of 
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these missile systems were identified as being powered by solid rocket fuel and a 
strong consensus existed among eminent Western analysts which identified the 
Nadiradze Bureau as possessing a designated monopoly on the development of solid 
fuel and was inextricably linked to the beliefthat the Nadiradze Bureau had been 
solely responsible for the development of these three "generations" of missile systems. 
In the light of new evidence which has been gleaned from Russian documentary 
sources and interviews during the course of my research it is now apparent that the 
88-20 was not possessed of the lineage accorded to it by past analyses and as such did 
not represent the fruition of the Nadiradze Bureau's efforts upon the pyramid of prior 
failures represented by the 88-13, 88-14 and 88-15 systems. While the link between 
the 88-16 and 88-20 has been re-affirmed, close inspection of the chronology of the 
programmes' development cycles serves to cast doubt upon the traditional 
interpretation of the 88-20 as a direct derivative of the aborted ICBM programme. 
The available evidence now points towards a more complex developmental interaction 
in which the programmes' origins may have run in parallel fashion. Indeed the initial 
concept for the eventual 88-20 design might well have predated that ofthe 88-16 in 
sharp contrast to all existing analyses of their R&D antecedents. 
Previous Western analyses were correct in characterising the 88-14 as a technical off-
shoot ofthe 88-13 programme, which utilised two of the ICBM's three stages, 
although they again failed to discern the institutional origins of either system. Thus 
the 88-13 ICBM which was thought to have formed the basis ofthe Nadiradze family 
of designs emanated from the Korolev Bureau while the 88-14 was developed by a 
filial design bureau. The evidence uncovered during the course of my research has 
established that previous Western accounts that attributed the S8-15's development to 
the Nadiradze Bureau and ascribed to it the status of a "stable mate" ofthe 88-13 and 
88-14 to have been similarly erroneous. While Jane's speCUlation on the origins of the 
88-15 design proved to be partially correct it seems that Zaloga was alone in 
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accurately identifYing its bureau of origin. The missile was a product of the Yangel 
Bureau and was accorded the description of a "combined, two-stage ICBM" not the 
three-stage IRBM656 it was perceived as in the West. It would thus seem reasonable 
to extrapolate that the principal role envisioned for the 88-15 was not as a potential 
replacement for the 88-4/88-5 force but rather as an addition to the intercontinental 
capabilities of the 8trategic Rocket Forces. The fact that the subsequent failure ofthe 
88-15 programme seems likely to have served as a catalyst for the attempted 
development ofthe 88-16 ICBM serves to add weight to such an interpretation. 
Development of the 88-15 did not commence until 1964, a good deal later than 
posited by Western analyses.657 It was intended that the 88-15 would be deployed in 
silos and railway and road-mobile carriers. While the failure ofVolkova658 to list the 
88-15's CEP (Circular Error of Probability) may have implied this major deficiency in 
the system's accuracy as suspected by Western commentators, this remains open to 
conjecture. More tangible evidence of its fate was provided General-Lieutenant 
Kravets, a leading light in the design and development of 80viet missile systems for 
over 30 years. It seems indisputable that it was to the 88-15 that Kravets was 
referring when he described the massive explosion which engulfed a Yangellonger 
range mobile missile during a test launch in 1968 and which led to the programme's 
cancellation. 8ignificantly Kravets also noted that this particular missile employed a 
combined liquid-fuelled first stage with a solid-fuelled second stage. This provides 
further corroboration to the belief that it was to the 88-15 he was referring as this 
particular means of propulsion was apparently unique to the 88-15 design. The 88-15 
was a hybrid which sought to use two different types of fuel, the composition ofthe 
first stage was described as "blended solid fuel" while the second stage consisted of a 
656 Wright, B. (assisted by J. Murphy; series editor, R Forsberg) 1986. World Weapon Database, 
Volume 1, Soviet Missiles. Lexington Mass.: D.C. Heath and Company, p.332. 
657 Ibid.; Berman, RP. and Baker J.C. 1982. Soviet Strategic Forces: Requirements and Responses. 
Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution posited 1958-61 a the most likely period for the 
programme's inception, 1962 was the date offered by United States Department of Defence, 1981. 
Soviet Military Power Washington, D.C.: USGPO. 
658 Volkova, Ye.B. et al. 1996. Mezhkontinetal'nye ballisticheskie rakety SSSR (RF) i SShA: sozdanie 
i sokrashenie, Moscow: Strategic Rocket Forces, pp.328. 
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NDMG659 and N04. While "asymmetric dimetyl hydrazine's" chemical properties and 
its employment as a propellant by the U8 have been previously documented, no 
published Western source has previously identified this 80viet attempt to combine 
solid and liquid fuel sections within a single missile system. The absence of a "treaty" 
designation code for the 88-15 and its absence from the table of deployed 80viet 
systems within authoritative Russian sources seems to support the assertion that 
production of this system was negligible and may have failed even to meet Western 
estimates of a token deployment of c.60 units. 
In contrast to the brouhaha which surrounded its alleged deployment in the 1970s the 
88-16 receives scant attention in contemporary Russian texts. Those that do mention 
the S8-16 adhere to the traditional 80viet line which denied that the system had 
proceeded beyond the stage of operational testing. Vitally however, General Detinov 
acknowledged that the 88-16 was deployed "in small numbers in the early 1970s". 
Whether Detinov's allusion to this limited deployment refers to a largescale flight 
testing programme or to the partial replacement of existing silo-based 8S-13s by a 
number of 88-16s - as was so often alleged by contemporary U8 sources - remains 
open to conjecture. Were the latter to emerge as accurate, as seems distinctly 
possible, it would rank alongside the most serious allegations of 80viet non-
compliance with the provisions of the 8ALT Treaties. While General Detinov was 
unable to pin-point the precise details of the 88-16's technical failings, he did not 
recall them as having been insurmountable. Its demerits did however diminish the 
attraction of its further development and against a backdrop ofU8 opposition to the 
development of mobile ICBMs the 88-16 programme was cancelled. Furthermore it 
was also considered more desirable to fulfil the 80viet Union's ICBM allocation within 
8ALT I with MIRVed systems alone rather than with single-RV systems such as the 
88-16. General Detinov was able to confirm the accuracy of the traditional Western 
appraisal of the technical commonality of the 88-16 and 8S-20 systems. The 88-20's 
659 "Nesimmetrichnyi dimetilrgeedrazin" or "asymmetric dimetyl hydrazine." 
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two-stage booster rockets were "virtually identical" to the first two stages of the SS-
16 and the exceptionally high degree of component commonality that existed between 
the two systems facilitated the particularly rapid build-up ofSS-20 force levels that 
ensued. This was affirmed by General Belous.660 The accuracy of the assessments of 
the SS-20's likely technical lineage and performance characteristics offered by 
Western analyses compare favourably with those provided for other Soviet systems, 
most notably those offered for the other members of the supposed/amity of 
Nadiradze designs. Significantly the high level of operational efficacy and warhead 
accuracy with which the SS-20 was accorded by Western sources was later confirmed 
during the series of test flights performed as part of its decommissioning under the 
terms of the INF Treaty.661 The accuracy reflected in Western assessments of the SS-
20's technical characteristics did not however extend to their consideration ofthe 
chronology of the system's development. 
The new evidence provided by Russian sources has led to a reappraisal of the 
relationship between the SS-20 and the SS-16 and the priority of perceived Soviet 
weaponry requirements. Moreover it portrays something of a symbiotic relationship 
between the SS-16 and SS-20 programmes which contrasts with the "father and son" 
metaphor so often employed by Western assessments. While Western analyses were 
largely accurate in assessing the timing of the initiation of the SS-20's development, 
their appraisals of the inception of the SS-16 programme were markedly less reliable, 
dating it as early as 1964 or 1965.662 By contrast it has emerged that the origins of the 
SS-20 programme actually predated those of the SS-16 by over three years. The SS-
20 programme was initiated on 4 March 1966 while the SS-16 programme was not set 
in motion until 10 July 1969.663 When this new evidence is allied to confirmation that 
660 Detinov and Belous interviews. 
661 Confinnation of this was volunteered independently by both Detinov and Belous and was 
subsequently verified by a top-level Western source. 
662 Wright, World Weapon Database, p.180 quoted United States Department of Defence, Soviet 
Military Power 1985 and Berman and Baker resectively for these assessments. 
663 Volkova,et al. Mezhkontinetal'nye ballisticheskie rakety SSSR (RF) i SShA, pp.336-7. 
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the S8-13 emanated from the Korolev Bureau it serves to place the Nadiradze 
Bureau's initial attempt to develop an ICBM system a full decade later than Western 
accounts have traditionally posited. This would reinforce Detinov's assertion that the 
Nadiradze Bureau's roots lay in the development of tactical-range missiles and would 
be further explained by the intended ICBM role for Yangel's S8-15. Kravets' 
description of the initiation ofa new mobile, solid-fuel ICBM programme in the wake 
of the spectacular demise of the 88-15 programme in 1968664 coincides closely with 
the chronology of the 88-16's development. Kravets' account raises the possibility 
that the Nadiradze Bureau's attentions were diverted from the 88-20 in 1969 towards 
the pressing demand for a solid-fuel, mobile ICBM. This seems likely to have caused 
to the de/acto suspension of the 88-20 programme until the subsequent demise of the 
88-16 programme heralded its resurrection. Circumstantial evidence in support of 
this thesis is provided by the fact that the final throes ofthe 88-16's flight testing 
programme in the latter stages of 1974 closely coincided with the commencement of 
the 88-20's test programme. The chronological profile ofthe 8S-20's development 
cycle indicated that something of a lull occurred in the process, apparently as the 
Nadiradze Bureau's attentions were diverted towards the attempted creation of a 
viable solid-fuel mobile ICBM system in the wake of the demise ofYangel's 88-15 
programme. While TNF modernisation was indeed a matter of not inconsiderable 
importance it is significant that a technical programme to develop a new TNF system 
clearly seems to have been suspended in favour ofthe pursuit of a mobile ICBM 
system. 
One detail which remains subject to conjecture is whether the 88-20 programme was 
initiated in 1966 solely as an IRBM project or as a more general test bed which might 
spawn the development of a series of missiles in much the same vein as the S8-13. As 
such the 88-20 might initially have played the role of "stalking horse" as Ustinov and 
his allies in Minoboronprom awaited an opportune moment to openly challenge 
664 University of Edinburgh, Department of Defence Studies Archive, (limited access only), file 7. 
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Minobshchemash's previous monopoly by entering into the development ofICBM 
systems. While this thesis is supported by some degree of circumstantial evidence, 
significant anomalies also persist, and the case remains far from conclusive. As such a 
characterisation of the origins of the 88-20 programme as having been rooted firmly 
in the realm of intermediate-range missile development must retain equal weight. A 
definitive assessment of this issue will remain elusive in the foreseeable future as it 
would require the public disclosure of the Council of Ministers' decree. By contrast it 
seems incontestable that the dramatic failure of the 88-15 played a vital role as a 
catalyst in the subsequent development of the 8S-16 with its attendant implications for 
the course of the 88-20 programme. General-Lieutenant Kravets described the way 
in which "another mobile ICBM programme was initiated in 1968 as 80viet scientists 
improved their competence with solid fuel"665 following the 88-15's demise. This 
chronology of this new project closely corresponds to the SS-16's timescale of 
development666 and it thus seems likely that the Nadiradze Bureau's efforts were 
diverted toward the pressing demand for a solid-fuel, mobile ICBM in 1969 which 
caused the effective suspension of, or a marked diminution in the rate of, the SS-20 
programme. The ensuing failure of the 88-16 programme might well have then led 
the Nadiradze Bureau to resume its development efforts via the S8-20 project. 
Significantly this is supported by the fact that the 8S-16's flight testing programme 
was coming to an end in the latter stages of 1974 as the 8S-20's test programme was 
about to commence. Thus the apparently desultory development of the SS-20 and, in 
particUlar, the dearth of apparent progress in its development between 1968 and 1974 
could thus be attributed either to its secondary role in Ustinov's plans to facilitate 
Minoboronprom production ofICBMs or the pressing nature of the requirement for a 
mobile ICBM which emerged with both drama and urgency in the wake of the 
spectacular demise of the 8S-15 project. Proponents of the respective interpretations 
665 Ibid., file 7. 
666 If, as seems likely, Kravets was referring to the 88-16 this raises a number of intriguing questions 
regarding the existence of inter-bureaux interaction and the pooling of technological information. 
Moreover if such a practice did occur, was it conducted upon a voluntary basis or at the behest of the 
VPK or some other governing agency? 
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would thus attribute the ensuing resurrection of the SS-20 programme either to 
resource utilisation from a redundant ICBM programme or to the reversion, in the 
wake of the SS-16's abandonment, to the development of theatre forces whose 
importance - though vital - was secondary to that of strategic-range missiles. 
Whichever explanation is favoured - and both hold strong elements of common 
ground - it is clear that the lineal relationship between the SS-16 and SS-20 was 
symbiotic in nature to a previously unrecognised extent. 
The S8-25 ICBM which subsequently emanated from the Nadiradze Bureau bore a 
striking visual resemblance to its IRBM predecessor the SS-20 and shared much of 
the technology employed in the SS-20's and SS-16's propulsion and guidance systems. 
While Zaloga's claim that the SS-25 possessed a throw weight double that of the SS-
13 was exaggerated, the increase remained significant and vastly exceeded the 5% 
convention employed in SALT. However the SS-25's throw weight paralleled that of 
its immediate predecessor, the SS-16 and was but a fraction of that of its 
contemporary, the SS-24. The Soviet depiction of the SS-25 as a direct development 
of the existing SS-13 programme was viewed by Zaloga as disingenuous and an 
attempt to disguise the development of a new system in contravention of SALT. 
While relatively little elucidation as to the true nature and extent of the link between 
the two systems is provided by contemporary Russian sources Zaloga's allegation was 
tempered somewhat by Detinov's account which described the redistribution of 
existing Korolev projects among other design bureaux in the wake ofKorolev's 
specialisation in space launch rocket systems. The existing SS-13 programme was 
devolved upon the Nadiradze Bureau. However while the incorporation of the SS-13 
into the Nadiradze portfolio might have provided some impetus to the SS-25 
programme its tangible effects were likely to have been limited. The results of the SS-
13 programme had been unimpressive and it had lain dormant for a number of years 
prior to the development of the SS-25. Experiences derived from the development of 
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the SS-16 and SS-20 would have been offar greater significance to the subsequent 
development ofthe SS-25. Thus Zaloga's assertion that the development ofthe SS-25 
in tandem with the SS-24 circumvented the SALT II limits would seem to be well-
founded. The fact that the deployment of the single-RV SS-25 represented a move 
away from the massive Soviet MIRVed ICBMs of the 1970s was undoubtedly 
welcomed by the US and would explain their unusual reticence on an alleged breach 
of the Treaty's stipulations. 
In the light of my research it is clear that the thesis which sought to propound the 
existence ofaJamily ofNadiradze designs which spanned three generations of missile 
development requires fundamental revision. It is now evident that far fewer tangible 
results emanated from the Nadiradze Bureau than had previously been assumed. The 
belief that the parallel and interlinked development of the SS-13, SS-14 and SS-15 
formed the foundation of this interpretation. Emergent evidence has however refuted 
the very basis of this interpretation and has demonstrated the active involvement of 
both the Korolev and Yangel Bureaux in these development ventures. This fatally 
undermines the concept of an all-encompassingfamily of Nadir adze designs. The 
refutation of the established narrative which had formed the parameters for analysing 
commission awards and resource allocation also requires a fundamental reappraisal of 
the extent and nature of the resource allocation enjoyed by the Nadiradze Bureau 
itself. While previous analyses stressed the high levels of support enjoyed by the 
Nadiradze Bureau667 the continued patronage it enjoyed was thought to have been 
attributable to the perceived importance of developing a viable solid-fuel system and 
the attendant technical problems this entailed. As the Nadiradze Bureau was believed 
to have held a monopoly upon the attempted development of this form of propulsion, 
support for the principle of solid fuel necessarily entailed support for the Nadiradze 
Bureau itself. However the discrediting ofthe concept offamily of Nadir adze designs 
entails a corresponding disavowal of the concept ofa Nadiradze Bureau monopoly 
667 Cockburn, A. 1983. The Threat: Inside the Soviet Militmy Machine. London: Hutchinson, p.87. 
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upon the development of solid fuel propellants. The SS-13's and SS-15's origins 
prove that the Korolev and Yangel Bureaux sought to develop solid fuel throughout 
the course of the 1960s and these bureaux' pursuit of this form of propulsion might in 
fact have predated Nadiradze's activity in this field. It is difficult to deny the logic of 
allowing a broad range of development in pursuit of mastery of this complex and vital 
field of technological development. While Western appraisals, almost without 
exception, failed to discern the involvement of the Korolev and Yangel bureaux in the 
pursuit of solid fuel development, their assessment of the technical demerits of the 
missile systems themselves requires no significant revision. While the SS-20 was 
accurately ascribed the status of the Nadiradze Bureau's first operationally-viable 
system by Western sources the lineage of prior designs which were thought to have 
formed the technical basis of its development has been fatally undermined by the new 
evidence which has since emerged. The number of previous Nadiradze IRBM and 
ICBM designs which survived to the flight-testing stage has been dramatically 
diminished and now contains the SS-16 as its sole certain member. Indeed it seems 
that in practice the development of deficient missile systems to prototype status and 
beyond was shared among Soviet rocket bureaux on a rather more equitable basis 
than had been previously thought. The refutation of the premiss of the Nadiradze 
Bureau family of designs and its solid fuel monopoly serve to accentuate the scale of 
resource munificence that this particular design bureau enjoyed. This persisted over a 
prolonged period, apparently devoid of the threat of punitive sanctions, despite the 
persistent failure to develop a system whose technical viability justified progression to 
flight-testing. The eventual development of the SS-20 represented a significant 
accomplishment for the Nadiradze Bureau and provided the Strategic Rocket Forces 
with a significant addition to its burgeoning arsenal. The SS-20's mobility, high level 
of accuracy and the potential to proceed rapidly towards largescale deployment due to 
the pre-existing production lines as a legacy of the aborted SS-16 project afforded the 
new system a significant role in determining the overall strategic balance. 
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Resource Utilisation 
At first sight the notion that utilisation of resources was an important motivating 
element in 80viet weaponry production might seem to sit ill with the depiction of 
defence decisionmaking and production offered in the penultimate chapter. According 
to Detinov, there was "very great pressure" from both the military and the VPK to 
proceed with the 88-20. The former did not accept that 'parity' existed due to the 
exclusion ofFB8 from 8AL T. Detinov pointed out with no small amount of irony 
that the Soviet military were all too keen to accept Macnamara's notion of 400MT as 
being the requisite nuclear arsenal to inflict "unacceptable damage". The 88-20 would 
aid them in the pursuit of this aim while going some way to establishing a true 
strategic 'balance'. The VPK were apparently keen to utilise the pre-existing R&D 
work associated with the 88-16. The SS-20 was constructed at the Votkinsk 
Machine Building plant in Votkinsk, Udmurt, in a construction hall that had been 
specifically built to meet the anticipated production of the S8-16. To this significant 
capital outlay was added the host of associated investments in sub-contracted 
suppliers. By the time the political leadership decided to pursue the deVelopment of 
the SS-20 a number of sub-systems, ground support equipment and a plethora of 
related components had already been produced and delivered in anticipation of the 
S8-16 programme. Thus the development of the 88-20 seems likely to have been 
motivated by the interaction of a host of motivations. A form of frugality was 
perceptible in the VPK's desire to maximise resource utilisation. This coincided with 
the perennial desire on the part of the defence industries - well attested to in the 
previous chapter - to maintain weaponry production levels at maximal levels and a 
growing consensus within the Soviet military of the pressing need to galvanise TNFs 
through system modernisation which was accentuated by their continued exclusion 
from SALT following the Vladivostok Summit. Thus while the development of the 
SS-20 may not fit neatly into a convenient or simplistic structure of cost-benefit 
303 
analysis the available evidence tends to suggest the a desire to maximise production 
returns upon pre~existing investment did on this occasion playa role in the decision to 
proceed with a system's development. 
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Reconceptualising Soviet Military Decisionmaking 
The character of defence decisionmaking and weaponry procurement policy at the 
height of the Brezhnev era. 
In the course of investigating the impact of bureaucratic and intra-elite relations upon 
the course of defence decisionmaking this study has discovered new evidence which 
indicates that such machinations and institutional rivalries impinged upon Soviet 
weaponry procurement policy to an even greater extent than had previously 
postulated. Moreover this tendency increased in both scale and frequency over the 
course of time in a process whose chronological parameters closely paralleled the 
development of the SS-20 itself Thus the SS-20's development cycle coincided with 
a vital transitionary period in Soviet intra-elite relations and defence decisionmaking 
behaviour. Brezhnev's tenure had been marked at the outset by its collegiate style of 
decisionmaking and the pursuit of such elite consensus was particularly prevalent in 
the realm of defence policy. This new approach manifested itself in the sphere of 
strategic formulation through the re-affirmation of the traditional Soviet precept of 
"mixed forces". The military leadership in particular enjoyed an enhanced status 
within the Soviet ruling elite in the immediate aftermath of Khrushchev's ouster. The 
appointment of Marshal Grechko as Minister of Defence in 1967, in preference to 
Ustinov, served to add still more lustre to the military leadership's status and marked 
the zenith of its influence upon Soviet defence decisionmaking. The increasing 
autonomy enjoyed by the military leadership did not facilitate a broad-based consensus 
on the most efficacious direction of future strategic planning and attendant force 
structure requirements. The latitude afforded to the higher echelons of the military in 
the discussion of this subject served only to accentuate the prolonged and divisive 
nature of the revision process which extended for a decade or more. This is largely 
attributable to the increasing devolution of decisionmaking authority to Ustinov and 
his allies within the state bureaucracy by the Party leadership as a whole and Brezhnev 
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in particular, a practice which became still more prevalent as the 1970s progressed. 
Apparent attempts by the political leadership to participate in the formulation of 
military theory occurred in the late 1970s as demonstrated by Brezhnev's proclamation 
of the Tula Doctrine in 1977. However, as highlighted above, Russian sources now 
indicate that deliberations on military science remained devoid of involvement of the 
political hierarchy beyond the rhetorical level both throughout the remainder of 
Brezhnev's tenure as General Secretary and those of his three successors. The heated 
dispute between Minister of Defence Ustinov and Chief of the General Staff Ogarkov 
was fuelled to a large extent by their conflicting appraisals of future weaponry 
procurement requirements. However Ogarkov's removal from the post served to stifle 
further discussion of the divergent principles of military science which had 
underpinned the confrontation. 
In terms of resource allocation the first decade ofBrezhnev's tenure was justifiably 
characterised as a "golden age" for the Soviet defence sector. Both the military 
services and the defence industries benefited from the extraordinary munificence 
displayed by the Party leadership in the realm of weaponry procurement. Traditional 
branches of the military continued to enjoy significant levels of patronage while the 
decade witnessed a remarkable growth in the nuclear arsenal of the Strategic Rocket 
Forces. The expansion of Soviet strategic forces occurred on such a scale that by the 
end of the 1960s the Soviet Union had effectively overcome the United States' huge 
advantage in strategic forces. The Bolshevik state achieved effective strategic parity 
with all its attendant perquisites in geopolitical affairs, the most tangible of them being 
the United States' entry into the SALT process. 
The military hierarchy'S achievement of effective autonomy in the development of 
military science and the formulation of strategy coalesced with the zenith of their 
influence upon the weaponry procurement process. This took a tangible form in the 
role played by the Scientific-Technical Committee of the General Staff. It operated 
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autonomously within the General Staff until the mid-1960s, overseeing the issuing of 
contracts for weaponry production by individual service branches and possessing the 
right to veto on technical grounds. The Scientific-Technical Committee was also 
responsible for the detailed planning and direction of military research programmes as 
a whole and the Committee's support was a prerequisite to the sanctioning of new 
projects by the Chief of the General Staff. Following restructuring in the mid-1960s 
the Committee was incorporated into the General Staffs Directorate for Armaments 
and was placed under the authority of the Deputy Defence Minister for Armaments. 
The Directorate of Armaments continued to playa pivotal role in shaping weapons 
programmes and funding until the mid-1970s and its recommendations to the General 
Staff and to the VPK formed the basis of the funding allocation provided to 
development projects by the Minister of Defence, the General Staff, and the VPK. 
Thus by the close of the 1960s the General Staff had attained a position of pre-
eminence in the determination of military procurement policy and enjoyed de jure 
authority upon this vital aspect of defence decisionmaking. 
Ironically while the impressive degree of autonomy in the deliberation of military 
science was consolidated over the coming decade through Brezhnev's disengagement 
from the process, so too did the military suffer a dramatic diminution in its ability to 
influence the course of the weaponry procurement process for much the same reason. 
In this arena the dominant position was assumed by Dmitry Ustinov and his cohorts 
within the defence production sector. Ustinov's growing influence in the 
determination of defence policy was built upon a long association with both the 
defence sector and Brezhnev himself and was accompanied by his rise to prominence 
in the development of the Soviet Union's SALT negotiating position. It is instructive 
to note that although Ustinov at this point possessed neither the status accorded to a 
minister or state committee chairman, it was he who chaired the Big Five despite the 
membership of both the Defence and Foreign ministers and the heads of the powerful 
VPK and KGB on this committee. This served as testament to his considerable 
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influence in defence decisionmaking at the end of the 1960s and was to prove 
portentous as still more power was assumed by Ustinov throughout the 1970s 
progressed at the expense of Defence Minister Grechko in particular and the General 
Staff in general. Indeed Grechko's attainment of full membership status of the 
Politburo in 1973 was largely devoid of policymaking import as that body had by then 
relinquished effective control of defence decisionmaking. 
The dramatic deterioration in Brezhnev's health in the early 1970s served to accelerate 
the devolution of decisionmaking authority upon a troika of the governing elite in 
which the military leadership found itself increasingly marginalised. The Vladivostok 
Summit of November 1974 was identified as the last major event at which Brezhnev 
was able to function in a competent manner. Brezhnev's health quickly deteriorated 
and culminated in the General Secretary's major heart attack in 1976. This effectively 
signalled the end ofBrezhnev's participation in a functioning leadership capacity. 
From this point onwards Ustinov, Gromyko and Andropov emerged as the principal 
figures who filled the power vacuum left by Brezhnev's incapacitation. Their 
associated sections of the Soviet bureaucracy similarly expanded the scope of their 
activities and assumed responsibility for the determination of defence procurement 
policies. Emergent policy proposals were accorded Politburo acceptance as a matter 
of course. While the new leadership quorum possessed effective autonomy in the 
formulation of Soviet policy the military hierarchy experienced an inexorable 
diminution in its influence upon the actions of the de facto leadership. Professor 
Mstislav Keldysh, the President of the Academy of Sciences, also played an ever-
increasing role in the process of weaponry procurement. Keldysh had served as the 
General Secretary's principal adviser on matters of military doctrine and strategy and 
had been instrumental in the formulation of the Soviet Union's revised retaliatory 
strategy in 1969. His substantial influence upon the General Secretary was well 
attested and he increasingly acted as a spokesman for Brezhnev as the General 
Secretary's health declined. 
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The Kommissiya pri Politburo668 which was formed in the late 1960s was nominally 
headed by Brezhnev although the deputy chairman, Ustinov, customarily oversaw 
proceedings. Although Defence Minister Grechko was one of its members, it was 
dominated by ministers of the nine defence industries and general designers and 
members of the Academy of8ciences from the various institutes involved in the work 
of the defence ministries. This Commission acted as a de facto political-military-
industrial review committee led by the senior members of the Soviet Defence Council 
and composed of the leaders of the industries and institutes over which they were to 
exercise oversight. The Commission's decisions were passed for formal ratification by 
the Defence Council but were never amended by it. Thus the missile design bureaux 
gained an invaluable position of influence within the decisionmaking structure itself 
and upon the very committee which was intended to maintain an oversight upon their 
own activities. The Defence Council's level of participatory policymaking diminished 
during this period. It customarily met on a mere handful of occasions each year and 
was increasingly dominated by VPK interests. Its passive role during the debate over 
the contest between the 8S-17 and SS-19 systems is instructive and clearly 
demonstrated the Defence Council's largely symbolic role. Even within this forum 
however the influence of the military leadership was subsumed within the wider circle 
of the Big Five which formed the core membership. The remaining members included 
the Chief of the General Staff and the Defence Council was thus the only defence 
decisionmaking group where the professional military were themselves represented by 
a uniformed officer. However Grechko's death effectively reduced military 
representation to the attendance of the Chief of the General staff as the new Minister 
of Defence, Ustinov, was never accepted as a true "military" official by the officer 
corps itself 
By the time of his accession to the post of Defence Minister in 1976 Ustinov had 
firmly established himself as the pre-eminent figure in the formulation of Soviet 
668 The Commission under the Politburo. 
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weaponry procurement policy and consequently his personal policy preferences 
became the key determinant of the form of defence decisionmaking. Ustinovemerges 
from the elite interview series as a rather enigmatic figure, possessing a sound grasp of 
the technical aspects of weaponry development, while generally lacking of an 
appreciation of their associated military implications; a figure who facilitated the 
development of a raft of new weaponry technologies while a First Deputy Chairman in 
the 1960s yet presided over the burgeoning of stifling conservative production 
practices in the following decade. Paradoxically he retained a fearsome reputation 
from his wartime activities and his authority was unquestioned by defence 
industrialists yet at the same time his relation with them contained a certain 
ambivalence which led to a leniency which led to the acceptance both of systems 
whose performance fell well short of optimum operational capabilities and the 
manufacture of surplus stockpiles through additional production runs which were 
superfluous to requirements. This dichotomy came to the fore as Ustinov's rise 
endowed him with still greater influence upon the decisionmaking process and reached 
a critical juncture in the wake of his appointment as Minister of Defence. As General 
Danilevich succinctly opined, "he acted as the client, the contractor and the customer. 
In practice his position was such that he was often forced to compromise with himself. 
He stood on the edge ofthe blade and waflled in both directions".669 
While it is impossible to offer a precise timescale of the cyclical fluctuations of military 
influence upon defence policymaking it is clear that it reached something of a zenith 
during the Soviet Union's largescale strategic build-up in the mid-to-late 1960s and 
was accompanied by a consensus among the political and military leadership in 
support of this policy option. However the strategic revision which emerged at the 
close of the decade coincided with planning for the next generation of missile systems. 
At this point there seems to have been a divergence of interests between the military 
leadership and the defence industrialists. The scale of the ensuing policy conflicts 
669 University of Edinburgh, Department of Defence Studies Archive, (limited access only), file 1. 
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recounted by a host of well-informed and independent Russian sources is itself 
instructive as is the extent to which the defence industry's interests prevailed 
apparently without exception on the occasion of such a contretemps. For his part Dr 
Tsygichko criticised the consistent under-estimation of the role played by the military-
industrial department of the Central Committee which functioned as a de facto sitting 
Defence Council, setting military policy - which governed military doctrine and force 
development - and supporting the formal Defence Council. The Defence Industry 
Department of the Central Committee was identified as the principal vehicle through 
which the defence industrialists sought to bend weaponry procurement policy to their 
own ends. Tsygichko highlighted the fact that it was dominated by ministers 
responsible for armaments production, chief designers and political officers67o while a 
former senior Department official described its role in the development of new 
programmes and their series production. This official also stated categorically that the 
interests of the defence industry held sway with the Department over those of the 
General Staff or the Ministry of Defence without exception.671 
Ustinov's emerging ascendancy among the defence decisionmaking elite was 
accompanied by the growing influence of the principal players of the Soviet defence 
industries. This eclipsed that enjoyed by either the Ministry of Defence or the General 
Staff, whose reduced station was further evidenced by its increasing domination of 
policy preferences and the VPK's near-monopolistic supply of technical information to 
the Soviet leadership. Increasingly the VPK alone oversaw development programmes 
from their inception through their technical and strategic evaluation to their 
culmination through the determination of the size and location of the production run. 
The procedural reforms which emerged in the wake ofUstinov's accession to the post 
of Minister of Defence in 1976 served to swing the balance of power still further in 
favour ofthe defence industries. While Grechko's personal influence within the 
670 Ibid., file 5. 
671 Ibid., file 7. 
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leadership had diminished markedly in the years prior to his death the General Staff 
Directorate of Armaments Orders had played a central role in shaping weapons 
programmes and funding prior to 1976. At this point in time Ustinov introduced a 
revised process which reduced the General Staffs role and greatly expanded the 
VPK's influence. Henceforth funds were allocated directly to the VPK and individual 
service branches applied to the VPK for funding in addition to the traditional source, 
the Ministry of Defence. The Directorate of Armaments was removed from the 
General Staffs authority and made an independent Ministry of Defence Directorate 
headed by deputy minister of defence Shabanov. Significantly however, its executive 
role was removed and replaced by a mere advisory one. While General Detinov 
stressed the continued role played by the Scientific-Technical Committee in the wake 
of the reorganisation his military counterparts were unswerving in the import they 
accorded this development. The direct allocation of funds to the VPK unleashed the 
military-industrial complex and circumvented the General Staffs role in weaponry 
procurement policymaking. Both the VPK and the Central Committee Defence 
Department were viewed as having been motivated principally by their desire to 
represent the interests of the defence sector. 
The vested interests of the defence sector had broadly coalesced with those of the 
military leadership during the rapid build-up of strategic forces during the second half 
of the 1960s. The adoption of more sophisticated strategic concepts held attendant 
requirements in terms of strategic force structure and weaponry performance which 
placed a heavy emphasis upon qualitative advances within the next generation of 
Soviet missile systems. By this point in time however the design conservatism that 
was endemic throughout the long-established sections of the Soviet defence sector 
had also permeated through the ballistic missile sector. The tangible result was that 
the missile design bureaux mirrored the defence sector as a whole through the 
production of a host of weapons systems which were often ill-equipped to perform the 
designated tasks of Soviet strategy. As the 1970s progressed and the sectional 
312 
interests of the defence producers became increasingly dominant via Ustinov's 
associated rise to pre-eminence the practice of weapon system replication became 
endemic in Soviet defence production. Design conservatism combined with sectional 
self-advancement to ensure that the defence sector produced numerous units of 
weapons systems of often dubious operational merit. The preference for quantitative 
increase over qualitative improvement in Soviet defence production behaviour grew 
inexorably and reached its culmination by the end of the decade. However Ogarkov's 
subsequent fate seemed to provide a further indication of the inherent strength of the 
defence sector's institutional interests. 
The course of bureaucratic and intra-elite machinations which formed the backdrop to 
defence decisionmaking provides an invaluable avenue of investigation in the pursuit 
of an understanding of Soviet weaponry procurement. In the case ofthe SS-20 it has 
for the most part been overshadowed by consideration of the established rationales 
employed by previous Western analyses. In essence it would seem that while several 
strong rationales existed which one might have expected to have elicited a response 
such as the development ofthe SS-20 they cannot be considered independently of the 
extraneous exigencies of Soviet intra-elite relations which were coming to dominate 
defence decisionmaking at this time. The SS-20's development cycle was peculiar, 
indeed perhaps unique, and sat "on the cusp" of the evolving transition. The 
programme's inception coincided with the zenith of the military leadership'S input into 
the defence decisionmaking process, while the course of its development through to 
the point of deployment coincided with a dramatic diminution in military input into the 
weaponry procurement process. It thus met pertinent operational requirements to an 
extent that was unrivalled by both its predecessors and successors. 
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Modelling the SS-20 Decision 
The value of the SS-20's development as a case study 
I was drawn towards the study of the SS-20's development by my own vivid memories 
of the pivotal role that its deployment seemed to have played in the dramatic 
deterioration in East-West relations during the late 1970s and early 1980s. My 
curiosity into the motivations which underpinned the decision to develop this 
particular missile system outlived both the controversy surrounding such weapons and 
indeed the Soviet state itself. At the outset of my research a consensus seemed to 
emerge from Western accounts that confirmed the essence ofGarthoffs assessment of 
the SS-20's development as "a natural"672 - a classic example of the Soviet process of 
defence decisionmaking and weaponry procurement. In now seems that, by contrast, 
that the SS-20 was a largely atypical product of Soviet defence decisionmaking. 
Despite this the SS-20's development has served as an invaluable catalyst during the 
course of my research, facilitating the investigation of the much greater, yet far more 
diffuse, subject of Soviet defence decisionmaking during the Brezhnev era. The 
controversy which surrounded its deployment remains writ large upon the memories 
and perceptions ofthose who participated in these unfolding events and those who 
study the field of Soviet political history. Moreover, the passage oftime has afforded 
the possibility of a more objective appraisal by both participants and observers alike, 
while the dramatic political transformation in the intervening period has furnished the 
latter group with the liberty to discuss the details surrounding these events with a 
degree of candour that would have been unthinkable until recently and certainly could 
not have been anticipated during the dark days of East-West relations which 
accompanied the INF deployments in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The subject 
retains the potential to seize the attention and curiosity of those involved in both the 
practice and study of Soviet defence decisionmaking. 
672 Garthoff, R.L. 1983. "The Soviet SS-20 Decision", Survival, 15(1):112. 
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With hindsight the adoption of this particular case study was especially appropriate 
given the extreme complexity which surrounded the wider scope of my study, Soviet 
defence decisionmaking. Both in terms of the incremental process of developing my 
own understanding of the field and when broaching the subject with experts in the 
field - most especially my contacts in Russia - the SS-20 represented a tangible aspect 
and a vital "access point" through which to delineate the amorphous nature of Soviet 
weaponry procurement policy. Approaching this field of research was often a little 
daunting - without the employment of the SS-20 as a case study, it might have been 
an insurmountable task. 
However the development SS-20 does possess certain limitations when employed as a 
case study. In a sense the beauty of this case study also presents its principal 
limitation. While the SS-20 is without doubt the most famous, and arguably the most 
politically important, Soviet nuclear missile, it is also rather unusual because of its 
undoubted technical proficiency and its efficacy in meeting the operational 
requirements of Soviet nuclear strategy of the period. As I have detailed above this is 
most likely to have been attributable to the unique positioning of the SS-20's 
development cycle within the evolution of Soviet defence decisionmaking. Its 
inception and early development coincided with the zenith of General Staff input into 
weaponry procurement policy, which though circumscribed to an extent by the 
internal divisions which found personification in Grechko himself, compared 
favourably with what was to emerge as the 1970s proceeded. Thus to the inherent 
danger of over-determination which was so often evident in Western analyses of the 
SS-20's development must be added the additional caveat that the process which led 
to the development ofthis particular missile system was increasingly unrepresentative 
of established practice as it emerged in the coming years as Ustinov and his allies in 
the defence industries tightened their grip upon Soviet weaponry procurement policy. 
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Applicability of models 
Attributes associated with the action-reaction model were traditionally cited in 
explanations of the missile's development. The Soviet Union's deployment of a new 
generation ofTNFs could be viewed as the completion ofa programme of weaponry 
procurement which had spanned the decade from the mid-1960s. To the impressive 
build-up ofland-based ICBMs had been added submarine-based systems from the end 
of the 1960s. A rejuvenated theatre force could be viewed as having completed the 
Soviet Union's nuclear missile complement and providing it with its own form of 
"nuclear triad". Deployment of the SS-20 could thus be portrayed as the completion 
of a process of reactive force development which had originally been inspired by the 
US strategic build-up, but to which had been added a renewed urgency by the 
deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations in the late 1960s. Advocates of the 
technological dynamic variant of the action-reaction model might also have sought 
support for their beliefs in the SS-20 case study by highlighting Soviet intelligence's 
cognisance of the impending development of a new generation of US TNFs and the 
anticipated deployment ofa Chinese regional nuclear force. However, upon 
reflection, the apparent ready applicability of the action-reaction model to the SS-20's 
development is further testament to its greatest weakness, its indiscriminate 
acceptance of actions as being potentially reactive in nature, which militated against its 
employment for detailed consideration of the weaponry acquisition process. 
In contrast it seems clear at first sight that the national leadership model can be 
discounted as a means of explaining Soviet defence decisionmaking practices of the 
period. The Brezhnev regime was initially founded upon a consensus style of 
government. While Brezhnev's personal position was galvanised over time and he 
assumed a position of political pre-eminence, the evidence presented indicates that this 
was accompanied by an increasing devolution of defence decisionmaking authority 
and mechanisms upon the Soviet bureaucracy, whose role increased throughout 
316 
Brezhnev's tenure. The only semblance of a national leadership model which emerged 
from investigation of the subject applied not to the General Secretary, but to Dmitry 
Ustinov. A plausible argument could be offered that Ustinov came closest to donning 
the mantle of principal defence decisionmaker on the basis of the reforms which 
occurred in the wake of his appointment as Minister of Defence in 1976. Such a claim 
would however undoubtedly provoke considerable conjecture and lies beyond the 
immediate chronological parameters of my study ofthe SS-20. 
The decisionrnaking process which led to the development of the SS-20 displays 
characteristics which transcend two distinct models of weaponry procurement 
behaviour. The evidence concerning Soviet defence production and the course of its 
evolution provided by the interviews with fonner high level members of the Soviet 
Union's ruling circle undoubtedly portray the VPK and its allies within the defence 
industry as pursuing their own interests rather than seeking to fulfil the military's 
stated weaponry requirements. The efforts of the VPK and the weaponry designers to 
ensure development and production processes stability appear to have been a 
permanent feature of the Soviet Union's strategic procurement programme which 
increased over time and became the dominant determinant factor as Ustinov's 
influence grew. Detailed consideration of the extent and longevity of the defence 
sector's influence upon Soviet weaponry procurement in the realm of ballistic missiles 
must concede the apparent applicability value of the interest group model as a means 
of elucidation. However, within this amorphous process of evolution the SS-20 held a 
unique chronological position, which serves as a likely explanatory factor for the 
pertinence of its operational capabilities. The emplacement of the inception of the SS-
20 programme "on the cusp" of the evolutionary process, at a point which coincided 
with the zenith of military influence upon weaponry procurement, most likely 
engendered the missile with such perfonnance attributes and stands in stark contrast 
to the rapid diminution in military input which coincided with the initial deployment of 
the SS-20 itsel£ Within this context the defining parameters of the military mission 
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model can be ascribed - exceptionally, perhaps uniquely - to the development ofthe 
88-20. 
This study has sought to consider the 88-20's development in its widest possible 
context, revisiting and testing established rationales, while also detailing the political 
backdrop to the defence decisionmaking process provided by inter-elite machinations 
and bureaucratic interaction. The result of this exercise provides a more sophisticated 
appraisal of the motivating factors which underpinned the 88-20's development and 
places it astride two apparently conflicting explanatory models. This conclusion can 
be ascribed to the inherent limitations of seeking to employ a modelling structure to 
interpret the muhi-faceted character of weaponry procurement and accentuated both 
by the complexity of the 80viet Union and by the 88-20's chronological emplacement 
within a period characterised by a fluid transformation in 80viet defence 
decisionmaking practice. 
Further areas of research 
While this thesis has alluded to and investigated several 80viet missile systems its 
attentions have, for the most part, been directed towards an investigation of the 88-
20. Although it would pose a rather onerous task, a more comprehensive study which 
sought to consider a wider range of missile systems over a still longer timescale might 
facilitate a wider perspective of the nature of80viet defence decisionmaking and 
weaponry procurement policy and the relative propensity of missile systems to adhere 
to the stated demands of 80viet military strategy over a given period of time. Many 
of the insights that I have garnered from experts from both East and West throughout 
the course of my research lead me to believe that the 88-20 represented an atypical 
example of 80viet weaponry procurement, associated with the fact that the 
programme's inception coincided with the high watermark of military influence upon 
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defence decisionmaking and consequently came closer to meeting the strategic 
requirements delineated by Soviet military planners of the period than many of its 
contemporary weapons systems. When this was viewed in conjunction with the 
indisputable efficacy of the system's operational perfonnance the SS-20 might indeed 
be seen to represent the exception that proves the rule of Soviet weaponry 
procurement. While the Strategic Rocket Forces and their nuclear arsenal represented 
the most high-profile and militarily significant service of the former Soviet Union, 
studies of a similar nature could in theory be replicated for any given branch of the 
armed services. Additionally, one could follow the path of research via case study 
comparison on a international basis. This would serve to test the hypotheses offered 
by those such as Cockburn who sought to portray a similar, and inter-related, process 
of interest-group interaction at the heart of West em procurement during the same 
period. 
Specifically the link: between the SS-13 and SS-25 is in itself intriguing and serves as a 
vital postscript to the account ofthe SS-20 and provides a promising avenue for 
future research. General Detinov characterised the process of programme 
redistribution which was applied to existing Korolev projects as the customary 
practice associated with the voluntary surrender of projects by a design bureau 
ceasing work in a particular field of weaponry development.673 This fascinating 
revelation raises new questions about the extent of inter-agency co-operation in 
Soviet defence production. specifically the prospect that a degree of inter-bureau co-
operation and interchange of design projects might have existed.674 The existence of 
such a practice would in itself demand a significant revision of West em analyses of the 
character of Soviet missile design and development which has traditionally been cast 
as highly compartmentalised in character. Research which sought to employ wider 
673 Detinov interview. 
674 Kravets alluded to the existence of a degree of pooled research when he referred to the 
development of solid fuel and implied that it took place on a supra-bureau basis. University of 
Edinburgh, Department of Defence Studies Archive, (limited access only), file 7. 
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chronological parameters and an enhanced portfolio of bureaux as subjects of 
investigation would afford the opportunity to pursue such a comprehensive study of 
this nature. 
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Appendix A: Soviet Missile Designations 
Soviet 
Designation 
operational: technological: treaties: 
R-5M 8K51 
R~12 8K63 R-12 
R-12Y 8K63Y R~12 
R-14 8K65 R-14 
R~14Y 8K65Y R-14 
UR-lOO 8K84 
UR-100M 8K84M 
UR-100K 15A20 RS-IO 
UR-IOOY 15A20Y RS-IO 
RT~2 8K98 RS-12 
RT-2P 8K98P RS-12 
RT-15 8K96 
RT-20 8K99 
"Temp-2e" 15"zh"42 RS-14 
RSD-I0 lS"zh"45 RSD-lO 
[RSD-IO 15"zh"53 RSD-IO 
"Pioneer 'YTTXtl ') 
RT-2PM 15"zh"58 RS-12M 
Western 
Designation 
USAINATO: 
SS~3/Shyster675 
SS-4/Sandal 
" " 
SS-5/Skean 
" " 
SS-111Sego 
" " 
" " 
" " 
SS-13/Savage 
" " 
SS-14/Scapegoat 
SS-15/Scrooge 
SS-16/Sinner 
SS-20/Sabre 
SS-20 Mod.2/Sabre 
SS-25/Sickle 
The table above highlights the potential for confusion afforded by the plethora of 
terms used to identify Soviet missile systems. The mUltiplicity of Soviet designations 
675 Kolesnikov identified Korolev as the designer 
responsible for the SS-3. Previous accounts had attributed it to Yangel and had viewed it as having 
close developmental links with Yangel's subsequent SS-4 and SS-5. Kolesnikov, S.G. 1996. 
Strategicheskoe raketno-yadernoe uruzhie, Moscow: Arsenal Press, p.lI8. 
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provides testament to the obsession with preserving military data which so 
characterised the Soviet approach and led to a style of perennial reticence in their 
participation in SALT. The operational code was applied to a given system during its 
development, production and subsequent deployment and was the principal means of 
system identification within the Soviet military. The technological code was by 
contrast classified and was known only to a select few. The treaty designation was 
formulated specifically for use in arms control negotiations with the US,676 apparently 
to minimise the perceived risk of compromising the integrity of classified Soviet 
information.677 Thus the absence of such a term in the table above indicates that the 
system in question was not contained within the auspices of SALT or subsequent arms 
control negotiations thus indicating its failure to reach final deployment or its 
decommissioning prior to the initiation of the negotiating process. To add still more 
complexity some Soviet systems were also named, the SS-20 for example was termed 
Pioneer in such parlance. 
Western practice did little to minimise the complexity of terminology. NATO chose 
to designate each Soviet system with an individual codename, starting without 
exception in the case of ballistic missiles, with the letter "S. ,,678 The US employed an 
alphanumeric code where the first letter referred to the launch environment, the 
second to its designated target,679 followed by a number referring to the order of this 
in the sequence of all similar missiles known to have been developed.680 For the 
676 Savel'yev, A.G. & Detinov, N.N. 1995. The Big Five: Arms Control Decisionmaldng in the Soviet 
Union. Westport, Ct.: Praeger, pp.51-2. 
677 Many Soviet tracts sought to avoid potential mishap through the use of the convoluted style "the 
system known to the Americans as ... " when discussing Soviet missile systems. These careful 
preparations were to no avail however when Brezhnev let slip the name of the Typhoon SLBM 
system during negotiations with the US. 
678 The SS-20 was known as Sabre according to NATO designation. 
679 Thus any code which took the form "S8-.. " indicated a missile fired from the surface and intended 
to strike a surface target. 
680 The insertion of "X" within its designation indicated its prototype status, an "N" identified a naval 
system. Modular upgrades were a common feature of 80viet weaponry production and were 
indentified by the US by "Mod. I," etc. 
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purposes of ease of recognition, the US system of designation has been adopted as the 
norm during the course of this study. This seemed most fitting as it was in this guise 
that this particular missile system's reputation grew to take on such fame and 
notoriety. 
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Appendix B: The Defence Decisionmaking Process 
The Ministries of the Defence Industry. 
Most Soviet weapons were produced in one of the nine ministries whose output was 
ahnost exclusively devoted to the production of military equipment.681 They were 
controlled by the VPK and their activities were supervised by the Defence Production 
Department of the Central Committee Secretariat. 682 
Medium Machine Building:683 
General Machine Building:684 
Defence Industry:685 
Machine Building: 
Aviation Industry: 
nuclear warheads and 
devices, uranium 
mining and processing, 
lasers. 
strategic and cruise 
missiles, rockets and 
space vehicles, SLBM 
fire-contro 1 systems. 
. I . il 686 tactlca truss es, 
ground forces 
equipment - armoured 
vehicles, artillery, 
small-arms, optical 
equipment, SAMs, ASW 
missiles. 
conventional 
ammunition, explosives 
and explosive fuses. 
military and civilian 
fixed-wing aircraft 
and helicopters. 
681 In addition a number of "civilian" ministries also contributed to military equipment production, 
most notably the ministries for car and tractor, chemical and instrument production. Alexander, 
A.J., 1970, R&D in Soviet Aviation, Santa Monica, Cal.: RAND, p.22. 
682 For a detailed account of the evolution of the Soviet defence sector, see McDonnell, J. "The Soviet 
Defence Industry as a Pressure Group", in MccGwire M., Booth, K. and McDonnell, J. (eds.) 1975. 
Soviet Naval Policy; Objectives and Constraints. New York: Praeger Publishers, pp.87-122; 
Holloway, D. "The Soviet Union," in Ball, N. and Leitenberg, M. (eds.) 1983. The Structure of the 
Defence Industry; An International Survey. London: Croom Helm, pp.51-80. For details ofthe 
Central Committee Defence Industry Department, see Wells, D. & Miller, J., 1993. A Directory of 
Heads and Deputy Heads ofCPSU Central Committees, 1952-91, Lorton Paper, no.8. Manchester: 
Lorton House, pp.12-13. 
6&3 Minsredmash . 
684 Minobshchemash. 
685 Minoboronprom. 
686 As the Nadiradze Bureau initially designed only missiles of a tactical range it too was included 
under the auspices of Minoboronprom. When the Bureau transferred its attentions to the design of 
strategic systems it remained within this Ministry. 
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Shipbuilding Industry: 
Electronics Industry: 
Radio Industry: 
Communications Equipment 
Industry: 
military and civilian 
ships. 
computers and 
electronic components. 
radar and radio 
equipment and guidance 
and control systems. 
radio, telephone and 
telegraph communicat-
ions, satellite com-
munication systems. 
The ministries possessed a shared institutional framework led by a designated minister 
who was supported by a team of six to eight deputy ministers who oversaw the 
functions of programme development and production. The collegium of the ministry 
encompassed its highest ranking officials and served as the forum for the 
consideration of the principal issues pertaining to the work of the ministry. Ministerial 
departments were delegated the tasks of overseeing administrative questions of 
project planning, finance, availability of resources and quality assurance. A Scientific 
and Technical Council would draw together leading designers, scientists and engineers 
in the ministry's field of specialisation and would seek to formulate the technical 
parameters of the ministry's development plans and the feasibility of project proposals 
presented before it. 
The Ministry of Medium Machinebuilding (Minsredmash) was established in 1953 and 
from its inception it played a key role in the Soviet Union's development of nuclear 
weapons.687 Minsredmash was headed by the veteran E.P. Slavsky and was 
responsible for the entire process of production of nuclear warheads from the mining 
of the uranium ore to the final manufacture of the devices themselves. Minsredmash 
was joined from 1965 in the production of Soviet nuclear weapons by the Ministry of 
General Machine Building (Minobshchemash) and the Ministry of the Defence 
Industry (Minoboronprom). Agursky characterised the creation of the Ministry of 
687 Prior to this, the nuclear programme was overseen by the First Main Administration of the USSR 
Council of Ministers under Beria's leadership. 
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General Machinebuilding in 1965 as predicated by "bureaucratic-political" factors as 
Ustinov sought to consolidate his new-found powers.688 The creation of 
Minoboronprom signalled the removal of missiles from the authority of the State 
Committee on Aviation. Minoboronprom was responsible for the development and 
manufacture of ballistic missiles and space-launch vehicles. Four departments within 
the new ministry played a key role in the future development and production of Soviet 
missiles. The Central Design Office was responsible for allocating new orders to the 
four main design bureaux, whose work was overseen by the Central Missile Engine 
Design Office, the Missile Engine Design Bureau and the Central Guidance 
Development Office. The Central Construction Office was charged with the 
construction of launch control sites and silos. According to the US Department of 
Defence Minoboronprom encompassed more than twenty plants dedicated solely to 
the production of missile systems and supported by a host of satellite factories 
supplying requisite components.689 A number of research institutes were also 
encompassed within Minoboronprom although detailed information on their form and 
activities was sparse. 690 
688 Agursky, M. "Nauchno-issedovatel'skii institut tekhnologii Mashinostroeniya kak chast' 
sovetskogo voenno-promyshlennogo kompleksa", pp.32-44 cited in 1.A. McDonnell, "The Soviet 
Weapons Acquisition System", in Jones, D.R 1979. Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual, volume 3, 
Gulf Breeze: Academic International Programme. 
689 Soviet Military Power, p.97. 
690 Cooper, 1. in McLean, S. 1986. How Nuclear Weapons Decisions Are Made, London: Macmillan, 
p.18. 
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